Hezbollah-linked Financial Institution Faces Systematic Israeli Military Campaign

Part of the building struck by an Israeli air strike in the Bashoura area, where the Israeli military said Hezbollah stores money beneath it (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Part of the building struck by an Israeli air strike in the Bashoura area, where the Israeli military said Hezbollah stores money beneath it (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Hezbollah-linked Financial Institution Faces Systematic Israeli Military Campaign

Part of the building struck by an Israeli air strike in the Bashoura area, where the Israeli military said Hezbollah stores money beneath it (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Part of the building struck by an Israeli air strike in the Bashoura area, where the Israeli military said Hezbollah stores money beneath it (Asharq Al-Awsat)

The Al-Qard Al-Hasan Association, a financial institution linked to Hezbollah, is facing a systematic military campaign as part of what appears to be a renewed Israeli strategy aimed at undermining the group’s economic infrastructure and cutting off its funding sources.

After the association’s branches were targeted during the 2024 war between Israel and Hezbollah, the institution has once again become a primary target in the current conflict.

The renewed campaign appears aimed at eliminating its role entirely, after it resumed operations following the previous war.

Ongoing campaign

In addition to years of political pressure and sanctions, the Israeli army targeted several of the association’s branches in Beirut, the Bekaa Valley and southern Lebanon during the 2024 war, making the institution part of a broader multi-level confrontation involving military strikes, financial sanctions and political pressure.

During the 66-day war, most of the association’s branches were hit by Israeli air strikes. Despite this, the institution was able to resume operations after the ceasefire and continued to provide financial services.

Hezbollah also used the association to distribute aid and compensation to people affected by the war through checks issued in the group’s name. The group attempted to circumvent sanctions through an entity it called the Joud Foundation, intended to serve similar financial purposes.

But in February, the United States imposed sanctions on it, saying it was being used to ensure the flow of funds from Iran to Hezbollah.

Attempt to eliminate it completely

In the current war, Israel has intensified its strikes against the association in a systematic manner. The Israeli military has clearly stated that all Al-Qard Al-Hasan branches are considered targets, a pledge it has carried out through strikes on most buildings housing its offices.

This has become a source of concern for residents, particularly because many of the association’s offices are located in residential buildings. Residents have therefore demanded that the offices be closed.

Lebanese security authorities have attempted to limit losses resulting from attacks on the association’s branches.

In this context, a decision was taken to close its branch in Sidon, southern Lebanon, and remove its sign on Thursday, following demands from business owners and institutions on the street and in neighboring buildings.

Authorities also evacuated the association’s branch building in Beirut’s Noueiri district on Friday following a decision by the interior minister.

It is also clear that the Israeli army is no longer only pursuing the association’s branches but also money storage facilities. Israeli military spokesman Avichay Adraee said on Thursday, after a strike on a building in the Bashoura area near central Beirut, that Hezbollah had hidden millions of dollars beneath the civilian building to fund its “terrorist activities.”

He added that the site was guarded by armed men and that access to the storage facility was through the building’s parking lot.

While Israeli strikes in 2024 failed to destroy what is often described as “Hezbollah’s central bank,” Israel, which views the association as a central element in financing Hezbollah’s activities and harmful to the Lebanese economy in the service of Iranian interests, now appears intent on weakening it fundamentally.

The goal appears to be depriving the group of one of its most important sources of economic and social influence in Lebanon.

Drying up resources a long and complex process

However, financial and economic affairs researcher Professor Maroun Khater said it is unlikely that Al-Qard Al-Hasan could be completely eliminated.

“Experience shows that such networks are often capable of adapting and finding alternative channels, which makes the process of cutting off resources long and complex,” Khater told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“For this reason, it is difficult to conclude that the blows suffered by Al-Qard Al-Hasan have led to the complete collapse of Hezbollah’s financial system, due both to the nature of the association itself and the diversity of funding sources that international reports say the group relies on.”

Khater added that despite the pressure, the association relies on a broad social network of depositors and borrowers who have used its services as an alternative to the traditional banking system, even before Lebanon’s banking sector effectively collapsed in 2019.

“This social base, along with political and security protection, has given it a certain capacity to endure, albeit within a limited scope, and has so far allowed it room to reorganize its activities whenever it is hit,” he said.

Fate of funds unclear

Khater also stressed that it would be simplistic to view the association as Hezbollah’s only source of funding.

Research centers and international institutions estimate that the group’s financing relies on a mix of sources, including foreign support, local economic networks, and donations, as well as various financial and commercial activities.

Some resources are also believed to move through individuals or private institutions that may remain outside full regulatory oversight, whether inside Lebanon or abroad.

For this reason, Khater said, it remains difficult to determine the true scale of the wealth accumulated by Hezbollah over past decades or to know what has happened to portions of its funds, gold reserves or other assets.

A parallel banking system under pressure

The Al-Qard Al-Hasan Association was founded in 1983 and operates more than 30 branches across Lebanon, including in Beirut, southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley. A broad segment of the public relies on it to obtain small loans or cash liquidity in exchange for gold or other assets pledged as collateral.

As Lebanon’s financial crisis worsened after 2019, the association’s role expanded, functioning in many ways as Hezbollah’s “parallel banking system.”

While banks suspended lending, Al-Qard Al-Hasan said it had issued 212,000 loans totaling $553 million in 2020 and 2021.

The US Treasury froze the association’s assets in 2007 and imposed additional sanctions in 2021 on several individuals linked to it, accusing the organization of collecting foreign currency to help Hezbollah build a support base.

The Treasury says that although the association claims to serve the Lebanese public, it actually transfers funds illegally through fictitious accounts and intermediaries, exposing Lebanese financial institutions to potential sanctions.

Lebanese authorities have also tightened restrictions. In 2025, Lebanon’s central bank instructed banks and financial institutions not to deal with unlicensed entities subject to sanctions, including Al-Qard Al-Hasan.



Conflicting Reports on Two Iraqi Factions Giving Up Their Weapons

Mourners attend the funeral of members of the Iraqi armed group Kataib Hezbollah who were killed in an airstrike that targeted a PMF headquarters on the Syrian border, amid the US-Israel conflict with Iran, in Baghdad, Iraq, March 2, 2026. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Suda
Mourners attend the funeral of members of the Iraqi armed group Kataib Hezbollah who were killed in an airstrike that targeted a PMF headquarters on the Syrian border, amid the US-Israel conflict with Iran, in Baghdad, Iraq, March 2, 2026. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Suda
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Conflicting Reports on Two Iraqi Factions Giving Up Their Weapons

Mourners attend the funeral of members of the Iraqi armed group Kataib Hezbollah who were killed in an airstrike that targeted a PMF headquarters on the Syrian border, amid the US-Israel conflict with Iran, in Baghdad, Iraq, March 2, 2026. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Suda
Mourners attend the funeral of members of the Iraqi armed group Kataib Hezbollah who were killed in an airstrike that targeted a PMF headquarters on the Syrian border, amid the US-Israel conflict with Iran, in Baghdad, Iraq, March 2, 2026. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Suda

Reports have diverged over whether the faction Asaib Ahl al-Haq, led by Qais al-Khazali, and Kataib al-Imam Ali, affiliated with Shibl al-Zaidi, have handed over their weapons to the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The move is seen as a partial response to US conditions calling for disarming factions and placing all arms under the authority of the Iraqi state. However, it may be largely symbolic, while informed sources speak of a “theoretical framework” gaining traction that could eventually allow the factions file to be resolved.

The reports come just days after Coordination Framework forces succeeded in nominating Ali al-Zaidi for prime minister, and President Nizar Amidi tasked him with forming a government. The assignment appears relatively straightforward given the continued US support for Zaidi, as well as a call from President Donald Trump inviting him to visit the White House.

In mid-April, the US Treasury Department designated seven leaders of Iraqi factions responsible for planning, directing, and carrying out attacks against US personnel, facilities, and interests in Iraq, including figures linked to Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.

Al-Sudani mediates between the head of the Popular Mobilization Forces, Faleh Al-Fayyad, and his Chief of Staff, Abu Fadak (Government media)

Disarmament

For months, there has been ongoing discussion about the possibility of disarming factions, particularly those with significant weight inside the Coordination Framework, such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib al-Imam Ali. This contrasts with repeated rejection from factions such as Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataib Hezbollah.

By end of March, the Services Alliance, which holds around six seats in parliament, announced it was severing ties with Kataib al-Imam Ali, despite Shibl al-Zaidi leading both the alliance and the armed faction. The alliance said it sought to present itself as a “comprehensive national political alliance based on the principle of national partnership, bringing together multiple political forces and currents that collectively bear responsibility for governing the state and serving society,” according to a statement at the time.

Amid the talk of weapons handovers, neither Asaib Ahl al-Haq nor Kataib al-Imam Ali has issued an official statement on the reports. The supposed mechanism of such a transfer is also surrounded by major questions, as it would effectively mean “moving what you hold in your right hand to your left,” according to sources close to the PMF and the factions.

Sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Asaib Ahl al-Haq has three main brigades within the PMF (41, 42, and 43), deployed in northern Baghdad and Salah al-Din province, while Kataib al-Imam Ali has the 40th Brigade, led by Shibl al-Zaidi. If they were to hand over their weapons to the PMF, they would in practice be transferring them to their own brigades already embedded within the PMF structure.

A theoretical framework

The same sources said they were unaware of any serious move at this stage to disarm the factions or even to carry out the reported transfer to the PMF. Instead, they referred to what could be described as a “theoretical framework” that may later translate into a possible settlement addressing weapons held outside the state.

They suggested that circulating such reports may serve as an early test of the prime minister-designate’s intentions and his responsiveness to US pressure regarding factional arms. It could also be a way to secure ministerial positions in the next government.

The sources added that Asaib Ahl al-Haq, which holds 27 seats in parliament and secured the position of first deputy speaker in the current term, may be genuinely seeking to avoid potential US anger. It is attempting to shed its factional past and aims to obtain ministerial portfolios, as it did in the previous term, but appears unable to convince Washington.

For this reason, the sources believe that a vague announcement of this kind about handing over weapons is insufficient to persuade Washington that the factions are disarming. More substantive steps would likely be required, potentially involving restructuring the PMF and integrating it into the regular armed forces.

Many observers point to the need to restructure leadership within the PMF as a first step toward resolving the issue of factional weapons. They also highlight the need to change key positions within the organization by redeploying some brigades to distant sectors, integrating selected units into the army or federal police, and retiring or sidelining undisciplined commanders.


Israeli Airstrikes on Southern Lebanon Kill 7 Amid Fragile Ceasefire

Smoke rises from the site of an Israeli airstrike that targeted the southern Lebanese village of Mayfadoun in the Nabatieh district on May 2, 2026. (AFP)
Smoke rises from the site of an Israeli airstrike that targeted the southern Lebanese village of Mayfadoun in the Nabatieh district on May 2, 2026. (AFP)
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Israeli Airstrikes on Southern Lebanon Kill 7 Amid Fragile Ceasefire

Smoke rises from the site of an Israeli airstrike that targeted the southern Lebanese village of Mayfadoun in the Nabatieh district on May 2, 2026. (AFP)
Smoke rises from the site of an Israeli airstrike that targeted the southern Lebanese village of Mayfadoun in the Nabatieh district on May 2, 2026. (AFP)

Israeli airstrikes on southern Lebanon kill at least seven people and wounded others on Saturday as hostilities continue between Israel and Hezbollah despite a ceasefire.

The Israeli airstrikes on southern Lebanon Saturday came as Israel’s military issued a new warning for residents of nine southern villages to evacuate.

Israel’s military and Lebanon’s Hezbollah have kept up their attacks despite a ceasefire in place since April 17.

Lebanon’s state-run National News Agency reported an airstrike on a car in the village of Kfar Dajal that killed 2 people, while another hit a home in the village of Lwaizeh killing three. NNA also reported a strike on the village of Shoukin that killed two people.

Israel’s military Arabic-language spokeswoman, Lt. Col. Ella Waweya, posted on X that the Israeli air force carried out about 50 airstrikes over the past 24 hours, saying that they targeted Hezbollah infrastructure and members.

Hezbollah said that it attacked on Saturday Israeli troops who gathered inside a house in the coastal village of Bayed with a drone.

The latest war between Israel and Hezbollah began on March 2, when Hezbollah fired rockets into northern Israel two days after the United States and Israel launched a war on its main backer, Iran. Israel has since carried out hundreds of airstrikes and launched a ground invasion of southern Lebanon, capturing dozens of towns and villages along the border.

Since then Lebanon and Israel have held their first direct talks in more than three decades. The two countries have formally been in a state of war since the founding of the state of Israel in 1948.

A 10-day ceasefire declared in Washington went into effect on April 17. The ceasefire was later extended by three weeks.


Why Does Trump Favor Iraq’s Al-Zaidi?

New Iraqi Prime Minister-designate Ali al-Zaidi, uses a phone at his office in Baghdad, Iraq, April 28, 2026. (Iraqi Prime Minister’s Media Office/Handout via Reuters).
New Iraqi Prime Minister-designate Ali al-Zaidi, uses a phone at his office in Baghdad, Iraq, April 28, 2026. (Iraqi Prime Minister’s Media Office/Handout via Reuters).
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Why Does Trump Favor Iraq’s Al-Zaidi?

New Iraqi Prime Minister-designate Ali al-Zaidi, uses a phone at his office in Baghdad, Iraq, April 28, 2026. (Iraqi Prime Minister’s Media Office/Handout via Reuters).
New Iraqi Prime Minister-designate Ali al-Zaidi, uses a phone at his office in Baghdad, Iraq, April 28, 2026. (Iraqi Prime Minister’s Media Office/Handout via Reuters).

Iraq’s ruling Coordination Framework has been on an intriguing journey that started with the United States’ adamant rejection of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki being appointed to head a new government and that ended with President Donald Trump personally congratulating Ali al-Zaidi on his appointment as PM-designate earlier this week.

On January 27, Trump threatened to cut US support to Iraq if Maliki returned to power. After 93 days, the Shiite forces in Iraq were surprised when Trump congratulated al-Zaidi and urged him to form a government that is free of “terrorism”. He even received an invitation to visit Washington.

Iran has yet to comment on any of these developments.

Trump’s envoy to Syria Tom Barrack had telephoned al-Zaidi on Tuesday ahead of Trump’s telephone call to the PM-designate, a banker who, with Shiite consensus, has become the face of a potential and still ambiguous American deal.

Normally, pro-Iran factions in Iraq don’t let such friendly American contacts go without a fierce wave of criticism against any attempt to normalize ties with Washington, the perceived great enemy. That did not happen.

On the contrary, the hawks of the so-called “Resistance Axis” are preoccupied with giving the new PM-designate advice over including “strong” figures in his cabinet lineup to ensure its success. They have already sent him numerous possible candidates.

Al-Zaidi was named to his post just two hours after his name was floated in the media. His name appeared out of nowhere just days after commander of Iran’s Quds Force Esmail Qaani visited Baghdad. It remains to be seen if Qaani had imposed his conditions or surrendered to a deal that is beyond Iran’s control.

Al-Zaidi's designation took place as Iraq finds itself caught between the US-Iran conflict with each country trying to impose its influence over Baghdad. The appointment could have been a victory of one party against the other.

The American veto over Maliki had limited the Coordination Framework’s options and forced it into a battle of wills with Washington. With the eruption of the conflict with Iran, al-Zaidi's name was floated as a possible candidate and way out. An evident deal was reached that led to his designation and it continues to raise questions.

Observers believe that the appointment is the beginning of a broader deal that may have intrigued Trump.

Sources said that al-Zaidi did not appear out of nowhere in the Framework and that he was actually always there as a “winning card” that can be used by influential parties.

Other sources said that al-Zaidi now faces two possibilities: His proposed cabinet lineup will fail to receive the parliament’s vote of confidence, giving the Framework room to catch its breath in the political impasse and line up other options.

This is viewed as a scenario that outgoing Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani could come up with.

The second possibility would be for the lineup to win the vote of confidence and for al-Zaidi to lead a transitional phase of two years or less. Observers have suggested that early elections could be held during this period. This scenario favors influential cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.

There also lies a third possibility that al-Zaidi was indeed designated through an American deal amid rumors that the US is seeking to limit China’s influence in the region.

The way Trump congratulated al-Zaidi suggests that Washington may have won something major in return from Baghdad. Or it could mean that Iran’s influence in Iraq had gotten so weak that it allowed major players in Baghdad to seize the reins and do what was necessary, including appointing al-Zaidi, to avoid US economic sanctions that would only further isolate Iraq and Iran.