Syrian Hospitals Turned Into Torture Chambers, with Tishreen Military Hospital as a Model

Reception sign at the entrance to Mezzeh Military Hospital 601 in Damascus, where torture and killings took place and where Caesar photos were taken (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Reception sign at the entrance to Mezzeh Military Hospital 601 in Damascus, where torture and killings took place and where Caesar photos were taken (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Syrian Hospitals Turned Into Torture Chambers, with Tishreen Military Hospital as a Model

Reception sign at the entrance to Mezzeh Military Hospital 601 in Damascus, where torture and killings took place and where Caesar photos were taken (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Reception sign at the entrance to Mezzeh Military Hospital 601 in Damascus, where torture and killings took place and where Caesar photos were taken (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Asharq Al-Awsat collected harrowing testimonies from survivors of “deliberate liquidation” operations carried out against detained opponents at Tishreen Military Hospital in Damascus and other military hospitals during the years of the Syrian revolution.

They described torture methods and killing techniques, most notably “breaking the neck.”

Syrian security authorities have detained dozens of people for questioning over those crimes, while most of those responsible and those who carried them out remain at large.

The Syrian Network for Human Rights said the data it had collected indicated the existence of organized networks of doctors, nurses, and security personnel involved in the crimes, including organ removal and direct killings.

This comes amid continuing shock among most Syrians since the beginning of this month, after videos and leaked images documenting the torture of detainees inside several sites, including Tishreen Hospital, were published.

The largest medical complex

Tishreen Military Hospital, located in the Barzeh neighborhood northeast of Damascus, opened in 1982 as the largest medical complex in Syria. It included modern buildings and received civilians as well as military personnel.

The hospital became one of the country’s leading specialized centers, with more than 36 specialized medical departments and divisions, modern equipment, especially for kidney dialysis, and a staff of nearly 1,600 doctors, nurses, administrators and guards.

The hospital’s administrative structure consisted of a director general, an officer with the rank of brigadier general, and two deputies, usually with the rank of brigadier general or colonel, one for technical and medical affairs and the other for administrative affairs.

It also included a security officer, whose rank ranged from captain to colonel; heads of divisions and departments, with ranks from lieutenant colonel to brigadier general; specialists and resident doctors, with ranks from first lieutenant to colonel; nursing staff, who were noncommissioned officers; and conscripts and corporals.

The number of military hospitals and clinics under the former regime reached about 30. They were affiliated with the Military Medical Services Directorate and distributed across 14 provinces.

The most prominent included Tishreen, 601 and Harasta hospitals in Damascus and its countryside, as well as hospitals in Aleppo, Homs and Latakia.

Since the leak of old videos and images showing that military hospitals, including Tishreen, had turned into “human slaughterhouses” under the former regime, families have demanded that those who committed the crimes be identified, arrested and held accountable, and that the fate of their loved ones be disclosed.

Asharq Al-Awsat learned that about 40 doctors had been detained for questioning, including three heads of medical departments and divisions.

However, the defense and interior ministries did not respond to Asharq Al-Awsat’s questions about the medical staff involved and the number of those detained.

The liquidation section

Doctor Mahmoud Rahban was a colonel in the former Military Medical Services Directorate. A resident of Damascus, he served in several medical centers and military hospitals, the last of which was Aleppo Hospital.

Rahban told Asharq Al-Awsat that buildings inside military hospitals, including Tishreen, had, over the years of the revolution, turned into mini security branches that were not affiliated with the hospital administration but were overseen by military police personnel.

The small building in Tishreen Hospital, as in Aleppo Hospital, was completely separate from the main building where doctors worked and where ordinary citizens came for treatment.

During the first years of the revolution, Rahban worked with a group of activists to bring medicines and medical supplies into the Barzeh and Qaboun neighborhoods. He was active within the Barzeh Housing Coordination Committee for the Syrian Revolution and the Union of Damascus Coordination Committees.

Rahban was arrested on charges of “financing terrorist acts,” referred to the “terrorism court,” and then sent to the notorious Sednaya prison.

After 75 days in detention, he was released under a decision to “bar prosecution for lack of evidence,” after paying large bribes to investigators and the investigating judge to secure his release.

Rahban said that when detainees became ill, most of them were referred to the “special section” at Tishreen Hospital.

“The treatment was very bad. We were beaten severely and described as terrorists and traitors by doctors and medical staff, whose main concern at the beginning of the revolution was to demonstrate absolute loyalty to the regime,” he said.

Liquidation by breaking necks

Despite the severity of torture in those hospitals, especially Tishreen, some people managed to survive, including Brigadier General Mohammed Mansour Ammar, who was serving at al-Seen Military Airport in the Damascus countryside when the revolution began in 2011.

He was detained in Sednaya between 2014 and 2022 on charges of “providing terrorists with information.”

Ammar told Asharq Al-Awsat that he was transferred to Tishreen Hospital six times during those years. “Each time, the number of those transferred was about 20 detainees, but no more than three of us would return,” he said.

Ammar described how the killings took place.

“All the members of the military police detachment were thugs. Every day, they would choose 10 detainees and order them to lie on their backs. Then one of the members would come and step forcefully on the detainee’s neck, killing him within minutes, while those still alive were forced to collect the bodies at the door of the detachment,” he said.

He pointed to the forensic doctor’s indifference. “He would not enter the detachment or examine the patients. He would simply ask the assistant from the doorway, with disgust, about the number of bodies so he could record them,” Ammar said. He added that during four visits to Tishreen Hospital, he witnessed “the liquidation of about 45 detainees by breaking their necks.”

Among the survivors was also Ibrahim Ali al-Hamdan, who held the rank of conscripted first lieutenant in the former regime’s army in Daraa. He defected in mid-2012 and was arrested in Damascus in August 2012.

Hamdan spoke bitterly to Asharq Al-Awsat about the severe torture he endured for a month and a half at Harasta Hospital.

“My body was exhausted from torture for three weeks. An assistant named Abu al-Layth told me, ‘There is a recommendation from the head of the branch to slaughter you because you are an informant for the Free Syrian Army.’”

He added: “A medical committee came to the section. When the doctor examined me, he found that my feet were infected because of the severe beatings. He cut open the swelling with a scalpel, without any anesthesia or disinfectant, and began pressing on it.”

According to Hamdan, Abu al-Layth once brought in a detainee, accompanied by a doctor and two members of the security forces. They tortured him severely for hours. After resting briefly, they resumed torturing him until midnight, and he died at dawn.

In July 2013, Hamdan was transferred to Sednaya prison. During his detention, he was referred 47 times to Tishreen Hospital, where on one occasion he stayed for about four months while suffering from several illnesses.

“They gave me an IV drip, and I developed a severe fever. I felt I was dying, and I vomited blood, while the doctors were saying that I might die,” Hamdan said.

Because of his condition, a doctor requested that Hamdan be transferred to the intensive care unit. But the director of the medical section replied: “He will remain in the holding cell until he dies. Intensive care is for war wounded, not traitors.”

Hamdan, who was released from Sednaya in late 2020 after serving his sentence, said “the hospital was a place to finish off detainees, not treat them. During four months, I recited the shahada for 40 people before they died.”

Diab Serrih, executive director of the Association of Detainees and the Missing in Sednaya Prison, said: “It is not possible, given the current data and circumstances, to verify any figures for the number of victims at Tishreen Military Hospital. But we estimate that about 39,000 detainees entered Sednaya prison between 2011 and 2021, of whom about 6,000 remained alive.”

Serrih said in a report published in 2023 that a significant number of those who lost their lives were transferred alive to Tishreen Military Hospital, then died there. He added: “We were able to document only 80 cases of people who returned alive from the hospital to Sednaya prison, out of 1,160 documented cases inside the prison.”

The fate of the perpetrators

In this context, Rahban said the old Military Medical Services Directorate had been “completely dissolved, and most of those involved in those crimes are believed to have fled the country.”

He said Major General Dr. Ammar Suleiman, the former director of the Military Medical Services Directorate, who had close ties with Bashar al-Assad, was chiefly responsible for the liquidation operations carried out in those hospitals.

Rahban said Suleiman was believed to have “fled the country, while Brigadier General Dr. Nizar Ismail was arrested two or three months after liberation.” Ismail had held the posts of deputy director of the directorate, head of the supply branch and head of its therapeutic branch.

“Information indicates that the head of the officers’ department in the directorate, Colonel Lubna Ali, fled on the night of liberation from her office to her hometown, then abroad. As for the directorate’s security officer, Brigadier General Mazen Iskandar, there is no information about him,” Rahban said.

According to Rahban, Major General Dr. Mufid Darwish, who served as hospital director until the fall of the regime, knew all the details of what was happening in the hospital, whether in the main building or in the isolated building for sick detainees.

But his treatment was extremely harsh even toward the medical staff working in the main civilian building.

Darwish remained in the country for a short period after liberation, then left for the United Arab Emirates. Some doctors were detained and later released, including the security officer at Tishreen Hospital, Brigadier General Dr. Hani Salloum.

As for the heads of medical departments and divisions in the main building, Rahban said they “had no connection to what was happening in the isolated building.”

He said most of them had regularized their status and were granted settlement documents after it was confirmed that they were not involved in bloodshed and that no personal claims had been filed against them.

Travel ban notices were placed on their names at land, air, and sea crossings. Anyone wishing to travel must submit a request to the Ministry of Defense and may be allowed to do so once for a period of three months after a security review.

Distribution of roles and tasks

The role of the forensic medicine division in the hospital was to document the deaths of detainees and issue death certificates.

But its head would state in the death certificate that the death resulted from “cardiac and respiratory arrest” or “cardiovascular collapse,” even though detainees had in fact died under torture.

From 2011 until liberation in December 2024, Brigadier General Dr. Akram Fares al-Shaar, from the Hama countryside, headed the forensic medicine division at Tishreen Hospital.

The division also included his deputy, Brigadier General Ismail Kiwan from the city of Sweida; Lieutenant Colonel Ayman Khalo; Lieutenant Munqith Shammut; and seven noncommissioned officers who served as nurses and administrators.

Rahban said Shaar had been detained, and noted that Ayman Khalo had been detained for some time over a criminal case unrelated to Tishreen Hospital. Ismail Kiwan fled to areas controlled by Druze cleric Hikmat al-Hijri in Sweida province in southern Syria.

With the dissolution of the old Military Medical Services Directorate, Asharq Al-Awsat’s information indicates that the number of former medical staff members who returned, including doctors and nurses, “can be counted on one hand.”

A number of doctors who were not involved in crimes are practicing in private clinics, while others have left for Western, regional, and Arab countries.

An accelerated process is currently underway to evacuate and hand over the ready housing units affiliated with Tishreen Hospital. The move implements a decision issued by the Ministry of Defense at the beginning of this May, which set a one-month deadline from the date of issuance.

An organized network of killing and torture

The Syrian Network for Human Rights does not yet have a fully documented figure for the number of doctors and medical personnel involved in liquidation operations specifically inside Tishreen Hospital.

What can be confirmed, according to the network’s documentation methodology, is that the hospital included an organized network of doctors, nurses, and security officers who cooperated in killings and torture, and that the violations were not committed by isolated individuals.

Its director, Fadel Abdul Ghany, told Asharq Al-Awsat that “the data collected by the network indicate the existence of networks of doctors, nurses, and security personnel involved in these crimes, including organ removal in addition to direct killings.”

The available data point to three categories. The first includes detainees whom the new security authorities managed to arrest. The second includes those who fled Syria. The third includes those who remained inside the country with unresolved legal status.

Abdul Ghany said some medical staff members were still in the hospital housing units or in different parts of Syria, as revealed by the recent security operation conducted in the nurses’ housing units affiliated with the hospital.

Abdul Ghany said the escape of some of those individuals posed a serious challenge to accountability efforts, requiring immediate international coordination to issue Interpol notices and international arrest warrants against suspects.

Abdul Ghany noted that some suspects had been arrested, but said their number remained limited compared with the scale of documented crimes.

Among the most prominent cases documented by official Syrian sources was the Interior Ministry’s announcement in late 2025 that five former members of the medical, judicial, military, and security cadres had been arrested in the nurses’ housing units in early May 2026, while a number of former workers were detained.

A German court issued its ruling on June 16, 2025, sentencing Syrian doctor Alaa Mousa to life in prison on charges of committing crimes against humanity, including torturing detainees in military hospitals in Syria.



Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood at a Crossroads

Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)
Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)
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Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood at a Crossroads

Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)
Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)

Sudan is passing through an exceptionally complex phase as the war enters its fourth year and military and political alliances continue to shift at a rapid pace. With factions that have defected from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) joining the Sudanese Armed Forces, alongside the Joint Forces of Darfur’s armed movements, the Sudan Shield Forces, and formations linked to the Islamist movement, a new balance of power is gradually emerging within the anti-RSF camp.

This evolving landscape reflects a temporary convergence of interests among actors that differ sharply in their backgrounds, objectives, and visions for Sudan’s future. While confronting the RSF remains the primary factor uniting these forces, underlying political and military differences raise serious questions about the durability of their alliance.

Sudan’s history suggests that wartime coalitions do not necessarily evolve into stable partnerships in peacetime. Instead, they often become arenas for new struggles over influence, power, and postwar arrangements. Understanding the emerging balance of forces is therefore crucial to assessing whether cooperation or confrontation will define the next phase.

In recent months, the Sudanese army has become the principal military umbrella under which a range of disparate groups operate.

The Joint Forces drawn from Darfur’s armed movements bring battlefield experience and significant combat capability. The Sudan Shield Forces have emerged as a growing tribal and military force, while former RSF members are seeking to secure a place within the new order.

Necessary alliance

This configuration has created what amounts to an “alliance of necessity.” Its members are united by a common objective — defeating the RSF — but not by a shared political project. Each faction has its own calculations regarding future power-sharing arrangements and influence.

Within this context, a central question concerns the place of Sudan’s Islamist movement in the postwar landscape.

For decades, Islamists constituted one of the most influential forces within the Sudanese state through their political, organizational, and security networks. Today, however, they no longer monopolize the instruments of power.

Many of the groups that have risen during the conflict do not subscribe to the Islamist project. Some also carry a long history of political rivalry with Islamists dating back to the era of the National Salvation regime led by ousted former President Omar al-Bashir.

This has produced a striking paradox: the broader the coalition supporting the army becomes, the smaller the Islamists’ relative weight within it. They are no longer the sole source of political backing, military support, or social mobilization. Instead, they have become one actor among several competing centers of influence, each pursuing its own interests.

Sudanese army soldiers parade in the streets of eastern Sudan's city of Gedaref on August 14, 2025 to mark the 71st anniversary of the formation of the Sudanese army. (AFP)

Mounting pressure

Signs are growing that the Islamist movement is facing increasing political pressure, both domestically and internationally.

Retired Maj. Gen. Abdel-Hadi Abdel-Basit, a strategic analyst close to Islamist circles, said the movement is confronting unprecedented challenges.

Calls have intensified for Islamists to be excluded from post-war arrangements and even held accountable for their role during decades of rule and the allegations associated with that period.

In recent months, several prominent Islamist figures were detained and later released, while National Congress Party leader Al-Numan Abdel Halim remains in custody.

These developments coincided with what many Islamists believe were externally driven pressures, including the US State Department’s designation of Sudan’s Islamist movement, the National Congress Party, and the Al-Baraa ibn Malik Battalion as terrorist organizations.

Regional and international actors have likewise called for Islamists to be excluded from any future political process.

Such positions have surfaced in consultations involving both the Quad mechanism — comprising Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and United States — and the Quintet mechanism, which includes the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, the Arab League, and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Civilian political forces, however, view the decline of Islamist influence primarily as a consequence of Sudan’s democratic transition rather than the war itself.

Bakri Eljack, spokesman for the democratic civilian coalition Somoud (Resilience), argued that army commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan may be able to distance himself from the Islamists, but their influence within state institutions remains significant.

Any effort to remove them would require a broad political alliance capable of managing the next phase, he explained.

Sharif Mohamed Osman, of the Sudanese Congress Party, said the Islamist project and National Congress Party rule were rejected by the people will during the December 2018 revolution.

He noted that efforts associated with prolonging the conflict have further weakened the movement, while international pressure and sanctions have deepened its political isolation.

Yet, predictions of the Islamists’ complete demise may be premature. The movement still possesses extensive organizational networks, decades of political experience, and influence within parts of the state and society.

Even so, current trends suggest that regaining the dominant position it enjoyed during the Bashir era may be more difficult than ever before.


Can Iran Maintain its Influence in Iraq?

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)
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Can Iran Maintain its Influence in Iraq?

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)

Iraqi politicians are closely watching what they describe as the potential “side effects” of any future US-Iran agreement and how it could reshape the balance of power inside Iraq.

Some observers argue that a deal would likely strengthen Washington’s influence while diminishing Tehran’s leverage. Others contend that Iran could emerge from the process with a renewed and possibly more durable form of dominance in Iraq over the coming months and years.

With significant ambiguity still surrounding the US-Iran memorandum of understanding - particularly regarding Tehran’s regional proxies and allied armed groups - signals from both capitals have done little to clarify Iraq’s future position within the competing spheres of influence of the two longtime adversaries.

The US Position

Despite repeated American warnings to Baghdad against bringing factions designated on the US terrorism list into government, Washington’s broader position remains unclear.

Asked by Alhurra, the US-funded Arabic-language broadcaster, whether a US-Iran agreement would affect Iraq and whether it might weaken or strengthen armed factions, Joshua Harris, the chargé d’affaires at the US Embassy in Baghdad, declined to speculate on the outcome.
Instead, he said the priority should be an Iraqi government that places the interests of its citizens first, noting that the United States approaches foreign policy by prioritizing its own national interests.

Harris added that the foundation of a mutually beneficial partnership between Washington and Baghdad depends on the Iraqi state confronting the challenge posed by militias and ensuring that weapons remain exclusively under state control. He described this as the essential benchmark that Iraq must meet in order to deepen its partnership with the United States.

A handout photo made available by the Iraqi Prime Minister's Media Office on 17 June 2026 shows Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi (L) meeting with US Special Presidential Envoy for Syria and Iraq Tom Barrack (R) in Baghdad, Iraq, 15 June 2026. EPA/IRAQI PRIME MINISTER'S MEDIA OFFICE

Iran Regains Momentum

At the same time, the Iranian role appears to be returning to the level seen before the war that erupted at the end of February.

Media outlets close to Tehran report that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi plans to visit Baghdad soon to discuss the talks held in Switzerland and preparations for the funeral procession of Iran’s former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Earlier, Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani announced that Khamenei’s body would be transferred in early July as part of the funeral arrangements preceding burial ceremonies.

Even amid uncertainty surrounding those plans, some observers argue that the announcement itself underscores the extent of Iran’s influence in Iraq.

The Militias Question

Although Iran-aligned factions created security challenges through their involvement in the war on Tehran’s side, Iran’s ambassador to Iraq, Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq, recently insisted that Iran “has not asked any party to intervene because it did not need such intervention.”

The remark suggested that Iraqi armed factions volunteered to support Iran rather than acting at Tehran’s request.

On the issue of restricting weapons to state control - a matter on which Washington has adopted a notably firm position - the Iranian ambassador said it was an internal Iraqi matter and that Tehran would respect any decision taken by the Iraqi government.

At the same time, he stressed the need to understand why armed factions wish to retain their weapons and to address what he described as their concerns and fears.

The source argued that Iran has demonstrated over the past two decades that it knows precisely what it wants from Iraq, unlike what he characterized as inconsistent American policy. He predicted that this situation would continue even after any US-Iran agreement is signed.

According to the source, who requested anonymity, Iran is likely to adopt a less visible approach after an agreement, one that avoids provoking Washington while preserving its traditional influence through allied political parties and figures.

Mourners attend the funeral of members of the Iraqi armed group Kataib Hezbollah who were killed in an airstrike that targeted a PMF headquarters near the western al‑Qaim district on the Syrian border, amid the US-Israel conflict with Iran, in Baghdad, Iraq, March 2, 2026. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Suda

The Oil Card

Opponents of Iranian influence take a different view. They believe the administration of President Donald Trump is both willing and able to curb Tehran’s reach through mounting pressure on Iran and sustained influence over decision-making in Baghdad.

These groups argue that the threat of economic sanctions alone could prompt Iraqi leaders - particularly Shiite political parties - to reconsider the risks associated with continued Iranian influence.

A key factor is Iraq’s dependence on the US-controlled financial system. Revenues from Iraqi oil sales are deposited with the US Federal Reserve before being transferred back to Iraqi banks, giving Washington a powerful source of leverage over Baghdad.


Undoing the ‘Tangled Nest’ of Iran Sanctions Won’t Be Easy or Quick

A veiled Iranian woman walks past an anti-US mural, depicting an Iranian and US negotiation table, next to the former US embassy in Tehran, Iran, 22 June 2026. (EPA)
A veiled Iranian woman walks past an anti-US mural, depicting an Iranian and US negotiation table, next to the former US embassy in Tehran, Iran, 22 June 2026. (EPA)
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Undoing the ‘Tangled Nest’ of Iran Sanctions Won’t Be Easy or Quick

A veiled Iranian woman walks past an anti-US mural, depicting an Iranian and US negotiation table, next to the former US embassy in Tehran, Iran, 22 June 2026. (EPA)
A veiled Iranian woman walks past an anti-US mural, depicting an Iranian and US negotiation table, next to the former US embassy in Tehran, Iran, 22 June 2026. (EPA)

Tehran stands to gain billions of dollars from a 60-day reprieve from US sanctions announced on Monday, but unwinding more than four decades of restrictions poses legal, political and commercial challenges that could take years.

At issue is whether an interim US deal with Iran can translate into lasting economic relief, given the complexity of dismantling a sanctions regime that spans US law, international measures and private-sector risk concerns.

The United Nations, the US and the European Union have imposed sanctions and trade embargoes and have frozen assets since the late 1970s over Iran's nuclear program, human rights violations and support for armed groups around the region.

Under a 14-point memorandum of understanding signed by the US and Iran last week, Washington is to start abolishing all types of sanctions using a schedule to be forged in a final deal within 60 days, a period that can be extended.

On Monday, the US Treasury issued a temporary general license allowing the production, delivery and sale of crude oil and petrochemical and petroleum products of Iranian origin through August 21.

Removing the remaining sanctions - if it happens - would represent a stark change in US policy toward the Middle East, which has long focused on curbing ‌Iran's influence and ‌using financial pressure to weaken its theocratic government.

It would also be difficult, requiring executive action for some measures, approval ‌by ⁠Congress for others ⁠and close coordination with the UN and other countries that have imposed their own sanctions. Companies, wary after decades of restrictions, could also blunt the impact.

"You have this tangled nest of sanctions, and it's not just executive orders, it's congressional sanctions," said Juan Zarate, deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism under former President George W. Bush.

CONGRESS IS SKEPTICAL

Washington first sanctioned Iran in 1979, after revolutionary students seized the US embassy in Tehran, holding diplomats hostage.

Since then, Congress has passed half a dozen sanctions laws and presidents have issued executive orders over Iran's nuclear program and its support for groups the US deems terrorist organizations including Hamas, Hezbollah and Yemen's Houthis.

Since early 2025, the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has imposed sanctions on more than 1,000 people, vessels and aircraft, according to Treasury data.

Delisting thousands of entities designated for ⁠sanctions would take OFAC at least a year, said Jeremy Paner, a partner at law firm Hughes Hubbard & Reed ‌and a former US sanctions official.

President Donald Trump can rescind executive orders issued on Iran, but some ‌measures - including sanctions on Hamas and Hezbollah - are mandated by law and will have to be removed or amended by Congress, where the interim deal has already sparked sharp ‌public criticism from his fellow Republican lawmakers.

Undoing 40 years of sanctions would be difficult, added Matt Zweig, managing director of policy at FDD ‌Action, the lobbying arm of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

"Any attempt to comprehensively remove layer upon layer of sanctions will be like peeling back an onion - exposing the administration - not just to legal complexities but political risks," said Zweig, a former aide on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

The license issued on Monday could be worth up to $3 billion for Iran over two months, by some estimates.

That could swell to "at least tens of billions of dollars" if made permanent, erasing a discount on Iranian oil, allowing Tehran to ‌sell to additional buyers beyond China, and increasing exports, said Edward Fishman, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. China now buys about 90% of Iranian oil, despite the sanctions.

The new license is broader than ⁠the one issued in March, calling for ⁠inclusion of not just oil and petroleum products, but also banking, insurance and transportation related to the oil trade, giving Tehran quicker access to its revenues.

"There are a number of thorny issues involved," said Stephanie Connor, a former OFAC official now a partner with law firm Holland & Knight, adding that lifting sanctions could mean funds flowing to groups the US considers a threat.

"Are we really going to let money start flowing to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps?" she asked, referring to the powerful paramilitary force that the US has designated a foreign terrorist organization.

WARY COMPANIES

Banks, oil firms and insurers will face evolving regulations, tougher due diligence and exposure to sanctions-evasion risks tied to Iran links with countries such as China, North Korea and Russia. They also remain subject to separate sanctions from Britain, the UN, the EU and others.

"We've kind of beaten the markets up with the risk of doing business with or through Iran, so you can't just flip a switch and say, 'Oh, now it's okay to do business with Iran,'" Zarate said.

Companies that deal with Iran would still face lawsuits from victims of attacks, who can sue investors and companies for aiding designated groups under the 2016 Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, which aides say is unlikely to be repealed.

Given such risks, companies may steer clear of working with Iran to escape legal and reputational risk as long as the Iranian government remains in power, said Brett Erickson, principal with Obsidian Risk Advisors.

"We're not going to see massive multi-billion-dollar commitments until things are far more cemented and politically stable," he said. "There's just a long way to go."