Major General Al-Nour Al-Qubba’s (Al-Nour Ahmed Adam) defection from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to join the Sudanese army is not a minor military development. His decision raises deep questions about the cohesion and future of these forces amid mounting battlefield pressure and successive losses. Al-Qubba is no ordinary commander. He was among the most prominent figures of RSF and has been part of shaping its trajectory since its inception, including in the most consequential battles of the current war.
Despite the considerable uproar around his defection, it was neither the first nor likely to be the last. The most notable previous defector is Abu Aqla Keikel, who joined the army with his forces in October 2024 - a major military and moral blow that contributed to the success of operations that led to the liberation of Al-Jazira State, then Khartoum, and he later supported campaigns along the Kordofan axis.
The question now is: how significant will Al-Qubba’s defection be? Could it signal deeper fractures within the RSF that could alter the balance of the war?
Al-Qubba was among its commanders from its founding, whereas Keikel joined only after the war, in April 2023. Al-Qubba also belongs to the same group as the RSF base, and he took part in most of its major battles in Khartoum, Al-Jazira, and Darfur, playing a particularly significant role in Al-Fashir. From this perspective, his defection constitutes a serious blow to the RSF - more than a military problem; it suggests that the group’s foundations are shaking. This is especially true as it follows the offensive in Mistraiha, a stronghold of Musa Hilal (the leader of the Mahamid tribe and head of the Revolutionary Awakening Council), who left the area for Port Sudan and then Omdurman, affirming his support for the army in its war with the RSF.
There have been different interpretations, ranging from support to skepticism and outright rejection. Many believe that the army’s success in getting the RSF’s so-called “third man” on their side amounts to a painful blow for the former. He is privy to many of its secrets, and his departure is likely to weaken the ranks, damage morale, and encourage others to follow suit. His defection also reflects real tensions within the RSF following setbacks in Al-Jazira State and Khartoum, and later on the Kordofan fronts, as well as pressure on supply lines and declining morale.
Others, however, view Al-Qubba’s defection with suspicion, arguing that it is a ploy by certain RSF factions seeking to save themselves as they await shifts that could rearrange the political and military landscape. Some have even warned that some of the “surrendering” forces could act as Trojan horses, infiltrating the capital and reigniting the war there.
There is also a broad segment that completely rejects the warm reception given to RSF leaders and fighters after their mass human rights violations and the immense suffering they have caused to Sudanese civilians. After three years of war, there is now a thick psychological wall between the majority of Sudanese and the RSF. This was evident from the indignation around a video showing two individuals in RSF uniform claiming to be in Omdurman. Al-Qubba’s forces quickly denied that the individuals were under their command, claiming that the video had been filmed in Nyala to sow confusion.
While the outrage is understandable, the army leadership may be looking at these defections from a different angle: as a weakening of the adversary and a reduction in the cost of war. Attracting influential RSF figures can accelerate its disintegration and undermine its ability to go on.
What is certain is that the defection has shaken the RSF from within, prompting known figures such as Ali Rizqallah (“Al-Safana”) to publicly criticize its leadership, speaking of what he described as a lack of vision, leadership confusion, poor management, lack of discipline, exploitation of resources, and violations against civilians’ property. For his part, RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”) issued a decision stripping Al-Qubba of his rank and sentencing him to death in absentia. Yet such measures, rather than ending internal discontent, may deepen it amid complaints of chaos, unpaid salaries, lack of services and medical care, and the presence of racism and tribal discrimination. Al-Qubba himself described the RSF, after his defection, as “heading toward the abyss.”
In sum, Al-Nour Al-Qubba’s defection represents a clear moral blow to the RSF, but it will only become a decisive turning point if followed by further defections or if he and his forces play an influential role in battles in Darfur - much as occurred in Al-Jazira after Keikel’s defection. Until then, its greatest significance lies in the field intelligence he can provide to the army and in his connections with other commanders.
