Mercenaries of the Libya War: Easily Lured Cannon Fodder that Are Later Discarded

Mercenaries of the Libya War: Easily Lured Cannon Fodder that Are Later Discarded
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Mercenaries of the Libya War: Easily Lured Cannon Fodder that Are Later Discarded

Mercenaries of the Libya War: Easily Lured Cannon Fodder that Are Later Discarded

“Do we complete our mission, make some money and return to Syria? Or will we be captured by Haftar’s forces and get killed? What if his forces seize Tripoli, which we came here to defend? What then?”

These are the thoughts that plagued a Syria fighter who took part in the Libyan war (2019-20) as part of a group of mercenaries brought by the former Government of National Accord (GNA) headed by Fayez al-Sarraj.

These groups are backed Türkiye and militias in western Libya and fought the forces of Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar, who had captured the eastern parts of the country and some regions in the South. Haftar also enjoys the support of several tribes in the east and is backed by Russia’s Wagner mercenary group.

Asharq Al-Awsat spoke with “Rami Abou Mohammed”, who hails from Syria’s northern Aleppo countryside, about the journey he started from Türkiye at the beginning of 2020. On board a Libyan Afriqiyah Airways flight, he was flown with hundreds of Syrian mercenaries from Istanbul to Mitiga International Airport in the Libyan capital Tripoli.

At that time, Tripoli had been fighting a nine-month offensive by Haftar’s Wagner-backed forces to seize the capital. Ankara brought in mercenaries from Syrian opposition factions, most notably the Sultan Murad Division that was formed in 2013 with a majority of Syrian Turkmen members.

After 14 months of fighting, Sarraj’s GNA fighters forced the LNA to withdraw from the outskirts of Tripoli.

Amid a rapidly changing international scene and the opening of new war fronts in Africa, alliances and priorities changed and Russia soon formed the so-called Africa Corps as an alternative to the Wagner group with the aim to expand its influence in five African countries, starting with Libya.

With its attention focused on countering western influence in Africa, the mercenaries brought in by both warring parties in Libya were left behind, either in camps, bases or tasked with carrying out special missions for militias in western Libya.

Initially, efforts were made by official military authorities to remove the mercenaries from Libya. The warring parties signed a ceasefire agreement in Geneva in October 2023 that called for their withdrawal, but that never happened. In early February 2021, the United Nations mission in Libya acknowledged that 20,000 foreign fighters were “occupying” several military bases in Libya. No official figures are available over their exact numbers, but it is likely that the number has dropped with the intensity of the conflict.

In this report, Asharq Al-Awsat traced how fighters from a number countries became embroiled in a war that is not their own for a various ideological and financial reasons and how several ended up detained in Libyan military bases, losing whatever power they had when at one point in the conflict they were instrumental in determining the battle.

Rami recalled how - at just 23 years of age - he embarked on a “terrifying” journey from Syria to Libya. He said he was “forced by difficult economic conditions” to fly to Libya despite knowing that he may end up being killed in the fighting. “The situation in Syria is very difficult and death is everywhere,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

From Hawar Kalas to the Abou Salim front

Mercenaries had flooded LNA- and GNA-controlled regions. Mercenaries were seen as a mighty force that local and foreign powers could rely on as they vied for control in Libya. Some of the mercenaries came from security companies and irregular armies.

Rami, who had never joined an armed faction before, recalled the journey from Syria to Libya. He said: “We were brought in from several regions in Syria. They recorded our names and then transported us from the town of Hawar Kalas to Türkiye's Gaziantep airport.” They were then flown to Istanbul on board a military plane and later taken to Mitiga airport on board an Afriqiyah Airways flight.

Sarraj had turned to military assistance from Türkiye during a visit to Ankara on December 26, 2019, as the LNA closed in on Tripoli. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan scrambled to send military experts, fighters and military gear, most notably drones.

“Before being sent to Tripoli, the Turkish forces sent us to camps on the border with Syria where we received training,” said Rami. He believed that the training was provided by the Turkish SADAT Defense company. They were flown to Tripoli upon completing the training.

SADAT Defense “is the first and the only Private Military Company in Türkiye, that internationally provides consultancy, military training and logistics services at the international defense and interior security sector,” reads its website.

It was founded, under the presidency of Brigadier General (Retired) Adnan Tanriverdi, by 23 officers and NCOs retired from various units of Turkish Armed Forces and began its activities by February2012.

It denies that it was still operating in Libya despite acknowledging that it had carried out projects there in 2013. To avoid legal sanctions, it had recently established services companies to act as a front for its activities in Libya. It also recruited on occasion military leaders of armed Syrian factions.

Two UN reports from 2021 and 2023 revealed that SADAT Defense had recruited 5,000 mercenaries in Syria to fight in Tripoli. It also accused Ankara of violating the arms embargo on Libya.

The reports sparked outrage after being published by Turkish journalist Saygi Ozturk in the opposition Sozcu newspaper. SADAT Defense asserted that the report findings were baseless.

Turkish academic Dr. Muhannad Hafizoglu explained to Asharq Al-Awsat how Ankara does not view the Syrians it sent to Libya as mercenaries. Rather, it believes that everyone sent to Libya through Turkish facilitations was either Turkish or had Turkish roots. Everyone sent to fight for Sarraj held the Turkish nationality, he added.

The Turkish Foreign Ministry rejected repeated requests by Asharq Al-Awsat for comment. The pro-Türkiye Syrian National Army also refused to make any statement.

Ahmed Hamade, a defector of the Syrian Army, said that Syrians who headed to Libya worked as translators, not fighters. The Turkish Foreign Ministry refused to comment on the claim.

Hamade added that several Syrians were lured by money to fight for the Wager Group. Moreover, he said that the dispatch of Syrian fighters to Libya or elsewhere was “inspired” by the arrival of Iranian militias, Russian fighters and Wagner members to prop up the regime of President Bashar al-Assad against the revolution. Wagner promptly joined the fight in Libya.

Doubts and fears swirled through Rami’s mind throughout the flight to Mitiga airport. He recalled the warnings of his family, who urged him against embarking on such a journey, but he said he was a bit comforted by being surrounded by hundreds of other Syrians like him. “Whatever happens to them will happen to me,” he added.

He had the opportunity during the flight to get to know the other fighters, estimated at about 200. He learned that some were members of various armed factions, such as the Glory Corps. They were received at Mitiga airport by men in civilian clothing and transported to the Ain Zara area, some 18 kms southeast of Tripoli. Ain Zara witnessed some of the fiercest fighting during the battle between GNA and LNA.

The exchange of mercenaries to and from Libya and Syria never ceased between June 2020 and November 2024, revealed Rami Abdulrahman, Director of the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

Abdulrahman told Asharq Al-Awsat that some 2,000 Syrians remain in Libya. SADAT Defense and Turkish intelligence still fly them to Libya and they also return others back to Syria.

In January, the Observatory said that over 7,000 Syrian mercenaries were in Tripoli, but they have since fled to North Africa or Europe. A former military official said that only the military parties in Libya know the real number of mercenaries that were brought in to fight.

At the beginning of the war in 2019, the fighters were paid around 1,500 dollars, while now they earn 500 dollars. A Turkish soldier, meanwhile, barely earned 150 dollars at the time.

Abu Salim front

Rami, the Syrian fighter, said the newly-recruited Syrians in Libya received instructions from the Libyans. They were also trained by officers from SADAT Defense. They received weapons training and learned about the geography of the region where they will be fighting the “enemy”.

“We received training on the use of weapons and limited combat missions for a week at the Ain Zara camp. We were then taken to the Abou Salim front where we fought Haftar’s forces. Several Syrian factions were there, including the Glory Corps and Al-Mutassim group,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He recalled that several of his fellow fighters were captured or killed at the front. However, he spoke of victory, saying: “We managed to liberate the Yarmuk camp from Haftar’s forces.” Members of the Sultan Murad Division took up camp there.

Unofficial sources said some 500 mercenaries were killed. The GNA’s Volcano of Rage Operation against the LNA waged fierce battles to capture the Yarmuk and al-Hamza positions south of Tripoli. They are now the most significant bases where Syrian mercenaries are deployed.

Chaos in Libya

The security chaos in Libya made it easy for several “armed groups” to enter the country. Some took up base on the southern border and others were called up to fight for one of the warring factions when the “battle for Tripoli” erupted.

Chadian National Salvation Movement (MSNT) leader Omar Al-Mahdi Bashara attested to the chaos of fighters as he was a rebel deployed to the Chadian-Libyan border for 20 years before returning to political life.

This partially explains why Chadian, Sudanese and other African fighters joined the conflict in Libya, he said.

Since the end of the war on Tripoli, little was announced about the fate of the mercenaries. One announcement said 300 Sudanese fighters were deported from Libya.

Amid such secrecy, head of the joint 5+5 joint military committee in the western region Ahmed Abou Shahma accused Libyan politicians of obstructing the withdrawal of the mercenaries. “Each party is clinging on to their mercenaries,” he said.

Claudia Gazzini, the International Crisis Group's Senior Analyst for Libya, told Asharq Al-Awsat that it is difficult to tally the number of mercenaries in Libya. It is essential to differentiate between special forces that were paid by the various parties and between foreign forces that are deployed there.

Libyan political analyst Ahmed Abu Argoub told Asharq Al-Awsat that the countries that sent their fighters and mercenaries to Libya are keen on maintaining the political vacuum in the country and feeding divisions. “They have no interest in seeing the rise of a Libyan state,” he explained.

Meanwhile, advisor at the Libyan Tribal Union (LTU) Khaled al-Ghweil threatened civil disobedience followed by military action should the mercenaries fail to peacefully leave the country. “Any mercenary found in the country would be a legitimate target,” he warned.

Bases on the coast

Alongside Ankara, Moscow is another source of mercenaries in Libya. It has used its presence in Libya to extend its influence in Africa through the Africa Corps.

Russian forces in Libya are nothing new, but Moscow has sought to bolster its presence after moving forces and military gear to eastern Libya, said a report by the All Eyes on Wagner group, raising concerns with the US and Europe.

The Polish Institute of International Affairs released a report, “Africa Corps - a New Iteration of Russia's Old Military Presence in Africa”, that examines how Russia’s presence in Libya shifted to focus on the whole of Africa.

It said that Wagner’s operations in Libya were impacted by the death of the group’s founder Yevgeny Prigozhin and Moscow eventually signed a military agreement with Haftar in September 2023.

The Europeans continue to be worried. Then EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell declared on August 25: “We should be worried about what’s happening in Africa. When I first came to Brussels, the French and Italians were in Libya. They weren’t always in harmony, but they were present. Today, there are no Europeans left in Libya – only Turks and Russians.”

“The bases along Libya’s coast are no longer European; they belong to Türkiye and Russia. This is not the Mediterranean order we envisioned,” he added.

Former ambassador and advisor at ESCWA Ibrahim Mousa Grada said the Wagner mercenary presence in Libya is more complicated than any other foreign armed presence in the country.

Their deployment in Libya is seen as a foothold for Russia in Africa from which it expanded its influence in the continent and which has become part of an open struggle for power between Moscow and Washington.

Grada told Asharq Al-Awsat that Wagner’s presence in Libya is connected to major countries that have intersecting interests, especially in the Mediterranean and Africa. Given Russia’s war on Ukraine and the situation in Sudan, their pullout from Libya will definitely come at a price.

The Global Security Review said on August 18 that Russia has expanded its influence in Libya and Africa. The March 2023 edition of the Africa Defense Forum (adf) magazine, issued by AFRICOM, said that some 2,000 Wagner fighters had settled in central Libya since the ceasefire. They continue to train soldiers deployed in the east and guard oilfields in the southeast.

In November, adf said weapons from Libya were being smuggled to “terrorist groups” in Nigeria. It claimed that several of these weapons were made in Russia and that they were brought to Libya by the Wagner group.

The majority of the Wagner fighters are deployed at “sovereign” locations under the control of the LNA. They are tasked with guarding oilfields and ports in the central region known as the “oil crescent”.

Witnesses told Asharq Al-Awsat that Wagner fighters have been noticably active in the vicinity of Sirte city, some 450 kms from Tripoli. They noted their movement between the Ghardabiya Airbase, its naval port and the Al-Jufra Airbase. Members of the group were also spotted at the Brak base, 700 kms south of Tripoli.

Russia's ambassador to Libya Haider Aganin dismissed concerns over the Wagner group. In televised remarks on May 13, he accused western countries of stoking suspicions against the group.

Prisons and drugs

Another Syrian fighter brought in from Aleppo told Asharq Al-Awsat about his “deadly” experience in Libya.

“As soon as we arrived in Tripoli, we were turned over to a military leader who took us to the Sog Al-Khamis camp. No one was allowed to speak out against him or he would be detained,” said “Monzer Abou Khaled”.

Abou Khaled is still in Tripoli and has not been able to return to Syria. “Thousands of fighters are in the Kamis camp,” he added. They don’t allow us to stray far from the camp. We are in a prison. Some fighters have been here for two and three years. They can’t return to Syria and they aren’t receiving their salaries. They are given little food and drink, while the commanders enjoy plenty.”

“They have taken most of our salaries. Before heading to Libya, we reached an agreement to be paid 1,800 dollars a month, but they have only given us 500 dollars,” he revealed.

Asharq Al-Awsat learned that during that time, members of the Sultan Murad faction had arrested some 20 fighters in the Yarmuk camp for “refusing to hand over half of their financial earnings.”

Rami said the fighters were exploited and tempted by money. He spoke of drug smuggling and how their salaries were cut. “The leaders of the factions are profiting off of the fighters. They are trading weapons and smuggling drugs,” he stated.

He explained that the leaders ply the fighters with drugs so that they can be easily manipulated. They also smuggle drugs in Tripoli.

He described 2024 as the worst year for Syrian fighters because thousands of them have been prevented from leaving the city.

Return to Aleppo countryside

Rami left Tripoli after two years of fighting in southern Tripoli and time spent in Ain Zara. He returned to the Aleppo countryside, leaving behind colleagues who are still held in camps in western Libya.

He may have “survived death”, but painful memories still haunt him. “Several of our colleagues were killed in fighting. Others were lost at sea after they fled the camps and sought to escape to Europe,” he revealed.

When the war ended, several thousand mercenaries in Tripoli complained about not being paid or about salary cuts, prompting them to protest in the streets as seen in videos circulated on social media.

Observatory Director Abdulrahman told Asharq Al-Awsat that a “large number” of the mercenaries fled their camps in Tripoli. He did not specify the exact number, but said they escaped to various Libyan regions to seek work and other headed to Europe.

In September 2023, the Observatory said some 3,000 Syrian mercenaries had fled military bases in Libya and headed to Europe.

Expulsion

As alliances and balances changed in the past four years, so did the Libyans’ view of the mercenaries. They are now seen as pariahs and are unwanted in the country.

The hatred against them was on full display when dozens of Libyans protested in front of the military academy in Tripoli in August 2023 to demand the expulsion of the mercenaries who were present in the facility. The protesters managed to storm the academy and set vehicles on fire and chanted slogans demanding the expulsion of the fighters.

Al-Saady Radwan told Asharq Al-Awsat: “We had previously given them a deadline to leave Libya and they did not. Either the military agencies take action or we will take them by surprise and expel them.”

He also accused the Government of National Unity, headed by Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah, of “giving them funds from the state treasury.”

The Russian mercenaries are viewed with the same hatred.

UN Security Council President Pedro Comissário Afonso had recently urged the withdrawal of all foreign forces, fighters and mercenaries from Libya, saying it has become a pressing need.

From Libya to Togo

Libya is not the only place the Syrian mercenaries were recruited to fight. The conflicts across Africa have turned Libya into a “crossing” point for new mercenaries.

A Syrian, who spoke on condition of anonymity, revealed that the Sultan Murad Division had recruited his 17-year-old brother to head to Libya over the summer and from there, he was taken to Togo to fight.

“He spoke to us from a telephone line that appeared to be from Togo. We don’t really know if he is actually there. We don’t know what to do,” the Syrian told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Sudanese on the front

The war may be over, but the tragedies do not end. Every fighter has a story to tell.

Two Sudanese brothers were recruited to join the fight. One fought for the Tripoli forces and the other for the LNA.

In December 2023, Asharq Al-Awsat contacted their family to inquire about them. It learned that the older son’s fate remains unknown, while the other managed to flee Libya through Chad and he is now in El-Fasher in Sudan.

The family fled the war in Sudan to Egypt. Asharq Al-Awsat met with the mother who revealed that the family had not been in contact with the brothers for three years.

At one point they learned that one was in Tripoli. “They abducted one and misled the other. We gained nothing from this,” she lamented.

The older brother didn’t even know that his brother had been recruited to fight for the LNA. The brothers never faced each other in battle and the family never informed them that they had been recruited to fight for the rival parties.

“We informed the younger son when he returned to us from Chad in late 2022,” said the mother, who called herself “Umm Bashir.”

She showed Asharq Al-Awsat a video of her older son in Tripoli. His leg has been amputated, and the Tripoli militias are holding him at an arms depot.

“He is 27 years old now. He told us that his leg was amputated after a bullet lodged in his leg was left untreated for two months,” she said tearfully. The family has since lost contact with him.

The family had contacted several parties in Tripoli, including the former GNA, to inquire about him, without reply.

When the war in Sudan erupted in April 2023, mercenaries who had fought for Haftar and Sarraj returned home. The family rushed to learn anything about their son. They were told that he was last seen in Sabratha city, 70 kms west of Tripoli. He is believed to have drowned while attempting to flee to Europe by boat.



Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
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Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa

Political factions in Iraq have been maneuvering since the parliamentary election more than a month ago to form alliances that will shape the next government.

The November election didn't produce a bloc with a decisive majority, opening the door to a prolonged period of negotiations, said The Associated Press.

The government that eventually emerges will be inheriting a security situation that has stabilized in recent years, but it will also face a fragmented parliament, growing political influence by armed factions, a fragile economy, and often conflicting international and regional pressures, including the future of Iran-backed armed groups.

Uncertain prospects

Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's party took the largest number of seats in the election. Al-Sudani positioned himself in his first term as a pragmatist focused on improving public services and managed to keep Iraq on the sidelines of regional conflicts.

While his party is nominally part of the Coordination Framework, a coalition of Iran-backed Shiite parties that became the largest parliamentary bloc, observers say it’s unlikely that the Coordination Framework will support al-Sudani’s reelection bid.

“The choice for prime minister has to be someone the Framework believes they can control and doesn't have his own political ambitions,” said Sajad Jiyad, an Iraqi political analyst and fellow at The Century Foundation think tank.

Al-Sudani came to power in 2022 with the backing of the Framework, but Jiyad said that he believes now the coalition “will not give al-Sudani a second term as he has become a powerful competitor.”

The only Iraqi prime minister to serve a second term since 2003 was Nouri al-Maliki, first elected in 2006. His bid for a third term failed after being criticized for monopolizing power and alienating Sunnis and Kurds.

Jiyad said that the Coordination Framework drew a lesson from Maliki “that an ambitious prime minister will seek to consolidate power at the expense of others.”

He said that the figure selected as Iraq's prime minister must generally be seen as acceptable to Iran and the United States — two countries with huge influence over Iraq — and to Iraq’s top Shiite cleric, Grand Ali al-Sistani.

Al-Sudani in a bind

In the election, Shiite alliances and lists — dominated by the Coordination Framework parties — secured 187 seats, Sunni groups 77 seats, Kurdish groups 56 seats, in addition to nine seats reserved for members of minority groups.

The Reconstruction and Development Coalition, led by al-Sudani, dominated in Baghdad, and in several other provinces, winning 46 seats.

Al-Sudani's results, while strong, don't allow him to form a government without the support of a coalition, forcing him to align the Coordination Framework to preserve his political prospects.

Some saw this dynamic at play earlier this month when al-Sudani's government retracted a terror designation that Iraq had imposed on the Lebanese Hezbollah militant group and Yemen’s Houthis— Iran-aligned groups that are allied with Iraqi armed factions — just weeks after imposing the measure, saying it was a mistake.

The Coalition Framework saw its hand strengthened by the absence from the election of the powerful Sadrist movement led by Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, which has been boycotting the political system since being unable to form a government after winning the most seats in the 2021 election.

Hamed Al-Sayed, a political activist and official with the National Line Movement, an independent party that boycotted the election, said that Sadr’s absence had a “central impact.”

“It reduced participation in areas that were traditionally within his sphere of influence, such as Baghdad and the southern governorates, leaving an electoral vacuum that was exploited by rival militia groups,” he said, referring to several parties within the Coordination Framework that also have armed wings.

Groups with affiliated armed wings won more than 100 parliamentary seats, the largest showing since 2003.

Other political actors

Sunni forces, meanwhile, sought to reorganize under a new coalition called the National Political Council, aiming to regain influence lost since the 2018 and 2021 elections.

The Kurdish political scene remained dominated by the traditional split between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan parties, with ongoing negotiations between the two over the presidency.

By convention, Iraq’s president is always a Kurd, while the more powerful prime minister is Shiite and the parliamentary speaker Sunni.

Parliament is required to elect a speaker within 15 days of the Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of the election result, which occurred on Dec. 14.

The parliament should elect a president within 30 days of its first session, and the prime minister should be appointed within 15 days of the president’s election, with 30 days allotted to form the new government.

Washington steps in

The incoming government will face major economic and political challenges.

They include a high level of public debt — more than 90 trillion Iraqi dinars ($69 billion) — and a state budget that remains reliant on oil for about 90% of revenues, despite attempts to diversify, as well as entrenched corruption.

But perhaps the most delicate question will be the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces, a coalition of militias that formed to fight the ISIS group as it rampaged across Iraq more than a decade ago.

It was formally placed under the control of the Iraqi military in 2016 but in practice still operates with significant autonomy. After the Hamas-led attack in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023 sparked the devastating war in Gaza, some armed groups within the PMF launched attacks on US bases in the region in retaliation for Washington’s backing of Israel.

The US has been pushing for Iraq to disarm Iran-backed groups — a difficult proposition, given the political power that many of them hold and Iran’s likely opposition to such a step.

Two senior Iraqi political officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to comment publicly, said that the United States had warned against selecting any candidate for prime minister who controls an armed faction and also cautioned against letting figures associated with militias control key ministries or hold significant security posts.

“The biggest issue will be how to deal with the pro-Iran parties with armed wings, particularly those... which have been designated by the United States as terrorist entities,” Jiyad said.


What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
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What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)

In unusually blunt language, and following a visit by Sudan’s Sovereignty Council Chairman and army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to Cairo, the Egyptian presidency issued a statement on the war in Sudan outlining three points it described as red lines.

It said Egypt would not allow any of them to be crossed or compromised, as they directly affect Egypt’s national security, which it said is inseparable from Sudan’s national security.

The reference to activating the joint defense agreement between the two countries was seen as a signal that Egypt could bring its military, political, and diplomatic weight to bear in support of the Sudanese army.

Joint defense agreement

In March 2021, Egypt signed a military cooperation agreement with Sudan that covers training, border security, and the confrontation of shared threats. That agreement followed a joint defense pact signed in 1976 during the presidencies of Sudan’s Gaafar Nimeiry and Egypt’s Anwar Sadat.

Articles One and Two of the pact stipulate that any attack on one party is considered an attack on the other, and require immediate consultation, including the use of armed force to repel aggression. The agreement also commits both sides to coordinating their defense and military policies on matters related to their national security.

After the fall of Nimeiry’s regime in the 1985 popular uprising, then Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi informed the Egyptian leadership of his desire to cancel the joint defense agreement. Instead, the two sides signed what became known as the Brotherhood Charter in 1987. While it did not explicitly cancel the 1976 agreement, its mechanisms have not been discussed or activated since then.

Regional and international messages

Sudanese journalist Osman Mirghani, editor-in-chief of Al-Tayar newspaper, said the Egyptian statements amounted to regional and international messages linked to recent developments and what he described as serious security threats facing Sudan.

He pointed to the expansion of the Rapid Support Forces in the Darfur and Kordofan regions in a way that threatens shared Sudanese and Egyptian national security, warning of risks of geographic fragmentation that could endanger Sudan’s unity.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Mirghani said Egypt was, for the first time, using direct and tough language and signaling the possibility of intervention under international law in Sudan’s conflict. He said this reflected the level of Egyptian concern over the situation in Sudan.

Mirghani added that the reference to red lines was a message directed at all parties, noting that there are many influential players in Sudan.

The red lines

The first red line cited by Cairo was the preservation of Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity, preventing any tampering with its resources or those of the Sudanese people, and rejecting the secession of any part of the country. Egypt reiterated its categorical refusal to the establishment or recognition of any parallel entities, saying such moves would undermine Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity.

The statement also stressed the need to preserve Sudanese state institutions and prevent any harm to them. Egypt affirmed its full right to take all necessary measures permitted under international law, including activating the joint defense agreement between the two brotherly countries, to ensure these red lines are not crossed.

Timing of the visit

Former Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef noted the timing of Burhan’s visit to Cairo, stating that it occurred after his trip to Saudi Arabia earlier this week and following a visit by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the United States.

Youssef said the trip was part of efforts to end the war in Sudan through the Quartet mechanism, which includes Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and the United States.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Youssef said Burhan briefed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the outcomes of his Saudi visit and the latest developments in Sudan.

He stated that the visit did not follow the usual ceremonial protocol and was a result of developments in the war, noting that Egypt’s security is linked to Sudan’s security. He added that Egypt is part of the Quartet, which seeks to end a war that is approaching its third year.

Military implications

Sudanese military expert Al-Muatasim Abdel Qader said activating the joint agreement would imply Egyptian intervention in various forms, including supplying weapons and ammunition or direct military involvement.

He said the provisions of the agreement obligate each army to defend the other, adding that the red lines outlined by the Egyptian presidency represented a significant step and carried major implications for the Sudanese state.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, Abdel Qader described mutual protection between the two countries as a historically rooted matter, dating back to wars Egypt fought in the last century in which Sudanese armed forces took part.

Rapid Support Forces response

Basha Tabiq, an adviser to the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, said in posts on X that Egypt’s position amounted to blatant interference, bias toward one party, and a colonial mindset that views Sudan as a backyard.

Another source aligned with the RSF said accusations against Egypt of backing the Sudanese army have persisted since the early days of the war. The source pointed to the presence of Egyptian forces at Merowe air base in northern Sudan at the start of the conflict, when several Egyptian soldiers and officers were captured before later being handed over to Cairo.

The source also cited accusations by RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, who said in October 2024 that the Egyptian army had carried out air strikes against his forces and supplied the Sudanese army with drones and training.

He said Hemedti renewed those accusations last June, alleging that Cairo supported the Sudanese army with aircraft flown by Egyptian pilots that bombed areas under his forces’ control, and supplied weapons and aviation fuel. Hemedti described this as a blatant aggression against the Sudanese people.

The source, who requested anonymity, said Egypt has been intervening in the war from the outset and that activating the joint defense agreement would merely formalize an existing reality.

No time to spare

Sudanese ambassador Al-Sadiq al-Maqli said Egypt is working with Saudi Arabia and the international Quartet, in coordination with the United States, to give fresh momentum to efforts on Sudan.

He said Washington is currently using soft power rather than force, which he described as an option deferred until shuttle diplomacy by US President’s senior adviser Massad Boulos is exhausted.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Maqli said the United States fully understands the influence of Saudi Arabia and Egypt and their ability to persuade and soften the stance of Sudan’s government, which has rejected the latest US initiative.

He said Burhan currently has no time to spare, as what is unfolding in Sudan represents the world’s worst humanitarian disaster, according to the international community.

Maqli noted that Egypt, represented by Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, has been almost fully dedicated to making the Quartet mechanism succeed, given that the continuation of the current situation in Sudan poses a threat to Egypt’s national security.

He described Burhan’s visits to Riyadh and Cairo as short but necessary steps toward accepting the Quartet initiative, saying the Saudi visit marked a qualitative shift in the Sudanese government’s official position.

He added that Sudan’s foreign ministry later expressed Port Sudan’s readiness to cooperate with President Donald Trump, his secretary of state, and Boulos in efforts to achieve peace in Sudan, predicting imminent developments that could lead to a major breakthrough in the crisis.


Iraq Negotiates New Coalition Under US Pressure

Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
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Iraq Negotiates New Coalition Under US Pressure

Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)
Election workers count ballots as they close a polling station, during the parliamentary elections in Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 11, 2025. (AP)

More than a month after Iraq's parliamentary elections, the country's top leaders remain locked in talks to form a government while facing pressure from Washington to exclude Tehran-backed armed groups.

Amid seismic changes in the Middle East, where new alliances are forming and old powers waning, Iraqi leaders face a daunting task: navigating relations with US-blacklisted pro-Iranian factions.

The US has held significant sway over Iraqi politics since leading the 2003 invasion that ousted long-time ruler Saddam Hussein.

But another specter also haunts Iraq's halls of power: Washington's arch-foe, Iran.

Iraq has long been caught between the two, with successive governments negotiating a delicate balance.

Now, after November's election, Washington has demanded the eventual government must exclude Iran-backed armed groups and instead move to dismantle them, Iraqi officials and diplomats told AFP.

A State Department spokesperson, speaking on condition of anonymity, said: "Iraqi leaders well know what is and is not compatible with a strong US-Iraq partnership".

Washington, the spokesperson said, "will continue to speak plainly to the urgency of dismantling Iran-backed militias".

But some of these groups have increased their presence in the new chamber and have joined the Coordination Framework, an alliance of Shiite parties with varying ties to Iran and which holds the majority.

For weeks, the Coordination Framework has been embroiled in talks to nominate the next prime minister.

"The US has put conditions that armed factions should not be part of the new government," a senior Iraqi official said. The factions must disarm and "sever ties with Iran's Revolutionary Guard," he added.

In recent tweets, the US special envoy to Iraq, Mark Savaya said that Iraqi leaders are at a "crossroads".

Their decision "will send a clear and unmistakable signal to the United States... that Iraq is ready to claim its rightful place as a stable and respected nation in the new Middle East.

"The alternative is equally clear: economic deterioration, political confusion, and international isolation," Savaya said.

The US has blacklisted as "terrorist organizations" several armed groups from within the pro-Iran Popular Mobilization Forces, a former paramilitary alliance now integrated into the armed forces.

They are also part of the Iran-backed so-called "Axis of Resistance" and have called for the withdrawal of US troops -- deployed in Iraq as part of an anti-ISIS coalition -- and launched attacks against them.

Most of these groups hold seats in parliament and have seen their political and financial clout increase.

The Asaib Ahl al-Haq faction, led by Qais al-Khazali, who is a key figure in the Coordination Framework, won 27 seats in the latest election, making it harder to exclude it from the government.

A potential compromise is to deny it a key portfolio, as in the current government.

"The US has turned a blind eye before, so they might after all engage with the government as a whole but not with ministries held by armed groups," a former Iraqi official said.

Other blacklisted groups are:

+ Kataeb Hezbollah, one of the most powerful armed groups, supports a parliamentary bloc (six seats).

+ Kataeb Sayyid al-Shuhada, Kataeb Imam Ali and Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya.

+ The al-Nujaba movement is the only group that has steered clear of elections.

Iraq has its economic growth to worry about.

After decades of turmoil, it has only begun to regain a sense of normalcy in recent years.

Washington has already imposed sanctions on several Iraqi entities and banks, accusing them of helping Tehran evade sanctions.

But Iraqi leaders hope for greater foreign investments and support partnerships with US companies.

The most striking endorsement came from Khazali, an opponent of the US military presence who now argues that it would be in Baghdad's interest for major US companies to invest.

Since the Israel's war with Hamas in Gaza began in October 2023, Iraq has remained relatively unscathed by the turmoil engulfing the Middle East.

Iraqi armed groups did launch attacks on US troops and largely unsuccessful ones on Israel. Washington responded with heavy strikes, and the attacks have long since halted.

Iraq remained the only close regional ally of Iran to stay out of Israel's crosshairs.

So far, the US has acted as a buffer, helping to prevent an Israeli attack, but Iraqis have been warned of strikes against the armed groups, multiple sources said.

But as the presence of American forces dwindles, fears are growing.