The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
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The End of a Forced Coexistence: Arab Tribes Turn Against the Syrian Democratic Forces in Eastern Syria

Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)
Armed clashes between Arab tribal fighters and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Manbij area of northern Syria in September 2023 (Getty)

In Syria’s vast northeastern areas, a brittle arrangement has for years held together an uneasy coexistence between the Arab tribes and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). But today, that arrangement appears closer than ever to unraveling, as mounting grievances and shifting regional dynamics converge to end what many tribal leaders now call a “forced coexistence.”

Over the past months, prominent Arab tribal leaders have stepped up their denunciations of the SDF, accusing it of discrimination, repression, and siphoning off the region’s natural wealth. These tensions have erupted into public declarations, including a striking statement in early July, in which elders from major tribes in Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and al-Hasakah demanded that the US-led international coalition end its support for the SDF.

From Tactical Alliance to Deep Estrangement

When the SDF first emerged in 2015 - formed largely by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) but incorporating Arab and Christian militias - many Arab tribes regarded it as a necessary partner against ISIS. After all, the militant group had rampaged through tribal lands, massacring communities and imposing draconian rule. For a time, this partnership worked: from 2015 to 2017, tribes like the Shammar, Baggara, and parts of the Aqeedat fought shoulder-to-shoulder with Kurdish forces in a shared struggle against ISIS.

But as the warfronts cooled, new frictions emerged. Arab leaders began to accuse the SDF of marginalizing them politically and economically, imposing ideologically charged school curricula, conscripting young men and boys, and monopolizing oil and wheat revenues.

By 2018 and 2019, large protests against mandatory conscription and perceived ethnic bias erupted across the region. Still, the SDF retained an aura of indispensability, its American backing and battlefield record insulating it from more serious challenges.
Today, that insulation is wearing thin.

The most recent wave of anger began in June 2025, when an SDF fighter shot and killed 11-year-old Farid al-Hureish in the town of Abu Hardoub. Days later, another boy, Ali al-Awni, died after SDF forces opened fire as he gathered wheat near a checkpoint. Such incidents are far from isolated. Local monitors and human rights groups have documented kidnappings, forced recruitment of minors through the Revolutionary Youth organization, and heavy financial levies on families seeking exemptions from military service.

In a recent interview, Nasser Hammoud al-Faraj, a prominent sheikh from the Boushaban tribe, said these abuses had created a “boiling point” across the region: “The people have lived for years under repression, exclusion, and humiliation,” he said. “This is not a foreign agenda; our tribes themselves demanded this declaration.”

Indeed, the July statement signed by 14 tribal dignitaries did not mince words. It accused the SDF of “systematic oppression,” destabilization, and theft of resources. Addressed to the US government, the declaration called for an end to military and political support for the SDF and for Syria’s central government to reassert sovereignty over the entire northeast.

Though much Western coverage portrays the SDF as a unified Kurdish force, it is in fact a complex coalition. Alongside the YPG, it includes Arab formations such as the Sanadid Forces - historically loyal to the Shammar tribe - and the Deir ez-Zor Military Council, which incorporated Arab fighters from the Aqeedat and Baggara. Yet these same tribal networks are now fracturing.

A dramatic illustration came in 2023, when the SDF arrested Ahmed al-Khabil (Abu Khawla), leader of the Deir ez-Zor Military Council. That move shattered remaining loyalty among many Arab factions. “From that moment, the last shreds of trust began to disappear,” says al-Faraj.

To complicate matters further, some tribes and sub-clans remain aligned with the SDF, while others are in contact with Damascus. Even within a single tribe, families may be divided: some serving in SDF structures, others quietly supporting the Syrian government, and still others advocating autonomy or neutrality.

This tangle of loyalties is not new. For generations, tribal allegiances have shifted according to local interests, personal rivalries, and broader geopolitical currents. But according to tribal leaders, the balance is tipping decisively away from cooperation with the SDF.

While recent tribal declarations have emphasized peaceful solutions, the language has also grown more menacing. Sheikh al-Faraj said plainly that if diplomatic avenues fail, tribes may pursue military action: “We do not seek conflict for its own sake,” he said. “But we cannot accept the occupation of our lands. We will act if necessary, with our own forces and with others who share our vision.”

To that end, tribal networks have quietly reorganized self-defense groups and explored links with Damascus. While the SDF still controls the bulk of the region militarily, the Syrian government has positioned itself as a potential guarantor of tribal rights and national unity.

In the past year, official Syrian media - long restrained in its references to the SDF - has begun openly condemning it as an occupying force. Even Governor Ghassan al-Sayyed Ahmad of Deir ez-Zor, typically cautious in public remarks, confirmed that Damascus retains military options: “If negotiations fail,” he warned in late June, “we have three fully prepared divisions ready to intervene.”

Strategic Calculations: Damascus, Washington, and Ankara

For the United States, this tribal rupture represents a profound dilemma. The SDF has been Washington’s main counterterrorism partner against ISIS. US officials, including Special Envoy Thomas Barrack, have repeatedly stressed that their cooperation is based on combating extremism rather than endorsing any project of Kurdish autonomy. But tribal grievances are testing this posture.

While the Biden administration has so far avoided any direct condemnation of the SDF, it has privately urged Kurdish commanders to moderate their policies. According to multiple regional sources, US diplomats have warned that continued abuses could undermine the entire anti-ISIS coalition and trigger Turkish or Syrian intervention.

Türkiye, for its part, has consistently opposed any Kurdish-led administration along its border. Turkish leaders have threatened new incursions if the SDF attempts to formalize autonomy or establish closer ties with the PKK. Analysts believe that any large-scale tribal uprising would likely draw tacit Turkish support, especially if it further weakens Kurdish positions.

To contain the crisis, the SDF has resorted to tactical concessions. In the aftermath of the 2023 clashes, it released waves of detainees, some of whom were arrested for allegedly supporting ISIS, others simply for joining tribal protests. The releases continued sporadically into mid-2025, culminating in a large-scale exchange in April: 140 SDF captives for 100 prisoners held by Syrian government forces.

While these deals have bought time, they have not erased deep resentment. Many tribes now insist that only the full restoration of Syrian state authority can bring stability.

Beyond military options, Arab tribes have begun constructing new political frameworks. In April, tribal elites announced the creation of the “Council for Cooperation and Coordination in Jazira and the Euphrates,” aimed at unifying tribal voices against what they called SDF “hegemony.” In founding statements, council leaders vowed to reject any attempt by the SDF to claim representation of Arab communities in negotiations with Damascus or in international forums.

This reflects a broader evolution in tribal political consciousness. Where once many leaders accepted limited accommodation with the SDF, they now see prolonged Kurdish-led rule as an existential threat to Arab identity, economic rights, and local governance.

The northeastern region is a mosaic. In Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, Arabs form overwhelming majorities, organized in centuries-old confederations like the Aqeedat, Baggara, and Jubur. In al-Hasakah, the picture is more mixed: Arabs dominate much of the countryside, while Kurds are concentrated in urban centers such as Qamishli and Ras al-Ain. Christian Assyrian and Syriac communities add further complexity, as do smaller minorities of Turkmen, Circassians, and Armenians.

Any future political arrangement - whether federal, autonomous, or unitary - will have to balance these identities. The head of the Research Unit at the London-based Abaad Center for Strategic Studies, Syrian researcher Firas Faham, said: “The region is a dormant volcano. If there is no comprehensive settlement, conflict is inevitable.”

End of the Era of Forced Coexistence

In recent weeks, this metaphorical volcano has rumbled ever louder. Syrian state media and official statements now refer openly to “the occupation” by SDF forces. Behind closed doors, discussions are underway among Damascus, Moscow, and even Ankara about a possible reconfiguration of control.

Mudar Hammoud al-Assad, chairman of the Supreme Council of Syrian Tribes and Clans, told Asharq al-Awsat that the SDF’s options are narrowing: “After the American envoy clearly stated that the only legitimate interlocutor is the Syrian government, the SDF is exposed. They may face military action with tacit American and Turkish approval.”

Even if open war does not break out, tribal consensus against the SDF has never been stronger. What once was a tactical alliance, born of necessity in the struggle against ISIS, has become a marriage of deep resentment.

Despite the historical differences among the tribes, the growing resentment over marginalization, arbitrary arrests, and other grievances appears to have unified a tribal discourse demanding the return of the Syrian Army. Options remain suspended between negotiations and military confrontation, especially in light of official Syrian statements about the readiness of government forces.

This escalation places the international coalition in a delicate balancing act between supporting its ally, the Syrian Democratic Forces - whose local legitimacy is increasingly contested - and responding to tribal pressures warning of a potential explosion of unrest, something Washington does not want and is actively trying to prevent.



Why Pakistan Has Emerged as a Mediator between US and Iran

FILE PHOTO: US President Donald Trump looks at Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif speaking following the official signing of the first phase of the Gaza ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, during a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, October 13, 2025. REUTERS/Evelyn Hockstein/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: US President Donald Trump looks at Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif speaking following the official signing of the first phase of the Gaza ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, during a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, October 13, 2025. REUTERS/Evelyn Hockstein/File Photo
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Why Pakistan Has Emerged as a Mediator between US and Iran

FILE PHOTO: US President Donald Trump looks at Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif speaking following the official signing of the first phase of the Gaza ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, during a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, October 13, 2025. REUTERS/Evelyn Hockstein/File Photo
FILE PHOTO: US President Donald Trump looks at Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif speaking following the official signing of the first phase of the Gaza ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, during a world leaders' summit on ending the Gaza war, in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, October 13, 2025. REUTERS/Evelyn Hockstein/File Photo

As fears of a wider regional conflict escalate following US and Israeli strikes on Iran that began in late February, Pakistan has emerged as an unexpected mediator, offering to help bring Washington and Tehran to the negotiating table.

Islamabad isn't often called on to act as an intermediary in high-stakes diplomacy, but it's stepped into the role this time for a number of reasons, both because it has relatively good ties with both Washington and Tehran and because it has a lot at stake in seeing the war resolved.

Pakistani government officials have said that their public peace effort follows weeks of quiet diplomacy, though they have provided few details. They have also said that Islamabad stands ready to host talks between representatives from the US and Iran.

Here's what to know about Pakistan's mediation effort:

Pakistan helped US deliver 15-point plan to Iran

Pakistan’s role in Iran-US negotiations surfaced only days ago following media reports. Officials in Islamabad later acknowledged that a US proposal had been conveyed to Iran.

It remains unclear who has served as Iran’s point of contact in the indirect talks. Iran has maintained it has not held such talks and dismissed the US proposal, but Tehran has acknowledged responding with its own proposals.

According to Pakistani officials, US messages are being passed to Iran and Iranian responses relayed to Washington, though they did not specify how the process is being handled or who is directly communicating with whom. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said this week that Türkiye and Egypt are also working behind the scenes to bring the sides to the negotiating table.

Abdullah Khan, managing director of the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies, said that Pakistani’s mediation efforts may be contributing to relative restraint in the conflict. He noted that US President Donald Trump has delayed his threats of large-scale attacks on Iran’s energy infrastructure citing diplomatic progress, and Iranian responses toward US interests in the Gulf have been measured in what may be an effort to preserve space for diplomacy.

Ties with both US and Iran set Pakistan up for new role

Previous US-Iran negotiations have been facilitated mainly by countries in the Middle East, including Oman and Qatar, but as they come under Iranian fire during the war Pakistan has stepped into the role.

Analysts say Pakistan’s geographic proximity to Iran — it’s one of its neighbors — coupled with its longstanding ties with the US, gives it a unique position at a time when direct communication between the two sides remains constrained.

Islamabad has good working relations with most of the key parties in the war, including both the US and Iran. It has close strategic ties with Gulf states including Saudi Arabia, with which it signed a defense cooperation agreement last year. However, Pakistan has no diplomatic relations with Israel because of the lingering issue of Palestinian statehood.

Relations between the United States and Pakistan have improved since last year, with increased diplomatic engagement and expanding economic ties. Pakistan also joined Trump's Board of Peace, which aims to ensure peace in Gaza.

Pakistan has a lot at stake in ceasefire talks

The conflict poses some of “the biggest economic and energy security challenges” in Pakistan’s history, said Islamabad-based security analyst Syed Mohammad Ali.

The country gets most of its oil and gas from the Middle East — and, he said, the five million Pakistanis working in the Arab world send home remittances each year roughly equal to the country’s total export earnings.

Rising tensions have already contributed to higher global oil prices, forcing Pakistan to increase fuel prices by about 20% and putting pressure on the government of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s government.

The war is also adding to domestic turmoil, even as Pakistan has been grappling for months with its own conflict with neighboring Afghanistan. Islamabad has accused the country's Taliban government of tolerating militant groups that are behind attacks in Pakistan.

Earlier this month, protests erupted across the country following US strikes on Iran, with demonstrators clashing with security forces in several cities.

A day after the United States and Israel attacked Iran, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, clashes erupted in Pakistan’s southern port city of Karachi and in parts of the north, leaving at least 22 people dead and more than 120 injured nationwide.

At least 12 people were killed in and around the US Consulate in Karachi after a mob breached the compound and attempted to set it on fire.

Khamenei was a central religious and political figure for Shiites worldwide, including in Pakistan.

Pakistan has a record as a mediator

While Pakistan rarely serves as a mediator, its record does include playing a role in some very high-profile talks.

Pakistan’s then-President Gen. Yahya Khan facilitated backchannel contacts that led to US President Richard Nixon’s historic 1972 visit to China. That paved the way for the establishment of diplomatic ties between Washington and Beijing in 1979.


With Top Figures Dead, Who Is Now Running Iran?

A woman holds a poster depicting Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei during an anti-US and anti-Israeli rally, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Tehran, Iran, March 26, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters
A woman holds a poster depicting Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei during an anti-US and anti-Israeli rally, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Tehran, Iran, March 26, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters
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With Top Figures Dead, Who Is Now Running Iran?

A woman holds a poster depicting Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei during an anti-US and anti-Israeli rally, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Tehran, Iran, March 26, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters
A woman holds a poster depicting Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei during an anti-US and anti-Israeli rally, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Tehran, Iran, March 26, 2026. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via Reuters

Iran's veteran ‌supreme leader and a host of other top figures and Revolutionary Guards commanders have been killed in US-Israeli strikes, but the ruling system has maintained its ability to strategize and operate in the war that began on February 28.

Born from a 1979 revolution, the Iranian regime built a complex power structure with layered institutions buttressed by a shared commitment to the survival of the theocratic system rather than relying on a small number of individuals.

Here is a guide to who now wields power and influence in a depleted but resilient hierarchy:

IS THE SUPREME LEADER REALLY IN CHARGE?

Iran's veteran Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed in one of the first strikes of the war. In office since 1989 he enjoyed unquestioning obedience throughout the system and the last say on all major issues.

Under Iran's official ideology of velayat-e faqih, or “rule of the Islamic jurist”, the supreme leader is a learned cleric wielding temporal power on behalf of Shiite Islam's 12th imam, who disappeared in the ninth century.

The leader's office, known as the bayt, has a large staff that shadows other parts of Iran's government, allowing the leader to intervene directly across the bureaucracy.

The new leader, Khamenei's son Mojtaba, has inherited the role and its extensive formal powers, but he lacks the automatic authority enjoyed by his father.

The choice of the Revolutionary Guards, he may also be beholden to the hardline military corps.

He was wounded in ‌the strikes, and has ‌been referred to on state TV as a "janbaz", or "wounded veteran" of the current conflict.

More than three weeks after ‌his appointment ⁠he has not been ⁠seen in any photograph or video clip by Iranians and has only issued two written statements, raising questions over his condition.

HOW CENTRAL IS THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CORPS?

The Guards have been growing in influence for decades, but in the midst of a war and after the killing of Ali Khamenei and installation of Mojtaba Khamenei, they have assumed an even more central role in strategic decision-making.

Long prepared to withstand decapitation of their leadership, the Guards have a "mosaic" organizational structure with a line of replacements already named for each commander, and every unit able to operate independently according to set plans.

Many top-ranking Guards commanders were killed early on - following a long list of senior commanders killed in strikes last year - but they have been replaced with other experienced men who have so far proven able to manage a complex war effort.

That resilience reflects the command depth of a corps that took the ⁠lead in the devastating 1980-88 war with Iraq and has spearheaded Iran's close involvement with groups fighting in a host ‌of other conflicts around the Middle East for decades.

WHAT ROLE DOES THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP PLAY?

Iran's political system ‌merges clerical rule with an elected president and parliament, and they all have a significant role in running the country along with the Guards.

The killing of the late Khamenei's ‌main adviser Ali Larijani was a real blow to the ruling authorities given his extensive experience, his ability to operate between Iran's different power centers and his skills ‌negotiating with the outside world.

Other capable, experienced political figures remain but the more prominent ones likely to step into the shoes of Larijani and other assassinated individuals may be more hardline than those who have been killed.

The death of Revolutionary Guards naval head Alireza Tangsiri, an experienced commander in place since 2018, was another significant blow. Tangsiri had reportedly played a significant part in Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

WHO ARE SOME OF THE BIG NAMES LEFT?

Revolutionary Guards head Ahmad Vahidi: The corps' latest commander was appointed after his two immediate predecessors were ‌killed. Influential in the Guards for years, he fought in the Iran-Iraq war, ran the Qods Force, served as defense minister and helped crush internal dissent.

Revolutionary Guards' Quds Force chief Esmail Qaani: A secretive figure, he has ⁠managed Iran's ties with proxies and allies across ⁠the region since taking over the unit in 2020 when its veteran leader Qassem Soleimani was killed by a US drone strike ordered by US President Donald Trump.

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf: A former Revolutionary Guards commander, Tehran mayor and failed presidential candidate, Qalibaf may be the biggest political heavyweight still alive. He has been increasingly vocal over recent weeks, setting out Iran's stance as the war has developed and was said by an Israeli official and a source familiar with the matter to have been negotiating with the US over recent days.

Judiciary Head Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejei: A former intelligence head sanctioned for his role in the deadly repression of mass protests in 2009, Mohseni-Ejei is widely seen as a hardliner.

President Masoud Pezeshkian: While Iran's presidency is far less important than it once was, Pezeshkian is the most senior directly elected figure in Iran, giving him an important voice. The limits of his influence were starkly illustrated earlier this month when he incurred the Guards' ire by apologizing to Gulf states for Iranian attacks on their territory and he had to partially retract his comments.

Former Supreme National Security chief Saeed Jalili: An injured veteran of the Iran-Iraq war and one of the most hardline figures in Iranian politics, he was the losing 2024 presidential candidate and uncompromising former nuclear negotiator.

Guardian Council member Alireza Arafi: The senior cleric is a leading member of the Guardian Council, the body that chooses which candidates to exclude from elections, and was so well trusted that he was chosen to join the three-man interim council running Iran after Khamenei's death.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi: The veteran diplomat has conducted high-stakes negotiations with Iran's Western foes for years, as well as with global powers Russia and China, which have a better relationship with Tehran, and with Iran's Arab neighbors and rivals.


Report: Iran Hardliners Ramp up Calls for a Nuclear Bomb

A satellite imagery taken on February 1, 2026, shows a new roof over a previously destroyed building at Isfahan nuclear site, Iran. (2026 PLANET LABS PBC/Handout via Reuters)
A satellite imagery taken on February 1, 2026, shows a new roof over a previously destroyed building at Isfahan nuclear site, Iran. (2026 PLANET LABS PBC/Handout via Reuters)
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Report: Iran Hardliners Ramp up Calls for a Nuclear Bomb

A satellite imagery taken on February 1, 2026, shows a new roof over a previously destroyed building at Isfahan nuclear site, Iran. (2026 PLANET LABS PBC/Handout via Reuters)
A satellite imagery taken on February 1, 2026, shows a new roof over a previously destroyed building at Isfahan nuclear site, Iran. (2026 PLANET LABS PBC/Handout via Reuters)

The debate among Iranian hardliners over whether Tehran should seek a nuclear bomb in defiance of an escalating US-Israeli attack is getting louder, more public and more insistent, sources in the country say.

With the Revolutionary Guards now dominant following the killing of veteran Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei at the start of the war on February 28, hardline views on Iran's nuclear approach are in the ascendant, two senior Iranian sources said according to Reuters.

While Western countries have long believed that Iran wants the bomb - or at least the ability to make one very quickly - it has always denied that, saying Khamenei had banned nuclear arms as forbidden in Islam and citing its membership of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

There was no plan to change Iran's nuclear doctrine yet and Iran had not decided to seek a bomb, one of the sources said, but serious voices in the establishment were questioning the existing policy and demanding a change.

The US-Israeli attacks on Iran, which came midway through talks on Tehran's nuclear program, may have changed the equation, convincing Iranian ‌strategists that they ‌have little to gain by forswearing a bomb or staying in the NPT.

HARDLINER STANCE

The idea ‌of ⁠quitting the NPT - ⁠something hardliners have previously threatened - has been increasingly aired on state media along with the idea - once taboo in public - that Iran should go outright for the bomb.

The Tasnim News Agency, which is affiliated with the Guards, on Thursday published an article saying Iran should withdraw from the NPT as soon as possible while sticking with a civilian nuclear program.

Hardline politician Mohammad Javad Larijani, brother of senior official Ali Larijani who was killed in a strike this month, was quoted by state media this week urging Iran to suspend its membership of the NPT.

"The NPT should be suspended. We should form a committee to assess whether the NPT is of any use to us at all. If it ⁠proves useful, we will return to it. If not, they can keep it," he said.

Earlier in ‌the month, state television aired a segment with conservative commentator Nasser Torabi in ‌which he said the Iranian public demanded: "We need to act in order to build a nuclear weapon. Either we build it or we acquire ‌it."

Nuclear policy has also been a subject of private discussion in ruling circles, said the two sources, adding that there ‌was divergence between harder line elements including the Guards and those in the political hierarchy over the wisdom of such a move.

To be sure, Iranian officials have threatened in the past to reconsider membership of the NPT as a negotiating tactic during more than two decades of talks with the West over Iran's nuclear program without ever having done so.

The more public debate may represent just such a tactic. It is also far from clear ‌how quickly Iran might be able to push for a bomb after suffering weeks of air strikes on its nuclear, ballistic and other scientific facilities and after a shorter air campaign ⁠by Israel and the United ⁠States last year.

Israel had repeatedly warned over many years that Iran was only months away from being able to make a nuclear bomb, citing intelligence reports, Tehran's enrichment of uranium needed for a warhead almost to weapons grade, and its ballistics program.

NO CHANGE TO NUCLEAR POLICY YET

Analysts have said the country's goal has been to attain the status of a "threshold state" - able to produce a bomb quickly if needed but without incurring the pariah status that could come with the weapon itself.

Guards commanders and other senior figures had in the past warned that Iran would have to go straight for a bomb if the regime survival was threatened - a condition that the present war may meet.

Khamenei's fatwa, or religious opinion, that nuclear weapons were not permissible in Islam, was made in the early 2000s, though never issued in written form. Khamenei reiterated it in 2019.

One of the two senior Iranian sources said that with Khamenei's death and that of Ali Larijani, who the source said had also pushed back against hardliners, it was becoming more difficult to counter the more hawkish arguments.

It was also not clear whether the obligation to obey Khamenei's unwritten fatwa survived his death, though it would likely remain valid unless revoked by the new supreme leader - his son Mojtaba Khamenei, who has not been seen in public since the death of his father.