Mercenaries of the Libya War: Easily Lured Cannon Fodder that Are Later Discarded

Mercenaries of the Libya War: Easily Lured Cannon Fodder that Are Later Discarded
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Mercenaries of the Libya War: Easily Lured Cannon Fodder that Are Later Discarded

Mercenaries of the Libya War: Easily Lured Cannon Fodder that Are Later Discarded

“Do we complete our mission, make some money and return to Syria? Or will we be captured by Haftar’s forces and get killed? What if his forces seize Tripoli, which we came here to defend? What then?”

These are the thoughts that plagued a Syria fighter who took part in the Libyan war (2019-20) as part of a group of mercenaries brought by the former Government of National Accord (GNA) headed by Fayez al-Sarraj.

These groups are backed Türkiye and militias in western Libya and fought the forces of Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar, who had captured the eastern parts of the country and some regions in the South. Haftar also enjoys the support of several tribes in the east and is backed by Russia’s Wagner mercenary group.

Asharq Al-Awsat spoke with “Rami Abou Mohammed”, who hails from Syria’s northern Aleppo countryside, about the journey he started from Türkiye at the beginning of 2020. On board a Libyan Afriqiyah Airways flight, he was flown with hundreds of Syrian mercenaries from Istanbul to Mitiga International Airport in the Libyan capital Tripoli.

At that time, Tripoli had been fighting a nine-month offensive by Haftar’s Wagner-backed forces to seize the capital. Ankara brought in mercenaries from Syrian opposition factions, most notably the Sultan Murad Division that was formed in 2013 with a majority of Syrian Turkmen members.

After 14 months of fighting, Sarraj’s GNA fighters forced the LNA to withdraw from the outskirts of Tripoli.

Amid a rapidly changing international scene and the opening of new war fronts in Africa, alliances and priorities changed and Russia soon formed the so-called Africa Corps as an alternative to the Wagner group with the aim to expand its influence in five African countries, starting with Libya.

With its attention focused on countering western influence in Africa, the mercenaries brought in by both warring parties in Libya were left behind, either in camps, bases or tasked with carrying out special missions for militias in western Libya.

Initially, efforts were made by official military authorities to remove the mercenaries from Libya. The warring parties signed a ceasefire agreement in Geneva in October 2023 that called for their withdrawal, but that never happened. In early February 2021, the United Nations mission in Libya acknowledged that 20,000 foreign fighters were “occupying” several military bases in Libya. No official figures are available over their exact numbers, but it is likely that the number has dropped with the intensity of the conflict.

In this report, Asharq Al-Awsat traced how fighters from a number countries became embroiled in a war that is not their own for a various ideological and financial reasons and how several ended up detained in Libyan military bases, losing whatever power they had when at one point in the conflict they were instrumental in determining the battle.

Rami recalled how - at just 23 years of age - he embarked on a “terrifying” journey from Syria to Libya. He said he was “forced by difficult economic conditions” to fly to Libya despite knowing that he may end up being killed in the fighting. “The situation in Syria is very difficult and death is everywhere,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

From Hawar Kalas to the Abou Salim front

Mercenaries had flooded LNA- and GNA-controlled regions. Mercenaries were seen as a mighty force that local and foreign powers could rely on as they vied for control in Libya. Some of the mercenaries came from security companies and irregular armies.

Rami, who had never joined an armed faction before, recalled the journey from Syria to Libya. He said: “We were brought in from several regions in Syria. They recorded our names and then transported us from the town of Hawar Kalas to Türkiye's Gaziantep airport.” They were then flown to Istanbul on board a military plane and later taken to Mitiga airport on board an Afriqiyah Airways flight.

Sarraj had turned to military assistance from Türkiye during a visit to Ankara on December 26, 2019, as the LNA closed in on Tripoli. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan scrambled to send military experts, fighters and military gear, most notably drones.

“Before being sent to Tripoli, the Turkish forces sent us to camps on the border with Syria where we received training,” said Rami. He believed that the training was provided by the Turkish SADAT Defense company. They were flown to Tripoli upon completing the training.

SADAT Defense “is the first and the only Private Military Company in Türkiye, that internationally provides consultancy, military training and logistics services at the international defense and interior security sector,” reads its website.

It was founded, under the presidency of Brigadier General (Retired) Adnan Tanriverdi, by 23 officers and NCOs retired from various units of Turkish Armed Forces and began its activities by February2012.

It denies that it was still operating in Libya despite acknowledging that it had carried out projects there in 2013. To avoid legal sanctions, it had recently established services companies to act as a front for its activities in Libya. It also recruited on occasion military leaders of armed Syrian factions.

Two UN reports from 2021 and 2023 revealed that SADAT Defense had recruited 5,000 mercenaries in Syria to fight in Tripoli. It also accused Ankara of violating the arms embargo on Libya.

The reports sparked outrage after being published by Turkish journalist Saygi Ozturk in the opposition Sozcu newspaper. SADAT Defense asserted that the report findings were baseless.

Turkish academic Dr. Muhannad Hafizoglu explained to Asharq Al-Awsat how Ankara does not view the Syrians it sent to Libya as mercenaries. Rather, it believes that everyone sent to Libya through Turkish facilitations was either Turkish or had Turkish roots. Everyone sent to fight for Sarraj held the Turkish nationality, he added.

The Turkish Foreign Ministry rejected repeated requests by Asharq Al-Awsat for comment. The pro-Türkiye Syrian National Army also refused to make any statement.

Ahmed Hamade, a defector of the Syrian Army, said that Syrians who headed to Libya worked as translators, not fighters. The Turkish Foreign Ministry refused to comment on the claim.

Hamade added that several Syrians were lured by money to fight for the Wager Group. Moreover, he said that the dispatch of Syrian fighters to Libya or elsewhere was “inspired” by the arrival of Iranian militias, Russian fighters and Wagner members to prop up the regime of President Bashar al-Assad against the revolution. Wagner promptly joined the fight in Libya.

Doubts and fears swirled through Rami’s mind throughout the flight to Mitiga airport. He recalled the warnings of his family, who urged him against embarking on such a journey, but he said he was a bit comforted by being surrounded by hundreds of other Syrians like him. “Whatever happens to them will happen to me,” he added.

He had the opportunity during the flight to get to know the other fighters, estimated at about 200. He learned that some were members of various armed factions, such as the Glory Corps. They were received at Mitiga airport by men in civilian clothing and transported to the Ain Zara area, some 18 kms southeast of Tripoli. Ain Zara witnessed some of the fiercest fighting during the battle between GNA and LNA.

The exchange of mercenaries to and from Libya and Syria never ceased between June 2020 and November 2024, revealed Rami Abdulrahman, Director of the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

Abdulrahman told Asharq Al-Awsat that some 2,000 Syrians remain in Libya. SADAT Defense and Turkish intelligence still fly them to Libya and they also return others back to Syria.

In January, the Observatory said that over 7,000 Syrian mercenaries were in Tripoli, but they have since fled to North Africa or Europe. A former military official said that only the military parties in Libya know the real number of mercenaries that were brought in to fight.

At the beginning of the war in 2019, the fighters were paid around 1,500 dollars, while now they earn 500 dollars. A Turkish soldier, meanwhile, barely earned 150 dollars at the time.

Abu Salim front

Rami, the Syrian fighter, said the newly-recruited Syrians in Libya received instructions from the Libyans. They were also trained by officers from SADAT Defense. They received weapons training and learned about the geography of the region where they will be fighting the “enemy”.

“We received training on the use of weapons and limited combat missions for a week at the Ain Zara camp. We were then taken to the Abou Salim front where we fought Haftar’s forces. Several Syrian factions were there, including the Glory Corps and Al-Mutassim group,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He recalled that several of his fellow fighters were captured or killed at the front. However, he spoke of victory, saying: “We managed to liberate the Yarmuk camp from Haftar’s forces.” Members of the Sultan Murad Division took up camp there.

Unofficial sources said some 500 mercenaries were killed. The GNA’s Volcano of Rage Operation against the LNA waged fierce battles to capture the Yarmuk and al-Hamza positions south of Tripoli. They are now the most significant bases where Syrian mercenaries are deployed.

Chaos in Libya

The security chaos in Libya made it easy for several “armed groups” to enter the country. Some took up base on the southern border and others were called up to fight for one of the warring factions when the “battle for Tripoli” erupted.

Chadian National Salvation Movement (MSNT) leader Omar Al-Mahdi Bashara attested to the chaos of fighters as he was a rebel deployed to the Chadian-Libyan border for 20 years before returning to political life.

This partially explains why Chadian, Sudanese and other African fighters joined the conflict in Libya, he said.

Since the end of the war on Tripoli, little was announced about the fate of the mercenaries. One announcement said 300 Sudanese fighters were deported from Libya.

Amid such secrecy, head of the joint 5+5 joint military committee in the western region Ahmed Abou Shahma accused Libyan politicians of obstructing the withdrawal of the mercenaries. “Each party is clinging on to their mercenaries,” he said.

Claudia Gazzini, the International Crisis Group's Senior Analyst for Libya, told Asharq Al-Awsat that it is difficult to tally the number of mercenaries in Libya. It is essential to differentiate between special forces that were paid by the various parties and between foreign forces that are deployed there.

Libyan political analyst Ahmed Abu Argoub told Asharq Al-Awsat that the countries that sent their fighters and mercenaries to Libya are keen on maintaining the political vacuum in the country and feeding divisions. “They have no interest in seeing the rise of a Libyan state,” he explained.

Meanwhile, advisor at the Libyan Tribal Union (LTU) Khaled al-Ghweil threatened civil disobedience followed by military action should the mercenaries fail to peacefully leave the country. “Any mercenary found in the country would be a legitimate target,” he warned.

Bases on the coast

Alongside Ankara, Moscow is another source of mercenaries in Libya. It has used its presence in Libya to extend its influence in Africa through the Africa Corps.

Russian forces in Libya are nothing new, but Moscow has sought to bolster its presence after moving forces and military gear to eastern Libya, said a report by the All Eyes on Wagner group, raising concerns with the US and Europe.

The Polish Institute of International Affairs released a report, “Africa Corps - a New Iteration of Russia's Old Military Presence in Africa”, that examines how Russia’s presence in Libya shifted to focus on the whole of Africa.

It said that Wagner’s operations in Libya were impacted by the death of the group’s founder Yevgeny Prigozhin and Moscow eventually signed a military agreement with Haftar in September 2023.

The Europeans continue to be worried. Then EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell declared on August 25: “We should be worried about what’s happening in Africa. When I first came to Brussels, the French and Italians were in Libya. They weren’t always in harmony, but they were present. Today, there are no Europeans left in Libya – only Turks and Russians.”

“The bases along Libya’s coast are no longer European; they belong to Türkiye and Russia. This is not the Mediterranean order we envisioned,” he added.

Former ambassador and advisor at ESCWA Ibrahim Mousa Grada said the Wagner mercenary presence in Libya is more complicated than any other foreign armed presence in the country.

Their deployment in Libya is seen as a foothold for Russia in Africa from which it expanded its influence in the continent and which has become part of an open struggle for power between Moscow and Washington.

Grada told Asharq Al-Awsat that Wagner’s presence in Libya is connected to major countries that have intersecting interests, especially in the Mediterranean and Africa. Given Russia’s war on Ukraine and the situation in Sudan, their pullout from Libya will definitely come at a price.

The Global Security Review said on August 18 that Russia has expanded its influence in Libya and Africa. The March 2023 edition of the Africa Defense Forum (adf) magazine, issued by AFRICOM, said that some 2,000 Wagner fighters had settled in central Libya since the ceasefire. They continue to train soldiers deployed in the east and guard oilfields in the southeast.

In November, adf said weapons from Libya were being smuggled to “terrorist groups” in Nigeria. It claimed that several of these weapons were made in Russia and that they were brought to Libya by the Wagner group.

The majority of the Wagner fighters are deployed at “sovereign” locations under the control of the LNA. They are tasked with guarding oilfields and ports in the central region known as the “oil crescent”.

Witnesses told Asharq Al-Awsat that Wagner fighters have been noticably active in the vicinity of Sirte city, some 450 kms from Tripoli. They noted their movement between the Ghardabiya Airbase, its naval port and the Al-Jufra Airbase. Members of the group were also spotted at the Brak base, 700 kms south of Tripoli.

Russia's ambassador to Libya Haider Aganin dismissed concerns over the Wagner group. In televised remarks on May 13, he accused western countries of stoking suspicions against the group.

Prisons and drugs

Another Syrian fighter brought in from Aleppo told Asharq Al-Awsat about his “deadly” experience in Libya.

“As soon as we arrived in Tripoli, we were turned over to a military leader who took us to the Sog Al-Khamis camp. No one was allowed to speak out against him or he would be detained,” said “Monzer Abou Khaled”.

Abou Khaled is still in Tripoli and has not been able to return to Syria. “Thousands of fighters are in the Kamis camp,” he added. They don’t allow us to stray far from the camp. We are in a prison. Some fighters have been here for two and three years. They can’t return to Syria and they aren’t receiving their salaries. They are given little food and drink, while the commanders enjoy plenty.”

“They have taken most of our salaries. Before heading to Libya, we reached an agreement to be paid 1,800 dollars a month, but they have only given us 500 dollars,” he revealed.

Asharq Al-Awsat learned that during that time, members of the Sultan Murad faction had arrested some 20 fighters in the Yarmuk camp for “refusing to hand over half of their financial earnings.”

Rami said the fighters were exploited and tempted by money. He spoke of drug smuggling and how their salaries were cut. “The leaders of the factions are profiting off of the fighters. They are trading weapons and smuggling drugs,” he stated.

He explained that the leaders ply the fighters with drugs so that they can be easily manipulated. They also smuggle drugs in Tripoli.

He described 2024 as the worst year for Syrian fighters because thousands of them have been prevented from leaving the city.

Return to Aleppo countryside

Rami left Tripoli after two years of fighting in southern Tripoli and time spent in Ain Zara. He returned to the Aleppo countryside, leaving behind colleagues who are still held in camps in western Libya.

He may have “survived death”, but painful memories still haunt him. “Several of our colleagues were killed in fighting. Others were lost at sea after they fled the camps and sought to escape to Europe,” he revealed.

When the war ended, several thousand mercenaries in Tripoli complained about not being paid or about salary cuts, prompting them to protest in the streets as seen in videos circulated on social media.

Observatory Director Abdulrahman told Asharq Al-Awsat that a “large number” of the mercenaries fled their camps in Tripoli. He did not specify the exact number, but said they escaped to various Libyan regions to seek work and other headed to Europe.

In September 2023, the Observatory said some 3,000 Syrian mercenaries had fled military bases in Libya and headed to Europe.

Expulsion

As alliances and balances changed in the past four years, so did the Libyans’ view of the mercenaries. They are now seen as pariahs and are unwanted in the country.

The hatred against them was on full display when dozens of Libyans protested in front of the military academy in Tripoli in August 2023 to demand the expulsion of the mercenaries who were present in the facility. The protesters managed to storm the academy and set vehicles on fire and chanted slogans demanding the expulsion of the fighters.

Al-Saady Radwan told Asharq Al-Awsat: “We had previously given them a deadline to leave Libya and they did not. Either the military agencies take action or we will take them by surprise and expel them.”

He also accused the Government of National Unity, headed by Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah, of “giving them funds from the state treasury.”

The Russian mercenaries are viewed with the same hatred.

UN Security Council President Pedro Comissário Afonso had recently urged the withdrawal of all foreign forces, fighters and mercenaries from Libya, saying it has become a pressing need.

From Libya to Togo

Libya is not the only place the Syrian mercenaries were recruited to fight. The conflicts across Africa have turned Libya into a “crossing” point for new mercenaries.

A Syrian, who spoke on condition of anonymity, revealed that the Sultan Murad Division had recruited his 17-year-old brother to head to Libya over the summer and from there, he was taken to Togo to fight.

“He spoke to us from a telephone line that appeared to be from Togo. We don’t really know if he is actually there. We don’t know what to do,” the Syrian told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Sudanese on the front

The war may be over, but the tragedies do not end. Every fighter has a story to tell.

Two Sudanese brothers were recruited to join the fight. One fought for the Tripoli forces and the other for the LNA.

In December 2023, Asharq Al-Awsat contacted their family to inquire about them. It learned that the older son’s fate remains unknown, while the other managed to flee Libya through Chad and he is now in El-Fasher in Sudan.

The family fled the war in Sudan to Egypt. Asharq Al-Awsat met with the mother who revealed that the family had not been in contact with the brothers for three years.

At one point they learned that one was in Tripoli. “They abducted one and misled the other. We gained nothing from this,” she lamented.

The older brother didn’t even know that his brother had been recruited to fight for the LNA. The brothers never faced each other in battle and the family never informed them that they had been recruited to fight for the rival parties.

“We informed the younger son when he returned to us from Chad in late 2022,” said the mother, who called herself “Umm Bashir.”

She showed Asharq Al-Awsat a video of her older son in Tripoli. His leg has been amputated, and the Tripoli militias are holding him at an arms depot.

“He is 27 years old now. He told us that his leg was amputated after a bullet lodged in his leg was left untreated for two months,” she said tearfully. The family has since lost contact with him.

The family had contacted several parties in Tripoli, including the former GNA, to inquire about him, without reply.

When the war in Sudan erupted in April 2023, mercenaries who had fought for Haftar and Sarraj returned home. The family rushed to learn anything about their son. They were told that he was last seen in Sabratha city, 70 kms west of Tripoli. He is believed to have drowned while attempting to flee to Europe by boat.



Ethiopia Builds Secret Camp to Train Sudan RSF Fighters 

Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
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Ethiopia Builds Secret Camp to Train Sudan RSF Fighters 

Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)
Satellite imagery shows new construction and drone support infrastructure at Asosa airport in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 28, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

Ethiopia is hosting a secret camp to train thousands of fighters for the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in neighboring Sudan, Reuters reporting has found, in the latest sign that one of the world’s deadliest conflicts is sucking in regional powers from Africa and the Middle East.

The camp is the first direct evidence of Ethiopia’s involvement in Sudan’s civil war, marking a potentially dangerous development that provides the RSF a substantial supply of fresh soldiers as fighting escalates in Sudan’s south.

Eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, said the United Arab Emirates financed the camp’s construction and provided military trainers and logistical support to the site, a view also shared in an internal note by Ethiopia’s security services and in a diplomatic cable, reviewed by Reuters.

The news agency could not independently verify UAE involvement in the project or the purpose of the camp. In response to a request for comment, the UAE foreign ministry said it was not a party to the conflict or “in any way” involved in the hostilities.

Reuters spoke to 15 sources familiar with the camp's construction and operations, including Ethiopian officials and diplomats, and analyzed satellite imagery of the area. Two Ethiopian intelligence officials and the satellite images provided information that corroborated details contained in the security memo and cable.

The location and scale of the camp and the detailed allegations of the UAE’s involvement have not been previously reported. The images show the extent of the new development, as recently as in the past few weeks, along with construction for a drone ground control station at a nearby airport.

Satellite imagery shows a camp with hundreds of tents in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 22, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

Activity picked up in October at the camp, which is located in the remote western region of Benishangul-Gumuz, near the border with Sudan, satellite images show.

Ethiopia’s government spokesperson, its army and the RSF did not respond to detailed requests for comment about the findings of this story.

On January 6, UAE and Ethiopia issued a joint statement that included a call for a ceasefire in Sudan, as well as celebrating ties they said served the defense of each other’s security.

The Sudanese Armed Forces did not respond to a request for comment.

As of early January, 4,300 RSF fighters were undergoing military training at the site and “their logistical and military supplies are being provided by the UAE,” the note by Ethiopia’s security services seen by Reuters read.

Sudan's army has previously accused the UAE of supplying the RSF with weapons, a claim UN experts and US lawmakers have found credible.

The camp’s recruits are mainly Ethiopians, but citizens from South Sudan and Sudan, including from the SPLM-N, a Sudanese rebel group that controls territory in Sudan’s neighboring Blue Nile state, are also present, six officials said.

Reuters was unable to independently establish who was at the camp or the terms or conditions of recruitment.

A senior leader of the SPLM-N, who declined to be named, denied his forces had a presence in Ethiopia.

The six officials said the recruits are expected to join the RSF battling Sudanese soldiers in Blue Nile, which has emerged as a front in the struggle for control of Sudan. Two of the officials said hundreds had already crossed in recent weeks to support the paramilitaries in Blue Nile.

The internal security note said General Getachew Gudina, the Chief of the Defense Intelligence Department of the Ethiopian National Defense Force, was responsible for setting up the camp. A senior Ethiopian government official as well as four diplomatic and security sources confirmed Getachew’s role in launching the project.

Getachew did not respond to a request for comment.

The camp was carved out of forested land in a district called Menge, about 32 km from the border and strategically located at the intersection of the two countries and South Sudan, according to the satellite imagery and the diplomatic cable.

The first sign of activity in the area began in April, with forest clearing and the construction of metal-roofed buildings in a small area to the north of what is now the area of the camp with tents, where work began in the second half of October.

Satellite imagery shows a forested area where, ten months later, a camp with hundreds of tents was built in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, December 15, 2024. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

The diplomatic cable, dated November, described the camp as having a capacity of up to 10,000 fighters, saying activity began in October with the arrival of dozens of Land Cruisers, heavy trucks, RSF units and UAE trainers. Reuters is not revealing the country that wrote the cable, to protect the source.

Two of the officials described seeing trucks with the logo of the Emirati logistics company Gorica Group heading through the town of Asosa and towards the camp in October. Gorica did not respond to a request for comment.

The news agency was able to match elements of the timeframe specified in the diplomatic cable with satellite imagery. Images from Airbus Defense and Space show that after the initial clearing work, tents began filling the area from early November. Multiple diggers are visible in the imagery.

An image taken by US space technology firm Vantor on November 24 shows more than 640 tents at the camp, approximately four meters square. Each tent could comfortably house four people with some individual equipment, so the camp could accommodate at least 2,500 people, according to an analysis of the satellite imagery by defense intelligence company Janes.

Janes said it could not confirm the site was military based on their analysis of the imagery.

New recruits were spotted travelling to the camp in mid-November, two senior military officials said.

Satellite imagery shows an area where trucks come and go at a camp in Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia, January 22, 2026. (Vantor/Handout via Reuters)

On November 17, a column of 56 trucks packed with trainees rumbled through dirt roads of the remote region, the officials, who witnessed the convoys, told Reuters, with each truck holding between 50 and 60 fighters, the officials estimated.

Two days later, both officials saw another convoy of 70 trucks carrying soldiers driving in the same direction, they said.

The November 24 image shows at least 18 large trucks at the site. The vehicles’ size, shape and design match those of models frequently used by the Ethiopian military and its allies to transport soldiers, according to Reuters analysis.

Development continued in late January, the Vantor images show, including new clearing and digging in the riverbed just north of the main camp and dozens of shipping containers lined around the camp visible in a January 22 image. A senior Ethiopian government official said construction on the camp was ongoing but did not elaborate on future building plans.

Sudan’s civil war erupted in 2023 after a power struggle between the Sudanese army and the RSF ahead of a planned transition to civilian rule.


Gaza Girls Take Up Boxing to Heal War’s Scars

Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
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Gaza Girls Take Up Boxing to Heal War’s Scars

Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)
Palestinian girls and young women attend a boxing training session between displacement tents in Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip, on February 9, 2026. (AFP)

In a makeshift boxing ring etched into the sand between the tens of displaced Palestinians in southern Gaza, a dozen young girls warmed up before delivering fierce blows at their coach's command.

Osama Ayub once ran a boxing club in Gaza City, in the north of the Palestinian territory, until it was destroyed in a strike along with his home during the war between Israel and Hamas.

After finding shelter in the southern city of Khan Younis, he opted to put his sporting skills at the service of displaced Gazans, crammed by the tens of thousands in tents and makeshift shelters.

"We decided to work inside the camp to offer the girls some psychological relief from the war", Ayub told AFP.

Behind him, some of the young athletes faced each other in the ring surrounded by cheering gymmates, while others trained on a punching bag.

"The girls have been affected by the war and the bombardments; some have lost their families or loved ones. They feel pain and want to release it, so they have found in boxing a way to express their emotions," said Ayub.

Ayub now runs these free training sessions for 45 boxers aged between 8 and 19 three times a week, with positive feedback from his students as well as from the community.

One of the youngsters, Ghazal Radwan, aged 14, hopes to become a champion and represent her country.

"I practice boxing to develop my character, release pent-up energy and to become a champion in the future, compete against world champions in other countries, and raise the Palestinian flag around the world", she told AFP.

- Call for aid -

One after the other, the girls trained with Ayub, shifting from right to left jabs, hooks and uppercuts at his command.

In war-devastated Gaza, where construction materials are scarce, Ayub had to improvise to build his small training facility.

"We brought wood and built a square boxing ring, but there are no mats or safety measures," he said.

He called on the international community to support the boxers and help them travel abroad to train, "to strengthen their confidence and offer them psychological support".

The strict blockade that Israel imposed on the Gaza Strip makes the reconstruction of sports facilities particularly complicated, as building materials are routinely rejected by Israeli officials.

The official Palestinian news agency Wafa reported in January that a shipment of artificial turf donated by China to Gaza's youth and sports council was not allowed in by Israel.

With medicine, food and fuel all in short supply, sports equipment comes much lower on the list of items entering the Palestinian territory.

Rimas, a 16-year-old boxer, said she and her friends continued "to practice boxing despite the war, the bombardments and the destruction".

"We, the girls who box, hope for your support, that you will bring us gloves and shoes. We train on sand and need mats and punching bags," she said in comments addressed to the international community.


Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
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Is Iran Pushing Houthis Toward Military Action Against Washington?

Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 
Houthis continue mobilization, fundraising, and declare combat readiness (AP) 

As US military movements intensify in the Middle East and the possibility of strikes on Iran looms, Yemen’s Houthi group has continued military preparations, mobilizing fighters and establishing new weapons sites.

The Houthi mobilization comes at a time when the group is widely viewed as one of Iran’s most important regional arms for retaliation.

Although the Iran-backed group has not issued any official statement declaring its position on a potential US attack on Iran, its leaders have warned Washington against any military action and against bearing full responsibility for any escalation and its consequences.

They have hinted that any response would be handled in accordance with the group’s senior leadership's assessment, after evaluating developments and potential repercussions.

Despite these signals, some interpret the Houthis’ stance as an attempt to avoid drawing the attention of the current US administration, led by President Donald Trump, to the need for preemptive action in anticipation of a potential Houthi response.

The Trump administration previously launched a military campaign against the group in the spring of last year, inflicting heavy losses.

Islam al-Mansi, an Egyptian researcher specializing in Iranian affairs, said Iran may avoid burning all its cards unless absolutely necessary, particularly given US threats to raise the level of escalation should any Iranian military proxies intervene or take part in a confrontation.

Iran did not resort to using its military proxies during its confrontation with Israel or during a limited US strike last summer because it did not perceive an existential threat, al-Mansi said.

That calculation could change in the anticipated confrontation, potentially prompting Houthi intervention, including targeting US allies, interests, and military forces, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Al-Mansi added that although Iran previously offered, within a negotiating framework, to abandon its regional proxies, including the Houthis, this makes it more likely that Tehran would use them in retaliation, noting that Iran created these groups to defend its territory from afar.

Many intelligence reports suggest that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has discussed with the Houthis the activation of alternative support arenas in a potential US-Iran confrontation, including the use of cells and weapons not previously deployed.

Visible readiness

In recent days, Chinese media outlets cited an unnamed Houthi military commander as saying the group had raised its alert level and carried out inspections of missile launch platforms in several areas across Yemen, including the strategically important Red Sea region.

In this context, Yemeni political researcher Salah Ali Salah said the Houthis would participate in defending Iran against any US attacks, citing the group’s media rhetoric accompanying mass rallies, which openly supports Iran’s right to defend itself.

While this rhetoric maintains some ambiguity regarding Iran, it repeatedly invokes the war in Gaza and renews Houthi pledges to resume military escalation in defense of the besieged enclave’s population, Salah told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He noted that Iran would not have shared advanced and sophisticated military technologies with the Houthis without a high degree of trust in their ability to use them in Iran’s interest.

In recent months, following Israeli strikes on the unrecognized Houthi government and several of its leaders, hardline Houthi figures demonstrating strong loyalty to Iran have become more prominent.

On the ground, the group has established new military sites and moved equipment and weapons to new locations along and near the coast, alongside the potential use of security cells beyond Yemen’s borders.

Salah said that if the threat of a military strike on Iran escalates, the Iranian response could take a more advanced form, potentially including efforts to close strategic waterways, placing the Bab al-Mandab Strait within the Houthis’ target range.

Many observers have expressed concern that the Houthis may have transferred fighters and intelligence cells outside Yemen over recent years to target US and Western interests in the region.

Open options

After a ceasefire was declared in Gaza, the Houthis lost one of their key justifications for mobilizing fighters and collecting funds. The group has since faced growing public anger over its practices and worsening humanitarian conditions, responding with media messaging aimed at convincing audiences that the battle is not over and that further rounds lie ahead.

Alongside weekly rallies in areas under their control in support of Gaza, the Houthis have carried out attacks on front lines with Yemen’s internationally recognized government, particularly in Taiz province.

Some military experts describe these incidents as probing attacks, while others see them as attempts to divert attention from other activities.

In this context, Walid al-Abara, head of the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, said the Houthis entered a critical phase after the Gaza war ended, having lost one of the main justifications for their attacks on Red Sea shipping.

As a result, they may seek to manufacture new pretexts, including claims of sanctions imposed against them, to maintain media momentum and their regional role.

Al-Abara told Asharq Al-Awsat that the group has two other options. The first is redirecting its activity inward to strengthen its military and economic leverage, either to impose its conditions in any future settlement or to consolidate power.

The second is yielding to international and regional pressure and entering a negotiation track, particularly if sanctions intensify or its economic and military capacity declines.

According to an assessment by the Yemen and Gulf Studies Center, widespread protests in Iran are increasingly pressuring the regime’s ability to manage its regional influence at the same pace as before, without dismantling its network of proxies.

This reality is pushing Tehran toward a more cautious approach, governed by domestic priorities and cost-benefit calculations, while maintaining a minimum level of external influence without broad escalation.

Within this framework, al-Abara said Iran is likely to maintain a controlled continuity in its relationship with the Houthis through selective support that ensures the group remains effective.

However, an expansion of protests or a direct military strike on Iran could open the door to a deeper Houthi repositioning, including broader political and security concessions in exchange for regional guarantees.