Geagea to Asharq Al-Awsat: Hezbollah’s Weapons No Longer Intimidate Israel  

Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea. (Lebanese Forces)
Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea. (Lebanese Forces)
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Geagea to Asharq Al-Awsat: Hezbollah’s Weapons No Longer Intimidate Israel  

Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea. (Lebanese Forces)
Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea. (Lebanese Forces)

Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea has warned that Lebanon is heading toward a “dangerous and potentially destructive summer” if the government fails to take decisive action to disarm Hezbollah.

In an exclusive interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Geagea declared that Hezbollah’s weapons “no longer serve Lebanon’s defense” and instead bring “only harm and ruin.”

With an approaching US-backed deadline of August 1 to centralize all arms under state control, Geagea said Lebanon faces two stark choices: “Either the government moves to disband all armed and security factions operating outside the state, or the country braces for a turbulent, if not outright violent summer.”

According to Geagea, the November 2024 ceasefire agreement, which ended a war between Hezbollah and Israel, explicitly stipulates that all arms must be in the hands of official state institutions.

“We were given 120 days to implement this, yet little has been done,” he said. “The only legal bearers of arms are the army and municipal police. Everything else must go.”

He added that while focus remains on Israeli violations and its presence in several disputed border points, the real issue lies within. “We can’t rely on empty rhetoric anymore. Hezbollah’s weapons have proven useless in defending Lebanon, and the international community no longer even pretends to acknowledge our suffering.”

Geagea argued that Lebanon’s strength lies in its diplomatic ties, especially with the Gulf, led by Saudi Arabia, and the West.

“Today, the world pressures Israel to stop the war in Gaza. No one is speaking about what’s happening in Lebanon,” he said. “We should be leveraging our relationships with Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and the United States to stop the Israeli aggression and restore our sovereignty, not undermining those ties,” he underlined.

He accused Lebanese officials of “political paralysis” and “gray-zone governance,” saying they have squandered every opportunity to assert the state’s authority.

“We’re still stuck debating Israel while ignoring our own responsibilities. The state must act, or the country will collapse under the weight of its contradictions,” he said.

Addressing concerns that disarming Hezbollah without its consent could spark civil conflict, Geagea categorically rejected this excuse, noting that this logic has paralyzed Lebanon for years.

“We have a duly elected president, a legitimate government, and a functioning parliament. These institutions must govern, not defer to threats,” he remarked.

He called on the Cabinet to convene immediately and issue a binding resolution to dissolve all armed groups within a fixed timeframe, tasking the Lebanese Army with implementation.

“No one is suggesting a military campaign in Beirut’s southern suburbs,” he clarified. “What’s needed is for the state to project authority. Arrests should follow for those in violation, and they must be prosecuted under the law.”

'Illusion is over’

Geagea firmly rejected proposals that would allow Hezbollah to keep its light weaponry, while surrendering heavier arms. “Whether light or heavy, Hezbollah’s weapons no longer intimidate Israel. That illusion is over,” he said. “We are not discussing weapons in the material sense. The real issue is that an armed organization operates independently within what should be a sovereign nation. How is the entire world supposed to take us seriously, while we don’t?”

He warned that Lebanon cannot continue to function with divided authority. “We cannot keep passing decisions through parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, who relays them to Hezbollah, then back to us. That’s not how a sovereign state works. Until full authority rests with the state, we will not be recognized as one.”

International support at risk

Geagea cautioned that Lebanon risks losing the goodwill of its international allies unless swift action is taken.

He stated: “The countries that helped us reach consensus on electing a president and forming a government are warning us loudly that this situation is unsustainable.”

He pointed to delays in a proposed French-led donor conference, reportedly stalled by US objections, saying: “Even the fall conference might not happen. The international community is growing weary of Lebanon’s inability to function as a state.”

Hezbollah’s ‘toys’ serve no one

Geagea questioned Hezbollah’s continued insistence on maintaining what he called “toys”, a colloquial Lebanese term for trivial or useless things.

“Why insist on operating a military and intelligence network parallel to the state’s? If this arsenal is meant to defend Lebanon, where is the evidence?” the LF leader asked.

He emphasized that disbanding Hezbollah’s military structure is not merely a foreign demand. “It’s in the President’s oath of office, the government’s policy statement, and the Taif Agreement. This is a Lebanese demand, rooted in law.”

False promises

Criticizing the government’s handling of the issue, Geagea said: “We’ve been in constant contact with officials. The answers are always the same: (US envoy Tom) Barrack is coming, Barrack is going, Berri is trying... I never believed it. I knew from the beginning this was just a farce.”

He added: “No serious country gives someone the option to keep their weapons. You say: ‘surrender them, or face consequences.’ We have elected leaders. They must decide, not turn to Berri, who then speaks to Hezbollah. Our leaders must stop hiding behind procedural games. The state doesn’t beg for permission or keep an entire country waiting for a response from abroad.”

“Officials must take the decisions in line with their conscience, presidential oath and government statement,” Geagea urged.

Increasing political pressure

Asked what options remain, he said his party would escalate political pressure. “We are in direct communication with the president and prime minister. We’ve told them clearly: we will not wait long.”

He revealed that talks are ongoing with other political blocs in government to issue a formal resolution banning all non-state armed groups. “Should we keep watching out country collapse as Israel escalates its strikes and more people immigrate?” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He warned of direct consequences if the status quo continues. “At minimum, we risk losing international funding, whether for the Lebanese Army or for United Nations peacekeepers in the south.”

Geagea contrasted Lebanon’s inaction with developments in Syria: “There are Arab investment projects worth over $10 billion in Syria. And here we are, waiting for messages from Barrack and Berri.”

He dismissed the idea that national security matters should be limited to the president. “This is squarely within the Cabinet’s authority, especially after Lebanon agreed to the November ceasefire. Pretending otherwise is a constitutional violation.”

New threat from East

Geagea stressed that Hezbollah’s role now brings harm from all directions. He explained: “It used to be just Israel and the West. Today, it includes Syria and the East.”

He pointed to reports that Hezbollah is supplying weapons to armed cells in Syria. “How do you think Syria’s new leadership will view this?”

Geagea downplayed the impact of what he described as “fear campaigns in Lebanon regarding developments in Syria.”

“We judge things based on facts, not intentions,” he said. “What exactly has the new Syrian leadership done so far that should cause concern?”

The LF leader argued that it is inappropriate to judge the current Syrian regime solely based on the ideology of its predecessor. “Since Ahmed Al-Sharaa assumed the presidency, relations with Lebanon have not progressed as they should, but at the very least, we have not witnessed any hostility from them,” he remarked.

He pointed to a second, more significant, factor of regional stability: “There are three countries with substantial influence over the Syrian situation - Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and the United States. The real question is: do these three powers, each for its own reasons, want Lebanon to remain stable or not?”

Geagea concluded that much of the fear being stirred is politically motivated: “Hezbollah and the so-called ‘Axis of Resistance’ are trying to collect every card they can to justify holding onto their weapons.”

As for fears that Syria’s political transition could fuel extremism in Lebanon, Geagea dismissed them as unfounded. “Even during the height of the previous crisis and the rise of ISIS, we didn’t see extremism emerge in Lebanon. Why would it now?”

He added: “The Lebanese people, particularly the Sunni community, are inherently moderate. The past has proven this, and there’s no reason to believe it will change. Moreover, Lebanon’s security agencies are alert and actively working to contain any threat before it materializes.”



ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria

An ISIS fighter in Baghouz, Syria, in 2019, in a photo released by the group’s Amaq agency (AP)
An ISIS fighter in Baghouz, Syria, in 2019, in a photo released by the group’s Amaq agency (AP)
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ISIS Shifts Priorities, Seeks to Raise Cost of Rule in Syria

An ISIS fighter in Baghouz, Syria, in 2019, in a photo released by the group’s Amaq agency (AP)
An ISIS fighter in Baghouz, Syria, in 2019, in a photo released by the group’s Amaq agency (AP)

Syria has moved since early this year from internal unrest in the northeast, the coast, and the south to relative calm and attempts to impose a new security and political order, most clearly seen in the security file and in an agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces.

But the shift has set up an undeclared race with ISIS across multiple regions and social environments.

ISIS has re-emerged as a destabilizing force, seeking to regain a foothold by exploiting gaps in security control. It is leaning on an aggressive narrative and targeted attacks that intensified from mid-February, eased in early March, then picked up again.

The Jazira region, spanning Deir al-Zor, Raqqa and Hasaka, is the main test ground for the group in 2026. Damascus’s takeover of areas east of the Euphrates in late January, after a US troop repositioning and full withdrawal, along with the earlier pullback of SDF forces, created a new security landscape that ISIS is trying to exploit.

The US withdrawal and repositioning at bases such as Kharab al-Jir and Rmelan caused temporary disruption along control lines.

ISIS’s weekly al-Nabaa newsletter reported a rise in attacks on government checkpoints and positions, using roadside bombs and direct assaults. The group carried out about 22 attacks across Syria in March 2026 alone, targeting military sites and civilians.

Ability to hit high-value targets

An attack on Syria’s 86th Division in Deir al-Zor, and on its positions near the Panorama area at the city’s southern entrance, underscored ISIS’s ability to strike deep inside government-held territory and hit sensitive targets.

The group has fully shifted to guerrilla warfare, deploying small, mobile units across vast desert areas that still offer cover despite heavy US airstrikes.

Its messaging, including a Feb. 5 speech by spokesman Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari, signals an effort to recast itself as the “only legitimate resistance” to the new order. Content in al-Nabaa shows a shift from monitoring to a broad ideological offensive.

The spokesman declared a “new phase of operations” targeting governance in Damascus, signaling a move from defending desert pockets to a war of attrition in cities. Al-Nabaa has stepped up attacks on the new government, branding it an “updated version of apostasy,” and focusing on Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, still referred to by his former nom de guerre.

Undermining military credibility

ISIS casts al-Sharaa’s shift from jihadist leader to head of state as a “great betrayal.” It is trying to draw in fighters from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and other factions frustrated by integration into the “new Syrian army” or by perceived leniency toward former regime officials.

It also questions Syria’s role in the US-led coalition, framing it as a concession.

By escalating attacks since mid-February, ISIS appears intent on undermining the government’s ability to enforce security and stability, while casting doubt on the military effectiveness of newly formed forces. It promotes a narrative that al-Sharaa serves US interests, presenting itself as a more ideologically rigid alternative.

Exploiting fault lines

ISIS is betting on social tensions as Damascus reasserts control over areas once run by autonomous authorities or foreign-backed factions, especially in the northeast and parts of the north.

It taps into tribal concerns over central rule, positioning itself as a fallback or covert ally against perceived abuses. At the same time, the state’s focus on remnants of the former regime and opposition militias on the coast and in Sweida gives ISIS more room to move in the east.

Despite losing territory, ISIS retains the ability to survive through flexibility, continued recruitment and enough funding to sustain operations.

Its strength lies in decentralization. Regional branches now operate with autonomy after the weakening of central leadership following the killing of its fourth “caliph,” Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Hashimi. Cells can recruit and act without waiting for orders.

The group has also rebuilt small support hubs in rugged parts of the Homs desert, some hit by US strikes this year, including raids on Jabal al-Amour near Palmyra, making full clearance difficult.

The United States said it carried out 10 airstrikes between Feb. 3 and 12 on more than 30 targets across Syria, many in Homs province, including the Sukhnah desert and gas field areas, raising fresh concerns after the US withdrawal.

Recruiting a new generation

ISIS is targeting teenagers and young men raised in displacement camps or economic hardship, using encrypted platforms to avoid detection. It also exploits sectarian and political narratives to reinforce a sense of marginalization among Sunni communities.

But it faces mounting pressure. Coordination between Damascus and the international coalition has tightened, limiting ISIS’s ability to exploit divisions. Advances in surveillance and drone technology have also reduced the advantage of desert terrain.

Still, the group is betting on potential economic failure or weak public acceptance of the government in newly retaken areas. It is also trying to destabilize tribal dynamics in Deir al-Zor by exploiting arrests of local figures or disputes over oil resources.

Momentum shifts

A security campaign launched in late February by the Interior Ministry, with army support, shifted the balance on the ground. Operations swept eastern Hama, the central desert, and areas around Aleppo and the coast.

In early March, authorities said they foiled a major attack targeting military sites in Aleppo and dismantled three sleeper cells on the coast and in the Homs countryside, disrupting ISIS’s internal networks and communications.

By mid-March, attacks had dropped to levels not seen since late 2024. Small groups were seen moving to the rural edges of Raqqa and Deir al-Zor to regroup.

Some fighters reportedly sought settlements with authorities amid funding shortages and a lack of basic supplies.

Researcher Zain al-Abidin al-Akeidi said ISIS had previously exploited Arab tribal resentment toward the SDF, but areas still under SDF control are now mostly Kurdish, limiting the group’s reach.

He warned of continued recruitment despite the government's experience in tracking ISIS cells, noting that resolving the al-Hol camp issue and restoring state control east of the Euphrates could weaken ISIS propaganda.

But he said security conditions in the Jazira region remain “very difficult,” citing poor living conditions, weak services and drug trade as factors ISIS exploits.

A Syrian army colonel, Mohammed al-Amer, said “tribal fronts” in eastern Syria have links to ISIS and have mediated with some fighters to leave the group after ideological reviews.

He said some were detained and others monitored, adding, “We use all methods to end ISIS’s presence in Syria, especially through security and intelligence work.”

Harassment over control

ISIS no longer aims to seize territory, but to raise the cost of governing. It retains the ability to harass Damascus, even if at a limited level.

Attacks in late March were largely defensive, targeting small patrols or abandoned positions on desert fringes, reflecting weaker planning capacity and a shift toward symbolic presence.

Lying low

By early April, ISIS appeared to enter a “dormancy” phase, pulling back from frontlines, reorganizing and reassessing. This likely precedes a familiar strategy of hiding and rebuilding after losses, as seen in Iraq in 2007.

Worsening economic conditions could aid recruitment, but Damascus's progress in building a unified army and stabilizing living conditions could undermine the group.

ISIS may have lost its aura of dominance in 2026, but not its will to fight. Its attacks on the president and government reflect recognition of the threat posed by the new state.

A dual test

The drop in ISIS activity reflects a mix of security, military and economic pressures. Campaigns have disrupted its structure, forced a partial withdrawal, and triggered internal reorganization and a shift away from direct attacks.

Small cells remain active along desert edges and at the frontlines between Deir al-Zor and Raqqa, suggesting a temporary phase of regrouping.

Past patterns show ISIS exploits downturns to reposition and capitalize on instability. Regional conditions could help it reopen supply lines or reconnect with affiliates.

The coming months will test whether Syrian forces can hold recent gains, and whether ISIS can endure sustained pressure. It may either fade into a marginal threat or re-emerge through sporadic, targeted attacks to signal its presence without entering open conflict.

Either way, the next phase will be decisive in shaping the security landscape in northern and central Syria and defining the trajectory of the fight between the state and ISIS.


Gaza Prepares for First Local Elections in Two Decades

Election campaign banners showing candidates for the upcoming municipal elections hang on a building in Deir al-Balah in the central Gaza Strip on April 21, 2026. (AFP)
Election campaign banners showing candidates for the upcoming municipal elections hang on a building in Deir al-Balah in the central Gaza Strip on April 21, 2026. (AFP)
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Gaza Prepares for First Local Elections in Two Decades

Election campaign banners showing candidates for the upcoming municipal elections hang on a building in Deir al-Balah in the central Gaza Strip on April 21, 2026. (AFP)
Election campaign banners showing candidates for the upcoming municipal elections hang on a building in Deir al-Balah in the central Gaza Strip on April 21, 2026. (AFP)

Deir al-Balah in central Gaza will hold the enclave’s first local elections in nearly two decades, with voting set to begin on Saturday alongside municipal polls in the occupied West Bank.

A decree by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas designated Deir al-Balah as the only voting site in Gaza, citing its relatively limited damage from the Israeli war and better-preserved infrastructure compared with other areas.

Gaza last held local elections in 2005, when Hamas secured a majority. It followed with a legislative election win a year later and in 2007 consolidated control of the enclave after a conflict with rival Fatah. From 2005 to 2023, Hamas appointed members of local councils and municipalities across Gaza.

This vote comes after a two-year war that has reshaped the enclave and added political and operational challenges.

Who can vote?

The Central Elections Commission said about 70,449 registered voters in Deir al-Balah are eligible to cast ballots at 12 polling centers. These include open areas fitted with tents, while schools remain shelters for displaced residents.

The figure excludes many displaced people now living in the city, as only original residents are allowed to vote.

The commission has accredited 292 observers from 10 local monitoring groups and 45 journalists. Around 675 staff will run polling operations to ensure compliance with legal and professional standards.

Jamil al-Khalidi, the commission’s regional director in Gaza, told Asharq Al-Awsat the system uses closed lists. Voters select one list and cast votes for five candidates from it. A 15-member municipal council will be formed from the candidates who get the most votes, with at least four seats reserved for women.

Khalidi said ballot boxes and papers were ready ahead of Saturday, with 12 centers prepared across nine tents and three civil society facilities. Each center will include eight polling stations.

Preliminary results are expected on Sunday morning. All competing lists are independent and clan-based, with competition driven largely by geographic and family ties.

Who will secure the vote?

Khalidi said the Palestinian civil police, effectively the Hamas-run force, will secure the process.

He added that officers will keep their distance from polling centers due to the risk of Israeli strikes. They will deploy without weapons and intervene only if needed, before returning to positions outside the sites.

A private security company had been considered to handle the task, but Gaza’s civil police insisted on taking responsibility, and a plan was agreed with all parties, Khalidi said.

Commitment to the PLO program

Four lists are competing and campaigning has been more visible online than on the ground, with limited posters. Observers say the lists are self-funded, without factional backing.

Candidates were required to sign a pledge committing to the program of the Palestine Liberation Organization and recognizing it as the legitimate representative.

This requirement is contentious for Hamas, as it implies adherence to positions including recognition of Israel. The Palestinian Authority is seeking to enforce the pledge in line with its commitment to a two-state solution.

A local source said some candidates have past ties to Fatah and Hamas but are running as independents. No faction has publicly endorsed any of the competing lists.


South of Litani: A New Front Under Israel-Set Deterrence Limits

This picture shows the rubble of buildings destroyed in Israeli strikes in the southern Lebanese coastal city of Tyre on April 21, 2026. (AFP)
This picture shows the rubble of buildings destroyed in Israeli strikes in the southern Lebanese coastal city of Tyre on April 21, 2026. (AFP)
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South of Litani: A New Front Under Israel-Set Deterrence Limits

This picture shows the rubble of buildings destroyed in Israeli strikes in the southern Lebanese coastal city of Tyre on April 21, 2026. (AFP)
This picture shows the rubble of buildings destroyed in Israeli strikes in the southern Lebanese coastal city of Tyre on April 21, 2026. (AFP)

After Israel imposed a new reality on the ground following a ceasefire, a new deterrence equation has emerged, confining hostilities to the area south of the Litani River.

Israeli forces continue operations in zones under their control, while Hezbollah has limited its attacks to that area, with restrained responses to ceasefire violations inside northern Israel.

With direct talks between Lebanon and Israel expected to begin, with Israeli withdrawal a central issue, this equation came into focus on Tuesday.

Hezbollah said it responded to what it called “blatant and documented violations by the Israeli army, exceeding 200 breaches since the ceasefire took effect, including targeting civilians and destroying villages and homes in southern Lebanon.”

It said it targeted an artillery position in the settlement of Kfar Giladi, which it described as the source of recent shelling toward Yohmor al-Shaqif, using a barrage of rockets and drones.

On Wednesday, Hezbollah said it again targeted an Israeli artillery position in Bayyada with a drone, “in response to Israeli ceasefire violations and continued shelling of villages in southern Lebanon.”

The Israeli military said Hezbollah launched a drone toward its troops on the front line in southern Lebanon, adding the air force intercepted it before it crossed into Israel, calling it a breach of the ceasefire.

Limited operations to avoid escalation

Riad Kahwaji, a security and defense analyst, told Asharq Al-Awsat that Hezbollah is trying to impose new rules of engagement but lacks the military capability to do so. He said the group knows any escalation beyond the current framework would trigger a broad Israeli response.

He explained that Hezbollah is operating within a calculated margin, carrying out limited strikes inside what is known as the “engagement zone” or “yellow zone” set by Israel, in an attempt to shape a new equation without sliding into full-scale war.

Kahwaji said rules of engagement are dictated by the balance of power, not intent, adding that Israel retains the ability to define the scope and ceiling of operations. He pointed to the expansion of Israeli activity to areas south of the Zahrani River, not just south of the Litani, highlighting a wide gap in military capabilities, from precision to firepower and reach, giving Israel operational superiority.

Kahwaji said Hezbollah’s operations reflect that reality, remaining limited and largely symbolic. He said they often target open areas, claiming to hit military targets without clear evidence, in an effort to preserve deterrence rather than shift the balance.

Hezbollah understands Israel’s ability to inflict wide destruction on border villages and that it cannot currently protect or retake them if the conflict expands. As a result, its role is confined to acting as “a support front for Iran,” launching rockets within calculated limits while preserving its military capacity ahead of any renewed war involving Iran, he added.

Captive Hezbollah fighter

Israeli ceasefire violations continued on Wednesday. One person was killed, and two were wounded in a drone strike on the outskirts of the Jbour area in western Bekaa.

The town of Tayri was later shelled in an area where journalists and civilians were present, the National News Agency said, adding that two people were killed and journalists were wounded.

The agency said Israeli forces surrounded journalists Amal Khalil and Zeinab Faraj and prevented the Red Cross and the Lebanese army from reaching them for some time, triggering an alert in Lebanon. Information Minister Paul Morcos said he was following up with UNIFIL and the Lebanese army and held Israel responsible for their safety.

Separately, Lebanese Civil Defense personnel in Rmeish treated a wounded Hezbollah fighter who had crawled to Ain Ebel from Bint Jbeil, before contacting the Lebanese Red Cross to evacuate him. Israeli forces in Debel called the rescuers, demanding he be handed over and threatening to target the ambulance, the agency said.

The rescuers refused. The wounded man then chose to walk toward Debel to surrender, to protect the medics and residents, despite heavy blood loss.

Systematic demolitions

Israeli operations south of the Litani have intensified, with systematic demolitions in residential neighborhoods in Bint Jbeil and the towns of Beit Lif, Shema, Tayr Harfa and Hanine.

Roads in Wadi al-Slouqi have been bulldozed using heavy machinery backed by military vehicles. Homes and property in Aita al-Shaab were also destroyed, including remaining shops along the main road.

In Khiam, near-continuous explosions have targeted homes, buildings and mosques, alongside demolition and bulldozing of infrastructure, in what appears to be an attempt to erase the town. Israeli forces also blew up several homes at dawn in Bayyada, with explosions heard across Tyre.

Israeli army spokesperson Ella Waweya said the military carried out an airstrike to “eliminate an immediate threat” after detecting two individuals who she said breached the front defensive line in Wadi al-Slouqi.

She added that forces are continuing operations south of that line to prevent threats to northern communities.