El-Mahboub Abdul Salam to Asharq Al-Awsat: Al-Turabi Tasted the Betrayal of his Disciples, Foremost Among them Omar al-Bashir

 
Al-Bashir and al-Turabi (right) after the coup (AP)
Al-Bashir and al-Turabi (right) after the coup (AP)
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El-Mahboub Abdul Salam to Asharq Al-Awsat: Al-Turabi Tasted the Betrayal of his Disciples, Foremost Among them Omar al-Bashir

 
Al-Bashir and al-Turabi (right) after the coup (AP)
Al-Bashir and al-Turabi (right) after the coup (AP)

Dr. Hassan Abdullah al-Turabi once tasted a bitter truth: that a man’s own disciples may one day betray him. It is almost a law of political life that students eventually turn on their teachers.

Al-Turabi had chosen the young army officer Omar Hassan al-Bashir to lead Sudan, perhaps imagining that he could remain behind the curtain as the guiding hand, a spiritual mentor presiding over the state, as Ayatollah Khomeini had done in Iran. But generals have their own instincts. Power is a feast that tolerates no partners. Soon enough, al-Bashir rebelled, and the master who had raised him was cast aside.

In 2017, a year after al-Turabi’s death, I interviewed Omar al-Bashir on that complicated relationship. When asked who had been the hardest person to deal with in his political life, he immediately named al-Turabi. He described him as a man of “immense charisma,” one who had long dominated the Islamic Movement and triumphed in every internal battle, until his clash with al-Bashir himself, when, for the first time, he lost.

Al-Bashir’s rule was marked by constant shifts and contradictions, none more telling than his oscillating relationship with Iran. In 1992, Sudan was under suffocating sanctions, short of weapons and ammunition, and isolated after Iraq’s decline.

Desperate for aid, Finance Minister Abdul-Rahim Hamdi traveled to Tehran to request assistance. The Iranians, however, demanded that Sudan first repay the debts left by the Jaafar Nimeiri regime. They explained that their priority was to help the newly independent Shiite communities emerging from the collapse of the Soviet Union, and offered instead to send books and sports equipment. Khartoum’s delegation was stunned. When Hamdi recounted the story to al-Turabi, the latter laughed bitterly and said: “Haven’t you read The Book of Misers? Most of it is about the Persians.”

Iran’s stance changed years later. After 2003, it supported the Sudanese army in the war in Darfur, established husayniyyas (Shiite centers), converted a small number of Sudanese to Shiism, and sent hundreds of youths for training in Syria. Iranian engineers helped build military industries south of Khartoum, and weapons were smuggled through Port Sudan to Gaza for Hamas, via Egyptian tunnels. Israeli warplanes would later strike those factories, exposing the secret routes.

I once asked al-Bashir whether he could ever enjoy life as a “former president.” He smiled and said: “Not only would it be easy - it would be a pleasure. People will still call you ‘Your Excellency’ in the street, but you’ll have no responsibilities.” Experience teaches journalists not to take such remarks at face value; similar words are spoken by leaders who never truly imagine leaving office.

Al-Turabi himself seldom condemned other rulers. He counted Muammar Gaddafi among his friends, saying their meetings were always frank and candid. He also believed that Saddam Hussein had undergone a transformation after the first Gulf War, symbolized by adding the phrase Allahu Akbar to Iraq’s flag. Such reflections revealed a man who, despite his ideological fervor, viewed other strongmen as peers in power and survival.

Among those who knew both al-Turabi and al-Bashir closely was Dr. Al-Mahboub Abdul Salam, a Sudanese politician and thinker who lived through the rise and unraveling of their shared project. In his view, the Sudan of today - torn apart by war and bleeding from within - is the direct legacy of that turbulent era.

Abdul Salam said that many Sudanese now live with the haunting fear of becoming people without a homeland. “This is not just a feeling,” he observed. “It’s a psychological reality. Some Sudanese have already begun to rebuild their lives elsewhere. The war has touched everyone - it has destroyed homes, livelihoods, memories, and the very sense of belonging. No one has been spared.”

He noted that the blame for Sudan’s collapse lied with the country’s elites, those of both the left and the right. “The Marxists, the Islamists, and even the centrist politicians share responsibility,” he said. “The military and civilian elites are two faces of the same coin. Tayeb Salih once wrote that in Sudan, some officers wake up one morning and decide to seize power by driving a tank to the radio station. But many civilians have the same hunger for authority. They just wear different clothes.”

Abdul Salam argued that politics became, for many, “a profession for the unqualified.” True politics, he insisted, requires training, study, and deep knowledge of the country and the world. “If you are Sudanese, you must know every corner of Sudan, its regions, its people, its contradictions. But many who rushed into power came from nowhere, driven only by ambition.”

He added that both soldiers and civilians failed equally. “What Sudan suffers today is the meeting of two failures, military and civilian.”

Reflecting on his own past, Abdul Salam admits that even before the 1989 coup, he doubted that the Islamic Movement was ready to govern. “We had capable leaders, scholars, and administrators,” he said, “but a state is far larger than any movement can imagine. Had we let the movement mature within democracy instead of seizing power by force, Sudan’s story might have been different.”

There is no doubt in his mind that Hassan al-Turabi was the mastermind of the 1989 coup that brought al-Bashir to power. “He designed it from start to finish,” Abdul Salam said. Al-Turabi had met al-Bashir only once before the coup, two days before its launch. “Go to the palace as president,” he told the young officer, “and I will go to prison as a captive.” It was a deliberate act of deception meant to mislead Sudan’s political parties and foreign observers into thinking that al-Turabi was uninvolved. For a while, the ruse worked. Egypt and other neighbors welcomed the new regime, unaware of its Islamist core.

Al-Turabi justified his deceit as a wartime tactic. He often said that the world would never accept an Islamic regime, whether it came to power democratically or through a coup. Therefore, he considered the revolution a form of war, where deception was permissible. But the disguise did not last long. The Gulf War exposed Khartoum’s Islamist sympathies when it sided with Saddam Hussein, and Sudan found itself isolated, condemned by its neighbors and the world.

Sudan also became the most vivid example of the “Sheikh and the President” dynamic: a spiritual guide wielding hidden influence while the official ruler executed his will. Al-Turabi and al-Bashir shared an office called the “Leadership Bureau.” Formally, al-Turabi was head of the movement and al-Bashir one of its members. In reality, the former commanded ideological power while the latter held the guns. That dual authority could not endure.

The rupture came on December 12, 1999, when the famous Mufasala, the Great Split, tore the movement apart. For al-Turabi, it was a personal and moral betrayal. He believed they were united by a sacred project to transform history, and that conspiracies could never achieve such a mission. But his own disciples, both civilian and military, had conspired behind his back. The “Memorandum of Ten,” drafted by his opponents within the movement, marked the beginning of the end.

Abdul Salam believes that al-Bashir began to see al-Turabi as a burden as early as 1993, when the latter demanded that the Revolutionary Command Council be dissolved and that the officers return to their barracks. This was the first real collision between al-Turabi’s strategic vision and the generals’ lust for permanence. Yet external pressures - international isolation and domestic opposition - forced them to remain together for several more years. “They knew any split at that time would destroy the regime entirely,” Abdul Salam explained. “Besides, al-Turabi still commanded loyalty even within the military.”

Over time, however, the state’s intelligence services began spying on al-Turabi himself. “They claimed it was their duty,” Abdul Salam said, “but we objected. We believed he deserved independent protection - just as Western leaders have their own special security apart from intelligence agencies.”

Looking back on Sudan’s modern history, Abdul Salam described Jaafar Nimeiri as a charismatic but authoritarian ruler. “A strong leader, yes, but a dictator nonetheless.”

As for Sadiq al-Mahdi, the long-time leader of the National Umma Party, Abdul Salam described him as “deeply intelligent, highly charismatic, but born into an environment that sanctified leadership.” Al-Mahdi saw himself as destined to rule, yet lacked the decisiveness of a true statesman. “He was a thinker, a lecturer, a man of ideas - more suited to opposition and intellectual debate than to governance.”

Abdul Salam spent a decade as al-Turabi’s chief of staff, witnessing firsthand the man’s ambition and complexity. “He changed the face of Sudanese politics,” he said. “Before him, the political arena was divided between two religious sects - the Umma Party of Sadiq al-Mahdi and the Democratic Unionist Party of Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani. Al-Turabi broke that monopoly. He became, in a sense, the ‘third saint’ of Sudanese politics.”

When al-Turabi joined Nimeiri’s government after seven years in prison, some were shocked. He used to smile and say: “We are Islamizing the system, step by step.” His goal, Abdul Salam explained, was to ensure that his movement could organize freely in society - among students, women, farmers, and professionals - while cooperating with power from within.

He even likened politics to a “game” governed by its own rules and fouls. Nimeiri tolerated him, believing the Islamists would never rule until long after his death. But during those years of so-called “national reconciliation,” the Islamist movement built its real foundations.

For al-Turabi, prison had been a university. He said he never suffered from solitude, reading hundreds of books and writing new theories of Islamic jurisprudence. “He read four hundred volumes on economics alone,” Abdul Salam recalled. “He used prison as others might use a library.”

Exposure to Western thought also shaped al-Turabi profoundly. Educated in Britain and France, he brought to the Islamist project a rare sophistication. “He produced the most advanced version of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology,” Abdul Salam remarked, “one that tried to engage modernity rather than reject it.” Yet that same intellect drove him to think in terms of long-term strategy. He divided the movement’s progress into stages: secrecy, preparation, empowerment, and eventual control of the state - by elections if possible, by revolution if necessary. From the 1960s onward, he had already imagined that a coup might one day be the vehicle.

Sudan’s October Revolution of 1964, which overthrew a military regime, had convinced many - including Communist leader Abdul Khaliq Mahjoub - that the army would never again seize power. But when Nimeiri did exactly that in 1969, the lesson was clear: the temptation of power never dies.

According to Abdul Salam, the relationship between Hassan al-Turabi and Sadiq al-Mahdi combined intimacy with rivalry. Both came from Islamic traditions and shared views on freedom, women’s rights, and economic openness. Early on, they appeared almost as one political family. Al-Mahdi, confident in his vast popular base, saw al-Turabi and other intellectuals as tools to modernize the Umma Party and assumed al-Turabi’s role would never exceed that of a minister. But al-Turabi’s ambitions were far greater: he sought to found his own movement, a third force in Sudanese politics. Had that partnership endured, Sudan might have gained a powerful current capable of bringing lasting stability.



What Safe Havens Remain for the Islamic Jihad?

The late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei receives the late «Hamas» leader Ismail Haniyeh and the leader of the «Jihad» movement, Ziad al-Nakhala, in Tehran, July 2024 (AFP)
The late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei receives the late «Hamas» leader Ismail Haniyeh and the leader of the «Jihad» movement, Ziad al-Nakhala, in Tehran, July 2024 (AFP)
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What Safe Havens Remain for the Islamic Jihad?

The late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei receives the late «Hamas» leader Ismail Haniyeh and the leader of the «Jihad» movement, Ziad al-Nakhala, in Tehran, July 2024 (AFP)
The late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei receives the late «Hamas» leader Ismail Haniyeh and the leader of the «Jihad» movement, Ziad al-Nakhala, in Tehran, July 2024 (AFP)

The US-Israeli war against Iran has reshaped the landscape for Palestinian factions aligned with Tehran, with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad among the most affected. The group has faced financial and security setbacks in both Syria and Lebanon, even as fighting continues in the Gaza Strip.

Sources in the movement told Asharq Al-Awsat that the regional security changes and the war against Iran have further complicated the organization’s remaining safe havens.

While Hamas maintains close ties with Tehran, Islamic Jihad’s relationship with Iran runs deeper. The connection dates back to the group’s founding in the 1980s by Fathi Shaqaqi.

For decades, Islamic Jihad maintained a military and human presence in both Syria and Lebanon, gaining additional protection as Iranian influence expanded in the two countries over the past ten years.

However, the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’ political bureau, in Tehran in July 2024, followed by an attempted attack on Hamas leaders in Doha in September, served as a major warning to Palestinian faction leaders, particularly Islamic Jihad.

Three countries

According to sources in the group, Secretary-General Ziad al-Nakhalah has sharply reduced his visits to Iran, traveling there only three times since Haniyeh’s assassination. One visit involved a joint delegation from Islamic Jihad and Hamas and lasted several days, while the other two were brief.

Previously, Nakhalah and several senior figures — particularly Akram al-Ajouri, who oversees the group’s armed wing, the Al-Quds Brigades — considered Iran a key safe haven, along with other capitals, such as Beirut. In recent years, however, the group has also expanded its contacts with Qatar and strengthened ties with Egypt.

A source close to Nakhalah said the leader has recently been moving between Doha and Cairo, staying for extended periods, especially in Doha, where his deputy Mohammed al-Hindi is based almost permanently.

Hindi also travels between Qatar, Egypt and Türkiye, with his role in Egypt largely focused on Gaza-related discussions with Egyptian intelligence officials.

Sources declined to confirm whether Ajouri, who had been based in Beirut’s southern suburbs in recent years, has left the area because of security concerns.

Israel recently killed Adham al-Othman, a commander in the Al-Quds Brigades in Lebanon, in a strike on an apartment used by Hezbollah in Beirut’s southern suburbs. He was known to be close to Ajouri.

Pressure in Syria

Israel had already tightened pressure on the Islamic Jihad in Syria before the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government. A November 2024 airstrike on a group facility in Damascus killed senior figures Abdul Aziz al-Minawi and Rasmi Abu Issa, along with other members.

After the regime’s collapse in December 2024, the pressure intensified. Syria’s new authorities arrested the Islamic Jihad’s representative in the country, Khaled Khaled, and his deputy Abu Ali Yasser in April 2025, holding them for several months.

Movement sources say many of its members in Syria were detained and later released, with interrogations focusing on their weapons and where they were stored.

Some Israeli strikes in recent months have also targeted senior operatives, including field commanders in the Al-Quds Brigades who had previously been wounded in Gaza and remained in Damascus for treatment.

Facing continued Israeli pressure, some Islamic Jihad activists have relocated from Syria to Lebanon or Türkiye. Others have joined Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon.

All of this comes as the Islamic Jihad faces a severe financial crisis. Iranian support has largely stopped, affecting salary payments for fighters and limiting the group’s operational budgets both inside Gaza and abroad.


Syrians on Alert to Prevent Accommodation of Displaced Hezbollah Supporters from Lebanon

 Syrians living in Lebanon wait outside the Ministry of Interior Immigration and Passports Department, at the Syrian-Lebanese border, as they return to Syria due to ongoing hostilities between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Jdaydet Yabous, Syria, March 3, 2026. (Reuters)
Syrians living in Lebanon wait outside the Ministry of Interior Immigration and Passports Department, at the Syrian-Lebanese border, as they return to Syria due to ongoing hostilities between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Jdaydet Yabous, Syria, March 3, 2026. (Reuters)
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Syrians on Alert to Prevent Accommodation of Displaced Hezbollah Supporters from Lebanon

 Syrians living in Lebanon wait outside the Ministry of Interior Immigration and Passports Department, at the Syrian-Lebanese border, as they return to Syria due to ongoing hostilities between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Jdaydet Yabous, Syria, March 3, 2026. (Reuters)
Syrians living in Lebanon wait outside the Ministry of Interior Immigration and Passports Department, at the Syrian-Lebanese border, as they return to Syria due to ongoing hostilities between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Jdaydet Yabous, Syria, March 3, 2026. (Reuters)

Syrians in Damascus, its countryside, and western Homs countryside are on alert to prevent displaced Lebanese supporters of Hezbollah from entering Syrian territory or being hosted by locals.

The stance marks a sharp departure from previous Israeli wars on Lebanon, when Syrian cities received tens of thousands of Lebanese fleeing the fighting.

As Israel broadened its strikes in the region to include Hezbollah, not just Iran, displacement from southern Lebanon and Beirut's southern suburbs has resumed. This time, however, those fleeing include not only Lebanese but also Syrians who had been living as refugees in Lebanon.

The scene in and around Damascus appears markedly different from past years. No private cars carrying Lebanese displaced people have been seen in the capital Damascus and its outskirts, unlike during earlier Israeli wars on southern Lebanon under the rule of ousted leader Bashar al-Assad.

In previous waves of displacement, tens of thousands of Lebanese fled to Damascus. Some stayed in hotels, others rented apartments, while a small number were housed in shelters.

The same pattern now applies to Eastern Ghouta. Hezbollah and Iran had turned the area into a strategic rear base while fighting alongside Assad's government during the years of the Syrian uprising.

Hezbollah also housed large numbers of fighters' families there during its war with Israel.

Omar Mohammad Safi, known as Abu Firas, from the town of Beit Sahm in Eastern Ghouta, said the town has not seen the arrival of any Lebanese during the current war, whether Hezbollah supporters or others.

“When Israel attacked Hezbollah the last time, large numbers of fighters' families came and stayed in homes the party had seized in Ghouta, Sayeda Zeinab and elsewhere, but in this war, we have not seen any of them at all in any town,” he told Asharq al-Awsat.

Over the past two days, activists circulated a statement purportedly issued by residents of Damascus and its countryside, especially Eastern Ghouta, warning against renting property to or hosting strangers from southern Lebanon, or Lebanese individuals or families, particularly those linked to Hezbollah.

The statement said Hezbollah, during its support for the former regime, had “committed crimes and massacres,” adding: “We will not forget the massacres of Eastern Ghouta and the chemical massacre.

“Whoever dared to kill us and gloat over us will have no place among us, and we will expel him from the area immediately, along with anyone who shelters him, by all means,” it warned.

During the war in Syria, Hezbollah turned the western Qalamoun area in the Damascus countryside, adjacent to Lebanon's Bekaa region, into a strategic regional rear base.

During the previous war with Israel, the area also hosted tens of thousands of displaced people from Beirut's southern suburbs and southern Lebanon, with facilitation from Assad's government.

But Mahmoud Qusaibiya, known as Abu Alaa, from the town of Jarjir in western Qalamoun, said the town has not seen the arrival of any displaced Lebanese Hezbollah supporters.

“A warning was circulated by elders and prominent figures telling residents not to receive anyone from Hezbollah or their families, because we supported the revolution and they stood with the former government and its remnants,” he told Asharq al-Awsat.

The clearest development has been in the city of Qusayr in western Homs countryside, which Hezbollah seized during the Syrina war.

Rashid Jammoul, known as Abu Mohammad, who comes from the city, said Syrians at the border with Lebanon around Qusayr were on high alert to prevent Hezbollah members, their families, or people linked to them from entering Syrian territory.

“There have been some attempts, but there is an alert by the army and by residents at all legal and illegal crossings,” the man in his sixties told Asharq al-Awsat.

“We will not allow any of them or anyone linked to them to enter or be received after they committed massacres against us, destroyed our villages, and burned our homes.”

Since Israel launched its new war on southern Lebanon, more than 25,000 Syrians have returned to their country.

Syria’s General Authority for Ports and Customs denied that families of Hezbollah members were among those arriving from Lebanon.

Mazen Alloush, director of relations at the authority, said two days ago that since the first day families began fleeing from Lebanon to Syria, social media had been flooded with rumors claiming that families of Hezbollah fighters and supporters were entering Syrian territory through border crossings.

As the rumors spread, some buses leaving the Jousieh border crossing were stopped by young men in the city of Qusayr and attacked on that pretext.

Seeking to clarify the situation, Alloush said all the passengers on those buses were Syrians who had been living in Lebanon and who came from different Syrian provinces.

He said they had entered the country legally.


This Is How Ukraine Has Countered Russia’s Iran-Designed Drones

An Iranian Shahed exploding drone launched by Russia flies through the sky seconds before it struck buildings in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Oct. 17, 2022. (AP)
An Iranian Shahed exploding drone launched by Russia flies through the sky seconds before it struck buildings in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Oct. 17, 2022. (AP)
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This Is How Ukraine Has Countered Russia’s Iran-Designed Drones

An Iranian Shahed exploding drone launched by Russia flies through the sky seconds before it struck buildings in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Oct. 17, 2022. (AP)
An Iranian Shahed exploding drone launched by Russia flies through the sky seconds before it struck buildings in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Oct. 17, 2022. (AP)

Ukraine is preparing to dispatch military drone specialists to Gulf states to help them fend off Iranian-designed drones -- something the Ukrainian army has been doing since the start of Russia's invasion.

The military assault launched in February 2022 spawned a cat-and-mouse game of aerial drone warfare that has forced both sides to constantly innovate -- or perish.

Moscow has dramatically scaled-up the production and sophistication of its drones, based on Iranian-designed Shaheds drones that Tehran has launched at Israel and Gulf states over the last week.

That has forced Ukraine to develop cheap and versatile defense systems that allows it to down hundreds of drones in a single barrage -- experience Kyiv says is unmatched anywhere in the world.

- Interceptors vs Shaheds -

Private Ukrainian arms companies have spearheaded the development of drone interceptors -- cheap, light single-use drones that are designed to knock Russian unmanned aerial vehicles out of the sky.

The interceptors -- usually winged or propeller-like helicopters -- are mainly controlled with inbuilt cameras that beam real-time images to pilots on the ground.

Late last year, President Volodymyr Zelensky released grainy, black-and-white images recorded from interceptors as they crashed into Shaheds. He has instructed manufacturers to produce up to 1,000 a day.

This method of air defense is becoming increasingly prevalent: Ukraine's commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrsky said this week that some 70 percent of all drones launched by Russia at Kyiv and its surrounding region in February were downed by interceptors.

Individual interceptors can cost around as little as $700 or as much as $12,000. But even the most expensive varieties are a fraction of the price of a single missile fired from US Patriot air defense batteries, which are estimated to cost more than $1 million.

"The warfare shifted a lot. First it was drones against humans, soldiers and tanks. Now it's mostly drones against drones," Konstantyn, a deputy commander of an anti-aerial unit deployed in eastern Ukraine recently explained to AFP.

- Anti-aircraft guns, pick-ups -

Ukrainian air defense units also deploy traditional, tried-and-tested weapons: anti-aircraft guns.

These come both in the form of heavy machine guns set on wheels, and make-shift solutions, where troops attach any high-caliber weapon they have onto the back of a pick-up truck.

AFP journalists in Kyiv have seen -- and heard -- these air defense units work during nighttime Russian attacks.

Ukrainian troops also deploy man-portable air-defense systems: guided surface-to-air missiles that are shoulder-launched and originally designed to take down low flying aerial targets.

These portable weapons are used alongside tracking and radar systems.

- F-16s, choppers, Yaks -

Ukraine lobbied its Western allies for supplies of advanced fighter jets for months before finally receiving its first batch of F-16s in mid-2024.

Kyiv has not received many F-16s and there have been reports of issues in training Ukrainian pilots but they are among the aerial arsenal that Ukraine uses to down Shaheds.

The Ukrainian air force also deploys ageing Soviet-era aircraft to down Russian drones, including helicopters like the Mi-24 and Mi-8 or the Yak-52 plane.

- Electronic jamming -

Ukraine has for years deployed a variety of electronic systems that disorientate the navigation systems used by Shaheds to lock onto and fly towards their targets.

By scrambling the networks used by Shaheds inside Ukraine's borders, these means of electronic warfare force Moscow's drones to alter their course and fly back towards Russia.

According to Ukraine air force data, the military has been consistently intercepting or shooting down more than 80 percent of all incoming Russian drones -- hundreds of which are fired every night.