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Where Are the Armed Groups That Fought Hamas in Gaza Now?

Hamas police officers patrol a street in Gaza City (Reuters)
Hamas police officers patrol a street in Gaza City (Reuters)
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Where Are the Armed Groups That Fought Hamas in Gaza Now?

Hamas police officers patrol a street in Gaza City (Reuters)
Hamas police officers patrol a street in Gaza City (Reuters)

During the two-year Israeli war on Gaza that followed Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, attack, the group faced growing internal challenges, including clashes with armed clans and factions that emerged amid the chaos and sought to spread lawlessness across the enclave.

Two days before the ceasefire took effect last Friday, Hamas fought one of its fiercest internal battles against gunmen from the Al-Majayda clan in Khan Younis, southern Gaza.

When the fighting with Israel stopped, new confrontations erupted, this time with members of the Doghmosh clan south of the city, as Hamas also hunted armed groups it accused of operating under Israeli patronage.

The Abu Shabab Group

In recent months, Yasser Abu Shabab has risen as a key figure leading one of Gaza’s most prominent armed groups, estimated to number in the hundreds. His men, lightly armed, are based in Rafah, at Gaza’s southernmost edge, which remains under full Israeli control even after the ceasefire. Many residents there belong to Abu Shabab’s own Bedouin clan.

Abu Shabab has not spoken publicly since the war ended. Earlier, he had tried to expand his influence into Khan Younis by recruiting members of the Barbakh clan after their attack on Nasser Medical Complex and police forces protecting it in late June. The effort failed, however, and his influence remains confined to Rafah.

Hamas refers to his faction as the “Abu Shabab Gang”, saying it operates within Israeli-controlled areas of Rafah. Although their positions have not changed, their attacks have ceased since the ceasefire. In previous months, the group had repeatedly tried to exploit Israeli bombardments to infiltrate neighborhoods, loot civilians, and target Hamas fighters — notably in the Mawasi area and parts of Khan Younis.

Hamas accuses Abu Shabab’s men of “serving Israel”. Abu Shabab, who calls his faction the “Popular Forces,” has alternated between denying and admitting links to Israel or the Palestinian Authority.

Once a minor criminal figure detained by Hamas police, Abu Shabab had no prior political or militant background. His notoriety grew after his men looted aid trucks near Israeli military zones. Hamas pursued him relentlessly, killing his brother during one of the chases.

Though not yet a major threat, Hamas has continued to strike at his group to demonstrate control and is expected to mount further operations against them.

Hossam al-Astal

Another group operates in southeastern Khan Younis, particularly in Qizan al-Najjar, Jorat al-Lout, and Al-Manara. Led by Hossam al-Astal, a former officer in the Palestinian Authority’s security services, it consists of roughly 40 fighters. The area remains contested, with sporadic Israeli activity.

Reports suggest al-Astal split from Abu Shabab to form his own faction — a claim Abu Shabab denied on Facebook before deleting the post.

In 2022, Hamas sentenced al-Astal to death for allegedly helping Israel’s Mossad assassinate senior Al-Qassam Brigades commander Fadi al-Batsh in Malaysia in 2018. Despite the charges, his group has shown limited activity and carried out no major attacks.

Al-Majayda Clan

The Al-Majayda are one of Gaza’s largest clans, based mainly in Khan Younis. Tensions with Hamas escalated when clan members killed two Al-Qassam fighters and a mediator attempting to defuse the dispute. Hamas gave the clan a brief deadline to hand over the killers. When mediators failed, Hamas launched a large assault days before the ceasefire, killing the suspects and seizing weapons. Israeli airstrikes later hit Hamas forces involved, killing about 20.

Following mediation efforts, the clan pledged on Monday to hand over unlicensed weapons and affirmed support for Hamas in combating “security chaos.”

Central Gaza

In central Gaza, two small armed groups — the Abu Khammash and Abu Moghaiseb factions — surfaced around Deir al-Balah before the January ceasefire and reappeared after fighting resumed in March. Hamas quickly crushed both, killing and wounding several members before tribal elders brokered a truce and arranged for the surrender of their weapons.

The Doghmosh Clan

In Gaza City and the northern parts of the enclave, Hamas also clashed with the Doghmosh clan, which is concentrated in the Tel al-Hawa and al-Sabra neighborhoods. Clan members accused Hamas of killing their elder after he refused to cooperate with an Israeli plan to turn local clans into armed administrators of their neighborhoods.

During the war, Hamas accused Doghmosh gunmen of killing Al-Qassam fighters, seizing their weapons — including Yasin-105 anti-tank rockets — and attempting to assassinate more fighters. The operation was never completed due to Israeli airstrikes and Hamas’s preoccupation with the frontlines.

Before the war, Hamas had praised the clan’s leadership for rejecting Israeli offers to form local militias, a stance that led to Israeli strikes on their homes.

When the ceasefire began Friday afternoon, two Al-Qassam fighters — including the son of a senior commander — were killed by Doghmosh gunmen. Hamas issued an ultimatum to hand over the killers, then launched raids over the following two days.

The fighting left at least 20 Doghmosh members and six Hamas fighters dead, including senior figure Bassem Naim’s son and journalist Saleh al-Jafarawi, who was covering the clashes. Hamas later arrested several clan members and released a video showing executions of alleged “Israeli collaborators,” though it remains unclear if any belonged to the clan.

Northern Gaza

After the Doghmosh battle, Hamas forces stormed positions held by Rami Helles, leader of a militant group operating in Gaza City’s Shujaiya, Zeitoun, and Tuffah districts. The group, numbering in the dozens, retreated eastward as Israeli forces withdrew. On Tuesday, Hamas attacked again, killing and wounding several members.

Simultaneously, another Hamas raid targeted Ashraf al-Mansi’s group in Jabalia, Sheikh Radwan, Nasr, and Beit Lahia. His men, operating under Israeli drone cover, had reportedly looted property and attacked civilians, including near Al-Shifa Hospital.

Israeli Cooperation and Covert Networks

Israeli media have acknowledged that Israel treated wounded Palestinian fighters who collaborated with it against Hamas — particularly in eastern Gaza — and cited one case involving the tunnel explosion that killed members of Helles’s faction.

Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that a body once believed to belong to an Israeli soldier killed in a tunnel blast in Jabalia in May 2024 was later identified as a Palestinian operative from Shujaiya who had fought alongside Israel for pay.

“These cells were composed of infiltrators and mercenaries recruited by Israel to serve its objectives inside Gaza,” the sources said, adding that Hamas had decided to “deal with them decisively — whether during the previous ceasefire or after the war.”

They confirmed that Hamas is now implementing “a comprehensive plan to eliminate these gangs gradually.”

Trump’s Reaction

During a White House meeting with Argentine President Javier Milei, US President Donald Trump spoke approvingly of the way Hamas “took out two very evil gangs” in Gaza and “killed a number of them.”

Israel has made no official comment on Hamas’s campaign, though some Israeli analysts say the country has “abandoned its allies too quickly.” Hebrew-language media have continued to report extensively on Hamas’s internal security operations in Gaza and its pursuit of groups accused of collaborating with Israel.

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The Ethiopian Dam Dispute and Egypt’s ‘Right to Self-Defense’

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry
Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry
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The Ethiopian Dam Dispute and Egypt’s ‘Right to Self-Defense’

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry
Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty. Photo: Foreign Ministry

Over the past two weeks, Egypt has repeatedly stressed its right to prevent any actions by Addis Ababa on the Nile River that could harm its water interests, stressing that it possesses the “right to self-defense” over Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

According to experts who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, Egypt’s signaling means that it “will not hesitate to use all legitimate means to safeguard its water security.”

They explained that the message is a stern warning to Ethiopia and suggests that Cairo is seeking to shift from a policy of protesting Ethiopian measures to preventive deterrence, aimed at stopping the establishment of a new status quo on the Nile.

New Egyptian Warning

Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty said that “Egypt will not allow the construction of additional dams ... that affect its water interests,” stressing Cairo’s commitment to a legally binding agreement that guarantees its water rights.

In a television interview on Wednesday evening, Abdelatty said that Egypt does not oppose African countries’ right to development, noting Cairo’s participation in dam and infrastructure projects in several Nile Basin states. However, he stressed the need to balance the right to development with the rights of downstream countries.

He also underscored Egypt’s commitment to protecting its water interests. “We have the right to self-defense to protect our interests and water security,” said the minister. “We will not accept any agreement regarding the Nile River unless it is legally binding,” he reiterated.

Mohamed Hegazy, a member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs and a former assistant foreign minister, says the right of self-defense is protected under international law after all peaceful means have been exhausted.

According to Hegazy, the core message is that Cairo still prefers agreement and negotiation, but it no longer accepts using negotiations to impose a fait accompli.

He argued that the most significant aspect of Abdelatty’s statements is that they send three simultaneous messages - Rejection of unilateral measures, rejection of additional dams, and insistence on the right of self-defense to protect water security.

Hussein El-Behairy, an African affairs expert at the National Center for Middle East Studies, said the minister’s recent statements reaffirm Egypt’s right to defend its historical and water rights in the Nile by whatever means the Egyptian state deems appropriate to preserve what Egyptians view as a matter of life and death.

Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Reuters

Escalating Egyptian Position

This is the third time Egypt has signaled the possibility of using its “right to self-defense” and preventing dam construction on the Nile.

On August 16, Egypt’s state news agency quoted an unnamed Egyptian official as saying that Cairo “will neither accept nor allow any party to control the flow of Nile waters to downstream countries,” stressing that the Egyptian state possesses multiple tools capable of protecting its people’s interests in the Nile.

The statement came in response to remarks attributed to Ethiopian Minister of Water and Energy Habtamu Itefa concerning the construction of additional dams on the Nile and control over water flows to downstream states, namely Egypt and Sudan.

Earlier, on August 4, Egyptian Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Hani Sewilam stated during a press conference that Egypt “will not allow the construction of new Ethiopian dams on the Nile River.”

He said: “It is well known that Ethiopia has plans to build additional dams, but will the Egyptian state allow this? No.”

According to Hegazy, the ball is now in Ethiopia’s court. If Addis Ababa agrees to resume serious negotiations leading to a legally binding agreement on GERD, the crisis can be contained.

However, if Ethiopia continues to create new realities on the Nile, the scope for a diplomatic solution will narrow, making risk management and deterrence a more prominent part of Egypt’s strategy.

El-Behairy does not expect the escalation to pave the way for new negotiations on GERD unless the Ethiopian government is willing to make concessions in response to Cairo’s demands. These demands include reaching a legally binding agreement that guarantees Egypt’s water rights during periods of drought and severe drought, and providing Egypt with information regarding the operation of the dam in a manner that does not harm its water interests.

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Train to Nowhere? South Korea’s Lonely Push for Peace with the North

A locomotive is seen at the Woljeong-ri Station in Cheorwon, Gangwon Province, in South Korea, near the demilitarized zone separating North and South Korea on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
A locomotive is seen at the Woljeong-ri Station in Cheorwon, Gangwon Province, in South Korea, near the demilitarized zone separating North and South Korea on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
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Train to Nowhere? South Korea’s Lonely Push for Peace with the North

A locomotive is seen at the Woljeong-ri Station in Cheorwon, Gangwon Province, in South Korea, near the demilitarized zone separating North and South Korea on August 10, 2026. (AFP)
A locomotive is seen at the Woljeong-ri Station in Cheorwon, Gangwon Province, in South Korea, near the demilitarized zone separating North and South Korea on August 10, 2026. (AFP)

Near the heavily fortified frontier dividing the Korean peninsula, the abandoned Woljeong-ri station is being recast as a symbol of South Korea's hopes to reconcile with the North.

But plans to reconnect South Korea's northernmost station to the rail network come at an awkward moment, as Pyongyang ignores Seoul's overtures while the South's old ally Washington pursues its own talks with Pyongyang.

A turbulent few days have raised doubts about the role of South Korea in any diplomatic push, despite President Lee Jae Myung's dovish line on the North since taking power last year.

US President Donald Trump abruptly scaled back annual military drills with Seoul this week, calling them "inappropriate and hostile" towards the nuclear-armed North.

He also berated South Korea for not helping in his war against Iran and said he would meet the North's leader Kim Jong Un this year.

North Korea then fired around 10 short-range ballistic missiles on Thursday, while Kim's powerful sister mocked Seoul's "master-servant" relationship with Washington.

The developments have overshadowed the Lee administration's outreach, including the Woljeong-ri project aimed at "eventual" reconciliation.

The modest station -- originally located inside today's demilitarized zone (DMZ) -- once sat on a line linking Seoul to Wonsan, but was destroyed during the 1950-53 Korean War. It was reconstructed at its current site in the border town of Cheorwon in 1988.

It is now an attraction for visitors to the nearby DMZ separating the two countries, and the line's former terminus -- Wonsan -- lies in North Korea.

Its history, however, underscores how vulnerable such hopes are to the politics of the peninsula.

Work began in 2015 but ground to a halt just a year later after North Korea's fourth nuclear test.

The latest reboot inspires more skepticism than hope for some in Cheorwon.

"It seems like they keep trying to reconcile with North Korea (through the railway project), but from our point of view, it isn't really practical," said resident Moon Jae-yong, 70.

- Lonely push for peace -

South Korea's reconciliation program eventually aims to restore rail links, such as Woljeong-ri, with the North.

Lee has also said he is ready for talks with Pyongyang without preconditions, including on formally ending the Korean War, which concluded with an armistice.

His unification minister said in July that Seoul had shifted from prioritizing denuclearization to curbing the expansion of North Korea's nuclear program.

But Pyongyang -- emboldened by support from traditional ally China, and Russia, whose invasion of Ukraine it is backing -- has been unmoved.

It has repeatedly declared itself an "irreversible" nuclear state and labelled Seoul its "most hostile" enemy.

The US leader may be trying to revive diplomacy to record a foreign policy win ahead of November's midterm elections, with many voters disenchanted by his intervention in the Middle East.

That has sidelined Seoul, with Lee voicing respect for Trump's decision and pledging to "do his utmost" to support his peacemaking efforts.

South Korea is "reasonably afraid that it gets sidelined -- China, Russia and now America are all engaged with Pyongyang in different ways, while Seoul is not," Vladimir Tikhonov, Korean Studies professor at the University of Oslo, told AFP.

"So, Seoul is desperate to get some opening with North Korea. But it can do very little, so far."

- Impossible dream? -

That leaves the rail project standing as a symbol of South Korea's lonely push for peace.

Along the disused line from Woljeong-ri towards Baengmagoji station to the south -- the section to be restored under the peace project -- vegetation crowds both sides of the tracks, nearly swallowing a stone wall.

"The iron horse wants to run," a sign reads, alongside a phrase in English: "We want to be back on track."

Preparing infrastructure in the South now could save time if inter-Korean links are eventually restored, said Lim Eul-chul, a professor at Kyungnam University.

"But realistically, it is virtually impossible under the current circumstances, and everyone knows that," he told AFP.

With few options on North Korea, Seoul has turned to projects it can "pursue unilaterally", Lim said.

The project also aims to boost tourism along the border, where residents face frequent disruptions and security risks.

Pyongyang sent trash-filled balloons and broadcast unsettling noises across the border during the administration of Lee's hawkish predecessor, Yoon Suk Yeol.

Kim Sun-hee, 70, described them as "like scraping cement, or even ghost-like noises. It was really frightening".

A bombed-out locomotive from the Korean War remains near Woljeong-ri station as a reminder of the division.

It is "heartbreaking to see", said visitor Ahn Seung-hyun.

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Lockerbie Specter Returns in Netflix Drama: Who Was Bombmaker Marwan Khreesat?

Marwan Khreesat (Facebook)
Marwan Khreesat (Facebook)
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Lockerbie Specter Returns in Netflix Drama: Who Was Bombmaker Marwan Khreesat?

Marwan Khreesat (Facebook)
Marwan Khreesat (Facebook)

In the shadow world of Palestinian factional operations and intelligence wars that defined the 1970s and 1980s, few names were as mysterious or controversial as Marwan Khreesat.

Linked to what became known as the “engineering of airborne death,” Khreesat was described in Western intelligence accounts as a skilled bombmaker for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, or PFLP-GC, led by Ahmed Jibril.

For decades, he remained an elusive figure, moving between world capitals. West Germany arrested him, then released him in circumstances that fueled speculation. Israel’s Mossad pursued him. He eventually died in Amman at about 70, taking many of his secrets with him.

To some, he was a fedayeen who used his electrical skills against the Israeli occupation. To Western investigators, he was linked to aviation attacks that shocked the world.

His death did not end the questions.

Khreesat’s fingerprints, at least in the investigative sense, continued to hover over the Lockerbie case. More recently, his name returned to international attention as a Netflix docudrama revisited the hidden battles, intelligence operations, and unresolved questions of that era.

The electronics expert inside the PFLP-GC

Khreesat’s story began with technical skill.

A talented electrician and technician, he became involved in armed activity early, driven by his nationalist background. As radical Palestinian factions expanded, he joined the PFLP-GC, which had split from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and focused on specialized cross-border military operations.

Ahmed Jibril, born in 1938 in a village in the Jaffa district, founded the faction in 1968 after breaking away from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

He quickly recognized Khreesat’s ability to work with electrical circuits and plastic explosives such as C-4 and Semtex.

Khreesat was not a front-line fighter.

He worked instead in secret, specially equipped laboratories, designing sophisticated explosive devices triggered by changes in air pressure or by digital timers.

That technical skill turned ordinary objects into devices capable of defeating airport security systems.

From El Al to Operation Autumn Leaves

Khreesat’s expertise did not suddenly emerge in the 1980s. It had been developed years earlier in the laboratories of the region’s shadow wars.

One early episode came in Rome in the summer of 1972.

The PFLP-GC used what the source describes as an emotional deception involving two British women, who were persuaded to carry a household record player presented as a farewell gift before boarding an El Al flight to Tel Aviv.

Hidden inside the record player was a charge of powerful plastic explosives fitted with a barometric trigger.

The device was designed to detonate automatically when the aircraft reached a high altitude over the Mediterranean, sending the wreckage — and potentially the evidence — into the sea.

The bomb exploded about 20 minutes after takeoff, tearing a large hole in the aircraft.

But airport security had insisted the record player be placed in the baggage hold rather than the passenger cabin. That reduced the blast’s impact and allowed the pilot to make a safe emergency landing in Rome.

The incident became an early warning to international intelligence services: an engineer was turning ordinary household electronics into sophisticated airborne bombs.

The most serious threat to Khreesat’s operations came 16 years later.

In the autumn of 1988, West German authorities penetrated a PFLP-GC cell in Frankfurt led by Hafez Dalkamoni as part of what became known as Operation Autumn Leaves.

German police arrested Khreesat and seized explosives concealed inside modified Toshiba radios and cassette players.

The devices were designed to explode automatically once an aircraft reached a specific altitude, triggered by changes in atmospheric pressure.

Then came the mystery.

German authorities released Khreesat only days after his arrest.

The decision triggered years of speculation. Later Western intelligence reports and suspicions suggested he may have been acting as a “double agent,” passing sensitive information to Jordanian, US or other security services.

Lockerbie and the question that would not disappear

On Dec. 21, 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 exploded over the Scottish town of Lockerbie, killing 270 people.

The technical similarities drew immediate attention.

The bomb used in the attack had also been concealed in a Toshiba cassette player, echoing devices seized from Khreesat in Germany just two months earlier.

Although the international judicial process later convicted Libyan Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, Khreesat’s name never fully disappeared from the investigation.

Decades later, it returned to public view through The Bombing of Pan Am 103, a major docudrama produced by the BBC and Netflix.

The series examined the criminal investigation and the joint pursuit by Scottish investigators and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation.

It also revived the theory of an “Iranian-Palestinian connection.”

Khreesat appeared in that context through references to fragments linked to the bomb and comparisons with devices he had designed that were seized in Germany.

The old question returned with it:

Was Marwan Khreesat the man who actually built the bomb that destroyed Pan Am Flight 103 over Scotland?

The secret file left behind

Khreesat spent his final decades largely silent at his home in the suburbs of Amman, refusing repeated approaches from Western media.

In later years, however, he began publishing memoirs and documents online, attacking some Palestinian leaders and at times boasting about earlier operations against Israeli interests.

After his death, the story took another turn.

His daughter, Suha Khreesat, made claims to British media, again pushing his name into the headlines.

In a 2018 interview with Britain’s Daily Mirror, marking the 30th anniversary of the Lockerbie bombing, she said her father had played no part in the deaths of the victims.

But she also said he had left behind a “large secret file, documents and recordings” kept by her mother, his wife.

She said the material proved that Ahmed Jibril — who later died in Damascus at about 83 — had carried out the Lockerbie operation under a major direct financial deal with the Iranian government.

Marwan Khreesat died, leaving behind a legacy as murky as the intelligence wars in which he operated.

He was a bombmaker whose technical skills challenged security services across two continents, a figure whose story fused electronics, covert operations, and regional power struggles.

And decades later, his name still shadows the Lockerbie file — preserved in intelligence documents, revived in investigations and retold on screens, revisiting one of the era’s most enduring mysteries.