Proposed Gaza Ceasefire Puts Netanyahu at a Crossroads That Could Shape His Legacy 

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks at a ceremony for the “Remembrance Day for the Fallen of Israel's Wars and Victims of Terrorism” at Yad LeBanim in Jerusalem, Israel, Sunday, May 12, 2024. (AP)
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks at a ceremony for the “Remembrance Day for the Fallen of Israel's Wars and Victims of Terrorism” at Yad LeBanim in Jerusalem, Israel, Sunday, May 12, 2024. (AP)
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Proposed Gaza Ceasefire Puts Netanyahu at a Crossroads That Could Shape His Legacy 

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks at a ceremony for the “Remembrance Day for the Fallen of Israel's Wars and Victims of Terrorism” at Yad LeBanim in Jerusalem, Israel, Sunday, May 12, 2024. (AP)
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks at a ceremony for the “Remembrance Day for the Fallen of Israel's Wars and Victims of Terrorism” at Yad LeBanim in Jerusalem, Israel, Sunday, May 12, 2024. (AP)

The ceasefire proposal announced by President Joe Biden has placed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at a crossroads, with either path likely to shape the legacy of Israel’s longest-serving and deeply divisive leader.

The proposal offers the possibility of ending Israel's war against Hamas, returning scores of hostages held by the armed group and quieting the northern border with Lebanon.

But it would also likely shatter Netanyahu’s governing coalition, potentially sending him into the opposition and making him more vulnerable to a conviction in his corruption trial. The full withdrawal of Israeli forces called for in the agreement could allow Hamas to claim victory and reconstitute itself.

Netanyahu’s rejection of the deal, on the other hand, could deepen Israel’s international isolation, worsen ties with an American administration eager to wind down the war and expose him to accusations of having abandoned the hostages to save his own skin.

It’s a conundrum, and that may explain the strange choreography of Biden’s Friday night address: An American president, announcing what he says is an Israeli proposal, during the Jewish sabbath, when Israel’s political class goes largely silent.

Netanyahu acknowledged the proposal, which has been shared with Hamas through mediators, but then appeared to contradict Biden’s remarks. He said Israel remains committed to dismantling Hamas’ military and governing capabilities and that any talk of a permanent ceasefire before then was a “nonstarter.”

On Monday, he said the destruction of Hamas is “part of the proposal” and was quoted as telling a closed parliamentary hearing that Israel reserves the right to return to war if its objectives are not met.

But it has never been clear what the destruction of Hamas entails or whether it's even possible. Biden said Israel had degraded Hamas to the point where it could no longer carry out an Oct. 7-style attack, and that that by continuing the war, Israel risked getting bogged down in Gaza.

But Netanyahu appears to be seeking a much bigger victory.

‘NETANYAHU’S ENDGAME IS TO SURVIVE’ Netanyahu’s critics fear he will reject any ceasefire to appease his ultranationalist governing partners, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir. They want to continue the war, fully reoccupy Gaza and rebuild Jewish settlements there.

They have already vowed to leave the government if the proposal announced by Biden comes to pass. Netanyahu’s political opponents have offered a safety net if he reaches a deal to release hostages but they are unlikely to help him stay in office long-term.

“Everything that Ben-Gvir and Smotrich demand or threaten to do, you see Netanyahu is very attentive to that,” said Tal Schneider, an Israeli political commentator. “Netanyahu’s endgame is to survive.”

Netanyahu’s current government, formed in late 2022 after five consecutive elections, is the most nationalist and religious in Israel’s history. Months before the war, it pushed policies that entrenched Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, deepened the ultra-Orthodox Jewish community’s reliance on state subsidies and set in motion an overhaul of the judicial system that tore the country apart.

The coalition initially had a slim majority of 64 seats in Israel’s 120-seat parliament - enough to govern but with a fragility that would keep Netanyahu’s fate tied to the whims of any of the smaller parties that form the government.

A VETERAN OF ‘DIFFICULT' POLITICS Shortly after Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack ignited the war in Gaza, Benny Gantz, a former military chief and a top political rival of Netanyahu, joined the government in a show of unity. Netanyahu, Gantz and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant formed a three-man War Cabinet to direct the offensive.

Mazal Mualem, a Netanyahu biographer, said that effort largely succeeded in sidelining the ultranationalists and allowing Netanyahu to govern in a more pragmatic mold that has defined his 17 years in office going back to the 1990s.

She pointed to Israel’s limited response to an aerial attack by Iran in April, which Ben-Gvir criticized as “weak,” and to a ceasefire and hostage release deal reached with Hamas in November that Smotrich had initially opposed but later voted for.

“Over the years, Bibi has taught himself to do what he wants to do in difficult political environments,” she said, referring to Netanyahu by his popular nickname.

But Gantz has threatened to quit the government unless Netanyahu lays out a postwar plan by June 8, which would leave him far more reliant on Smotrich and Ben-Gvir.

Netanyahu’s decision to press ahead with Israel’s massive military campaign in Gaza as scores of hostages languish in captivity has opened him up to fierce criticism from many Israelis, including families of the captives. Thousands have joined weekly mass protests.

“The government of Israel has given up on the hostages,” Yehi Yehud, who has an adult child being held hostage in Gaza, told Israeli Army Radio. “Bibi, you don’t have the permission or the moral validity to sacrifice them on the altar of your political survival.”

OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS Netanyahu’s hard-line stance has also weighed heavily on Israel’s relations with its closest ally, the United States, which has provided crucial military support but expressed exasperation with civilian casualties and the lack of any realistic Israeli postwar plans.

Internationally, it has exposed Israel to charges of genocide, which it denies, and a potential international arrest warrant against Netanyahu himself.

In his address on Friday, Biden appeared to be offering Netanyahu a way out: Claim victory by saying a battered Hamas can no longer mount an Oct. 7-style attack, bring all the hostages home and then work with the US and Arab nations to build a new regional security architecture.

But the fear of losing power could prevail.

Netanyahu has spent years nurturing an image that only he can lead Israel through its myriad diplomatic and security challenges. That legacy suffered a major blow on Oct. 7, with many Israelis directly blaming him for the most devastating security failure in the country’s history. Public opinion polls indicate that Netanyahu is trailing behind Gantz and would struggle to form a government if elections were held today.

For all their threats, his far-right allies are in a similar predicament. They would likely join him in the opposition if early elections are held, losing the power he has granted them over the Israeli police and settlement expansion in the occupied West Bank.

If Netanyahu can hold his coalition together until the next scheduled elections in 2026, he might be able to rehabilitate his image. His poll numbers have already started to climb from the depths they hit after Oct. 7 as he has presented himself as withstanding international pressure to end the war.

Aviv Bushinsky, a former Netanyahu adviser, said Netanyahu’s wartime decision-making has less to do with immediate political survival and more with securing a legacy that would not be entirely overshadowed by Oct. 7. That requires some kind of victory over Hamas.

“From a historical perspective, Netanyahu’s only option is to go all the way,” he said. Ben-Gvir and Smotrich “are helping him reach that destination, to keep his head above water.”



Iran in a Quarter Century: Clash Between the ‘Revolution’ and the State

An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)
An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)
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Iran in a Quarter Century: Clash Between the ‘Revolution’ and the State

An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)
An Iranian woman walks by the former US embassy in Tehran. (AFP)

For the past quarter century, Iran endured a bitter conflict between the ideological aspects of the “revolution” and the strategic view aimed at protecting the state and its interests in a changing world.

Despite hopes for radical change, attempts to achieve reform collided with resistance from the traditional centers of power, preventing real reconciliation between the contradiction in the principles of the “revolution” and the demands of national reforms, or at least achieving some form of sustainable agreement between these opposing movements.

Since 2000, Iran witnessed the election of five presidents with limited jurisdiction, and five parliamentary elections, which were dominated by either of the main reformist and conservative movements, amid the ongoing debate over the nature of rule, its agenda and priorities.

Since the 1979 revolution, the jurisdiction of the parliament and government has been fully under the control of the decision-making centers in the country, with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei at the top of the pyramid. The supreme leader enjoys almost absolute power, making him above all state institutions.

Meanwhile, the role of the military and political institutions, such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Guardian Council, expanded as they maintained their role in protecting the ideological principles of the ruling system. The system is based on a constitution that is in turn based on the Wilayat al-Faqih. These institutions are the main tools for preserving the identity of the “Islamic Republic” and bolstering its position that is hostile to the West.

Some 45 years after its “Islamic Revolution”, Iran has yet to reconcile the contradictions between its principles and national interests. (Getty Images)

Khatami and shift in the conflict

The beginning of the new millennium in Iran coincided with a decisive moment in reformist President Mohammed Khatami’s term (1997-2005). The period was marked with the intensification of the confrontation between the reformists and conservatives. The latter sought to obstruct reforms pursued by Khatami, especially in civil freedoms and freedom of expression.

The non-elected institutions that are under Khamenei’s direct supervision, such as the Guardian Council and judiciary, played a decisive role in obstructing reform measures, creating challenges for the reformists in achieving their political and social agendas.

Khatami’s term in office witnessed a major shift in the clash between the supporters of the ideology of the revolution and those calling for achieving strategic interests. He believed that the reforms were a strategic need to secure the continuity of the system of rule and its ability to adapt to internal and external changes. His critics, however, believed that his approach threatened the very foundations of the Wilayat al-Faqih.

Iran worked on improving its relations with the West and boosting its national identity through the Dialogue Among Civilizations, but the September 11, 2001, attacks and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 were a blow to these efforts.

Iran saw in the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime in neighboring Iraq an opportunity to expand its ideological influence through supporting groups that were affiliated with Iran or were established within its territory. The nuclear file also undermined the Dialogue Among Civilizations initiative and efforts to build trust with the West, thereby increasing Iran’s isolation and regional and international tensions.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guards played a main role in the nuclear program and regional wars. (Khamenei’s official website)

IRGC and the regional role

The IRGC played a main role in issues related to the nuclear program, internal developments and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq at the end of Khatami’s term.

In Afghanistan, the IRGC supported the United States in ousting the Taliban from power. In Iraq, the IRGC’s Quds Force led armed Iraqi factions in bolstering Iranian influence that persist to this day. Under General Qassem Soleimani’s leadership, the Quds Force also expanded its operations in Lebanon, helping establish a network that ran parallel to Iranian diplomacy in regional politics.

Iran felt threatened by the US’ bolstered military presence in the region, leading it to expand its security and strategic plans, starting with the nuclear and ballistic missiles programs.

In 2002, the discovery of secret nuclear facilities aroused suspicions among the international community about Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the possibility that it would pursue the production of a nuclear bomb. Amid the rising tensions, the West shifted its priorities towards Tehran to curbing its nuclear activities. Moreover, US officials, especially during President George W. Bush’s term, threatened on numerous occasions to use military force against Iran if it continued to pursue its nuclear ambitions.

Iran has bolstered its influence in the Middle East, stoking tensions with regional powers. (AP)

Nuclear file and internal tensions

The nuclear file has been a source of tension inside and outside Iran ever since. On the domestic level, it sparked debate about the country’s national priorities. The reformists sought to maintain Tehran’s international relations and ease tensions, while the conservatives clung on to their ideological principles.

In 2003, Tehran declared that it was voluntarily ending its uranium enrichment as part of the Amad Plan agreement reached with the European troika. In return, it received a pledge that the file would not be referred to the UN Security Council and that economic ties would be established with Europe. That same year, Iran heavily promoted Khamenei’s fatwa that barred the production, storing or use of nuclear weapons.

The US, however, remained suspicious of Iran’s intentions. It believed that agreements were not enough and it accused Iran of expanding its nuclear program, leading it to impose sanctions on its banks and energy sector. During the term of President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, it referred the program to the Security Council – a move that was welcomed by the international community. The move prompted Iran to adopt an aggressive policy against western powers.

Iran has never officially declared that it was developing nuclear weapons. In 2007, US intelligence released a report that said Tehran had stopped its nuclear weapons development in 2003, helping to soften the American position against it.

Throughout Ahmedinejad’s eight years in office, tensions rose with the West over the nuclear program. Tehran raised its level of uranium enrichment to 20 percent while the president insisted on his country’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology. In return, crippling sanctions were imposed on its nuclear program, oil exports and economy.

Khamenei meets with veterans from the Iraqi-Iranian war. (EPA)

Iran and the ‘Arab Spring’

On the foreign level, Iran aspired to bolster relations with Arab, African and Latin American countries. It also backed armed groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas.

With the eruption of the “Arab Spring” revolts, Iran sought to consolidate its influence in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, stoking tensions with regional powers and Arab countries. Supporting Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria was also a top priority for Ahmedinejad before he was succeeded by Hassan Rouhani.

On the domestic level, Iran went through a huge crisis after Ahmedinejad won the 2009 elections. The wave of “Green Movement” demonstrations erupted in protest against the elections results between Ahmedinejad, and reformist candidates Mir Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi.

After Ahmedinejad’s term ended, Iran tried to ease tensions with the West. It took part in nuclear negotiations aimed at managing tensions with the major powers. Two years of negotiations led to the 2015 nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), that suspended UN sanctions on Iran and lifted restrictions on its nuclear program.

The supreme leader played a pivotal role in the negotiations. He set red lines when it came to maintaining Iran’s right to uranium enrichment, lifting economic sanctions and refusing visits to military facilities by international inspectors.

Khamenei cautiously supported Rouhani’s negotiating team at the nuclear talks despite pressure from conservative movements. The negotiations struck a balance between ideology and strategic interests as Iran sought to maintain its “revolutionary” slogans, while adapting to international changes, confronting economic and security challenges and continuing to fund its regional activities to ensure that it remained a main player in the Middle East.

The IRGC continued to consolidate Iran’s influence in the region, especially in Syria and Iraq, and Khamenei threatened to expel American forces from the region. The tensions alarmed the American administration leading then President Donald Trump to pull Washington out of the nuclear deal in 2018.

Qassem Soleimani. (Tasnim)

Patience in handling pressure

In confronting Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign, including preventing Iran from selling oil, Tehran adopted a policy of “walking on the edge of the abyss” and of “strategic patience.” Regional tensions also spiked with the IRGC seizing oil tankers after Tehran threatened to block oil shipping lanes. Trump consequently designated the IRGC as terrorist.

Trump would also order the killing of Quds Forces commander Soleimani in Baghdad in January 2020. The move took Iranian-American tensions to a whole new level and threatened to spark a direct war between the two countries.

In a leaked 2021 recording, then foreign minister Mohammed Javad Zarif called for striking a balance between foreign policy and the policy on the field, a reference to the Quds Force that leads the IRGC’s foreign operations. The recordings exposed an internal rift between the ideological and pragmatic movements in Iran, with the latter wanting to achieve interests, such as the lifting of sanctions.

Zarif defended his conviction that diplomatic work relies on the situation on the ground and vice versa, meaning diplomacy can grant “international legitimacy” to achievements on the field.

When US President Joe Biden came to office, Khamenei used his influence to support the IRGC and showed limited leniency in managing tensions through new nuclear negotiations. Biden tried to return to the nuclear pact with Tehran, but Iran’s unprecedented nuclear measures adopted by conservative late President Ebrahim Raisi and Russia’s war on Ukraine thwarted diplomacy.

18 December 2024, Iran, Tehran: Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian speaks during the Cabinet meeting in Tehran. (Iranian Presidency/dpa)

Raisi and the ‘revolutionary government’

Under Raisi, Tehran pursued diplomacy at the negotiating table with the West, but the talks never made it to the finish line.

His term in office was cut short by his death in a helicopter crash in May 2024. His time in power was marked by loyalty to the supreme leader’s view of forming a “revolutionary government” and limiting state power to conservatives.

Raisi effectively followed in the same footsteps as Ahmedinejad: Tehran sought rapprochement with regional forces, while hoping to circumvent sanctions and speed up its nuclear activities.

Raisi was succeeded by Masoud Pezeshkian, who was backed reformists. He pledged to maintain the policy of turning to the east and bolstering relations with China and Russia. He also sought to lift sanctions on Iran by returning to nuclear negotiations.

On the regional level, Tehran’s “shadow war” with Israel came out to the open and the two sides traded direct blows. Following Raisi’s death, Iran continued to suffer more setbacks, notably the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and the weakening of Hezbollah and Hamas’ roles. These developments will weaken the IRGC’s regional role, but it could seek to compensate for its losses in other regions, even inside Iran itself.

Pezeshkian and internal reconciliation

Pezeshkian’s presidency is seen as an opportunity to achieve internal reconciliation in Iran at a critical time when the people are preoccupied with the issue of Khamenei’s successor. Iran is unlikely to introduce radical change to its relations with the West and Pezeshkian may be granted limited jurisdiction in the nuclear negotiations.

Soon after Trump’s re-election as president, Pezeshkian stressed the need to manage relations and the confrontation with the US. He said his government will follow the strategy of the ruling system.

Pezeshkian will likely receive the backing of the supreme leader and IRGC to reach a settlement that would ease pressure on Iran. This does not necessarily mean that Iran will be moving away from the edge of the abyss. On the contrary, it could reflect an attempt to widen the margin for maneuver amid the tensions with the West. Iran is expected to follow this approach in the near future or at least when the identity of the third supreme leader is revealed.