Geagea to Asharq Al-Awsat: Hezbollah’s Weapons No Longer Intimidate Israel  

Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea. (Lebanese Forces)
Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea. (Lebanese Forces)
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Geagea to Asharq Al-Awsat: Hezbollah’s Weapons No Longer Intimidate Israel  

Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea. (Lebanese Forces)
Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea. (Lebanese Forces)

Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea has warned that Lebanon is heading toward a “dangerous and potentially destructive summer” if the government fails to take decisive action to disarm Hezbollah.

In an exclusive interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Geagea declared that Hezbollah’s weapons “no longer serve Lebanon’s defense” and instead bring “only harm and ruin.”

With an approaching US-backed deadline of August 1 to centralize all arms under state control, Geagea said Lebanon faces two stark choices: “Either the government moves to disband all armed and security factions operating outside the state, or the country braces for a turbulent, if not outright violent summer.”

According to Geagea, the November 2024 ceasefire agreement, which ended a war between Hezbollah and Israel, explicitly stipulates that all arms must be in the hands of official state institutions.

“We were given 120 days to implement this, yet little has been done,” he said. “The only legal bearers of arms are the army and municipal police. Everything else must go.”

He added that while focus remains on Israeli violations and its presence in several disputed border points, the real issue lies within. “We can’t rely on empty rhetoric anymore. Hezbollah’s weapons have proven useless in defending Lebanon, and the international community no longer even pretends to acknowledge our suffering.”

Geagea argued that Lebanon’s strength lies in its diplomatic ties, especially with the Gulf, led by Saudi Arabia, and the West.

“Today, the world pressures Israel to stop the war in Gaza. No one is speaking about what’s happening in Lebanon,” he said. “We should be leveraging our relationships with Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and the United States to stop the Israeli aggression and restore our sovereignty, not undermining those ties,” he underlined.

He accused Lebanese officials of “political paralysis” and “gray-zone governance,” saying they have squandered every opportunity to assert the state’s authority.

“We’re still stuck debating Israel while ignoring our own responsibilities. The state must act, or the country will collapse under the weight of its contradictions,” he said.

Addressing concerns that disarming Hezbollah without its consent could spark civil conflict, Geagea categorically rejected this excuse, noting that this logic has paralyzed Lebanon for years.

“We have a duly elected president, a legitimate government, and a functioning parliament. These institutions must govern, not defer to threats,” he remarked.

He called on the Cabinet to convene immediately and issue a binding resolution to dissolve all armed groups within a fixed timeframe, tasking the Lebanese Army with implementation.

“No one is suggesting a military campaign in Beirut’s southern suburbs,” he clarified. “What’s needed is for the state to project authority. Arrests should follow for those in violation, and they must be prosecuted under the law.”

'Illusion is over’

Geagea firmly rejected proposals that would allow Hezbollah to keep its light weaponry, while surrendering heavier arms. “Whether light or heavy, Hezbollah’s weapons no longer intimidate Israel. That illusion is over,” he said. “We are not discussing weapons in the material sense. The real issue is that an armed organization operates independently within what should be a sovereign nation. How is the entire world supposed to take us seriously, while we don’t?”

He warned that Lebanon cannot continue to function with divided authority. “We cannot keep passing decisions through parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, who relays them to Hezbollah, then back to us. That’s not how a sovereign state works. Until full authority rests with the state, we will not be recognized as one.”

International support at risk

Geagea cautioned that Lebanon risks losing the goodwill of its international allies unless swift action is taken.

He stated: “The countries that helped us reach consensus on electing a president and forming a government are warning us loudly that this situation is unsustainable.”

He pointed to delays in a proposed French-led donor conference, reportedly stalled by US objections, saying: “Even the fall conference might not happen. The international community is growing weary of Lebanon’s inability to function as a state.”

Hezbollah’s ‘toys’ serve no one

Geagea questioned Hezbollah’s continued insistence on maintaining what he called “toys”, a colloquial Lebanese term for trivial or useless things.

“Why insist on operating a military and intelligence network parallel to the state’s? If this arsenal is meant to defend Lebanon, where is the evidence?” the LF leader asked.

He emphasized that disbanding Hezbollah’s military structure is not merely a foreign demand. “It’s in the President’s oath of office, the government’s policy statement, and the Taif Agreement. This is a Lebanese demand, rooted in law.”

False promises

Criticizing the government’s handling of the issue, Geagea said: “We’ve been in constant contact with officials. The answers are always the same: (US envoy Tom) Barrack is coming, Barrack is going, Berri is trying... I never believed it. I knew from the beginning this was just a farce.”

He added: “No serious country gives someone the option to keep their weapons. You say: ‘surrender them, or face consequences.’ We have elected leaders. They must decide, not turn to Berri, who then speaks to Hezbollah. Our leaders must stop hiding behind procedural games. The state doesn’t beg for permission or keep an entire country waiting for a response from abroad.”

“Officials must take the decisions in line with their conscience, presidential oath and government statement,” Geagea urged.

Increasing political pressure

Asked what options remain, he said his party would escalate political pressure. “We are in direct communication with the president and prime minister. We’ve told them clearly: we will not wait long.”

He revealed that talks are ongoing with other political blocs in government to issue a formal resolution banning all non-state armed groups. “Should we keep watching out country collapse as Israel escalates its strikes and more people immigrate?” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He warned of direct consequences if the status quo continues. “At minimum, we risk losing international funding, whether for the Lebanese Army or for United Nations peacekeepers in the south.”

Geagea contrasted Lebanon’s inaction with developments in Syria: “There are Arab investment projects worth over $10 billion in Syria. And here we are, waiting for messages from Barrack and Berri.”

He dismissed the idea that national security matters should be limited to the president. “This is squarely within the Cabinet’s authority, especially after Lebanon agreed to the November ceasefire. Pretending otherwise is a constitutional violation.”

New threat from East

Geagea stressed that Hezbollah’s role now brings harm from all directions. He explained: “It used to be just Israel and the West. Today, it includes Syria and the East.”

He pointed to reports that Hezbollah is supplying weapons to armed cells in Syria. “How do you think Syria’s new leadership will view this?”

Geagea downplayed the impact of what he described as “fear campaigns in Lebanon regarding developments in Syria.”

“We judge things based on facts, not intentions,” he said. “What exactly has the new Syrian leadership done so far that should cause concern?”

The LF leader argued that it is inappropriate to judge the current Syrian regime solely based on the ideology of its predecessor. “Since Ahmed Al-Sharaa assumed the presidency, relations with Lebanon have not progressed as they should, but at the very least, we have not witnessed any hostility from them,” he remarked.

He pointed to a second, more significant, factor of regional stability: “There are three countries with substantial influence over the Syrian situation - Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and the United States. The real question is: do these three powers, each for its own reasons, want Lebanon to remain stable or not?”

Geagea concluded that much of the fear being stirred is politically motivated: “Hezbollah and the so-called ‘Axis of Resistance’ are trying to collect every card they can to justify holding onto their weapons.”

As for fears that Syria’s political transition could fuel extremism in Lebanon, Geagea dismissed them as unfounded. “Even during the height of the previous crisis and the rise of ISIS, we didn’t see extremism emerge in Lebanon. Why would it now?”

He added: “The Lebanese people, particularly the Sunni community, are inherently moderate. The past has proven this, and there’s no reason to believe it will change. Moreover, Lebanon’s security agencies are alert and actively working to contain any threat before it materializes.”



Field Escalation in Lebanon as Israel Seeks to Entrench Security Belt Ahead of Washington Talks

A map released by the Israeli army showing what it calls a “security zone” in south Lebanon. (Reuters)
A map released by the Israeli army showing what it calls a “security zone” in south Lebanon. (Reuters)
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Field Escalation in Lebanon as Israel Seeks to Entrench Security Belt Ahead of Washington Talks

A map released by the Israeli army showing what it calls a “security zone” in south Lebanon. (Reuters)
A map released by the Israeli army showing what it calls a “security zone” in south Lebanon. (Reuters)

The map published by the Israeli army showing the areas where its forces are deployed in south Lebanon has raised questions about the implications of the US-Iranian agreement, as military operations continue and the issues of withdrawal and redeployment remain tied to anticipated Lebanese-Israeli negotiations in Washington.

While Israel speaks of a “security zone” inside Lebanese territory, Israeli army spokesman Avichay Adraee said Israeli forces are deployed “based on operational necessity” within an area extending roughly 10 kilometers into Lebanon, with the aim of removing what he described as threats and improving the defense of residents in northern Israel.

On the ground, two people were killed and another wounded in an Israeli drone strike that targeted a vehicle at the Kfar Tebnit roundabout. Drones also struck Hadatha without causing casualties, while another drone dropped a bomb on Beit Yahoun, wounding two people. An Israeli drone also dropped a stun grenade on a family inside a house in Nabatieh al-Fawqa near the teachers’ college.

Artillery shelling struck the outskirts of Nabatieh al-Fawqa, while the Israeli army carried out bulldozing operations in Khiam.

As Lebanese army troops and members of the Al-Risala Health Emergency Association entered Hadatha, Israeli forces opened fire toward civilians and Lebanese soldiers in the town. Villages in the eastern sector and the Marjayoun district remained relatively calm compared with other parts of southern Lebanon.

A field source in south Lebanon told Asharq Al-Awsat that the map “effectively reflects an attempt to impose a new reality on the ground following the US-Iranian understanding by treating vast areas of south Lebanon as zones under Israeli security and military control.”

The source said the boundaries shown on the map extend beyond what is known in some places as the “Yellow Line” and include areas where the Israeli army was unable to establish a permanent presence during the war, such as Ali al-Taher Hill and the southeastern outskirts of Hadatha.

The source noted that the Lebanese army is deployed inside Hadatha itself, while Israeli forces continue attempting to advance toward the surrounding high ground.

According to the source, “including these areas on the Israeli map has heightened residents’ fears and slowed the return of displaced people to Nabatieh and its surroundings.”

The concern, the source added, extends beyond Nabatieh city to include Dweir, Jibshit, Harouf, Zebdine, Mifadoun, Shoukine, Kfar Tebnit and Nabatieh al-Fawqa. These areas still lack basic living conditions, while near-daily artillery shelling continues, prompting many residents to delay their return.

The source said, “The boundaries Israel is drawing today closely resemble those that existed before its withdrawal from south Lebanon in 2000, stretching from the western sector through the central sector and into large parts of the eastern sector toward Khiam.”

Israel did not include in its current map some areas it previously occupied as far as the outskirts of Jezzine, the source said. In practice, however, it has treated the entire western and central sectors, together with the highlands extending east of Nabatieh toward the Marjayoun-Khiam axis, as falling within its security sphere of control.

The source said the most significant outcome of the period following the US-Iranian understanding has been Israel’s effort to draw what it described as “occupation boundaries” and establish them as a fait accompli on the ground by effectively turning these areas into an undeclared security belt.

According to the source, the line Israel is seeking to consolidate runs through the central sector along the Bint Jbeil and Wadi al-Salouqi axes, reaching Hadatha, Baraachit and Beit Yahoun.

Although Israeli forces are not physically deployed inside these towns, the source said they are treated as part of an advanced security zone and a new line of contact in south Lebanon.

No Signs of Israeli Withdrawal

Retired Brig. Gen. Bassam Yassin told Asharq Al-Awsat that the US-Iranian agreement has not yet translated into any tangible changes on the ground in south Lebanon.

The situation on the ground, he said, still reflects continued Israeli deployment in the areas under its control, while issues related to withdrawal and post-war arrangements remain under discussion in negotiations currently taking place in Washington.

Yassin said the map recently published by the Israeli army suggests that Israel views the areas it marked as territory under its military control, “as though it is saying these areas are under Israeli occupation, should not be approached, and that any movement within them will be treated as a security threat.”

He said one of the most important of these areas is Ali al-Taher. Many people, he noted, reduce it to a hill or small elevation, “when in fact Ali al-Taher is a mountain ridge extending between three and four kilometers from the area around Kfar Tebnit toward Kfar Rumman. Including large parts of it in what Israel considers an area under its control therefore carries important operational implications.”

“The Israeli occupation is currently consolidating the positions where it is deployed, while attempts to advance toward Ali al-Taher are still continuing,” he said.

Artillery and rocket fire in the Nabatieh area has also continued in recent weeks, he added, stressing that “there are still no real indications of Israeli withdrawals, contrary to what some believe.”

Yassin said the issues related to an Israeli withdrawal, redeployment or the deployment of the Lebanese army “are not decided on the ground but are being discussed within the framework of ongoing Lebanese meetings and negotiations in Washington.”

Any talk of withdrawal or new arrangements, he added, “remains premature at this stage.”

No Withdrawal

Meanwhile, Israel’s Channel 14 reported that “the future of the Israeli deployment in south Lebanon will be discussed during negotiations with the Lebanese side in Washington.”

Israel’s public broadcaster also reported that the issue of withdrawing from positions where Israeli forces remain deployed inside Lebanon will be raised during the next round of negotiations.

Yedioth Ahronoth reported that “the Israeli army has demanded that it retain a buffer zone inside south Lebanon while insisting on the dismantling of weapons in the south.”


Defections Shake Sudan’s RSF, Threaten Cohesion of Tasis Alliance

Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan meets Major General Al-Nour al-Qubba, who defected from the Rapid Support Forces. (Sovereign Council)
Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan meets Major General Al-Nour al-Qubba, who defected from the Rapid Support Forces. (Sovereign Council)
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Defections Shake Sudan’s RSF, Threaten Cohesion of Tasis Alliance

Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan meets Major General Al-Nour al-Qubba, who defected from the Rapid Support Forces. (Sovereign Council)
Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan meets Major General Al-Nour al-Qubba, who defected from the Rapid Support Forces. (Sovereign Council)

The resignation of Fares al-Nur, a senior figure in the Sudan Founding Alliance (Tasis), from all his posts in the Rapid Support Forces and the political bloc backing it has revived questions about a wave of defections from the force in recent months and what they may mean for its military and political cohesion.

The move comes as Sudan’s war enters its fourth year with no clear sign that either side is close to a decisive military victory.

Al-Nur told Asharq Al-Awsat on Wednesday that he had left all positions of responsibility within the RSF and Tasis. He said he acted because of what he described as a deepening political deadlock, the continuation of the war and the vast humanitarian suffering it has caused.

He said his resignation was intended to open space for a broad Sudanese dialogue that brings together different parties, away from political and military polarization, and helps reach a settlement to end the crisis.

The importance of the step lies not only in al-Nur’s position inside the alliance, but also in its nature. He is not a battlefield commander with troops on the ground.

He is instead viewed as one of the most prominent political figures associated with the project that the RSF sought to build alongside its military campaign. That gives his resignation political weight beyond any immediate military effect.

Al-Nur was a member of the Tasis presidential council and had been appointed “governor of Khartoum Region” in the parallel government announced by the alliance. He had previously served for years as an adviser to RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, and was one of the most prominent members of the RSF negotiating delegation at the 2023 Jeddah talks.

What makes this different?

This type of departure differs from earlier splits within the RSF over the past two years. Most of those involved were field commanders with military influence or fighters on the ground.

In May, Bashara al-Huweira, who was responsible for military operations on the Bara axis in North Kordofan State, announced his defection from the RSF. Before him, field commander Al-Nour Adam, known as Al-Nour al-Qubba, said he had withdrawn from the RSF and joined the Sudanese army after his forces left their positions in North Darfur.

Before them all, Abu Aqla Keikal, one of the RSF’s most prominent commanders and the governor of Gezira State while it was under RSF control, announced his cooperation with the Sudanese army.

File photo showing the defecting commander Abu Aqla Keikal (third from left) with Rapid Support Forces elements before joining the army.

That was seen as one of the most consequential defections because of his influence in central Sudan. Most recently, field commander Ali Rizq Allah, known as Al-Savannah, announced his defection and joined the Sudanese Armed Forces.

The political and military weight of these figures varies. But the pace of defections over a short period has raised a sharper question: do they point to growing pressure inside the RSF camp, or are they still individual moves that do not affect the force’s core structure?

The RSF has tried to project a different picture. In recent days, it broadcast video clips that it said, according to its Telegram platform, showed groups from the Joint Force of armed movements allied with the army joining its ranks.

The message was clear: movement between the camps is not going in one direction only.

Such messages are part of a propaganda and media war running alongside the fighting, with each side trying to prove its cohesion and its ability to attract leaders and fighters.

Shartai Samir, a prominent RSF supporter on social media, played down the importance of Fares al-Nur’s departure. He said the political and military project represented by Tasis had moved beyond individuals, and that the departure of leaders or groups would not affect its continuity.

He also said the developments were part of attempts to attract political and military figures from the RSF camp after its opponents, as he put it, failed to achieve their goals militarily.

But the key question is not how many people leave. It is what effect they have.

Political researcher Mohamed Latif says it is important to distinguish between political and military defections.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that Sudanese politics has seen repeated splits inside parties and alliances over many decades, but that they have rarely produced a radical shift in the balance of power.

Latif said most political splits are driven by personal disputes or ambitions rather than ideological or programmatic differences. For that reason, their impact often remains limited.

He said the impact of “military defections” is measured by how far they affect a party’s fighting strength or geographical deployment. In his view, most of the defections from the RSF in the recent period have not had a tangible effect on its basic military structure or its main areas of influence.

That is why he said he did not expect the departure of Fares al-Nur, as a political and civilian figure, to have a major impact on the cohesion of the Tasis alliance.

But not everyone agrees with that assessment.

Commander Al-Savannah, who defected from the Rapid Support Forces, speaking at a press conference in Khartoum (Sudan News Agency/SUNA)

Retired Brigadier General Dr. Jamal al-Shaheed, a strategic expert specializing in security and military affairs, says defections should not be judged by the announcement alone, but by their practical effects on the ground.

Al-Shaheed told Asharq Al-Awsat that defections become significant when they reach middle-ranking and field commanders, or political figures with organizational and social influence. Such figures, he said, are the link between the top leadership and the base.

“The indicators that should be monitored are not limited to the number of defectors, but include whether the phenomenon continues and expands, and its impact on internal discipline, the ability to recruit and mobilize, and the maintenance of field deployments,” he said.

According to al-Shaheed, the decisive test is ultimately military performance.

If defections are accompanied by battlefield retreats, the loss of areas of influence, or a weaker ability to carry out coordinated operations, then they move from being a political or media event to a factor affecting the balance of the conflict.

The retired military expert points to earlier experiences of Sudanese armed movements during the civil war in southern Sudan and the Darfur conflict. Some defections yielded no meaningful strategic results, while others weakened entire factions by stripping them of influential leaders and undermining their organizational cohesion.

All of this raises a broader question about the future of the war itself.

RSF supporters say the latest defections are no more than individual moves that will not affect their political and military project. Others argue that their repetition warrants close attention as a sign of internal pressures and challenges that may extend beyond individuals to the organizational structure itself.

So far, there is no evidence that defections between the parties to the war can, on their own, change the course of the conflict or force a political settlement.

But their persistence and spread among military and political figures make them a phenomenon worth watching in a long, open-ended war. Its final outcome still depends on what the battlefield reveals in the coming months, and on whether the warring parties can preserve both military and political cohesion.


US Issues Sanctions on Hezbollah-linked Targets

A man walks with a boy, carrying a Hezbollah flag, past a mural depicting former Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and other senior figures near the burial site of Hassan Nasrallah on the outskirts of Beirut, Lebanon, June 17, 2026. REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir
A man walks with a boy, carrying a Hezbollah flag, past a mural depicting former Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and other senior figures near the burial site of Hassan Nasrallah on the outskirts of Beirut, Lebanon, June 17, 2026. REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir
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US Issues Sanctions on Hezbollah-linked Targets

A man walks with a boy, carrying a Hezbollah flag, past a mural depicting former Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and other senior figures near the burial site of Hassan Nasrallah on the outskirts of Beirut, Lebanon, June 17, 2026. REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir
A man walks with a boy, carrying a Hezbollah flag, past a mural depicting former Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and other senior figures near the burial site of Hassan Nasrallah on the outskirts of Beirut, Lebanon, June 17, 2026. REUTERS/Mohamed Azakir

Washington has issued new "counter ‌terrorism" ‌sanctions ​targeting ‌individuals ⁠and entities ​linked to ⁠Lebanon’s ‌Hezbollah, details ‌posted ​to ‌the US‌ Treasury Department's ‌website on Thursday showed.

It announced sanctions against several Lebanese officials it said were aligned with Hezbollah and members of the sanctioned ⁠Alaa Hassan Hamieh ⁠business network for obstructing Lebanon’s peace process and delaying the disarmament of Hezbollah.

The Treasury said its Office of Foreign Assets Control was also designating individuals in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, who it said were raising ⁠funds ⁠and operating front companies to generate revenue for Hezbollah, an Iran-backed militant group.