Death of Iraqi ‘Oil King’ Exposes ‘Jurf al-Sakhar Empire’

A photo released by the Popular Mobilization Forces showing its fighters in the town of Jurf al-Sakhar, south of Baghdad, in 2014
A photo released by the Popular Mobilization Forces showing its fighters in the town of Jurf al-Sakhar, south of Baghdad, in 2014
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Death of Iraqi ‘Oil King’ Exposes ‘Jurf al-Sakhar Empire’

A photo released by the Popular Mobilization Forces showing its fighters in the town of Jurf al-Sakhar, south of Baghdad, in 2014
A photo released by the Popular Mobilization Forces showing its fighters in the town of Jurf al-Sakhar, south of Baghdad, in 2014

A mysterious assassination of a faction leader in Iraq has exposed details of a lucrative oil trade run by what officials and local sources describe as the “Jurf al-Sakhar empire” south of Baghdad, according to information gathered from officials and local residents.

Sources said a “major incident” led to the killing of Abu Saif, believed to be the key figure overseeing the trade in smuggled crude oil, its refining and the sale of its derivatives.

Officials, who requested anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter, said Abu Saif was likely targeted by a drone strike, coinciding with a broader security escalation in Iraq linked to the war on Iran.

The strike is believed to have been carried out by the United States or Israel, as military aircraft of various types were seen flying intensively over several parts of Iraq throughout the previous week.

Sources said the flights were intended to track groups and individuals already involved in the conflict.

Since Feb. 28, 2026, Iraq’s skies have turned into a crowded theater of drones, attack helicopters and missiles launched by the opposing sides in the regional confrontation: the US and Israel on one side, and Iran and its Iraqi proxies on the other.

Backbone of militia finances

Abu Saif was a shadowy operator who largely worked behind the scenes. Sources said he began as a member of the Mahdi Army, the militia once loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr, before splitting with others and joining factions whose influence has since expanded.

Over the past decade, he has become a central coordinator of specialized operations tied to oil trading, building networks of intermediaries across northern and western Iraqi provinces.

These intermediaries helped obscure his factional ties within what sources describe as Iraq’s “large shadow oil market.”

A person familiar with the parallel oil market described Abu Saif as “one of the nerves of the parallel economy of Iran-aligned groups.”

As the business expanded and the network widened, Abu Saif oversaw refining oil, selling it on the local market, and supplying Iraqi Kurdistan, eventually emerging as one of what sources called Iraq’s “oil kings.”

His network controlled several mobile refineries, known locally as “furnaces,” which produce petroleum derivatives from crude oil siphoned through illegal punctures in major pipelines.

A former oil engineer said these units are small, mobile refining systems designed for quick installation and transport.

They rely on simple distillation equipment that includes heating tanks, small distillation towers, cooling systems and storage tanks that separate gasoline, kerosene, diesel and other products.

Despite their crude design, the operations generate huge profits. But they lack safety and environmental standards, making them vulnerable to explosions and causing severe pollution. The resulting fuel is often low quality and harmful to vehicle engines, the engineer said.

The furnaces also leave behind distinct black stains that damage soil and groundwater, revealing where they have operated.

“Jurf al-Sakhar furnaces”

Security sources said such furnaces spread in areas that experienced security turmoil after 2014, where armed groups and smugglers used them to refine oil extracted from small wells or siphoned from punctured pipelines.

The account is based on remote interviews with security and local sources. Field verification remains difficult because Jurf al-Sakhar has largely been closed to journalists and researchers for years.

The town south of Baghdad became a key hub for these operations because strategic pipelines linking southern oil fields with refineries and stations in central and northern Iraq pass through it.

Jurf al-Sakhar became a major stronghold for Iraqi factions in 2014, when military operations were launched to retake the agricultural town from ISIS fighters. While Shiite factions expelled the militants, around 120,000 civilians were forced to leave.

In the years that followed, the town — once dependent on agriculture — evolved into a complex hub for military and intelligence operations run by armed factions.

According to sources, surrounding farms offered safe cover for mobile refineries, tanker fleets and specialized equipment operated by workers with oil-sector expertise.

Clients of the “oil king”

Sources described a structured network behind Abu Saif’s operations. Products refined in the furnaces were loaded onto tankers that carried no official movement permits and transported to private refineries or facilities with government operating contracts that require petroleum derivatives, such as asphalt plants.

Normally, tanker drivers must carry documents — including official permits — allowing them to pass through checkpoints between Iraqi provinces. But sources said Abu Saif had enough influence to move shipments without interference from security or government authorities.

Dozens of contractors and intermediaries formed what sources described as an army of agents working for the oil king, handling every stage of the process — from operating and relocating furnaces to distributing products to factories and refineries. Many of these intermediaries operate in northern and western Iraqi cities.

The final deal

About a month before his assassination, Abu Saif completed what sources described as his final deal.

They said the network sold about 600,000 tons of oil products, worth roughly $120 million, with nearly half going to the local market.

It remains unclear how the network collects or stores the money. But sources said the deals represent pure profit, since the crude oil is siphoned illegally from pipelines at no cost.

Iraqi authorities periodically announce the dismantling of sites used to recycle and smuggle petroleum derivatives, seizing tankers and illegal refineries across the country.

In some cases, preliminary investigations reveal small networks led by oil traders, operators and complicit security or military officers.

Since 2018, oil smuggling by Iraqi militias has drawn increasing attention from US authorities, prompting Washington to sanction individuals and networks accused of involvement in the factions’ economic activities.

Among them is businessman Salim Ahmed Said, sanctioned by the US Treasury Department in 2025 for running a network of companies that sold Iranian oil as Iraqi oil using front companies and ship-to-ship transfers to conceal the shipments’ origins.

Washington also sanctioned businessman Walid Khaled Hamid al-Samarrai, accused of running a network of tankers and shipping companies used to smuggle Iranian oil and blend it with Iraqi crude before marketing it internationally.

Sources said the oil king exported large quantities of heavy derivatives, particularly black fuel oil, to regional networks that blend them with Iranian oil to facilitate exports using altered shipping documents.

The “Jurf empire”

Sources believe Abu Saif’s assassination during the war on Iran was likely linked to his involvement in military activities targeting US interests from within Jurf al-Sakhar.

Political sources said Shiite armed groups received orders from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards after the killing of Iran’s supreme leader to carry out operations aimed at damaging the US and its allies and targeting the most significant objectives.

Although Abu Saif’s main role involved oil trading and managing the furnaces hidden in Jurf al-Sakhar’s farms, his killing came after his commercial activities intersected with military assignments, which may have included launching explosive drones from the town.

The overlapping roles illustrate how Iraqi factions have built a semi-integrated empire inside Jurf al-Sakhar, combining economic and security functions.

According to sources, the enclave includes missile and drone depots, workshops to test and manufacture improvised explosives, farms, fish lakes, mobile refineries, command and intelligence centers and fortified prisons.

The area also serves as an alternative regional headquarters for units of Hezbollah and advisers from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the sources said.

 



Syria Destroys 400 Mn Captagon Pills in Major Drug Haul

Syrian authorities burn seized narcotics, including captagon pills, on Sunday, Nov. 22, 2026. (SANA)
Syrian authorities burn seized narcotics, including captagon pills, on Sunday, Nov. 22, 2026. (SANA)
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Syria Destroys 400 Mn Captagon Pills in Major Drug Haul

Syrian authorities burn seized narcotics, including captagon pills, on Sunday, Nov. 22, 2026. (SANA)
Syrian authorities burn seized narcotics, including captagon pills, on Sunday, Nov. 22, 2026. (SANA)

Syrian authorities on Sunday announced the destruction of large quantities of narcotics, including 400 million captagon pills seized by security forces in multiple operations.

"Large quantities of narcotic and psychotropic substances seized during various security operations were destroyed in batches," the drug enforcement department announced in a statement carried by state news agency SANA.

It added that the quantities destroyed included "400 million captagon pills, 12.2 tons of hashish, in addition to 2.3 tons of cannabis plants, six kilograms of heroin, as well as 5.4 million narcotic pills".

"Tools and equipment used in smuggling, concealment, transport, and manufacture, including chemical substances," were also destroyed.

Synthetic stimulant captagon became Syria's largest export after the civil war began in 2011, flooding the region and becoming a key source of illicit funding for now ousted Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.

Syria's new authorities who took power in December 2024 have been working to combat the captagon trade.

Khaled Eid, the head of the drug enforcement department, announced in June that authorities "carried out 1,550 operations to seize and foil" drug smuggling attempts since Assad's fall, according to SANA.

He said authorities dismantled 90 international smuggling networks, shut down 17 captagon manufacturing plants, and seized 697 million captagon pills and 15 tons of hashish during those operations.


Burhan Downplays RSF Advances in Blue Nile, Vows to Fight On

Burhan offers his condolences to the relatives of Khatmiyya leader Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani. (Sudan's Transitional Sovereignty Council)
Burhan offers his condolences to the relatives of Khatmiyya leader Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani. (Sudan's Transitional Sovereignty Council)
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Burhan Downplays RSF Advances in Blue Nile, Vows to Fight On

Burhan offers his condolences to the relatives of Khatmiyya leader Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani. (Sudan's Transitional Sovereignty Council)
Burhan offers his condolences to the relatives of Khatmiyya leader Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani. (Sudan's Transitional Sovereignty Council)

Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan downplayed advances by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their allies in the Blue Nile region, urging residents not to fear an attack on the regional capital and vowing to fight until what he called the rebellion is defeated.

His remarks came hours after the RSF-aligned Tasis alliance claimed control of five areas in Geissan, a day after announcing the capture of the Bau locality headquarters.

Speaking in Khartoum on Friday evening while offering condolences over the death of Khatmiyya Sufi leader Mohamed Osman al-Mirghani, Burhan sought to reassure residents of Ad-Damazin, the Blue Nile capital.

“Don’t be afraid,” he said, citing the army’s expulsion of RSF fighters from Khartoum as evidence of its ability to prevail.

“They were sitting in the very house where I am speaking,” he added. “Wherever they enter, they will find themselves in a tunnel, in a trap they cannot escape.”

Burhan said that the war remained a priority, acknowledging that much of the state’s resources were being directed toward military operations.

“The army is defending Sudan, its citizens and their right to exist. We will fight until we win, and we will win,” he declared.

The Tasis alliance, comprising the RSF and its ally, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, announced on Friday that its forces had captured several towns in Geissan, nearly 40 kilometers southeast of Ad-Damazin.

The alliance had claimed control of the Bau locality headquarters the previous day, while conflicting accounts emerged from the warring sides over other towns.

Blue Nile’s regional government stressed that the army still held the initiative and was working to restore security in the southern part of the region.

Burhan also praised the Democratic Unionist Party, led by Mirghani, for supporting the army throughout the war through its members and political positions, describing it as a partner alongside other parties and organizations backing the military and Sudanese people.

While acknowledging what he described as hardships in daily living conditions, he attributed much of the economic pressure to an “economic war” waged by countries he accused of instigating the conflict on April 15, 2023.

He also criticized reports about famine and fuel shortages, describing them as attempts to discourage Sudanese citizens and undermine morale.

Famine warnings

Despite Burhan’s dismissal of the reports, international humanitarian organizations have repeatedly warned of worsening food insecurity in parts of Darfur and Kordofan.

The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) identified famine conditions in El Fasher and Kadugli and warned of further deterioration driven by fighting, displacement, drought and insufficient humanitarian funding.

According to a World Health Organization alert issued on October 12, IPC analysis covering February through May 2026 found that around 19.5 million people in Sudan faced acute food insecurity at crisis level or worse, including around 135,000 in the catastrophic category.

The World Food Program (WFP) has documented restrictions on the movement of goods, particularly in areas affected by fighting and displacement.

It attributed rising food prices to disrupted supplies and the depreciation of the Sudanese pound.


Israel Uncovers More Gaza Tunnels After Years of Devastating War

Israeli soldiers inside a tunnel in the Gaza Strip (Reuters). 
Israeli soldiers inside a tunnel in the Gaza Strip (Reuters). 
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Israel Uncovers More Gaza Tunnels After Years of Devastating War

Israeli soldiers inside a tunnel in the Gaza Strip (Reuters). 
Israeli soldiers inside a tunnel in the Gaza Strip (Reuters). 

Years of a devastating war have failed to dismantle Hamas’ vast tunnel network in Gaza, with Israel continuing to uncover underground passages even in areas under its military control.

Recent Israeli announcements have detailed new discoveries on both sides of the Yellow Line, established under the October 10, 2025, ceasefire agreement. The boundary initially left Israel controlling about 50% of Gaza, a share that has since expanded to more than 65%.

The latest operation, described as the first of its kind since the ceasefire, targeted a Hamas tunnel west of the Yellow Line and Salah al-Din Road, near the southern side of the Netzarim Corridor toward central Gaza.

Israeli forces have also reported destroying several tunnels within areas they control, underscoring the complexity of an underground network that has proved more extensive and resilient than anticipated.

Origins of the Tunnel Network

Hamas first used a tunnel in a military operation on September 26, 2001, a year after the outbreak of the Second Intifada.

The group detonated explosives inside a tunnel approximately 150 meters long beneath a military tower at the Termit outpost in Rafah, southern Gaza, killing and wounding several Israeli soldiers.

Israel initially paid limited attention to the tactic, quickly sealing and destroying the tunnel using rudimentary methods rather than the advanced technology employed today.

Hamas subsequently repeated the approach in other operations, including one in 2006 in which Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit was captured.

After taking control of Gaza, Hamas devoted considerable resources to developing tunnels for defensive and offensive operations, as well as smuggling weapons and military equipment.

Commercial tunnels also proliferated along the Rafah border after Israel imposed a sweeping blockade on the territory.

During the 51-day Gaza war in 2014, Hamas surprised Israeli forces with a series of cross-border tunnel operations, allowing its fighters to attack Israeli troops at close range.

The attacks heightened fears among residents of Israeli communities surrounding Gaza and prompted demands for stronger defenses against underground infiltration.

Israel subsequently built a technologically advanced border barrier equipped with aboveground and underground detection and protection systems.

However, during the October 7, 2023, attack, Hamas breached the new barrier using explosives designed to destroy sections of it and aerial means, including paragliders.

Tunnels, meanwhile, remained primarily defensive structures and facilities for command and control, although Hamas field commanders were later forced to abandon some of them after they came under attack.

Israeli Assessments

Israeli Southern Command officers have recently acknowledged that Hamas’ military arsenal, particularly its tunnel network, has not been completely eliminated.

They have also indicated that further measures are needed to address the future of the group’s weapons.

Amichai Mitelman, of the civil engineering department at Ariel University, estimated in a report published recently by Israel’s Maariv newspaper that a substantial portion of Hamas’ tunnels remains intact. He cautioned that no single method could destroy the entire network.

According to Mitelman, estimates of the total length of Gaza’s tunnels before the October 7 attack ranged from 500 to 1,000 kilometers.

Some tunnels were between 30 and 40 meters deep, with branching passages of varying widths, he explained.

Efforts to destroy the network by flooding tunnels with seawater or detonating large quantities of explosives have failed to eliminate it completely.

Filling tunnels with concrete has recently proved more effective, he said, although the method is costly and labor-intensive.

The Qassam Engineers

The underground network has remained a major challenge for Israel throughout the war, which has continued at a limited level despite the ceasefire.

Israel has demanded the complete destruction of Hamas’ tunnels under the ceasefire agreement, subject to monitoring by Israel, the United States and mediating countries.

The fate of Hamas’ other weapons, including rockets, has also become a central issue.

During operations to recover Israeli hostages, particularly the remains of those killed, it emerged that some had been buried in small tunnels and branches that Israeli forces had failed to detect.

Some of these passages remained intact within tunnel systems the military had believed it had destroyed.

Videos released by Hamas’ armed wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, featuring commanders and fighters killed during the war, have also shed light on the construction of the tunnels and the development of the group’s rocket arsenal.

The footage suggests that much of the work relied on local expertise and manual labor rather than exclusively on weapons smuggled from Iran or elsewhere, as is often assumed.

This has also prompted Israeli demands to dismantle Hamas’ weapons-manufacturing workshops.

The videos indicate that many of those responsible for tunnel construction and rocket development, known within the group as the “Qassam engineers,” did not hold formal engineering qualifications.

While a small number had engineering degrees, most had studied other subjects, and some had no academic qualifications.

Many were construction workers or technicians whose practical skills enabled them to oversee the development of the underground network over many years. They supervised excavation teams largely composed of younger Qassam recruits.

The so-called engineers assessed soil conditions, identified areas of structural strength and weakness, and determined tunnel routes before excavation began.

Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that tunnel construction and preparation followed what they described as professional engineering practices, using various types of equipment operated by skilled technicians.

The sources credited these workers with playing a central role in developing what Hamas considers a strategic military asset.

They acknowledged that construction had faced serious difficulties over the years, with numerous workers killed during excavation and others suffering paralysis or other injuries following soil collapses and unexpected incidents.

Security challenges also complicated the work, including alleged Israeli attempts to recruit informants from among faction members, tunnel workers and others to identify underground locations.

Other Hamas sources said the group’s rocket industry similarly relied on domestic development. According to these accounts, engineers from Gaza received training and studied relevant subjects at universities and other institutions before returning to train additional personnel, expanding the number of people capable of manufacturing and developing weapons.

The sources maintained that explosives were also manufactured and adapted locally to meet operational requirements, including those used to destroy sections of Israel’s border barrier during the October 7 attack.

They credited the engineers with adapting weapons to changing battlefield conditions.

The same approach, they added, extended to other locally developed weapons, including the Yassin 105 anti-armor projectile, which Hamas used extensively against Israeli forces during the war.