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Iraqi Justice Minister to Asharq Al-Awsat: ISIS Prisoners Held at a Fortified Site, Escape Impossible

Iraqi Justice Minister Khaled Shwani
Iraqi Justice Minister Khaled Shwani
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Iraqi Justice Minister to Asharq Al-Awsat: ISIS Prisoners Held at a Fortified Site, Escape Impossible

Iraqi Justice Minister Khaled Shwani
Iraqi Justice Minister Khaled Shwani

Iraqi Justice Minister Khaled Shwani told Asharq Al-Awsat that Iraq will not repatriate foreign prisoners affiliated with ISIS to their home countries if their involvement in crimes against Iraqi citizens is proven. He said a heavily fortified Iraqi prison currently holds thousands of ISIS members transferred from Syria, stressing that security breaches, escapes, smuggling, or internal unrest are not possible, despite what he described as enormous pressure on judicial institutions and the presence among the detainees of some of the world’s most dangerous terrorists.

Iraq agreed to receive thousands of prisoners suspected of affiliation with ISIS starting January 21. Although the international coalition transferred them in batches from prisons previously overseen by the Syrian Democratic Forces following military operations by the Syrian army in northeastern Syria, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani confirmed that “the decision to receive the prisoners was purely an Iraqi one.”

Since then, Shwani says he has been “working intensively with judicial, government, and security officials” to manage a highly sensitive and dangerous operation aimed at accommodating a large number of prisoners in a way that prevents them from becoming a “ticking time bomb,” and at returning most of them to their countries so that their detention does not turn into a new school for producing extremism.

The Minister was born in the city of Kirkuk, north of Baghdad, in 1975. He has served as Iraq’s justice minister since 2022. He is a lawyer and constitutional expert, and a member of the political bureau of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, led by Pavel Talabani.

Iraqi Justice Minister Khaled Shwani

In an exclusive interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, the Iraqi Minister said that taking custody of ISIS prisoners in such large numbers came after major efforts to ease prison overcrowding, but that Iraqi authorities bore the burden in order to safeguard regional security.

According to Shwani, the Justice Ministry has long experience in managing terrorist inmates and confronting extremism. It relies on a program known as the “Moderation Program,” which aims to strip inmates of extremist ideology through multiple means, including vocational training. For this reason, he said, the international community trusts Iraq to house the most dangerous terrorists in its prisons. The following is the full text of the interview:

When the decision was announced to transfer prisoners from Syria to Iraq, was the Justice Ministry ready to receive this number of inmates?

After the Iraqi government agreed to receive the prisoners, the National Security Council of Ministers convened, and preparations began to take custody of them. Certainly, receiving such a large number is neither easy nor simple. It requires large prison facilities, equipment, and security protection, in addition to everything inmates need in correctional institutions, whether for the prisoners themselves or the security requirements to protect the prisons.

Our prisons were already overcrowded. But because we believe in the importance of this issue, and because it is related to protecting regional security from prisoners of an extremely dangerous level, urgent measures had to be taken to prepare prison sections to receive and house them. With the support provided by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani, and the relevant bodies in government and the judiciary, we were able to succeed. All prisoners received were placed in jail, and we have now provided all prison-related requirements, as well as the security requirements to protect it.

What do you mean by those requirements?

The detainees are now housed in standard prisons with air conditioning, bathrooms, and cleaning supplies. They receive three meals a day and are guarded by a professional staff of guards and investigators. I can say that the judicial institution is dealing with them professionally, likely different from the situation in Syria. Their conditions are now better than they were before their transfer to Iraq.

An ISIS member at Al-Karkh Prison in Baghdad (AP)

Has overcrowding increased after the addition of these prisoners? How are they distributed?

Because of the exceptional circumstances Iraq went through, including the occupation of areas by ISIS, earlier bombings by Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, as well as organized crime, the prison overcrowding rate when I took office three years ago stood at 300 percent. We put in place a systematic plan and managed to reduce overcrowding to 25 percent above normal capacity.

However, receiving 5,704 prisoners at once caused overcrowding again, because accommodating nearly 6,000 inmates required placing additional strain on other prisons, undermining efforts to ease overcrowding.

Where were they housed?

They were placed in a single prison. The operation is complex because their classification requires housing them in a prison that is tightly secured, fortified, and protected- security-wise, militarily, and intelligence-wise.

How were they housed while in pretrial detention, given that the Justice Ministry deals only with convicted prisoners?

Under Iraqi law, when a detainee is dangerous, a judge has the authority to place him in a secure location from which escape is impossible or feared, and where his protection can be guaranteed. This is not an exceptional case; it is purely legal. They are detainees under judicial decisions, and because of the danger they pose, they were placed in this prison, where they are held away from other prisoners.

How do you bear the burden? How is such a large number of prisoners managed?

There is a heavy burden on us at all levels. We need human resources to run this prison, infrastructure, additional manpower, military and security forces for protection, as well as the costs of housing, maintenance, and providing services to 5,704 prisoners. This is not easy. We face challenges, especially financial ones. But there is communication with the international coalition to bear the costs, and they have expressed readiness in this regard.

How is this matter funded?

There is understanding and communication with the international coalition, which has expressed readiness to bear financial burdens related to housing those prisoners, providing infrastructure and prison supplies, and some security requirements. We prepared a comprehensive project and sent it to the coalition, and we are awaiting their response and procedures.

How many investigators handle the prisoners’ cases?

About 150 investigators are working through the files of thousands of prisoners. They are carrying out enormous work, assisted by a large number of employees and specialized experts.

How are they classified?

We have among them the most dangerous terrorists. They are classified according to security criteria and internationally approved standards for dealing with prisoners. Highly dangerous inmates and those with terrorist ideology do not mix with ordinary prisoners. Our prisons are classified by type of crime, the severity of the offense, and age groups.

How likely is a breach or internal mutiny?

This prison is fortified and cannot be breached. I will not disclose further details, but the site is protected and cannot be penetrated. Nor can we speak of internal mutiny, because the security agencies supporting the Justice Ministry have taken their precautions with full professionalism. This cannot happen.

How are prisoners’ affairs managed inside the prison, and what measures are taken to prevent some from becoming potential hubs for terrorist activity?

First, we are in contact with their countries to repatriate them according to their nationalities once investigations are completed, provided they are not among those who fought Iraq, killed Iraqis, or participated in terrorist activities inside Iraq. Those exceptions will not be returned even if requested. We are working to repatriate the remaining detainees, and the international coalition is working with us to expedite the process.

As for their management, the Justice Ministry has long experience in this field. Other prisons of the same security classification hold dangerous terrorists, including ISIS leaders captured during operations to liberate Iraqi territory from the group. They have been placed in rehabilitation and reform programs.

This includes the “Moderation Program,” which aims to remove extremist ideology through intellectual, cultural, social, sports, and artistic approaches, in addition to vocational training. The program has achieved significant results. We seek to ensure their stay is temporary pending deportation, and during their time in custody we apply established programs and expertise in dealing with high-risk terrorist inmates.

What if efforts to return them fail? What would the situation be if they remain in Iraqi prisons for a long period?

What has been agreed with countries and with the international coalition is to return them as quickly as possible. There is clear coordination on this matter, with the exception of those who fought Iraqi security forces or committed crimes against Iraqis, as I said earlier. Those will be tried and will remain in Iraq.

ISIS members as they are placed in custody at Al-Karkh Central Prison in Baghdad (AP)

Are there countries that refuse to take back their nationals?

The matter is still in its early stages, as are the attempts. The international coalition and the United States are working with us to urge countries that have prisoners to receive them, and we will continue these efforts.

Why did the international coalition transfer ISIS prisoners to Iraq?

There may be a political aspect unrelated to the Justice Ministry, but I will highlight clear points: there is trust in the Iraqi defense and security system, trust that Iraq is a partner and an influential state within the international coalition to combat ISIS, and a reliable system to house these prisoners.

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Interviews

Ukrainian Official to Asharq Al-Awsat: Russia’s Demands to Annex Territory are a Red Line

Ukrainian soldiers at an undisclosed location in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region on January 30, 2026 (AFP)
Ukrainian soldiers at an undisclosed location in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region on January 30, 2026 (AFP)
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Ukrainian Official to Asharq Al-Awsat: Russia’s Demands to Annex Territory are a Red Line

Ukrainian soldiers at an undisclosed location in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region on January 30, 2026 (AFP)
Ukrainian soldiers at an undisclosed location in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region on January 30, 2026 (AFP)

A senior Ukrainian official said Kyiv is concentrating its negotiating efforts with Russia on achieving an unconditional ceasefire, while stressing the need for full international security guarantees to ensure that any future attack on Ukraine does not recur. He underscored that Russia’s demands to annex Ukrainian territory represent a red line.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Ukraine’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia Anatolii Petrenko reaffirmed his country’s commitment to peace, saying: “We take every opportunity to engage in diplomatic negotiations with Russia to deescalate the ongoing military standoff as a key prerequisite for inclusive political solution in order to achieve just and lasting peace.”

He added that “real breakthrough in current negotiations would be to achieve the unconditional ceasefire.” He also stressed the urgency of making progress on the return of abducted Ukrainian children and prisoners of war, noting that “If promptly agreed these would pave the way for much broader and deeper dialogue between Ukraine and Russia potentially leading to a comprehensive political decision.”

Anatolii Petrenko, Ukraine’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia (Embassy of Ukraine in Riyadh)

Petrenko said that, in this complex process, Ukraine is supported by its international partners who stand firmly on the principles of international law, Ukraine’s sovereignty, and its territorial integrity. He said: “We are convinced that unconditional ceasefire would be top testament of Russia’s genuine readiness for lasting peace.”

At the same time, he expressed regret that “daily realities of Russian strikes against Ukraine’s critical energy infrastructure against the backdrop of ongoing diplomatic efforts reflect fundamental gap we are to bridge using every compelling leverage in possession of international community.”

Petrenko went on to stress that “the issue of Russia’s demands for territorial annexation are illegitimate and represent our red line in accordance with Ukraine’s Constitution.” He added that “It cannot be considered as a matter of a technical compromise for the sake of ongoing negotiations with Russia,” noting that “Ukraine’s delegation has a clear mandate to pursue further diplomatic negotiations strictly based on our national interests.”

The American Role

Petrenko described the US role in any political settlement as central, saying: “The United States’ role remains central. This is our strategic partner, and we rely on our partnership to achieve a strategic solution for Ukraine’s sovereignty.”

He said this partnership includes “steadfast support to ongoing diplomatic negotiations with Russia, vital commitment to sustained combat readiness of our defense forces with tangible security guarantees and clear common vision for economic recovery of Ukraine once the war is terminated.”

Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelenskyy during at the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 22 (Reuters)

Petrenko stressed that “United States’ leadership in maintaining world security should deliver an effective political solution to stop war against Ukraine thus undoubtedly generating global stability much needed across all continents and regions.”

On another front, he said Ukraine aspires to join the European Union in the foreseeable future, saying: “Ukraine has always been a part of Europe.” He added: “Our national ambition is to become a new member of the European Union in foreseeable future.”

He said “the European Union is our strongest partner to maintain macro-economic stability, develop Ukraine’s defense industry and contribute to future security guarantees,” noting that “our joint approach to ending the war has always been unified – politically, economically and militarily.”

Petrenko added that “European Union has to be part of diplomatic negotiations for peace as we all understand the European security remains undivided and Ukraine is the cornerstone of that security.”

Russia’s Exhaustion

Petrenko spoke about Russian losses since the war began on 24 February 2022, saying: “Since 24 February 2022, Russia has lost around 1.3 mln personnel, with 11,654 tanks, 24,013 armored vehicles, 435 aircraft and 28 warships destroyed.” He said “These figures illustrate not only a tragic human toll but also a profound degradation of Russia’s warfighting capacity.”

On the economic front, he noted: “Russia’s wartime economy shows clear signs of running aground,” stressing that “GDP growth has slowed to near stagnation at around 1% in 2025 and projected to remain minimal in 2026 due to sanctions, declining oil and gas revenues and rising structural imbalances.” He added: “Annual inflation reached around 7% with key interest rate at 16%, the budget is expected to run a noticeable deficit.”

Petrenko said: “War brings no prosperity to any nation in the world.” He added that “Russia should take this very seriously and reverse the aggression into civilized neighborly relationship with Ukraine as a responsible member of the United Nations and its Security Council.”

Saudi–Ukrainian Partnership

On relations with Saudi Arabia, Petrenko said: “Ukraine and Saudi Arabia experience a dynamic phase of consistent political and economic engagement.”

He said: “Last year President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy paid an official visit to Saudi Arabia which resulted in the adoption of a Joint Statement showcasing the strong political will of the leaders to deepen and expand cooperation in the prospective fields.”

Volodymyr Zelenskyy holding talks with Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman in Jeddah on March 10, 2025 (EPA)

Petrenko reaffirmed the two countries’ determination to strengthen investment relations through partnerships in priority sectors, including energy, food industries, and infrastructure, with a shared desire to continue exploring opportunities for cooperation in oil, gas, their derivatives, and petrochemicals.

He added: “Particular value is attached to the Kingdom’s practical efforts to provide a conducive environment for diplomatic engagement within the Ukraine–US–Russia triangle last year, underscoring the Saudi Monarchy’s sincere commitment to contribute to a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine in a meaningful and practical way.”

Petrenko expressed his country’s deep gratitude for the humanitarian and energy assistance provided by Saudi Arabia.

Interviews

Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)

In the final part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, recounted in detail his meetings with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, and disclosed an alleged attempt by Rifaat al-Assad to assassinate former Jordanian prime minister Mudar Badran.

Obeidat began with his impression of Saddam following a 2001 meeting in Baghdad. He said he left convinced that the Iraqi leader “did not accurately understand the reality of the international situation, the trap that had been set for Iraq, nor the magnitude of the danger surrounding the country and what was coming.”

He also described how strong ties between the late King Hussein of Jordan and Assad deteriorated as the Iran-Iraq war intensified. “Exceptional channels of communication” opened between King Hussein and Saddam Hussein, he said, and those channels “thwarted Assad’s efforts to build an axis against Iraq.”

Obeidat further revealed that Rifaat al-Assad “sent a group to assassinate Mudar Badran” on the pretext that Jordan was harboring the Muslim Brotherhood and hosting training camps. “All of that was false,” he said, adding that the attempt was foiled and those involved were arrested.

Turning to the file of the Palestinian militant Abu Nidal, who split from Fatah, Obeidat recalled how Abu Iyad once “protected him from arrest,” before “the tables were turned,” in a reference to Abu Iyad later becoming one of Abu Nidal’s victims.

Asked about his history with Abu Nidal, Obeidat described him as “not an easy adversary.” Abu Nidal attacked Jordanian embassies and diplomats, he said, and was responsible for killing two or three ambassadors. He was also behind the assassination of the son of former prime minister Saeed al-Mufti, a diplomat at the Jordanian embassy in Bucharest, and wounded two ambassadors in separate operations.

When Obeidat served as prime minister in 1983-1984, Abu Nidal assassinated Fahd al-Qawasmi, the mayor of Hebron, during a visit to Amman.

Abu Nidal, Obeidat said, worked at different times for Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence services. “He was ready to work for the benefit of any intelligence service in any country and allowed them to control him,” he said. Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence used him more than once, and the Iraqis deployed him against Fatah in an effort to create splits and internal problems.

Abu Iyad had shielded Abu Nidal from detention when Fatah sought to arrest him, Obeidat said. “But in the end the tables were turned,” and Abu Iyad became one of his victims. It was said, he added, that Abu Iyad came to believe that Abu Nidal had begun working for “Zionist intelligence.”

As for Jordan’s response when its diplomats were targeted, Obeidat said that at the time he was prime minister and did not follow the security file closely due to the pressures of government. He was aware, however, that contacts were made to reach a deal to halt Abu Nidal’s operations in Jordan. “Their operations did indeed stop,” he said.

On coordination with major powers, Obeidat said Jordan cooperated with “any party that possessed information of interest to us,” except the Zionists. Relations with Syrian intelligence fluctuated between competition and brief periods of cooperation, after earlier periods of no contact.

He then recounted his 1979 meeting with Hafez al-Assad over accusations that Jordan was training members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Acting on instructions from King Hussein, Obeidat, then intelligence chief, and Prime Minister Mudar Badran met Assad to address the issue.

“We made clear to Hafez al-Assad that it was impossible for us to have camps training the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,” he said. Jordan informed Assad that such camps were in Iraq and that Syrians were traveling via Jordan to Iraq using forged passports. Without lists of those names from Damascus, Jordan could not act.

“This is a Syrian problem, not a Jordanian one,” Obeidat said he told Assad. Jordan would not allow armed activity on its soil but needed Syrian intelligence cooperation and names to intervene effectively.

He acknowledged that tensions were aggravated when Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood leader, Mohammed Abdul Rahman Khalifeh, brought Syrian cleric Saeed Hawwa to meet King Hussein without informing the royal court or intelligence services. The move surprised the palace and embarrassed the intelligence service.

After investigating, Jordan discovered that a group of Syrians had entered the country, most intending to travel onward to Iraq. To prevent escalation with Damascus, Jordan asked them to leave, allowing limited humanitarian cases time to arrange residence elsewhere.

Obeidat described Assad as “a good listener” who did not comment during their meeting but later instructed Syrian intelligence to cooperate with Jordan. His dealings with Syrian intelligence chief Ali Duba were limited but manageable.

He dismissed suggestions that Ahmed Jibril was behind operations against Jordan, saying the more serious problem involved Rifaat al-Assad. Rifaat’s alleged plot to assassinate Badran was uncovered, with suspects arrested at the border and in an apartment in Amman’s Sweileh district. They possessed weapons and explosives and were tried before Jordan’s State Security Court.

In an earlier incident, Obeidat said, members of Rifaat’s force assassinated a Syrian political refugee in Amman.

Asked about challenges upon assuming the premiership, Obeidat cited financial strain. Arab and Gulf aid declined to near zero, while Jordanian workers returned from the Gulf after losing their jobs, placing heavy pressure on living conditions.

Security challenges included Abu Nidal’s activities. At the same time, relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization improved. King Hussein allowed the Palestinian National Council to convene in Amman in 1984, triggering a political crisis with Syria.

Several attempted attacks targeting Jordan and council members were foiled, Obeidat said. Syria exerted pressure to prevent attendance, but Jordan ensured the session’s success. Supporting the PLO after its recognition as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians became, in his words, a Jordanian necessity to prevent a political vacuum.

Obeidat described a later meeting with Yasser Arafat as cordial after earlier strained ties, and said he also met Abu Iyad at the royal court during the council’s session. He met George Habash later in Beirut, outside office.

He then revisited the 1968 Battle of Karameh. Fighters from Fatah “stood firm and fought bravely,” he said, though many were killed. Some trainees were left without weapons or guidance despite warnings that battle was imminent, leading to heavy casualties.

King Hussein, he said, “was very resolute” during the battle.

On his relationship with the monarch, Obeidat said King Hussein “respected those who respected themselves.” Their relationship cooled after the 1994 Wadi Araba peace treaty, which Obeidat opposed.

Jordanian intelligence, he stressed, did not conduct operations in Beirut in response to the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal, though he noted military intelligence operated separately.

Obeidat listed foreign leaders he met as prime minister, including Assad, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Saddam Hussein. Meetings with Britain’s queen, Austria’s president and Spain’s king were protocol visits.

He described relations between King Hussein and Assad as once “good, frank and continuous,” with almost weekly contact, before shifting during the Iran-Iraq war as close ties formed between King Hussein and Saddam.

Recalling his 2001 Baghdad visit, Obeidat said Saddam spoke at length about sanctions and support for Palestinians. He reproached Jordan over its peace treaty and alluded to Hussein Kamel’s defection. Obeidat insisted Jordan had no role in that defection or in his return.

When Iraqi officials called for cutting oil supplies to Jordan, Obeidat told Saddam that such a move would effectively besiege the Jordanian people. Saddam responded, “I will never abandon the Jordanian people under any circumstances.”

In Obeidat’s final reflection, the meeting left a lasting impression. From Saddam’s remarks that day, he said, he concluded that the Iraqi leader did not fully comprehend the scale of the international threat facing his country, a judgment he carried with him long after the encounter.

Interviews

Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).

In the second installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister and intelligence chief Ahmad Obeidat recounts details of a missile plot to assassinate King Hussein, which he says was backed by Muammar Gaddafi and carried out through operatives linked to Wadie Haddad, head of the external operations arm of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Obeidat, who also served as head of intelligence and as minister of interior and defense, revisits the confrontation between Israeli forces, the Jordanian army, and Palestinian guerrillas (fedayeen) in the border town of Karameh in March 1968, asserting that the Jordanian army “decided the battle,” but suffered a “moral defeat amid the fedayeen’s claims of victory.”

Obeidat died earlier this month. The interview was recorded before the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” whose aftermath delayed its publication. Below is the text of the second installment.
 

King Hussein inspects an Israeli tank left behind by occupying forces during the Battle of Karameh (Getty)

“Battle of Karameh”

Obeidat calls Karameh “a pivotal point of utmost importance,” especially for an army still reeling from the 1967 defeat and its withdrawal from the West Bank.

“The army lived the bitterness of that defeat,” he says. “It felt a moral, national, and pan-Arab responsibility.”

Karameh, he argues, offered a chance to restore the army’s fighting morale and reclaim some of its lost dignity.

“It was the army that settled the battle,” Obeidat says.

He credits Jordanian forces with thwarting Israeli attempts to build crossing bridges, destroying their vehicles on Jordanian soil and forcing, for the first time in Israel’s history, a request for a ceasefire. “The late King Hussein refused,” he adds.

Israel, he says, did not acknowledge a fifth of its casualties. Helicopters were evacuating the wounded who were “dripping with blood.”

He singles out artillery observation officers who advanced to the closest possible positions, relaying precise coordinates even as they effectively marked their own locations for shelling.

“The Jordanian soldier would identify his position near the Israeli army to be shelled,” he says, describing a willingness to die in order to restore dignity after the 1967 setback.

He says the declaration of “armed struggle” effectively erased the army’s role, presenting Palestinian fedayeen as the victors over Israel. “They monopolized the victory and ignored the army’s role entirely,” Obeidat says. “We emerged with a moral defeat in the face of their claims.”

He alleges that hundreds of millions of dollars in donations collected afterward, much of it going to Fatah, did not reach the Palestinian people but went to organizations and their leaders.

When the army entered Amman in September 1970, Obeidat says, it aimed to end what he describes as chaos: armed displays, roadblocks, arrests of soldiers on leave and interference in courts.

"When the army entered and began expelling the fedayeen from Amman, it swept through everything in its path. Even my own home, which I had recently rented after my abduction incident and which was close to the army’s command headquarters, was entered by the Jordanian army to search for fedayeen, while my family was inside the house at the time of the raid. My wife told them that her husband was an intelligence officer, but the Jordanian soldier replied, “Don’t lie.”

Obeidat says they did not leave the house until she contacted him, at which point he assigned one of his officers, the commander of an intelligence company, to speak with the army.

"Only then did they leave the house. The point is that the army swept areas without distinguishing between Jordanian and Palestinian; it wanted only to restore control over security. All of this forced me to send my family to my parents’ home in Irbid, in the north of the Kingdom."

He later describes what he calls a “state within a state,” extending from the Jordan Valley to Amman, after armed groups asserted authority over courts, roads, and civilian life.

On Syria’s intervention, Obeidat says Syrian forces entered northern Jordan flying Palestine Liberation Organization flags.

He later learned the decision was political, taken by the Baath Party, and that then-Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad complied reluctantly before Syrian tanks withdrew.

Iraq, he says, did not intervene. Obeidat affirms that he was told by Iraqi officials that neither the Iraqi state nor its forces intended to participate in any operation aimed at ending the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan.

According to one account, Iraqi leaders did not want to shoulder the political and diplomatic burden of the Palestinian issue or risk an uncalculated adventure.

He recounts another account, which he says he cannot adopt, according to which the operations command in the army was handled by a Pakistani figure. Under this account, Zia ul-Haq was receiving operational communications and sending messages that caused confusion among Iraqi and other forces, leading them to believe they would confront powerful strike units, prompting them to remain in a state of alert rather than engage.

He also recalls a meeting in which Palestinian figures, including Abu Iyad, reproached Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Al-Bakr replied: “We are a state with one life. If we make a fundamental mistake, we end. You are like cats with seven lives.”

As director of intelligence, Obeidat says he dealt directly with operations attributed to Haddad.

Between 1975 and 1977, he says, a missile was sent to Jordan with a group led by a Jordanian, Brik al-Hadid, affiliated with the PFLP. The target was King Hussein’s aircraft.

“The intention was to strike the plane, with Gaddafi’s knowledge and approval,” Obeidat says.

Jordanian intelligence monitored the group from the outset and later arrested its members. The king’s aircraft departed Marka military airport as scheduled but flew in the opposite direction to its planned route as a precaution, using jamming devices against any incoming missiles.

When confronted by Mudar Badran, then head of the Royal Court, Gaddafi denied knowledge. “I have no information,” Obeidat quotes him as saying.

Obeidat describes the aircraft hijackings orchestrated by Haddad as “the straw that broke the camel’s back,” contributing to the army’s intervention.

He says Jordanian intelligence had infiltrated Fatah and monitored its leaders, including Abu Iyad and Abu Yusuf al-Najjar.

In mid-1972, intelligence learned that Abu Dawood and a group were planning to enter Jordan from Baghdad to seize the Jordanian cabinet during a session and hold ministers hostage in exchange for the release of detained Fatah members.

The group crossed in three Mercedes cars, dressed in traditional Arab attire, with weapons concealed inside the seats and forged passports in hand. They were arrested at the border after a thorough search.

Obeidat rejects claims by Abu Iyad that Abu Dawood was tortured, insisting that “not a single hair on his head was touched,” and says Abu Dawood confessed only after realizing the operation had been fully uncovered.

Later, King Hussein met Abu Dawood’s parents, who pleaded for clemency. The king read the full confession and then met Abu Dawood himself. He ultimately ordered his release, honoring a promise he had made to Abu Dawood’s parents.

In Obeidat’s view, Abu Dawood was affected by the king’s treatment of his parents and “did not pose any future threat to Jordan.”

Obeidat describes a direct relationship between King Hussein and the General Intelligence Department.

The king met with officers regularly, not only to hear briefings but also to hear their personal views. 

Obeidat says he would submit reports to the prime minister and also meet with the king. When addressing the king, however, it was sometimes necessary to elaborate verbally on certain issues so that such information would not circulate among staff. 

When he was asked to present a security briefing before the king, the late King Hussein would summon Crown Prince Hassan. The king’s advisers would also attend, along with senior army commanders, the public security leadership, the head of the Royal Court, and the prime minister. The briefing of the security report would include an explanation of the security situation and any external or internal challenges.