Damascus, Kurdish SDF Caught Between US Pressure and Stalled Roadmap

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa signed a deal in Damascus last March with SDF commander Mazloum Abdi on integrating the force into state institutions (AP)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa signed a deal in Damascus last March with SDF commander Mazloum Abdi on integrating the force into state institutions (AP)
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Damascus, Kurdish SDF Caught Between US Pressure and Stalled Roadmap

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa signed a deal in Damascus last March with SDF commander Mazloum Abdi on integrating the force into state institutions (AP)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa signed a deal in Damascus last March with SDF commander Mazloum Abdi on integrating the force into state institutions (AP)

Diplomatic activity intensified in the Syrian capital in recent hours, centering on a high-level meeting between President Ahmed al-Sharaa and delegations from the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) and the United States, represented by Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack and US Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Admiral Brad Cooper.

According to multiple sources, the talks focused on implementing the March 10 Agreement signed between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), amid US pressure to accelerate the process before the end of the year.

The meetings — attended by Syria’s ministers of foreign affairs and defense and the head of the General Intelligence Directorate — covered several issues, including the ceasefire in the north announced after talks between Maj. Gen. Murhaf Abu Qasra, Syria’s defense minister, and Mazloum Abdi, the SDF’s top commander.

Discussions also addressed security and administrative arrangements, the sharing of oil revenues, and the future of decentralization in SDF-held areas.

The March 10 Agreement is viewed as the main political framework regulating ties between Damascus and the SDF, but implementation has been partial.

Sinam Mohamad, the Syrian Democratic Council’s representative in Washington, told Asharq Al-Awsat that joint committees “have made little progress,” noting that issues such as the return and protection of displaced residents “remain unresolved due to a lack of guarantees and continued coercive practices by Syrian security-affiliated groups.”

By contrast, Ayman Abdel Nour, a Syrian-American political analyst and media figure, said the slow implementation reflects “confusion in the US vision” more than local field obstacles.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that envoy Barrack “failed to strike a balance between supporting the Autonomous Administration and safeguarding Damascus’s interests,” and that his latest visit “was an attempt to rescue the agreement before US support ceases entirely.”

US Frustration Growing

James Jeffrey, the former US Secretary’s Special Representative for Syria Engagement under President Donald Trump, wrote that the roadmap negotiated between Damascus and the SDF “has yet to be implemented,” adding that Washington is increasingly frustrated by both sides’ delays.

In a commentary published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Jeffrey said the temporary halt to the US troop withdrawal was driven by concerns over a potential collapse of Syria’s fragile stability.

He added that the visits by Barrack and Cooper were part of an effort “to help break this impasse,” reflecting at the same time genuine American concern over losing diplomatic momentum in a file vital to regional peace.

Integration... the Toughest Hurdle

Leaks from the Damascus meeting indicated that the most sensitive issue discussed was the integration of military and security institutions between the Syrian army and SDF formations.

Sinam Mohamad said this “cannot be resolved through quick decisions,” stressing that the SDF “includes women’s units and diverse local components that are part of the region’s identity.”

She added: “We want to be part of a national Syrian army, but based on clear guarantees and respect for the distinct character of our areas.”

Abdel Nour noted that Damascus sees integration as “the easiest step,” with President al-Sharaa viewing it as a confidence-building measure. But the SDF insists on addressing civil and economic files first.

“The disagreement reflects the deep mistrust between both sides,” he said, as Damascus views any delay as a threat to sovereignty, while the Kurdish administration fears losing its organizational and security autonomy.

Commenting on the integration of the northeast into Syria, Jeffery wrote: “Ultimately, the future welfare (and wealth) of the Syrian nation and its people greatly depend on peacefully integrating the northeast.”

“To jumpstart this process, the Kurds should go first, taking the right combination of confidence-building steps so that Damascus can feel assured about responding with similar moves.”

Jeffery also wrote that “for now, the Kurds mainly need to acknowledge the central government’s sovereignty over all of Syria,” and that “Damascus has to show restraint toward minorities and at least meet minimum international standards in considering legitimate requests, including from the Kurds.”

Decentralization and the Return of the Displaced

Decentralization and the return of displaced people formed another key focus of the talks. Mohamad stressed that a solution “must be political, based on a decentralized system that allows all Syrian components to participate in national decision-making.”

She added that the lack of security guarantees in areas such as Sheikh Maqsoud and Sweida “makes it impossible to discuss disarmament or the reintegration of local administrations,” rejecting any calls for partition.

Abdel Nour said the debate over decentralization “remains suspended between US ambitions for a gradual settlement and Damascus’s fear of losing central control.” Washington, he added, “wants to preserve Syria’s unified state structure but knows the current system cannot survive without genuine structural reforms.”

Jeffrey argued that Syria’s unity is a prerequisite “for Syria to become a full member of the international community,” warning that ongoing delays in political and administrative reforms will keep the country divided and vulnerable to regional interference.

“The main preoccupation for Syrian officials seeking to promote unity and stability is the Kurdish-controlled northeast, home to most of the country’s hydrocarbons, much of its arable land, and more than 10 percent of its population, including a mix of Kurds, Arabs, and other groups,” wrote Jeffery.

He also highlighted Türkiye’s stance as the most sensitive external factor, saying Ankara is watching the agreement’s implementation with growing concern and sees continued SDF armament as a direct threat to its national security.

“This patience could wear thin at any point,” wrote Jeffery.

US Role and Waning Influence

The diplomatic push in Damascus coincided with signs of a shrinking US footprint in the Syrian file. Sources close to the talks said Washington informed both parties that its political and military mission “will conclude by year-end.”

Abdel Nour said this message “reflects President Trump’s desire to close the Syrian file as part of a broader regional peace plan rooted in expanding the Abraham Accords.” But, he added, “Envoy Barrack has failed to translate that vision on the ground or make breakthroughs in sensitive issues such as relations with Israel and oil revenue sharing.”

For her part, Mohamad said Washington “remains more interested in preventing escalation than imposing political solutions,” arguing that “the US priority is to keep frontlines quiet ahead of any future settlements.”

The withdrawal decision risks ceding American influence in Syria to Russia and Iran, stressing that pulling out before securing a settlement between Damascus and the SDF would plunge the country back into fragile chaos.

Jeffery wrote that “Washington should press the Kurds to take the following confidence-building steps as soon as possible:

Remove non-Syrian forces from the northeast, mainly PKK members serving as administrative or military personnel.

Formalize in writing the current informal arrangements with Damascus on oil deliveries from the northeast.

Turn over international border crossings to the central government, with arrangements to allow the unimpeded flow of US military supplies.

Accelerate negotiations on handing the largely Arab province of Deir al-Zour to Damascus.”

He then pointed to Washington, in return, having to “encourage Damascus to take immediate steps to alleviate Kurdish and international concerns, focusing on measures related to education, security, and inclusive governance (though future negotiations will address many of these issues more thoroughly).”

Despite announcements that consultations will continue in the coming weeks, Abdel Nour said envoy Barrack “faces a web of conflicting interests that could derail his mission,” citing his contradictory statements alternating between calls for Syrian unity and a confederal model.

He believes Barrack’s mission “may end soon,” coinciding with the expected departure of UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen in mid-November, with no successor likely to be appointed “given the disappearance of the conditions that justified his post following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.”



Syria Destroys 400 Mn Captagon Pills in Major Drug Haul

Syrian authorities burn seized narcotics, including captagon pills, on Sunday, Nov. 22, 2026. (SANA)
Syrian authorities burn seized narcotics, including captagon pills, on Sunday, Nov. 22, 2026. (SANA)
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Syria Destroys 400 Mn Captagon Pills in Major Drug Haul

Syrian authorities burn seized narcotics, including captagon pills, on Sunday, Nov. 22, 2026. (SANA)
Syrian authorities burn seized narcotics, including captagon pills, on Sunday, Nov. 22, 2026. (SANA)

Syrian authorities on Sunday announced the destruction of large quantities of narcotics, including 400 million captagon pills seized by security forces in multiple operations.

"Large quantities of narcotic and psychotropic substances seized during various security operations were destroyed in batches," the drug enforcement department announced in a statement carried by state news agency SANA.

It added that the quantities destroyed included "400 million captagon pills, 12.2 tons of hashish, in addition to 2.3 tons of cannabis plants, six kilograms of heroin, as well as 5.4 million narcotic pills".

"Tools and equipment used in smuggling, concealment, transport, and manufacture, including chemical substances," were also destroyed.

Synthetic stimulant captagon became Syria's largest export after the civil war began in 2011, flooding the region and becoming a key source of illicit funding for now ousted Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.

Syria's new authorities who took power in December 2024 have been working to combat the captagon trade.

Khaled Eid, the head of the drug enforcement department, announced in June that authorities "carried out 1,550 operations to seize and foil" drug smuggling attempts since Assad's fall, according to SANA.

He said authorities dismantled 90 international smuggling networks, shut down 17 captagon manufacturing plants, and seized 697 million captagon pills and 15 tons of hashish during those operations.


Burhan Downplays RSF Advances in Blue Nile, Vows to Fight On

Burhan offers his condolences to the relatives of Khatmiyya leader Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani. (Sudan's Transitional Sovereignty Council)
Burhan offers his condolences to the relatives of Khatmiyya leader Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani. (Sudan's Transitional Sovereignty Council)
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Burhan Downplays RSF Advances in Blue Nile, Vows to Fight On

Burhan offers his condolences to the relatives of Khatmiyya leader Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani. (Sudan's Transitional Sovereignty Council)
Burhan offers his condolences to the relatives of Khatmiyya leader Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani. (Sudan's Transitional Sovereignty Council)

Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan downplayed advances by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their allies in the Blue Nile region, urging residents not to fear an attack on the regional capital and vowing to fight until what he called the rebellion is defeated.

His remarks came hours after the RSF-aligned Tasis alliance claimed control of five areas in Geissan, a day after announcing the capture of the Bau locality headquarters.

Speaking in Khartoum on Friday evening while offering condolences over the death of Khatmiyya Sufi leader Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani, Burhan sought to reassure residents of Ad-Damazin, the Blue Nile capital.

“Don’t be afraid,” he said, citing the army’s expulsion of RSF fighters from Khartoum as evidence of its ability to prevail.

“They were sitting in the very house where I am speaking,” he added. “Wherever they enter, they will find themselves in a tunnel, in a trap they cannot escape.”

Burhan said that the war remained a priority, acknowledging that much of the state’s resources were being directed toward military operations.

“The army is defending Sudan, its citizens and their right to exist. We will fight until we win, and we will win,” he declared.

The Tasis alliance, comprising the RSF and its ally, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, announced on Friday that its forces had captured several towns in Geissan, nearly 40 kilometers southeast of Ad-Damazin.

The alliance had claimed control of the Bau locality headquarters the previous day, while conflicting accounts emerged from the warring sides over other towns.

Blue Nile’s regional government stressed that the army still held the initiative and was working to restore security in the southern part of the region.

Burhan also praised the Democratic Unionist Party, led by Mirghani, for supporting the army throughout the war through its members and political positions, describing it as a partner alongside other parties and organizations backing the military and Sudanese people.

While acknowledging what he described as hardships in daily living conditions, he attributed much of the economic pressure to an “economic war” waged by countries he accused of instigating the conflict on April 15, 2023.

He also criticized reports about famine and fuel shortages, describing them as attempts to discourage Sudanese citizens and undermine morale.

Famine warnings

Despite Burhan’s dismissal of the reports, international humanitarian organizations have repeatedly warned of worsening food insecurity in parts of Darfur and Kordofan.

The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) identified famine conditions in El Fasher and Kadugli and warned of further deterioration driven by fighting, displacement, drought and insufficient humanitarian funding.

According to a World Health Organization alert issued on October 12, IPC analysis covering February through May 2026 found that around 19.5 million people in Sudan faced acute food insecurity at crisis level or worse, including around 135,000 in the catastrophic category.

The World Food Program (WFP) has documented restrictions on the movement of goods, particularly in areas affected by fighting and displacement.

It attributed rising food prices to disrupted supplies and the depreciation of the Sudanese pound.


Israel Uncovers More Gaza Tunnels After Years of Devastating War

Israeli soldiers inside a tunnel in the Gaza Strip (Reuters). 
Israeli soldiers inside a tunnel in the Gaza Strip (Reuters). 
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Israel Uncovers More Gaza Tunnels After Years of Devastating War

Israeli soldiers inside a tunnel in the Gaza Strip (Reuters). 
Israeli soldiers inside a tunnel in the Gaza Strip (Reuters). 

Years of a devastating war have failed to dismantle Hamas’ vast tunnel network in Gaza, with Israel continuing to uncover underground passages even in areas under its military control.

Recent Israeli announcements have detailed new discoveries on both sides of the Yellow Line, established under the October 10, 2025, ceasefire agreement. The boundary initially left Israel controlling about 50% of Gaza, a share that has since expanded to more than 65%.

The latest operation, described as the first of its kind since the ceasefire, targeted a Hamas tunnel west of the Yellow Line and Salah al-Din Road, near the southern side of the Netzarim Corridor toward central Gaza.

Israeli forces have also reported destroying several tunnels within areas they control, underscoring the complexity of an underground network that has proved more extensive and resilient than anticipated.

Origins of the Tunnel Network

Hamas first used a tunnel in a military operation on September 26, 2001, a year after the outbreak of the Second Intifada.

The group detonated explosives inside a tunnel approximately 150 meters long beneath a military tower at the Termit outpost in Rafah, southern Gaza, killing and wounding several Israeli soldiers.

Israel initially paid limited attention to the tactic, quickly sealing and destroying the tunnel using rudimentary methods rather than the advanced technology employed today.

Hamas subsequently repeated the approach in other operations, including one in 2006 in which Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit was captured.

After taking control of Gaza, Hamas devoted considerable resources to developing tunnels for defensive and offensive operations, as well as smuggling weapons and military equipment.

Commercial tunnels also proliferated along the Rafah border after Israel imposed a sweeping blockade on the territory.

During the 51-day Gaza war in 2014, Hamas surprised Israeli forces with a series of cross-border tunnel operations, allowing its fighters to attack Israeli troops at close range.

The attacks heightened fears among residents of Israeli communities surrounding Gaza and prompted demands for stronger defenses against underground infiltration.

Israel subsequently built a technologically advanced border barrier equipped with aboveground and underground detection and protection systems.

However, during the October 7, 2023, attack, Hamas breached the new barrier using explosives designed to destroy sections of it and aerial means, including paragliders.

Tunnels, meanwhile, remained primarily defensive structures and facilities for command and control, although Hamas field commanders were later forced to abandon some of them after they came under attack.

Israeli Assessments

Israeli Southern Command officers have recently acknowledged that Hamas’ military arsenal, particularly its tunnel network, has not been completely eliminated.

They have also indicated that further measures are needed to address the future of the group’s weapons.

Amichai Mitelman, of the civil engineering department at Ariel University, estimated in a report published recently by Israel’s Maariv newspaper that a substantial portion of Hamas’ tunnels remains intact. He cautioned that no single method could destroy the entire network.

According to Mitelman, estimates of the total length of Gaza’s tunnels before the October 7 attack ranged from 500 to 1,000 kilometers.

Some tunnels were between 30 and 40 meters deep, with branching passages of varying widths, he explained.

Efforts to destroy the network by flooding tunnels with seawater or detonating large quantities of explosives have failed to eliminate it completely.

Filling tunnels with concrete has recently proved more effective, he said, although the method is costly and labor-intensive.

The Qassam Engineers

The underground network has remained a major challenge for Israel throughout the war, which has continued at a limited level despite the ceasefire.

Israel has demanded the complete destruction of Hamas’ tunnels under the ceasefire agreement, subject to monitoring by Israel, the United States and mediating countries.

The fate of Hamas’ other weapons, including rockets, has also become a central issue.

During operations to recover Israeli hostages, particularly the remains of those killed, it emerged that some had been buried in small tunnels and branches that Israeli forces had failed to detect.

Some of these passages remained intact within tunnel systems the military had believed it had destroyed.

Videos released by Hamas’ armed wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, featuring commanders and fighters killed during the war, have also shed light on the construction of the tunnels and the development of the group’s rocket arsenal.

The footage suggests that much of the work relied on local expertise and manual labor rather than exclusively on weapons smuggled from Iran or elsewhere, as is often assumed.

This has also prompted Israeli demands to dismantle Hamas’ weapons-manufacturing workshops.

The videos indicate that many of those responsible for tunnel construction and rocket development, known within the group as the “Qassam engineers,” did not hold formal engineering qualifications.

While a small number had engineering degrees, most had studied other subjects, and some had no academic qualifications.

Many were construction workers or technicians whose practical skills enabled them to oversee the development of the underground network over many years. They supervised excavation teams largely composed of younger Qassam recruits.

The so-called engineers assessed soil conditions, identified areas of structural strength and weakness, and determined tunnel routes before excavation began.

Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that tunnel construction and preparation followed what they described as professional engineering practices, using various types of equipment operated by skilled technicians.

The sources credited these workers with playing a central role in developing what Hamas considers a strategic military asset.

They acknowledged that construction had faced serious difficulties over the years, with numerous workers killed during excavation and others suffering paralysis or other injuries following soil collapses and unexpected incidents.

Security challenges also complicated the work, including alleged Israeli attempts to recruit informants from among faction members, tunnel workers and others to identify underground locations.

Other Hamas sources said the group’s rocket industry similarly relied on domestic development. According to these accounts, engineers from Gaza received training and studied relevant subjects at universities and other institutions before returning to train additional personnel, expanding the number of people capable of manufacturing and developing weapons.

The sources maintained that explosives were also manufactured and adapted locally to meet operational requirements, including those used to destroy sections of Israel’s border barrier during the October 7 attack.

They credited the engineers with adapting weapons to changing battlefield conditions.

The same approach, they added, extended to other locally developed weapons, including the Yassin 105 anti-armor projectile, which Hamas used extensively against Israeli forces during the war.