Esmail Khatib, Iran Spy Chief, from Shadow War to Assassination

A photo released by the Iranian supreme leader’s official website shows Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib in November last year
A photo released by the Iranian supreme leader’s official website shows Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib in November last year
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Esmail Khatib, Iran Spy Chief, from Shadow War to Assassination

A photo released by the Iranian supreme leader’s official website shows Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib in November last year
A photo released by the Iranian supreme leader’s official website shows Intelligence Minister Esmail Khatib in November last year

Within Iran’s ruling structure in Tehran, the post of intelligence minister is far from a routine cabinet role. The ministry, established after the 1979 revolution, is a central pillar of the security system, overseeing a wide network of intelligence operations at home and abroad.

While the president formally nominates the minister, the appointment is effectively decided with the Supreme Leader's approval, placing the role within a security structure closely tied to his office.

From this position, conservative cleric Esmail Khatib rose to lead Iran’s intelligence apparatus in 2021, after more than four decades in the Islamic Republic’s security and judicial institutions.

His career ended dramatically during the Iran-Israel war. On the 19th day of the conflict, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said the Israeli air force had carried out a strike in Tehran that killed Khatib.

The Israeli military said Khatib oversaw an apparatus responsible for espionage and covert operations, and played a role in suppressing protests inside Iran.

The announcement came days after his name surfaced outside Iran, when the US State Department’s Rewards for Justice program offered up to $10 million for information on several senior Iranian officials linked to the Revolutionary Guards and the Supreme Leader’s office, including Khatib.

For years, Khatib operated largely in the shadows within intelligence institutions. He moved to the center of the Iran-Israel confrontation as the shadow conflict between the two sides escalated in recent years.

The announcement of his death added his name to a list of figures from Iran’s Supreme National Security Council killed in the conflict, including Secretary Ali Larijani and Mohammad Bagher Pakpour, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

From seminary to state institutions

Esmail Khatib was born in 1961 in Qaenat, South Khorasan province, eastern Iran. In the mid-1970s, he moved to the seminary in Qom, where he studied Islamic jurisprudence under senior clerics.

His teachers included Mohammad Fazel Lankarani, Nasser Makarem Shirazi and Mojtaba Tehrani. He also attended jurisprudence lessons taught by Ali Khamenei before he became the supreme leader. This religious path was common for clerics who entered state institutions after the 1979 revolution that toppled the Shah.

After the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Khatib quickly joined the new system. At 19, he enlisted in the Revolutionary Guards and worked in intelligence and operations units during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. Reports indicate he was wounded, later placing him among recognized veterans, a status that carries political weight in Iran.

Entry into the intelligence ministry

In the mid-1980s, after the creation of the Ministry of Intelligence and Security in 1983, Khatib moved to the new body, which became Iran’s main civilian intelligence agency. He worked in several departments, including foreign affairs and intelligence analysis.

He gained prominence in the 1990s when he was appointed head of intelligence in Qom province.

Qom, a stronghold of the clerical establishment, is among Iran’s most sensitive provinces due to its religious institutions. Managing security there required navigating complex balances among clerics and political factions.

Khatib held the post for more than a decade, during a period marked by political tensions in the city, including developments linked to senior cleric Hossein Ali Montazeri, once seen as a potential successor to Ruhollah Khomeini before being sidelined.

Closer to the center of power

Over time, Khatib moved into roles closer to decision-making centers. In 2010, he joined the office of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in a unit responsible for his security and protection, a position reserved for senior intelligence officials.

Two years later, he was appointed head of the judiciary’s protection and intelligence center, tasked with monitoring judicial institutions and ensuring their political loyalty.

He remained in the role until 2019, during the tenure of judiciary chief Sadeq Larijani. With Ebrahim Raisi’s later appointment as head of the judiciary, ties between the two men strengthened.

The Astan Quds phase

In 2019, Khatib moved to Astan Quds Razavi in Mashhad, one of Iran’s largest economic and religious institutions, which oversees the Imam Reza shrine.

He took charge of security and protection within the organization, part of a network of institutions directly linked to the supreme leader’s office. He remained there until 2021, when he returned to the intelligence ministry, this time as its head.

Intelligence minister

In August 2021, after Ebrahim Raisi was elected president, he nominated Khatib as intelligence minister. As is customary, the appointment came after approval from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who had the final say on sensitive security posts.

Khatib became the eighth intelligence minister since the ministry’s establishment. He took office as Iran faced multiple security challenges, including sabotage at nuclear facilities, assassinations of scientists and officials, and an escalating intelligence confrontation with Israel.

Iran’s political landscape shifted after President Ebrahim Raisi died in May 2024 in a helicopter crash in the northwest. After subsequent elections, President Masoud Pezeshkian formed a new government.

Khatib was among the few ministers to retain his post. Pezeshkian renominated him, a move analysts said reflected the sensitivity of the role.

His retention drew criticism from some political and reformist circles that had hoped for changes in the leadership of security agencies.

Rivalry within the security apparatus

At the start of his tenure, Khatib worked to manage a key issue within the security establishment, the complex relationship between the intelligence ministry and its parallel counterpart, the Revolutionary Guards Intelligence Organization.

The two bodies have overlapping mandates and often compete over major security files. Khatib sought to improve coordination, particularly in countering what the system described as foreign infiltration. The balance, however, remained complicated, reflecting ties to different power centers.

Protests and sanctions

Khatib’s tenure saw one of Iran’s largest protest waves in the past decade. In 2022, demonstrations erupted after the death of Mahsa Amini while in the morality police custody.

Security agencies, including the intelligence ministry, played a central role in responding through arrests, investigations and the pursuit of activists.

Khatib echoed the official line, describing the protests as driven by foreign interference and accusing the United States, Britain and Israel of involvement.

In September 2022, the United States imposed sanctions on Khatib and the ministry, accusing it of running cyberattack networks targeting governments and companies in multiple countries, including Albania.

Security failures

Despite repeated announcements of dismantling espionage networks, Iran’s security apparatus faced criticism over several failures.

Among the most notable was a deadly attack in Kerman in 2024 during a ceremony marking the anniversary of Qassem Soleimani’s killing, which left dozens dead.

Assassinations inside Iran, including those targeting figures linked to the so-called resistance axis, also exposed vulnerabilities.

These incidents sparked debate within Iran’s elite over the system’s ability to counter external infiltration.

Criticism intensified after the killing of numerous Iranian officials, including military commanders and nuclear scientists, during the 12-day war in June, amid reports of extensive intelligence breaches.

End of a security career

Throughout his career, Esmail Khatib remained largely out of the spotlight. He was not a mass political figure, but a security official who rose steadily through state institutions.

The Iran-Israel war in 2026, however, thrust him into the center of the confrontation. The Israeli announcement of his killing on the 19th day of the war ended a career spanning more than 40 years in the security services.

Whether seen as a major intelligence blow or another chapter in the regional conflict, Khatib’s trajectory reflects a common path within Iran’s complex security establishment: a cleric who began in the seminary, joined the Revolutionary Guards in the early years of the revolution, and rose through the ranks to one of the most sensitive posts in the Iranian state.



Sept. 11’s Legacy Endures a Quarter-Century Later

A Palestinian man holds up a poster of ousted Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein (L) and wanted al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden during a demonstration by some 1,000 people in the West Bank town of Hebron 10 April 2004, in support of the Iraqi resistance against the US-led coalition. (AFP via Getty Images)
A Palestinian man holds up a poster of ousted Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein (L) and wanted al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden during a demonstration by some 1,000 people in the West Bank town of Hebron 10 April 2004, in support of the Iraqi resistance against the US-led coalition. (AFP via Getty Images)
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Sept. 11’s Legacy Endures a Quarter-Century Later

A Palestinian man holds up a poster of ousted Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein (L) and wanted al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden during a demonstration by some 1,000 people in the West Bank town of Hebron 10 April 2004, in support of the Iraqi resistance against the US-led coalition. (AFP via Getty Images)
A Palestinian man holds up a poster of ousted Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein (L) and wanted al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden during a demonstration by some 1,000 people in the West Bank town of Hebron 10 April 2004, in support of the Iraqi resistance against the US-led coalition. (AFP via Getty Images)

Rarely does a day deserve to be called “the day that shook the world.” September 11, 2001, claimed that distinction the moment it happened. At first, many could scarcely believe what they were seeing on their screens. The sight of civilian aircraft exploding into symbols of American power and success in New York and Washington was shocking and deadly. A quarter-century later, there is no denying the mark that day left on the US, the Middle East and the world.

The day set in motion by al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden brought down two governments: the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein’s government in Iraq. Afghanistan may have returned to life under a diluted form of Taliban rule, but the Middle East is still paying the price for the regional imbalances created when the US military uprooted Iraq’s Baathist government.

The fall of both governments was an enormous, unintended gift to Iran, now engaged in a military conflict with the United States.

The world was not accustomed to seeing the US attacked at home. On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked the US base at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. Washington declared war on Japan the next day, and the rest is history.

On September 11, bin Laden brought the war onto American soil itself, prompting George W. Bush to launch a war against what he regarded as strongholds of terrorism.

It was no surprise that a wounded America, led by Bush, decided to topple the government of Mullah Mohammed Omar, who insisted on sheltering bin Laden and ignored calls to distance himself from the al-Qaeda leader or hand him over.

But the greater response came in the Middle East. In 2003, the region watched a US armored vehicle pull Saddam Hussein’s statue from its pedestal in Baghdad’s Firdos Square. It would later watch the hangman’s noose tighten around Saddam’s neck, alarming two men: Libya’s Moammar al-Gaddafi and Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Bin Laden deliberately chose mostly Saudis for the team that attacked New York and Washington, hoping to provoke a crisis and rupture relations between Washington and Riyadh. He did not get what he wanted, but the attacks posed a test across the Muslim world.

Many voices in the US called for terrorism to be uprooted at its source. The attacks unsettled the US and the West’s relations with many countries. They also strained relations between Western governments and Arab and Muslim communities, particularly as waves of migration increased. Today, the far-right is on the rise in several parts of Europe.

Yasser Arafat was living in Gaza that day. He was troubled by the attention focused on a few Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza who handed out sweets to celebrate the attacks and express their anger at American bias toward Israel.

Despite his advanced age, Arafat insisted on donating blood for those wounded in New York and Washington and went to a Gaza hospital. Some say that, in the first hours, he feared Palestinians might have been involved in carrying out the attacks.

Al-Gaddafi was also alarmed, although both he and Saddam initially imagined that the attacks would weaken the US. Al-Gaddafi asked Foreign Minister Abdulrahman Shalgham to arrange for Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika to tell Bush that Libya was ready to normalize relations and open a new chapter with the US.

Bouteflika conveyed the Libyan position, but the US president told his visitor: “Tell al-Gaddafi that he must immediately surrender his nuclear program’s arsenal, or we will go and destroy it ourselves.”

Shalgham, having gauged the tense mood in America, told a meeting in Tripoli that the United States would occupy Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. The Libyan leader did not hesitate to bow to Bush’s demands.

The US used Iraq’s alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction as a pretext for attacking the country. It also claimed that the Iraqi government had ties to al-Qaeda. Many did not believe the claim, particularly given the stark differences between Saddam and bin Laden and the vastly different ideologies that guided them.

The prevailing impression was that the allegation had been fabricated. In fact, no relationship existed. But Saddam made a serious error in the 1990s, while bin Laden was in Sudan, when he sent a member of Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood to meet him there. The al-Qaeda leader showed no interest in cooperating with what he called the “infidel Baathist regime.”

The Iraqi government tried again, sending an intelligence official named Farouk Hijazi. A meeting with bin Laden was arranged through Sudanese Islamist leader Hassan al-Turabi. After the meeting, which lasted more than three hours, Hijazi returned to Iraq and advised Saddam to abandon the idea of working with bin Laden, who reportedly demanded permission to establish independent camps on Iraqi soil.

The Iraqi government dropped the idea of cooperating with bin Laden. But US intelligence agencies exploited murky threads of contact between the two sides and used them to justify the invasion of Iraq.

The US toppled the Taliban and Saddam’s government and launched a prolonged hunt for al-Qaeda leaders.

On May 2, 2011, bin Laden, hiding in Abbottabad, Pakistan, was taken by surprise when US troops stormed his compound. America exacted revenge on the architect of the attacks on New York and Washington and disposed of his body at sea.

Osama bin Laden was gone, but al-Qaeda’s imprint exacted an enormous price from the countries of the Middle East.


What Options Does Hezbollah Have in Dealing with Israeli Escalation?

Portraits of current and former Iranian and Hezbollah leaders displayed at a rally, in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, September 2, 2026. (Reuters)
Portraits of current and former Iranian and Hezbollah leaders displayed at a rally, in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, September 2, 2026. (Reuters)
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What Options Does Hezbollah Have in Dealing with Israeli Escalation?

Portraits of current and former Iranian and Hezbollah leaders displayed at a rally, in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, September 2, 2026. (Reuters)
Portraits of current and former Iranian and Hezbollah leaders displayed at a rally, in the southern suburbs of Beirut, Lebanon, September 2, 2026. (Reuters)

Hezbollah finds itself facing an increasingly difficult equation as Israeli escalation in South Lebanon has widened in recent days. How will the party respond to mounting Israeli strikes without being drawn into a broader confrontation that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may be seeking either to postpone Israel’s elections or improve his prospects in them.

At the same time, Hezbollah is facing growing pressure from its support base, which is bearing the brunt of the strikes and demanding a response capable of deterring Tel Aviv. Yet the group’s options appear largely constrained by regional developments, particularly the course of US-Iran negotiations, as well as domestic political calculations in Lebanon.

A response could benefit Netanyahu

Sources familiar with Hezbollah’s position said the Iran-backed party has largely avoided signaling whether it intends to retaliate or continue exercising restraint and adhering unilaterally to the ceasefire agreement.

They told Asharq Al-Awsat that Hezbollah is currently focusing on holding the Lebanese authorities responsible for addressing the situation, noting that the group had previously called on the government to engage in dialogue over the expanding Israeli offensive and the failure of negotiations.

The sources see no indication so far that Hezbollah may make a military response. They argue that one objective of Israel’s widening offensive is to provoke Hezbollah and Iran into retaliating and trigger a broader war, which could benefit Netanyahu electorally or help him postpone the polls.

Limited ability to confront Israel

Hilal Khashan, a professor of political science at the American University of Beirut, took a different view, saying Hezbollah has no options left because its military power has collapsed, particularly after its decision to hand over Ali al-Taher — “a symbol of its pride” — to Israel rather than surrender it to the Lebanese army.

“Hezbollah lacks the ability not only to fight Israel, but even to provoke it,” Khashan told Asharq Al-Awsat. “It sent two drones, and we saw the results.”

The academic believes the party’s current priority is to retain its weapons domestically after its military role in confronting Israel has effectively ended, although Hezbollah “insists on living in denial.”

He expects Israeli escalation to continue ahead of the heated elections, saying it will not be confined to Lebanon but could extend to the West Bank, Gaza and southern Syria, amid continued threats of strikes against Iran.

“As for America’s ability to pressure Israel, it appears limited,” Khashan noted, saying this means an expansion of Israeli operations into Lebanon's Bekaa Valley cannot be ruled out.

Three options for Hezbollah

Retired Lebanese army Brig. Gen. Mounir Shehadeh offered a different assessment, identifying three options available to Hezbollah.

“The first is a broad, direct military response,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat. “This is the option that could give Israel the pretext it is seeking to expand its target list, take the escalation deeper into Lebanon and perhaps strike Lebanese infrastructure. It is therefore a high-cost option.”

The second is to refrain entirely from responding. That also carries a price because Israel could interpret it as evidence that it can impose new realities without paying a cost, particularly following the escalation over Ali al-Taher and the continuing strikes, he explained.

The third option is a calibrated, limited response. “In my view, this is the most logical option if the group decides to respond,” Shehadeh said.

Such action would seek to establish the principle that “aggression carries a cost” without triggering an all-out confrontation, he went on to say. Hezbollah could simultaneously maintain a policy of ambiguity by declining to claim every operation, particularly if it wanted to preserve room for political maneuver.

Shehadeh said Hezbollah may be facing a more complicated calculation: whether to respond to Israel now or wait until the direction of US-Iran negotiations becomes clearer.

Waiting for the outcome of those talks would not necessarily mean surrendering or remaining passive, he noted. Instead, Hezbollah could defer a major response while keeping the option of limited retaliation open, since a broad confrontation at this stage could benefit Israel more than the party and give it an opportunity to widen the war before the regional picture becomes clearer.

Shehadeh expects Hezbollah to avoid, in the near term, initiating a major response that could trigger an all-out war. At the same time, the group cannot indefinitely tolerate continued Israeli escalation without responding.

He stressed that the most realistic scenario is to contain the escalation, monitor developments on the ground, take into account the US-Iran diplomatic track and keep open the option of a limited, carefully calibrated response if Israel crosses certain lines.


Iran's Hormuz Leverage Wanes as US Economic Squeeze Bites

Vessels in the Strait of Hormuz near the beach of Bandar Abbas, Iran, September 5, 2026. (Reuters)
Vessels in the Strait of Hormuz near the beach of Bandar Abbas, Iran, September 5, 2026. (Reuters)
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Iran's Hormuz Leverage Wanes as US Economic Squeeze Bites

Vessels in the Strait of Hormuz near the beach of Bandar Abbas, Iran, September 5, 2026. (Reuters)
Vessels in the Strait of Hormuz near the beach of Bandar Abbas, Iran, September 5, 2026. (Reuters)

Six months after a conflict that rattled markets and pushed the region to the brink of a wider war, the tide may be turning against Iran as Washington unleashes an unprecedented economic offensive to achieve what military force could not.

After years of surviving sanctions, Tehran is now confronting one of the harshest squeezes in the regime's history, according to Iranian insiders and regional sources cited by Reuters.

A US naval blockade and tougher sanctions are curbing oil exports, ‌restricting access to foreign currency and exposing growing strains in the economy.

The campaign has led US and regional officials to wager that mounting economic pressure can force Tehran to allow free passage through the Strait of Hormuz, which carries about a fifth of global oil and LNG supplies.

Their bet rests on a simple calculation: Iran is suffering more economic damage than it is inflicting. Efforts to choke off oil exports have cut state revenues, while attempts to disrupt shipping through Hormuz have not triggered the global economic shock Tehran hoped would force Washington to compromise. Energy markets have adjusted and alternative supplies have continued to flow.

Whether the pressure will force concessions remains unclear, the regional sources said. Tehran has failed to impose the costs it hoped would break Washington's resolve but has shown little sign of abandoning demands for sanctions relief, access to frozen assets and recognition of its security role in Hormuz.

Still, a new formula for resolving the standoff is now under discussion between mediators and Iran, the sources said.

Can Tehran outlast the squeeze?

Three senior Iranian sources acknowledged that Washington's campaign is becoming increasingly difficult to withstand. The latest measures have sharply restricted Tehran's ability to access foreign currency, import goods and tap global financing networks that have helped keep the economy afloat.

Iranian leaders fear a worsening economy, marked by surging prices, weaker trade and pressure on household incomes, could reignite nationwide unrest that has repeatedly challenged Tehran.

Shortages of key imports, including fuel and wheat, are becoming an increasing concern, officials said.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent described the strategy as a “one-two punch” combining the blockade with “the toughest sanctions in history.”

“It is going to work in Iran and we are going to collapse this regime,” he told CNBC.

For some US, Israeli and regional officials, such ‌strains strengthen ⁠hopes that economic pressure could eventually carry political consequences inside Iran by triggering unrest, widening rifts within the leadership and weakening its grip on power.

Others remain skeptical that economic and military coercion will produce a political rupture, pointing to decades of failed efforts to destabilize the regime and Tehran's willingness to suppress dissent. They argue Iran's rulers may again prove more resilient than their adversaries expect.

Resilience test

Dennis Ross, a former US negotiator, said Washington may be interpreting Iran's economic distress as evidence of strategic success when the reality is more complicated. Tehran remains determined to demonstrate it can control Hormuz, but appears to be calibrating its use of force while keeping further escalation in reserve.

The Revolutionary Guards may believe Iran can absorb the economic pain and outlast the pressure rather than compromise, ⁠Ross said.

“The Iranians have consistently surprised us in terms of their resiliency,” he added, saying he doubted economic and military pressure alone would force a retreat. Hardliners, he said, may believe they can endure and ultimately secure what they want.

Resilience may depend as much on public tolerance as Tehran's ability to absorb economic hardship, said Burcu Ozcelik, a senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute.

“Of course, the economic squeeze raises the risk of public unrest, but for now, a wartime mentality appears to have a significant hold ⁠over the population,” said Ozcelik. “Foreign military intervention, civilian casualties and the perception of a wider civilization confrontation with a US-led order are sustaining a degree of 'Iran-first' patriotic support, tolerance or simply patience with the regime.”

The result is a more stubborn impasse than Washington may have anticipated. Economic pressure is deepening the pain, but Tehran's powerful Revolutionary Guards may see endurance, backed by the threat of escalation, as leverage rather than a reason to concede.

The key question is not whether Iran is ⁠hurting, but whether it is hurting enough to compromise before either side slips toward another confrontation, the regional sources said.

Ross said the clearest path to a deal may lie in the dispute over shipping fees through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran could abandon any demand for a toll while retaining the right to charge for legitimate navigational, security or environmental services, he said.

Such an arrangement could give both sides a claim to victory, allowing Tehran to step back without appearing to capitulate.

“If you could announce that the Strait were reopened,” Ross said, “I think Trump would do a deal.”