To Get Their Own Cash, People in Gaza Must Pay Middlemen a 40% Cut

A destroyed branch of the Bank of Palestine in the Tal al-Hawa neighborhood of Gaza City is seen Wednesday, July 9, 2025. (AP)
A destroyed branch of the Bank of Palestine in the Tal al-Hawa neighborhood of Gaza City is seen Wednesday, July 9, 2025. (AP)
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To Get Their Own Cash, People in Gaza Must Pay Middlemen a 40% Cut

A destroyed branch of the Bank of Palestine in the Tal al-Hawa neighborhood of Gaza City is seen Wednesday, July 9, 2025. (AP)
A destroyed branch of the Bank of Palestine in the Tal al-Hawa neighborhood of Gaza City is seen Wednesday, July 9, 2025. (AP)

Cash is the lifeblood of the Gaza Strip’s shattered economy, and like all other necessities in this war-torn territory — food, fuel, medicine — it is in extremely short supply.

With nearly every bank branch and ATM inoperable, people have become reliant on an unrestrained network of powerful cash brokers to get money for daily expenses and commissions on those transactions have soared to about 40%.

"The people are crying blood because of this," said Ayman al-Dahdouh, a school director living in Gaza City. "It’s suffocating us, starving us."

At a time of surging inflation, high unemployment and dwindling savings, the scarcity of cash has magnified the financial squeeze on families — some of whom have begun to sell their possessions to buy essential goods.

The cash that is available has even lost some of its luster. Palestinians use the Israeli currency, the shekel, for most transactions. Yet with Israel no longer resupplying the territory with newly printed bank notes, merchants are increasingly reluctant to accept frayed bills.

Gaza’s punishing cash crunch has several root causes, experts say.

To curtail Hamas’ ability to purchase weapons and pay its fighters, Israel stopped allowing cash to enter Gaza at the start of the war. Around the same time, many wealthy families in Gaza withdrew their money from banks and then fled the territory. And rising fears about Gaza’s financial system prompted foreign businesses selling goods into the territory to demand cash payments.

As Gaza’s money supply dwindled and civilians’ desperation mounted, cash brokers' commissions — around 5% at the start of the war — skyrocketed.

Someone needing cash transfers money electronically to a broker and moments later is handed a fraction of that amount in bills. Many brokers openly advertise their services, while others are more secretive. Some grocers and retailers have also begun exchanging cash for their customers.

"If I need $60, I need to transfer $100," said Mohammed Basheer al-Farra, who lives in southern Gaza after being displaced from Khan Younis. "This is the only way we can buy essentials, like flour and sugar. We lose nearly half of our money just to be able to spend it."

In 2024, inflation in Gaza surged by 230%, according to the World Bank. It dropped slightly during the ceasefire that began in January, only to shoot up again after Israel backed out of the truce in March.

Cash touches every aspect of life in Gaza

About 80% of people in Gaza were unemployed at the end of 2024, according to the World Bank, and the figure is likely higher now. Those with jobs are mostly paid by direct deposits into their bank accounts.

But "when you want to buy vegetables, food, water, medication -- if you want to take transportation, or you need a blanket, or anything — you must use cash," al-Dahdouh said.

Shahid Ajjour’s family has been living off of savings for two years after the pharmacy and another business they owned were ruined by the war.

"We had to sell everything just to get cash," said Ajjour, who sold her gold to buy flour and canned beans. The family of eight spends the equivalent of $12 every two days on flour; before the war, that cost less than $4.

Sugar is very expensive, costing the equivalent of $80-$100 per kilogram (2.2 pounds), multiple people said; before the war, that cost less than $2.

Gasoline is about $25 a liter, or roughly $95 a gallon, when paying the lower, cash price.

Bills are worn and unusable

The bills in Gaza are tattered after 21 months of war.

Money is so fragile, it feels as if it is going to melt in your hands, said Mohammed al-Awini, who lives in a tent camp in southern Gaza.

Small business owners said they were under pressure to ask customers for undamaged cash because their suppliers demand pristine bills from them.

Thaeir Suhwayl, a flour merchant in Deir al-Balah, said his suppliers recently demanded he pay them only with brand new 200-shekel ($60) bank notes, which he said are rare. Most civilians pay him with 20-shekel ($6) notes that are often in poor condition.

On a recent visit to the market, Ajjour transferred the shekel equivalent of around $100 to a cash broker and received around $50 in return. But when she tried to buy some household supplies from a merchant, she was turned away because the bills weren’t in good condition.

"So the worth of your $50 is zero in the end," she said.

This problem has given rise to a new business in Gaza: money repair. It costs between 3 and 10 shekels ($1-$3) to mend old bank notes. But even cash repaired with tape or other means is sometimes rejected.

People are at the mercy of cash brokers

After most of the banks closed in the early days of the war, those with large reserves of cash suddenly had immense power.

"People are at their mercy," said Mahmoud Aqel, who has been displaced from his home in southern Gaza. "No one can stop them."

The war makes it impossible to regulate market prices and exchange rates, said Dalia Alazzeh, an expert in finance and accounting at the University of the West of Scotland. "Nobody can physically monitor what’s happening," Alazzeh said.

A year ago, the Palestine Monetary Authority, the equivalent of a central bank for Gaza and the West Bank, sought to ease the crisis by introducing a digital payment system known as Iburaq. It attracted half a million users, or a quarter of the population, according to the World Bank, but was ultimately undermined by merchants insisting on cash.

Israel sought to ramp up financial pressure on Hamas earlier this year by tightening the distribution of humanitarian aid, which it said was routinely siphoned off by militants and then resold.

Experts said it is unclear if the cash brokers’ activities benefit Hamas, as some Israeli analysts claim.

The war has made it more difficult to determine who is behind all sorts of economic activity in the territory, said Omar Shabaan, director of Palthink for Strategic Studies, a Gaza-based think tank.

"It's a dark place now. You don't know who is bringing cigarettes into Gaza," he said, giving just one example. "It's like a mafia."

These same deep-pocketed traders are likely the ones running cash brokerages, and selling basic foodstuffs, he said. "They benefit by imposing these commissions," he said.

Once families run out of cash, they are forced to turn to humanitarian aid.

Al-Farra said that is what prompted him to begin seeking food at an aid distribution center, where it is common for Palestinians to jostle over one other for sacks of flour and boxes of pasta.

"This is the only way I can feed my family," he said.



Sheibani, an Iranian Diplomat with Intelligence Clout

 Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
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Sheibani, an Iranian Diplomat with Intelligence Clout

 Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)
Iranian ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Reza Sheibani (Iranian media)

Only weeks after Iranian diplomat Mohammad Reza Sheibani returned to Beirut as ambassador, his name has become the focus of a diplomatic crisis.

Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry withdrew its approval and declared him “persona non grata”, reflecting rising tensions between Beirut and Tehran and drawing renewed attention to a career tied to some of the Middle East’s most complex issues.

The decision swiftly ended the mission of a diplomat Tehran had sent back to Beirut, relying on his long experience on Lebanon and Syria.

His return had collided with a Lebanese political climate increasingly sensitive to the limits of foreign diplomatic roles.

War experience and regional role

Sheibani is no stranger to Lebanon. He served as Iran’s ambassador to Beirut from 2005 to 2009, a period that coincided with the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel, giving him direct experience managing ties under complex security and political conditions.

His reappointment in early 2026 reflected an Iranian preference for seasoned diplomats in areas where politics and security overlap.

He replaced former ambassador Mojtaba Amani, who was injured in a pager explosion in Beirut, at a time of regional escalation, giving his return added weight beyond routine diplomacy.

Between Beirut and Damascus

Born in 1960, Sheibani joined Iran’s Foreign Ministry in the 1980s and rose through its ranks, focusing on Middle East affairs.

He served as chargé d’affaires in Cyprus and as head of Iran’s interests section in Egypt, before being appointed ambassador to Lebanon and later to Syria from 2011 to 2016, during which he covered the early years of the war.

He later served as ambassador to Tunisia and non-resident ambassador to Libya, and as assistant foreign minister for Middle East affairs.

He also worked as a senior adviser and researcher at the Institute for Political and International Studies at the Foreign Ministry, before returning to the forefront amid rising regional tensions.

Roles during escalation

In October 2024, he was named special representative of the Iranian foreign minister for West Asia, and in January 2025, he was appointed special envoy to Syria following developments in Damascus, including the closure of Iran’s embassy.

He was also tasked with following the Lebanese file as a special envoy during a sensitive phase, reinforcing his role as a crisis diplomat.

His career reflects a distinction within Iran’s diplomatic structure, as he is linked to the Ministry of Intelligence rather than the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, highlighting a division of roles in foreign policy.

Legal and constitutional debate

The move by Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry has also sparked legal debate over how such decisions are made and enforced.

Constitutional expert Saeed Malek said the decision is based on Article 9 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which allows a state to declare a diplomat persona non grata without a specific procedure.

He said the measure does not amount to a break in diplomatic ties but falls within the management of diplomatic representation, adding that such decisions fall within the foreign minister’s authority under Article 66 of the constitution.

Malek said the decision is binding, and once the deadline to leave Lebanon expires, the ambassador’s presence becomes unlawful.

He added that security forces are required to enforce the decision and remove him once located.

However, he said enforcement remains bound by international rules, as the ambassador’s presence inside the embassy prevents Lebanese forces from entering under diplomatic immunity, meaning his expulsion can only be carried out once he leaves the premises.


Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr: A Man with Strong Connections at the Heart of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
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Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr: A Man with Strong Connections at the Heart of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.

Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr was not an unfamiliar figure when he was appointed on Tuesday as secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. One week after the killing of Ali Larijani, and amid a war that has thinned the ranks of Iran’s top leadership, authorities turned to a man shaped within one of the deepest layers of the “Islamic Republic’s” power structure.

Mehdi Tabatabaei, the Iranian president’s deputy communications director, said on Tuesday that General Zolghadr had been appointed to replace Larijani. He wrote on X that Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had approved the decision.

The Supreme National Security Council, formally headed by President Masoud Pezeshkian, coordinates security and foreign policy. It includes senior military, intelligence and government officials, as well as representatives of the Supreme Leader, who has final authority in state affairs.

Zolghadr’s appointment appears to reflect state priorities in a time of crisis. A further decree is expected to name him as the Supreme Leader’s representative on the council, allowing him to vote under the constitution.

Unlike politicians who rise through elections or public platforms, Zolghadr belongs to a different category: a figure who boasts internal networks that predate the state and later embedded themselves within it. He accumulated power within the agencies instead of confronting them. His career resembles less a sequence of administrative posts and more a continuous thread linking some of the most entrenched centers of power in Iran.

His elevation to one of the country’s top security posts is significant not only for the positions he has held, but for the role he has played within the system. A veteran of the Iran-Iraq war, he developed expertise in organization and network-based operations, consolidating his position within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and later extending his influence through the interior ministry, judiciary and Expediency Council.

The appointment signals a broader logic within Iran’s ruling establishment: in moments of heightened pressure, figures rooted in institutional networks tend to take precedence over those with a public political profile.

Early career

Zolghadr’s career is closely tied to the political environment from which he emerged. He belongs to a generation associated with the “Mansouroun” network, an early group that later produced influential figures within the IRGC, including Mohsen Rezaei, Ali Shamkhani, Gholam Ali Rashid, and Mohammad and Ahmad Forouzandeh.

The significance of this affiliation lies not only in early organizational ties, but in the nature of the group itself: an ideologically driven pre-revolutionary network that repositioned itself within the state through the IRGC.

Zolghadr’s rise was not an individual climb through institutional ranks, but growth within a web of relationships and loyalties embedded at the core of the system. He emerged not simply as a professional military officer, but as part of a generation that viewed security and politics as intertwined domains in safeguarding the regime. This gave him the rare ability to “reposition” himself and retain power as successive government ruled Iran.

War and the ‘Ramadan’ headquarters

After the fall of the Shah, Zolghadr, like other members of Mansouroun, initially operated through revolutionary committees before joining the IRGC. His most defining wartime role was leading the “Ramadan Headquarters,” a key unit during the Iran-Iraq war.

This post was central to his political and security development. The Ramadan Headquarters served as a nucleus for external operations, coordinating cross-border activities with Iraqi Kurdish and Shiite groups opposed to Saddam Hussein and managing operations inside Iraq. It later evolved into what became the Quds Force, the IRGC’s current foreign arm.

There, Zolghadr developed a hallmark approach: operating at the intersection of military, intelligence and political spheres. The role involved not only managing battlefield operations, but also building networks, cultivating allies and leveraging conflict to generate long-term influence.

This model — combining military structure, indirect operations and proxy management — became a defining feature of Iran’s regional strategy. Within this environment, Zolghadr gained a reputation as a manager and strategist rather than a public-facing commander.

Rise within the IRGC

Following the end of the war in the late 1980s, Zolghadr spent 16 years at the top of the IRGC hierarchy: eight years as chief of the joint staff and eight years as deputy commander-in-chief.

These roles emphasized administration, coordination and institutional discipline rather than field command. His influence was rooted not in public charisma but in his position within the IRGC’s internal machinery.

Over time, he became firmly aligned with Iran’s conservative camp. His political role became more visible during the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami, when tensions between reformists and hardline institutions intensified.

Reform era

During the late 1990s, Zolghadr was among military figures associated with the conservative bloc within the IRGC. His name was linked to a letter sent by IRGC commanders to President Khatami, widely seen as a signal of military intervention in political affairs at a time of unrest. He was also associated with hardline opposition to the reform movement and the student protests of that period.

This phase highlighted a structural aspect of his career: his political role did not begin after leaving the military, but was embedded within the IRGC itself as it became increasingly politicized during its confrontation with reformists.

Interior Ministry under Ahmadinejad

When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005, Zolghadr was appointed deputy interior minister for security affairs. The position placed him at the heart of internal security, overseeing provincial governors and managing crises, protests and local tensions. It marked a transition from military service to the executive branch, while maintaining a focus on security.

His move illustrated a broader pattern: shifting from protecting the system through force to safeguarding it through security bureaucracy, expanding his network within the state apparatus.

Basij

Zolghadr left the interior ministry in 2007 amid reports of differences with Ahmadinejad, but his departure did not signal a loss of influence. In December of that year, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed him deputy chief of staff of the armed forces for Basij affairs, a newly created role.

The Basij, a paramilitary force, plays a key role in ideological mobilization and maintaining the IRGC’s presence in Iranian society. The decree emphasized strengthening and expanding the Basij’s reach, underlining the importance of Zolghadr’s assignment.

Judiciary and expanding influence

In 2010, Zolghadr moved to the judiciary, serving first as deputy for social prevention and crime reduction, and later as strategic deputy to the head of the judiciary until 2020.

The shift did not represent a departure from security work, as Iran’s judiciary operates closely under the authority of the Supreme Leader. Instead, it broadened his influence across another pillar of the state.

In September 2021, he was appointed secretary of the Expediency Council, succeeding Mohsen Rezaei. The role involves overseeing the council’s committees and acting as a link to the highest levels of decision-making.

Zolghadr also has family ties that extend his influence. He is the father-in-law of Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs and a prominent figure in nuclear negotiations.

Gharibabadi previously served as Iran’s ambassador to international organizations in Vienna, including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

From Larijani to Zolghadr

Larijani’s death deprived Iran of a political figure skilled in navigating between power centers. The choice of Zolghadr suggests a shift in priorities.

While Larijani represented balance and negotiation, Zolghadr embodies institutional discipline and internal cohesion. His selection follows speculation over other candidates, including former defense minister Hossein Dehghan, who was ultimately not appointed.

The decision reflects the system’s preference, in wartime conditions, for figures trusted by security networks over those known for political flexibility.

He may not be a prominent public figure, but he represents a type of official often relied upon in times of crisis: a man with internal networks, brought back to the forefront as Iran faces one of its most challenging periods.


Expulsion of Iran Ambassador Tests Diplomacy between Beirut and Tehran

Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
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Expulsion of Iran Ambassador Tests Diplomacy between Beirut and Tehran

Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)

Diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Iran have entered a new phase with Beirut’s unprecedented withdrawal on Tuesday of its approval of the accreditation of Tehran’s new ambassador Mohammad Reza Sheibani.

The Foreign Ministry said in a statement that it had summoned the Iranian charge d'affaires in Lebanon and informed him of “the Lebanese state's decision to withdraw approval of the accreditation of the appointed Iranian ambassador, Mohammad Reza Sheibani, and declare him persona non grata, demanding that he leave Lebanese territory no later than next Sunday.”

The ministry said it had also summoned Lebanon's ambassador to Iran “in light of what the Lebanese state described as Tehran's violation of diplomatic norms and established practices between the two countries”, after Beirut accused Iran's Revolutionary Guards of commanding Hezbollah's operations in its war against Israel.

The government has accused Hezbollah of dragging Lebanon to war after it fired rockets at Israel on March 2 in wake of the killing of Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei at the beginning of the conflict.

Crisis

After three decades of calm, relations between Lebanon and Iran started to grow strained after the 2024 war between Hezbollah and Israel.

Iranian parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf declared at the time that Tehran was ready to negotiate with Paris about the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1701 in Lebanon, sparking condemnation from Lebanon.

Then Prime Minister Najib Mikati slammed it as flagrant meddling in Lebanon’s sovereign affairs. He informed the foreign minister at the time to summon Iran’s charge d’affaires to file a formal complaint.

Relations became more strained in 2025 after Ambassador Mojtaba Amani’s suitcases were searched at Beirut’s Rafik Hariri International Airport.

Youssef Raggi, who became Lebanon’s foreign minister in 2025, summoned the Iranian ambassador for the first time since the 1990s last year. In April, he summoned Amani after he posted that the “project to disarm Hezbollah is an obvious conspiracy.”

The Lebanese government had issued a decision on the disarmament of Iran-backed Hezbollah last year.

In December, media close to Hezbollah reported that Raggi had suspended procedures on approving the accreditation of the new Iranian ambassador.

Last week, he summoned the charge d’affaires over statements attributed to the Iranian mission in Beirut and Iranian officials over security and military developments in Lebanon.

Ties between Raggi and Iranian officials have been strained for months. Last year he declined an official invitation from his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araqhchi to visit Tehran, suggesting that they meet in a third neutral country.

The withdrawal of accreditation is rare and it effectively means that a country refuses to welcome a diplomatic representative, reflecting deep political disapproval of the concerned country’s behavior.

The withdrawal was the latest Lebanese measure against Iran.

On March 5, the government took a series of steps that reflect a hardening approach towards Tehran. It imposed visas on visiting Iranians that had been suspended since 2011 in an effort to encourage trade and tourism between Beirut and Tehran.

The government also banned any activity by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon. Dozens of Iranians have since been deported from Lebanon.

‘Correcting’ relations

Lebanon had in the early 1990s launched a phase to “correct” relations with Iran after the end of the Lebanese civil war.

Then Foreign Minister Fares Boueiz was responsible for “reorganizing diplomatic work in line with the Vienna Convection”, said Lebanese sources.

During the 1975-90 civil war, Iranian officials would move freely to Lebanon through Syria and meet with Hezbollah officials in Beirut. Lebanese authorities had opposed the behavior.

In previous statements to Asharq Al-Awsat, Boueiz said Iranian delegations would travel to Lebanon through Syria without coordinating with the state.

The situation was later addressed through official diplomatic channels, he added.

The Iranian ambassador at the time was informed of the authorities’ objection and the stance was relayed to then Iranian FM Ali Akbar Velayati, said Boueiz.

Two days later, the Lebanese Foreign Ministry received an approval to “correct relations”, leading to an exchange in official visits and the signing of agreements that “regulated” the ties.