After al-Sadr’s Boycott, al-Abadi Withdraws from Iraq’s Upcoming Elections

Former Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announcing victory over Daesh in late 2017 (Archive – Government Media) 
Former Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announcing victory over Daesh in late 2017 (Archive – Government Media) 
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After al-Sadr’s Boycott, al-Abadi Withdraws from Iraq’s Upcoming Elections

Former Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announcing victory over Daesh in late 2017 (Archive – Government Media) 
Former Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announcing victory over Daesh in late 2017 (Archive – Government Media) 

Following the decision by Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s Sadrist Movement to uphold its boycott of Iraq’s parliamentary elections, former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has also announced that his Victory Coalition will withdraw in protest against “political money” and the lack of safeguards to prevent its misuse.

Al-Sadr has repeatedly declared that systemic financial and political corruption is the main reason his movement refuses to participate. Al-Abadi’s coalition echoed similar concerns, saying the upcoming November vote has been overshadowed by unrestrained spending and vote-buying.

Despite efforts by political forces to convince the Sadrists to reconsider, al-Sadr remained resolute. While he did direct his supporters to update their voter records, it is still unclear whether he will ultimately endorse any of the electoral lists reportedly registered under different names by allied groups.

The Victory Coalition formally notified its partners in the National State Forces Alliance that it will not field its own candidates, becoming the second major Shiite bloc to step aside.

In a statement, the coalition said it remains committed to democratic principles but refuses to legitimize an election “driven by political money, lacking serious enforcement of legal measures to prevent manipulation, vote-buying, misuse of public resources, and foreign funding.” The coalition stressed that a political entity’s credibility stems from its conduct, which defines its true influence.

Meanwhile, the Independent High Electoral Commission has begun reviewing candidate lists submitted by parties and alliances after the nomination period closed. Commission spokesperson Imad Jameel confirmed that officials are verifying documents to ensure candidates meet eligibility criteria, with background checks to be completed within 15 days.

As millions of Sadrist supporters face the likelihood of sitting out the election, traditional Shiite factions are positioning themselves as the natural political heirs and preparing to court disillusioned voters, particularly in Baghdad.

Separately, an official source revealed that Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, leader of the Reconstruction and Development Coalition, plans to run about 470 candidates nationwide. Al-Sudani will hold the top slot in Baghdad. Former Speaker of Parliament and Taqaddum leader Mohammed al-Halbousi also plans to contest Baghdad rather than Anbar, seeking to secure a strong Sunni presence in the capital.

These moves signal an intense contest for dominance in Baghdad, as al-Sudani may capitalize on Sadrist absence to expand Shiite support, while al-Halbousi’s campaign could reshape the sectarian balance in Iraq’s political heartland.

 

 

 



France Reaffirms Support for Morocco's Position on Western Sahara

Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita receives French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Jean-Noël Barrot in Essaouira (Moroccan Foreign Ministry)
Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita receives French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Jean-Noël Barrot in Essaouira (Moroccan Foreign Ministry)
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France Reaffirms Support for Morocco's Position on Western Sahara

Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita receives French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Jean-Noël Barrot in Essaouira (Moroccan Foreign Ministry)
Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita receives French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Jean-Noël Barrot in Essaouira (Moroccan Foreign Ministry)

French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot reaffirmed France's unwavering support for Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara on Friday, declaring that the territory's "present and future fall exclusively within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty."

Speaking during talks with his Moroccan counterpart, Nasser Bourita, in the coastal city of Essaouira, Barrot reiterated Paris' full backing for Morocco's autonomy plan as the sole basis for a final political settlement to the regional dispute.

His remarks echoed France's longstanding position, reaffirmed at a UN Security Council meeting on Oct. 30.

Morocco's Foreign Ministry said the talks were part of efforts to put into practice the "Reinforced Exceptional Partnership" signed by King Mohammed VI and French President Emmanuel Macron on Oct. 28, 2024, a framework designed to strengthen bilateral ties and expand cooperation across multiple sectors.

The ministers welcomed the growing momentum in relations between Rabat and Paris, praising their strong ties of friendship and cooperation as a reflection of both leaders' determination to deepen their strategic partnership and make it more effective.

They reviewed cooperation in politics, trade, culture and humanitarian affairs, exploring ways to broaden ties in line with both countries' aspirations.

Turning to regional and international affairs, Barrot and Bourita welcomed their shared positions on key issues, particularly developments in the Middle East and prospects for implementing a two-state solution.

Both countries renewed their commitment to pursuing a just, comprehensive and lasting peace, while maintaining close coordination to advance security, stability and development across the Maghreb, the Sahel and the Mediterranean.

Barrot traveled to Morocco to attend a high-level session of the 2026 World Forum of Women for Peace, organized by the association Les Guerrières de la Paix in Essaouira.

His visit also included talks with senior Moroccan officials, visits to French cultural and educational institutions in the city and a meeting with representatives of the French community.


Damascus Moves to Reconnect Aleppo Countryside, End a Decade of Territorial Division

Preparations for the launch of the second phase of the “Echo of Resilience 2” project in Manbij (Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management)
Preparations for the launch of the second phase of the “Echo of Resilience 2” project in Manbij (Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management)
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Damascus Moves to Reconnect Aleppo Countryside, End a Decade of Territorial Division

Preparations for the launch of the second phase of the “Echo of Resilience 2” project in Manbij (Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management)
Preparations for the launch of the second phase of the “Echo of Resilience 2” project in Manbij (Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management)

A convoy of Syrian army heavy machinery headed to Manbij in northern Syria on Saturday to help tear down wartime earthen barriers and fill trenches stretching 841 kilometers across 255 cities and villages, in a drive to erase former frontlines and reunite areas divided by years of conflict.

The operation, in eastern Aleppo province, aims to consolidate state authority and reintegrate the affected areas administratively and economically.

Syria's Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management, which oversees the "Echo of Resilience" project in cooperation with Aleppo governorate, said the campaign would dismantle military fortifications, clear their remnants, rehabilitate damaged areas and reopen roads between towns and villages.

The ministry said the work would improve public services and help restore normal life and stability in the affected areas.

The project's second phase began on Thursday in Manbij and its surrounding countryside and is expected to last seven months. It aims to make the area safer by clearing landmines and other remnants of war, allowing displaced residents to return home and farmers to reclaim access to their fields and resume cultivation.

The new phase follows an initial operation launched in early July around Azaz in northern Aleppo province, seven kilometers from the Turkish border.

That phase concluded on Nov. 12 after crews cleared 202 kilometers of earthen barriers and trenches, reconnecting about 33 towns and villages and easing civilian movement.

Manbij's Divided Past

The work in Manbij carries particular political and geographical weight. Before the fall of the former government, the city and its surroundings were a volatile meeting point for three rival military forces.

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Manbij Military Council controlled the city and surrounding areas, while Turkish-backed Syrian National Army factions held positions to the north and west. Forces of the former government, backed by Russia and Iran, were stationed to the south.

The rival deployments left hundreds of kilometers of trenches, double-layered earthen barriers and minefields along four main fronts.

The fortifications stretched from the Sajur River toward Jarablus in the north, through the area around Arima toward al-Bab in the west, and from Abu Kahf toward Deir Hafir in the south to the vicinity of Tishrin Dam and Qara Qozak Bridge on the Euphrates River's western bank in the east.

Removing those defenses is intended to reopen vital transport and trade routes linking eastern and northern Aleppo and restore access to farmland that had been isolated or off-limits for years.

From Military Frontlines to State Control

The two phases of the "Echo of Resilience" project coincide with efforts to implement a Jan. 29, 2026, agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF.

The agreement seeks to end territorial divisions, integrate the affected areas administratively and economically, extend state control across Syria and ensure the return of forcibly displaced people and other residents once suitable conditions are in place.

Around Azaz, once a flashpoint along the frontlines facing Tal Rifaat and Afrin, the removal of earthen barriers marked a practical step toward dismantling former lines of confrontation and reconnecting Syrian territory, officials overseeing the project told the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA).

Observers of Syrian affairs say the dismantling of military fortifications by Syrian army units in a strategic area such as Manbij sends a clear political message: the state is consolidating control on the ground while reducing the military presence in residential and agricultural areas.

They say the shift could also strengthen border security and revive regional trade.


How Will the Showdown Between al-Zaidi and Kataib Hezbollah End?

Members of Iraq's Kataib Hezbollah carry the group's flag in central Baghdad (AFP)
Members of Iraq's Kataib Hezbollah carry the group's flag in central Baghdad (AFP)
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How Will the Showdown Between al-Zaidi and Kataib Hezbollah End?

Members of Iraq's Kataib Hezbollah carry the group's flag in central Baghdad (AFP)
Members of Iraq's Kataib Hezbollah carry the group's flag in central Baghdad (AFP)

A two-week standoff between Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi and Kataib Hezbollah has erupted into a public war of accusations, complicating government efforts to bring the weapons of Iran-backed armed groups under state control.

Tensions flared after leaked intelligence reports accused Kataib Hezbollah of smuggling thousands of barrels of oil extracted from Jurf al-Sakhar, south of Baghdad. The group has controlled the area for nearly a decade, barring successive governments from entering.

On Friday, the government sent a committee headed by the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) to investigate the smuggling allegations.

Lieutenant General Saad Maan, head of Iraq's Security Media Cell, said neither political parties nor armed factions were represented on the committee investigating the smuggling of petroleum products in Jurf al-Sakhar.

A senior official in the ruling Shiite Coordination Framework told Asharq Al-Awsat that the investigation into Kataib Hezbollah's alleged oil sales marked the first government move on the ground inside the restricted area controlled by the group.

Iran's patronage

Kataib Hezbollah was founded after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who was killed in a US strike near Baghdad International Airport in early 2020 alongside Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The Coordination Framework official said the group's strength and influence could not be understood without examining its ties to its Iranian patron.

Successive governments had largely failed to confront Kataib Hezbollah or enter Jurf al-Sakhar because of the power it drew from its close ties with Tehran, the official said, describing it as the spearhead of factions loyal to Iran's doctrine of guardianship of the Islamic jurist.

Despite a lack of reliable figures on its fighters and weapons, the official warned against underestimating the group's military strength.

Kataib Hezbollah has a sizable arsenal of rockets and drones, the official said, without specifying their types or numbers.

But Iran's financial backing was largely limited to the group's early years, the source said. Over the past few years, Kataib Hezbollah has developed a network of financial interests of its own, potentially including oil investment or theft.

The group also receives substantial funding from the PMF through three brigades under its command.

The official warned that the standoff with al-Zaidi's government had reached a dangerous point, raising serious alarm within the Coordination Framework.

Senior Shiite leaders were working intensively to avert a possible confrontation between the government and Kataib Hezbollah, the official said.

Taking on armed factions

Will al-Zaidi see the confrontation through?

Political analyst Akeel Abbas believes the prime minister has already gone further than any of his predecessors in confronting armed factions over their weapons.

Al-Zaidi has not only openly challenged one of Iraq's most powerful armed groups but also exposed corruption cases in Jurf al-Sakhar, an area of exceptional geographical and political sensitivity, Abbas told Asharq Al-Awsat.

"The decision to confront the group has already been made," Abbas said, although the nature of that confrontation could change as events unfold.

The Coordination Framework's influence over the dispute appears to be waning, he said, with its traditional role as mediator between the prime minister and armed factions no longer as effective as before.

Abbas called the latest standoff a significant development that challenged a long-standing assumption in Iraqi politics: any prime minister who confronted armed factions would be ousted.

US backing and the judiciary

Two factors have strengthened al-Zaidi's hand, according to Abbas: US backing at a time when Iran is grappling with acute weakness and turmoil, and support from Iraq's judiciary.

Together, he said, they have made the difference in the confrontation.

Still, Abbas did not rule out a retreat by the prime minister.

Under current circumstances, al-Zaidi appears to hold the stronger position against Kataib Hezbollah, a striking reversal in Iraqi politics, he said.

But backing down would be difficult for the prime minister, making a political deal between the two sides the more likely outcome as both seek to avoid defeat.

No clear strategy

Ayad al-Anbar, a political science professor at the University of Baghdad, is less convinced by the government's campaign to bring armed groups' weapons under state control.

He questioned whether the government has a coherent strategy for disarming the factions or confronting Kataib Hezbollah.

"The government's strategy for bringing weapons under state control remains unclear," Anbar told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Instead, he said, authorities rely on short-term tactics that shift with events and the reactions they provoke.

There is little sign of a clearly defined plan, with successive steps or contingency options, he said. Government measures trigger responses from armed factions, only for tensions to ease and the escalation to be contained.

Anbar said the same pattern applied to the government's latest pressure tactic: economic pressure.

The confrontation with Kataib Hezbollah and the wider disarmament issue have become exercises in political sparring and shows of force rather than a serious debate over a fundamental problem, he said.

The Iraqi state's fragility inevitably weakens its security system and allows competing centers of power and control to emerge, Anbar argued.

"In a country of political fiefdoms, why wouldn't those with weapons seek to become security fiefdoms themselves?" he asked.

That, he said, explains a fundamental part of the problem.