Lebanese Central Bank Rejects Proposals to Invest Gold Reserves

A visitor examines the weight of a gold bar at the Banque du Liban Currency Museum (Banque du Liban website).
A visitor examines the weight of a gold bar at the Banque du Liban Currency Museum (Banque du Liban website).
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Lebanese Central Bank Rejects Proposals to Invest Gold Reserves

A visitor examines the weight of a gold bar at the Banque du Liban Currency Museum (Banque du Liban website).
A visitor examines the weight of a gold bar at the Banque du Liban Currency Museum (Banque du Liban website).

The sharp rise in the market value of Lebanon’s gold reserves has sparked renewed debate over their potential use to support the country’s financial recovery. However, the central bank remains firm in its stance against any move to liquidate or invest the reserves, citing strict legal restrictions and the risks of mismanagement.
A senior financial official, speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, acknowledged the significance of these discussions, particularly as the central bank’s updated figures estimate Lebanon’s gold holdings at around $28 billion. However, he emphasized that before considering any new policies, a full qualitative audit of the reserves is necessary to determine their exact value, weight, and historical origins.
Lebanon officially holds approximately 286.8 tons of gold, or 9.25 million ounces. This reserve was accumulated under the 1963 Monetary and Credit Law to back the Lebanese lira. Currently, two-thirds of the gold is stored securely at the central bank in Beirut, while the remaining third is held at Fort Knox in the United States.
Despite the growing interest in leveraging this asset, Lebanese law strictly prohibits any direct or indirect transaction involving the gold. Law No. 42 of 1986 mandates that any sale, leasing, or investment of the reserves must receive explicit approval from Parliament. Acting Central Bank Governor Dr. Wassim Mansouri has reaffirmed this restriction, stating unequivocally: “No matter what happens, I will not sign off on moving even a gram of gold.”
Mansouri also highlighted the dangers of using reserves irresponsibly. Before Lebanon’s financial collapse in late 2019, the central bank held around $33 billion in foreign currency reserves, while gold reserves were valued at $16 billion. The cash reserves were largely depleted through unsustainable subsidy programs, leaving only $8.5 billion today. “We lost one and a half times the value of our gold, and it didn’t solve anything. The idea of using gold is simply not an option,” he said.
While some policymakers argue that investing the gold could generate much-needed revenue, financial experts warn that without proper governance, such a move could lead to further mismanagement. Instead, they stress the need for deeper economic and institutional reforms.
A key priority is securing an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to ensure financial discipline, transparency, and oversight. Any decision regarding the gold reserves would require parliamentary approval and a clear, well-justified plan. However, financial experts argue that Lebanon already possesses vast state-owned assets that, if managed properly, could help close the country’s estimated $72 billion financial gap.
These assets include coastal and riverfront properties, 850 million square meters of state-owned land, high-value real estate in Beirut and other cities, as well as key infrastructure such as electricity, water, telecommunications, ports, and transport networks. Many of these resources remain underutilized due to corruption and inefficiency.

 



Elusive Assassination Target, ‘Shadow Unit’ Founder: Who Is Mohammed al-Sinwar?

An image released by the Israeli military last December shows Mohammed al-Sinwar inside a vehicle in one of Hamas’ tunnels in northern Gaza (Israeli military/Reuters)
An image released by the Israeli military last December shows Mohammed al-Sinwar inside a vehicle in one of Hamas’ tunnels in northern Gaza (Israeli military/Reuters)
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Elusive Assassination Target, ‘Shadow Unit’ Founder: Who Is Mohammed al-Sinwar?

An image released by the Israeli military last December shows Mohammed al-Sinwar inside a vehicle in one of Hamas’ tunnels in northern Gaza (Israeli military/Reuters)
An image released by the Israeli military last December shows Mohammed al-Sinwar inside a vehicle in one of Hamas’ tunnels in northern Gaza (Israeli military/Reuters)

Doubts persist over whether senior Hamas military commander Mohammed al-Sinwar has been killed or survived an alleged Israeli strike, as Israeli officials intensify efforts to confirm his assassination while Hamas remains tight-lipped.

Multiple sources within the group have refused to confirm or deny al-Sinwar’s fate, fueling speculation surrounding the elusive commander, who has a decades-long track record of evading Israeli assassination attempts.

Al-Sinwar, the younger brother of slain Hamas leader Yehya al-Sinwar, has remained a top Israeli target throughout the Gaza war.

Yet, for more than 18 months of fighting, Israel has not officially confirmed a direct strike on him — a fact that reinforces his reputation as a master of disguise and a “high-value, hard-to-detect” target.

Despite a 13-year age gap — Yehya was born in 1962 and Mohammed in 1975 — the two shared not only blood ties but a deep-rooted partnership within Hamas, rising through the ranks together to lead the group’s military and political strategies.

The timing of Israel’s apparent attempt to target al-Sinwar — roughly 24 hours after the release of Israeli-American soldier Edan Alexander — has raised questions about whether the move was a calculated signal or the result of an intelligence breakthrough.

Sources within Hamas and other Gaza-based militant factions declined to confirm or deny whether the operation to recover Alexander was linked to locating al-Sinwar’s suspected hideout.

Tuesday’s intense airstrike, followed by a continued bombardment of the area on Wednesday that created a fire belt to prevent any rescue attempts, suggests Israel believed it was striking a high-value target.

Israel’s use of fire belts in a recent air assault on southern Gaza has drawn comparisons to previous assassination attempts targeting senior figures in Hezbollah and Hamas, including Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah and top Hamas military commanders Marwan Issa, Ahmed al-Ghandour, Bassem Issa and Jamal al-Zebda during the 2021 Gaza war.

On Tuesday night, Israeli warplanes dropped dozens of bombs and missiles on the emergency yard and rear compound of the European Gaza Hospital east of Khan Younis, as well as surrounding areas — with strikes extending up to 500 meters in some directions and about 300 meters in others, according to field sources who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat.

Israeli public broadcaster Kan reported that the attack involved bunker-busting bombs aimed at destroying a suspected underground tunnel network in the area. The strikes targeted multiple tunnel entrances to ensure that anyone hiding inside would be killed, even if not directly hit.

Sources from Gaza-based factions told Asharq Al-Awsat that the location did in fact contain a tunnel system previously damaged in the 2014 war. Hamas’ military wing, Al-Qassam Brigades, reportedly managed to restore the tunnels, which had only suffered minor damage in earlier attacks during the current conflict.

As his role within Hamas expanded, al-Sinwar became a frequent target of Israeli assassination attempts spanning more than two decades.

One of the closest calls came during the 2021 conflict, when he was lightly wounded in a tunnel strike alongside Rafaa Salama, the former commander of Hamas’ Khan Younis Brigade.

Both men survived the attack with minor injuries.

Salama was later killed in an Israeli strike in July, along with Mohammed Deif, Hamas’ elusive military chief, in the coastal al-Mawasi area.

Al-Sinwar has survived at least seven Israeli assassination attempts over the past two decades, according to Hamas sources — a track record that has helped cement his image as one of the group’s most elusive and high-value operatives.

One early attempt came during the Second Intifada, which erupted in September 2000. In 2003, an explosive device was planted in the wall of his home, but he escaped unscathed.

In 2006, an Israeli strike targeted a vehicle believed to be carrying al-Sinwar. He was not inside at the time, and the operation failed — one of several similar attempts over the years.

In 2008, Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that al-Sinwar outwitted Israeli intelligence by manipulating radio communications.

He allegedly used pre-recorded transmissions to give the impression he was speaking live over a two-way radio, prompting Israeli forces to bomb the signal’s location. The attack missed its target — al-Sinwar was never there.

In another reported incident in 2019, local media claimed that al-Sinwar, Salama and other Hamas commanders were the targets of an Israeli commando operation involving a plot to poison and abduct them from a beach in Khan Younis. The Al-Qassam Brigades swiftly denied the report, calling it baseless.

Al-Sinwar is credited with founding the group’s secretive “Shadow Unit,” tasked with guarding high-value captives, including Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, according to Hamas sources who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat.

The unit was established with approval from Mohammed Deif, the elusive commander of Hamas’ armed wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades. Al-Sinwar personally oversaw the formation of its initial core, selecting trusted field operatives from his home city of Khan Younis in southern Gaza.

Al-Sinwar’s central role in the 2006 abduction and concealment of Shalit near the Rafah border prompted the creation of the unit. Sources say it was formed roughly three months after the kidnapping, following several Israeli airstrikes on suspected Shalit hideouts.

The unit’s existence remained classified until 2016 — five years after Shalit’s release in a prisoner swap — when al-Qassam released previously unseen footage of the soldier during his captivity.

According to the same sources, both Deif and al-Sinwar ordered the establishment of the unit, with many of its founding members hailing from the Khan Younis refugee camp.

They included senior field commanders such as Abdul Rahman al-Mubasher, Khaled Abu Bakra, and Mohammed Dawoud — all of whom were later killed in Israeli operations in 2013 and 2021.

Other key figures linked to the unit included Sami al-Humaidah from Rafah, killed in 2008, and Abdullah Labad, a top explosives engineer from Gaza’s al-Shati camp, who was assassinated in 2011 along with his brother Ismail, a senior field operative involved in weapons production and smuggling.

Al-Sinwar continued to expand and develop the Shadow Unit for years, discreetly recruiting new members and enhancing its capabilities. Its full mission only became clearer following the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led assault on southern Israel.

Within Hamas, al-Sinwar has long been seen as the de facto operational commander of the al-Qassam Brigades, sources told Asharq Al-Awsat.

While Deif remained the official general commander, al-Sinwar is believed to have overseen many of the group’s military and administrative portfolios, shaping battlefield tactics and command structures behind the scenes.