The Syrian Prison: Bureaucracy of Death, Marketplace of Extortion

Munir Al-Faqir, co-founder of the Association of Sednaya Prison Detainees and Missing Persons (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Munir Al-Faqir, co-founder of the Association of Sednaya Prison Detainees and Missing Persons (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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The Syrian Prison: Bureaucracy of Death, Marketplace of Extortion

Munir Al-Faqir, co-founder of the Association of Sednaya Prison Detainees and Missing Persons (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Munir Al-Faqir, co-founder of the Association of Sednaya Prison Detainees and Missing Persons (Asharq Al-Awsat)

From the Raid Department that falls under the Military Security’s Branch 215—commonly referred to as the “Branch of Death”—Asharq Al-Awsat began its tour of the prisons of the ousted Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad.

We were accompanied in this journey by a former detainee who had been transferred between this branch, Military Hospital 601—dubbed “The Slaughterhouse”—where the infamous “Caesar” photographs were taken, and finally the larger slaughterhouse, Sednaya Prison.

The former detainee is Munir Al-Faqir, an engineer from Damascus and a co-founder of the Association of Sednaya Prison Detainees and Missing Persons. He shed light on the inner workings of Syria’s prison system, revealing how detainees—both alive and dead—are meticulously archived, while their families are extorted for immense sums of money estimated at nearly $1 billion, according to the association.

Amid the systematic abuse of documents, the chaos of legal frameworks, and over 100,000 forcibly disappeared persons, local and international organizations, as well as Syria’s current administration, face a colossal challenge in establishing truth commissions, ensuring accountability, and laying the foundation for comprehensive transitional justice.

More Than Just Sednaya

The Syrian prison experience over the past fifty years cannot be summed up by Sednaya Prison alone, despite its unique horrors. Sednaya represents only the tip of the iceberg, beneath which lies a network of security branches, detention centers, and prisons no less terrifying in their brutality.

If anyone could be considered the “ultimate survivor” of this hell, it would be Al-Faqir. Over two years, he was transferred between multiple detention centers, starting with Branch 215, the “Raid Department” of Military Security, followed by Military Hospital 601 and finally Sednaya.

When asked how he managed to survive, Al-Faqir says: “It’s a miracle I made it out alive from the first two branches. When I reached Sednaya, and my family learned of my whereabouts, the extortion business had already begun. My family, like many others, tried to secure my release with money. I was lucky enough that it worked for me.”

Remarkably, the head of the military court, Major General Mohamed Kanjo Hassan, who sentenced Al-Faqir to Sednaya in a trial lasting barely two minutes, was the same official who approved his release after receiving a substantial bribe through an extortion network.

Al-Faqir, to this day, remains unaware of the charges against him. He explains:

“I still don’t know my alleged crime or the length of my sentence. Throughout my detention, I was never informed of anything and was prohibited from asking. I could only guess based on the questions directed at me, but I never learned the truth.”

A Marketplace of Extortion

Al-Faqir outlines three types of release cases. Those include presidential pardons, which are extremely rare and granted only in exceptional circumstances to specific individuals; Prisoner exchanges, which are equally rare, involving swaps between detainees held by the regime and those held by opposing factions; and financial extortion - by far the most common.

He explains: “General Kanjo Hassan, who amassed immense wealth and properties, worked with brokers to identify high-value detainees. These brokers would contact the families—primarily mothers, followed by wives and sisters—to negotiate ransoms.”

According to Al-Faqir, his organization has documented this phenomenon and published a report to raise awareness among families about the extortion networks. They estimate that between 2011 and 2020, these networks extracted roughly $1 billion. While other human rights organizations estimate even higher figures, the association’s calculations are based on a statistical sample, not a comprehensive survey.

The extortion process thrives on the families’ hopes of finding their missing loved ones and their fears of losing another son.

Al-Faqir explains: “The marketplace begins with small payments for vague information about the missing person. As the family’s resources dwindle, they are either promised the detainee’s release or told that the person has died or cannot be located.”

For some families, the ordeal ends with a death certificate or the delivery of a body for burial—often after signing documents stating the death was due to natural causes like heart failure or kidney failure. However, most families are neither notified of the death nor given a body to bury.

A Descent into Horror

Leaving the well-organized bureaucratic section of the detention system, the journey takes a grim turn into the lower floors of Branch 215. Here lie the dormitories, solitary cells, and a former shooting range repurposed into mass detention and torture chambers. During peak periods, it also served as an execution site, earning Branch 215 its “Death Branch” reputation.

The stench of death still lingers in these spaces, with dark walls bearing the marks of unspeakable past atrocities. Al-Faqir recalls moments of overwhelming rage, punching his cell door until his hands bled, only to compose himself and continue his story.

In these overcrowded cells, blankets stamped with the UNHCR logo serve every purpose—spreading diseases, lice, and bacteria. Open wounds fester, and gangrene often sets in.

Al-Faqir says: “Many times, a detainee would die, and their body would remain in the cell for hours or days before being removed. The corpse would lie on these same blankets, which were later reused.”

In the same detention center, solitary cells resemble upright graves—narrow spaces that leave no room to move. Yet for many detainees, these cells offer a reprieve from the horrors of communal living and the unsanitary conditions of the shared blankets.

Generalized Terror Beyond the Prison Walls

One of the most insidious aspects of Syria’s decades-long systemic cruelty and widespread terror lies in the deliberate placement of detention centers within residential neighborhoods in Damascus. These locations, often tucked between branching streets, seem designed to normalize the violence within them, embedding it into the everyday lives of ordinary people. While Sednaya Prison is distant from public view and imagination, these security branches are situated in the heart of the capital, standing alongside “normal” life outside their walls.

To reach Branch 215, located within the security district between Kafr Sousa and Mezzeh—a site that marked the beginning of Munir’s grim detention journey—we traveled along the famous “Mezzeh Highway,” made a slight turn, and entered through an open gate on a public street. It felt as if we were heading into any other government office in an open, public space. Upon leaving the darkness of the detention corridors and stepping back into daylight, administrative buildings appeared on the rear side, their windows overlooking the compound’s yards. Office workers would likely sneak glances at the scene below during coffee and cigarette breaks before returning to their meticulously organized bureaucratic tasks.

On another side, residential buildings with shaded balconies—crowded with hanging laundry—also overlooked the branch. The sight of the laundry evoked both a strange sense of normalcy and a pervasive fear.

Many stories circulate about families who sold their homes and moved to escape the oppressive proximity to these centers. For some, it was the inability to endure the sounds of torture seeping into their living rooms and bedrooms that pushed them away.

“Trauma Section” and the Caesar Photos

A leaked directive from mid-2018, dated December 18, 2012, issued by the Military Intelligence Branch, instructs all affiliated security branches to report the death of any prisoner on the same day. The directive mandated direct communication with the branch chief via Telegram, including details such as the reason for arrest, investigation results, and cause of death.

This document, now used by human rights groups in international prosecutions, serves as explicit evidence of the systematic nature of detainee deaths. It also confirms that these deaths, in their overwhelming numbers, occur with the knowledge and direct approval of the highest levels of leadership.

Branch 215 played a central role in this “production line” of death, followed by the “Trauma Section” at the Mezzeh Military Hospital (formerly known as Yusuf Al-Azma), also referred to as Hospital 601.

According to Al-Faqir: “This is where deaths were processed medically, or patients were deliberately finished off under the guise of medical care.”

The Trauma Section was established after the 2011 revolution within the hospital’s old building, which dates back to the French Mandate era. Its purpose was to “treat” detainees as the systematic torture and killings in the security branches escalated, and as the number of victims increased. The section became essential for “disposing” of corpses and easing overcrowding. Simultaneously, it became an additional site for “medical torture” and a place where bodies were stored, archived, and numbered—many of which later appeared in the Caesar photos taken in the hospital’s courtyard.

Al-Faqir explained the role of medical staff in the Trauma Section.

“The supervisors were primarily security officers and military doctors. The section was managed by two security agencies: Military Intelligence and Air Force Intelligence. Each had its own ‘Angel of Death,’ as we used to call them because of their penchant for killing and their creativity in doing so.”

According to Munir—corroborated by other sources—a significant number of doctors, nurses, and even female nurses collaborated extensively with the military. These medical professionals would guide officers on how to inflict fatal injuries without leaving visible traces of torture, such as inducing internal bleeding, kidney failure, or asphyxiation. This allowed deaths to be officially recorded as “natural causes” in medical records, completing the meticulous administrative and bureaucratic cycle of murder.

While we waited for about two hours at the hospital’s main gate, many cars arrived with various requests: some came to hand over individual weapons, others sought non-existent medical services, and one former employee tried to retrieve personal belongings from her old office in exchange for handing over her office keys. Like others, she left disappointed. Only those turning in weapons received any attention or welcome from the armed guards.

Before returning to the celebrations at Umayyad Square, Al-Faqir paused for a long time at a sign posted on the hospital’s main entrance. It read:

“The hospital administration wishes patients a speedy recovery.”



Lebanon’s Latest Conflict Brings Rare Public Backlash Against Hezbollah as War Flares Again

Two women look at the sea as boxes of food prepared for Iftar during Ramadan lie on a bench along the Corniche, following an escalation between Hezbollah and Israel amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Beirut, Lebanon, March 10, 2026. (Reuters)
Two women look at the sea as boxes of food prepared for Iftar during Ramadan lie on a bench along the Corniche, following an escalation between Hezbollah and Israel amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Beirut, Lebanon, March 10, 2026. (Reuters)
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Lebanon’s Latest Conflict Brings Rare Public Backlash Against Hezbollah as War Flares Again

Two women look at the sea as boxes of food prepared for Iftar during Ramadan lie on a bench along the Corniche, following an escalation between Hezbollah and Israel amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Beirut, Lebanon, March 10, 2026. (Reuters)
Two women look at the sea as boxes of food prepared for Iftar during Ramadan lie on a bench along the Corniche, following an escalation between Hezbollah and Israel amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Beirut, Lebanon, March 10, 2026. (Reuters)

The Lebanese mother of two had just awakened to prepare the pre-dawn meal before another day of fasting during the holy month of Ramadan when Israeli warplanes began attacking southern Lebanon in retaliation for rockets and drones launched by Hezbollah.

The family quickly packed up and headed toward Beirut, seeking safety from another deadly war between Israel and Hezbollah. With tens of thousands of others fleeing on that March 2 day, the usually one-hour trip from the southern city of Nabatiyeh took 15 hours.

“I am against giving pretexts to Israel,” said the 45-year-old woman, who spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisals from the Hezbollah supporters she lives among.

“I am totally against Hezbollah’s decision to start with the first strike,” said the woman, who is now living with her husband, their 17- and 12-year-old children, and her mother-in-law inside a school turned into a shelter in the Lebanese capital.

As Hezbollah enters a new round of fighting with Israel just 15 months after the last Israel-Hezbollah war ended with a November 2024 US-brokered ceasefire, the Iran-backed group and political party is facing increasing grassroots discontent within its base and problems with the Lebanese authorities.

Population still reeling from the previous war

On March 2, two days after Israel and the US launched attacks on Iran, igniting a war in the Middle East, Hezbollah fired missiles and drones into Israel for the first time in more than a year.

Hundreds of thousands of residents of southern Lebanon, the eastern Bekaa valley and Beirut’s southern suburbs have fled their homes after Israeli warnings that their neighborhoods, towns and villages would be targeted.

The new round of fighting comes as Shiite communities that suffered the brunt of the last conflict are still reeling from it. The last Israel-Hezbollah war killed more than 4,000 people in Lebanon and caused $11 billion in damage, according to the World Bank.

Unlike in the past, when many people were afraid to publicly criticize Hezbollah, some Lebanese Shiites are openly blaming the group for their current misery as they find themselves living in the street, on public squares, or with relatives or friends amid cold weather and fasting during Ramadan.

For Hussein Ali, it was the second time in less than two years that he was forced to leave his house in Beirut’s southern suburb of Haret Hreik. During the last Israel-Hezbollah war, the apartment where he lived was destroyed and now the vegetable vendor is worried the same thing will happen again.

“No one wanted this war,” said the man, who is also staying in the school and relying on aid to survive. “People haven’t recovered from the previous war."

Government takes a harsher stance

After the end of Lebanon's civil war in 1990, militias were required to disarm, but Hezbollah was exempted because it was fighting Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon at the time.

Now the Lebanese government has sought to crack down on the group’s armed wing and end its status as a parallel armed force outside of state control.

The shift was clear when, on March 2, the Lebanese government moved to declare Hezbollah’s military activities illegal, with all but two of the 24 Cabinet ministers voting in favor; only the two Hezbollah ministers voted no. Even ministers from Hezbollah’s strongest ally, the Amal group of Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, voted to approve the measure.

“The government confirms that the decision of war and peace is only in the hand of the state,” Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said, adding that the government “orders the immediate ban on all of Hezbollah’s military activities as they are illegal and it should be forced to hand over its weapons to the Lebanese state.”

The Lebanese army has since begun to crack down and last week arrested three Hezbollah members who were found transporting weapons at a checkpoint. But the men were released on bail Monday.

Government officials have accused Hezbollah of repeatedly taking unilateral military actions that should be under state authority. On Oct. 8, 2023, the group began attacking Israel a day after the assault led by the Iranian-backed Hamas on southern Israel triggered the war in Gaza.

Now, the group has entered the fray on behalf of Iran to avenge the killing of its supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, as well as in retaliation, it says, for Israeli violations of the November 2024 ceasefire.

Some Hezbollah supporters see the war as justified

Ali al-Amin, a Lebanese journalist who is a harsh critic of Hezbollah, said that while some people are now criticizing the armed group more than in the past, many still remain quiet out of fear for their safety.

“Criticism could have a high cost and not all people express their opinions,” said al-Amin, a Shiite from south Lebanon, who added that many poor Shiites rely on assistance that could be cut off anytime by Hezbollah or the allied Amal movement.

In the past, people who criticized Hezbollah on social media were sometimes roughed up by its supporters and forced to make new videos saying they were wrong.

But the group still has many supporters. They say that Hezbollah's decision to strike was justified because Israel had not abided by the November 2024 ceasefire.

Since the ceasefire, Israel has continued to carry out almost daily airstrikes against Hezbollah, which have killed about 400 people, including dozens of civilians, and that have also prevented the reconstruction of destroyed areas.

“We cannot tolerate that anymore,” said Ali Saleh who was displaced from a southern village near Nabatiyeh. “I pray for God to protect our young men and make them victorious against Israel."

Even the Shiite woman who criticized Hezbollah's move to strike first said that if the party hadn't, the result might have been the same.

“If we attack they will attack us and if we don’t attack they would have attacked us,” she said.

Sadek Nabulsi, a political science professor at the Lebanese University whose thinking aligns with Hezbollah, said the latest complaints are nothing new and don’t represent a fissure in grassroots support for the Iranian-allied groups. There was a similar outcry during the 14-month Israel-Hezbollah war that ended in 2024 and the monthlong war in 2006, he said.

“Hezbollah’s base of support is known for ... tolerating pain,” Nabulsi said. “If you look at this base of support, despite all the harsh conditions, it is still coherent, patient and waiting for salvation.”


Gaza Patients Face Death Again as Rafah Crossing Stays Closed

Palestinian patients sit in wheelchairs in the courtyard of the Red Crescent Hospital in Khan Younis while waiting to leave for treatment (AFP)
Palestinian patients sit in wheelchairs in the courtyard of the Red Crescent Hospital in Khan Younis while waiting to leave for treatment (AFP)
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Gaza Patients Face Death Again as Rafah Crossing Stays Closed

Palestinian patients sit in wheelchairs in the courtyard of the Red Crescent Hospital in Khan Younis while waiting to leave for treatment (AFP)
Palestinian patients sit in wheelchairs in the courtyard of the Red Crescent Hospital in Khan Younis while waiting to leave for treatment (AFP)

Patients and wounded in Gaza are facing increasingly harsh conditions after Israeli authorities again closed the Rafah land crossing, which had been partially reopened for a short period under a ceasefire agreement following a prolonged shutdown that prevented tens of thousands from leaving for medical treatment.

The crossing’s reopening at the beginning of February had raised hopes among patients and the wounded that they would be able to travel abroad for treatment. However, Israeli restrictions on the number of people permitted to leave further complicated the situation.

Those hopes faded when the crossing was closed again following the start of the war with Iran on the 28th of last month.

Twelve-year-old Asmaa al-Shawish, who suffers from a rare disease known as Sanfilippo syndrome, has for years faced the threat of death as her health has recently deteriorated sharply, her mother told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Her mother said the girl had obtained a medical referral to receive treatment abroad in 2023, shortly before the war began, but did not manage to travel in time. She remained inside Gaza, and her condition has continued to worsen day by day.

She said her daughter is losing the ability to drink water and suffers from brain atrophy as well as enlargement of the liver and spleen. The child also experiences constant seizures and requires daily treatment in hospitals in an effort to keep her alive as long as possible. Her condition, she added, is deteriorating rapidly.

“When the Rafah crossing opened, we felt a little hope that we might be able to travel again,” she said. “But the large number of patients and wounded waiting like us delayed our departure until the occupation closed it again, leaving us to face our fate on our own.”

“Every time I see my daughter in this condition, I grieve over her harsh circumstances,” she added. “I see her taking her last breaths, and she could die at any moment.”

20,000 Patients

According to the Gaza Health Ministry, more than 20,000 patients and wounded people urgently need treatment abroad. Deaths are already being recorded among those waiting for the crossing to reopen regularly, as it operated before the war, so they can travel and save their lives.

The ministry said hospitals in the enclave lack the medical capabilities needed to save these patients amid the difficult conditions imposed by the Israeli blockade. It added that some medicines have completely run out, while others are close to being depleted.

According to the government media office, the total number of travelers and returnees during the period when the Rafah land crossing was partially open reached 1,148 out of the 3,400 expected to travel in both directions. This represents about 33% compliance with the agreement that was supposed to be implemented after the ceasefire.

Government sources from Hamas told Asharq Al-Awsat that there are “no promises to reopen the Rafah land crossing, even partially.”

Hazem Qassem, a spokesman for Hamas, said the continued closure of the Rafah crossing “under flimsy security pretexts and false claims” represents a “blatant and dangerous violation” of the ceasefire agreement and a retreat from commitments made to mediators, particularly Egypt.

He said the move is part of efforts to “tighten the blockade” imposed on the enclave, preventing tens of thousands of wounded people from traveling to receive what he described as their natural right to medical treatment.

Continued Killings

On the ground, Israel has continued its escalation, killing more Palestinians and striking multiple targets across the enclave.

The Israeli military said on Tuesday it had killed six Palestinians, three of whom it said had crossed the “yellow line” north of the enclave, and three armed Hamas members in tunnels in Rafah.

The number of Palestinian deaths since the ceasefire has risen to more than 656, including at least 20 killed since the start of the war with Iran. The cumulative toll since Oct. 7, 2023, has reached 72,134 deaths.

This coincided with Israeli airstrikes, artillery shelling and gunfire in several areas on both sides of the yellow line in the enclave. For the second consecutive day, bulldozers were seen demolishing what remained of homes east of Khan Younis, about 20 meters from Salah al-Din Road.

A warplane also struck a house whose residents had evacuated following an Israeli order in northern Khan Younis. Another strike hit a mobile phone charging point and an internet service station in an empty area next to tents housing displaced people southwest of Gaza City.


Trump’s Tough Test: Is Military Success Enough to End the War?

US President Donald Trump dances during a private celebration with the Republican majority in the House of Representatives in Florida on Monday (AFP)
US President Donald Trump dances during a private celebration with the Republican majority in the House of Representatives in Florida on Monday (AFP)
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Trump’s Tough Test: Is Military Success Enough to End the War?

US President Donald Trump dances during a private celebration with the Republican majority in the House of Representatives in Florida on Monday (AFP)
US President Donald Trump dances during a private celebration with the Republican majority in the House of Representatives in Florida on Monday (AFP)

On the eleventh day of the war, the conflict with Iran looks closer to a military decision than a political settlement. By most circulating estimates, the US and Israel have dealt heavy blows to Iran’s missile infrastructure, air defenses and military command structure, sharply reducing Tehran’s ability to strike its neighbors as it did in the opening days.

But the key question remains unanswered: is military success enough to end the war?

Here, the ambiguity of US President Donald Trump comes into view. He says the war “will end soon” and suggests he could talk to Iran. Yet he also insists Washington “has won in many ways, but not enough,” warning of tougher strikes if Tehran continues threatening shipping and energy flows.

The contradiction is not just rhetorical. It reveals a real dilemma: a battlefield achievement that still lacks the political formula to turn it into a stable endgame.

Iran, meanwhile, does not appear to be winning militarily. The appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei as a new supreme leader, widely read as a defiant signal, was followed by statements from senior officials pledging to continue the fight and rejecting negotiations.

The regime’s response to the strikes has not been compromise but tighter alignment with the Revolutionary Guards.

Tehran’s calculation is straightforward: political survival matters more than battlefield losses. If it prevents its adversaries from forcing total surrender, endurance itself can be seen as a form of victory.

Oil: Iran’s Most Powerful Card

As Iran loses conventional military tools, oil remains its most potent weapon. The Strait of Hormuz is not merely a shipping lane; it is a critical chokepoint for global energy markets. Any disruption there reverberates instantly through prices, shipping costs, insurance premiums and political nerves in Washington and Western capitals.

That is why markets have quickly become part of the war.

Iran knows it cannot match the United States and Israel in airpower or technology. What it can do is raise the economic and political price of the conflict, for both its adversaries and the world.

As oil prices climb, pressure builds inside the United States and Europe to end the war quickly. Not because Iran has prevailed militarily, but because it has turned energy into a strategic lever.

This is what makes the decision to stop the bombing so sensitive. If Washington halts the war simply because oil prices spike or political pressures grow, Tehran will draw a clear lesson: threatening energy flows ensures survival.

That would be more consequential than any short-term battlefield gain. It would mean Iran, even after losing much of its arsenal, still holds a deterrent capable of helping it rebuild its position later.

If, however, the US and Israel continue the pressure until Iran loses the ability to threaten shipping and disrupt energy markets, the regime would be stripped of its last major lever. Only then would halting the strikes resemble ending a war rather than freezing it.

The “Day After” Question

The central criticism aimed at Trump in Washington and abroad is simple: he lacks a coherent plan for the day after.

Who governs Iran? Who prevents chaos? Who signs ceasefire arrangements and nuclear restrictions? And who ensures the country does not slide into instability like that in Iraq or Syria?

The question is legitimate, but it may not match Trump’s own logic.

The US president does not appear interested in rebuilding Iran or managing a political transition there, as Washington attempted in earlier post-September 11 interventions. His approach seems simpler and harsher: destroy the regime’s ability to threaten US and regional interests.

What happens to power in Tehran afterward may not be a direct American responsibility.

In that sense, Washington does not seem intent on toppling the regime and then inheriting the burden of governing the country. The objective appears to be weakening it enough that it can no longer pose the same threat.

If the regime collapses internally, that would be an added bonus. If it survives but with far fewer capabilities, that too can be framed as a win.

This approach is less about nation-building and more about strategic punishment followed by withdrawal.

But such a method carries risks. There is no strong evidence that the regime is close to collapse despite visible fractures in its leadership. Nor is there an organized alternative ready to take its place.

Pushing Iran toward internal fragmentation or civil conflict could open the door to far wider instability, displacement and regional violence.

For that reason, the absence of a detailed day-after plan may not mean the administration lacks a goal. It may simply mean it has deliberately lowered its political ambitions.

The promise is not a new, stable and democratic Iran—only a weaker one.

Such a gamble will succeed only if Iran accepts the new reality, or proves unable to resist it. So far, Tehran shows little sign of doing so.

Three Possible Endings

The first scenario is a conditional ceasefire after the core strikes are completed. Operations would continue for days or weeks until Washington and Tel Aviv conclude that Iran’s missile, nuclear and military structures have been damaged enough. Indirect channels would then open to impose a ceasefire formula on US-Israeli terms.

This is the most rational outcome. It would allow Trump to claim victory without becoming trapped in a regime-change operation or the occupation of a large, complex country.

The second scenario is a longer war than Washington wants. That would happen if Mojtaba Khamenei rejects any settlement that looks like surrender and continues betting on exhausting markets and raising costs for the Gulf and the wider world.

Iran might not win militarily. But it could pursue a political objective: pushing the US to stop before turning its battlefield gains into a full strategic victory.

The third, and perhaps most likely, scenario is a victory without resolution.

The US and Israel would destroy a significant share of Iran’s capabilities and curb its ability to threaten shipping and its neighbors. Yet the regime survives – more hard-line and more tightly bound to the Revolutionary Guard, convinced that survival requires rebuilding deterrence later.

In that case, the conflict is not solved at its roots. It is merely postponed. What changes is the balance of power, not the conflict itself.

Will Trump Stop the Bombing Now?

The most realistic answer: not yet, but not indefinitely either.

Stopping now under pressure from oil markets and financial panic would allow Tehran to claim it succeeded in setting limits on Washington. Continuing indefinitely without a political horizon could turn military success into an open-ended drain.

Trump is therefore operating in the gray zone between those outcomes: seeking enough strikes to claim a decisive military victory while avoiding the burdens of the “day after” that previous US administrations accepted.

The risk is that this middle path produces only an incomplete victory.

Iran would be weaker but not politically defeated. The war would fade, but its deeper causes would remain.

The coming days will determine not only when the war ends, but also what its ending means: a settlement imposing new realities on Iran, or merely a pause from which the regime emerges wounded yet convinced that oil leverage saved it.

That is the real test facing Trump, not in the number of targets destroyed, but in the kind of ending he ultimately delivers.