Syrian Hospitals Turned Into Torture Chambers, with Tishreen Military Hospital as a Model

Reception sign at the entrance to Mezzeh Military Hospital 601 in Damascus, where torture and killings took place and where Caesar photos were taken (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Reception sign at the entrance to Mezzeh Military Hospital 601 in Damascus, where torture and killings took place and where Caesar photos were taken (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Syrian Hospitals Turned Into Torture Chambers, with Tishreen Military Hospital as a Model

Reception sign at the entrance to Mezzeh Military Hospital 601 in Damascus, where torture and killings took place and where Caesar photos were taken (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Reception sign at the entrance to Mezzeh Military Hospital 601 in Damascus, where torture and killings took place and where Caesar photos were taken (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Asharq Al-Awsat collected harrowing testimonies from survivors of “deliberate liquidation” operations carried out against detained opponents at Tishreen Military Hospital in Damascus and other military hospitals during the years of the Syrian revolution.

They described torture methods and killing techniques, most notably “breaking the neck.”

Syrian security authorities have detained dozens of people for questioning over those crimes, while most of those responsible and those who carried them out remain at large.

The Syrian Network for Human Rights said the data it had collected indicated the existence of organized networks of doctors, nurses, and security personnel involved in the crimes, including organ removal and direct killings.

This comes amid continuing shock among most Syrians since the beginning of this month, after videos and leaked images documenting the torture of detainees inside several sites, including Tishreen Hospital, were published.

The largest medical complex

Tishreen Military Hospital, located in the Barzeh neighborhood northeast of Damascus, opened in 1982 as the largest medical complex in Syria. It included modern buildings and received civilians as well as military personnel.

The hospital became one of the country’s leading specialized centers, with more than 36 specialized medical departments and divisions, modern equipment, especially for kidney dialysis, and a staff of nearly 1,600 doctors, nurses, administrators and guards.

The hospital’s administrative structure consisted of a director general, an officer with the rank of brigadier general, and two deputies, usually with the rank of brigadier general or colonel, one for technical and medical affairs and the other for administrative affairs.

It also included a security officer, whose rank ranged from captain to colonel; heads of divisions and departments, with ranks from lieutenant colonel to brigadier general; specialists and resident doctors, with ranks from first lieutenant to colonel; nursing staff, who were noncommissioned officers; and conscripts and corporals.

The number of military hospitals and clinics under the former regime reached about 30. They were affiliated with the Military Medical Services Directorate and distributed across 14 provinces.

The most prominent included Tishreen, 601 and Harasta hospitals in Damascus and its countryside, as well as hospitals in Aleppo, Homs and Latakia.

Since the leak of old videos and images showing that military hospitals, including Tishreen, had turned into “human slaughterhouses” under the former regime, families have demanded that those who committed the crimes be identified, arrested and held accountable, and that the fate of their loved ones be disclosed.

Asharq Al-Awsat learned that about 40 doctors had been detained for questioning, including three heads of medical departments and divisions.

However, the defense and interior ministries did not respond to Asharq Al-Awsat’s questions about the medical staff involved and the number of those detained.

The liquidation section

Doctor Mahmoud Rahban was a colonel in the former Military Medical Services Directorate. A resident of Damascus, he served in several medical centers and military hospitals, the last of which was Aleppo Hospital.

Rahban told Asharq Al-Awsat that buildings inside military hospitals, including Tishreen, had, over the years of the revolution, turned into mini security branches that were not affiliated with the hospital administration but were overseen by military police personnel.

The small building in Tishreen Hospital, as in Aleppo Hospital, was completely separate from the main building where doctors worked and where ordinary citizens came for treatment.

During the first years of the revolution, Rahban worked with a group of activists to bring medicines and medical supplies into the Barzeh and Qaboun neighborhoods. He was active within the Barzeh Housing Coordination Committee for the Syrian Revolution and the Union of Damascus Coordination Committees.

Rahban was arrested on charges of “financing terrorist acts,” referred to the “terrorism court,” and then sent to the notorious Sednaya prison.

After 75 days in detention, he was released under a decision to “bar prosecution for lack of evidence,” after paying large bribes to investigators and the investigating judge to secure his release.

Rahban said that when detainees became ill, most of them were referred to the “special section” at Tishreen Hospital.

“The treatment was very bad. We were beaten severely and described as terrorists and traitors by doctors and medical staff, whose main concern at the beginning of the revolution was to demonstrate absolute loyalty to the regime,” he said.

Liquidation by breaking necks

Despite the severity of torture in those hospitals, especially Tishreen, some people managed to survive, including Brigadier General Mohammed Mansour Ammar, who was serving at al-Seen Military Airport in the Damascus countryside when the revolution began in 2011.

He was detained in Sednaya between 2014 and 2022 on charges of “providing terrorists with information.”

Ammar told Asharq Al-Awsat that he was transferred to Tishreen Hospital six times during those years. “Each time, the number of those transferred was about 20 detainees, but no more than three of us would return,” he said.

Ammar described how the killings took place.

“All the members of the military police detachment were thugs. Every day, they would choose 10 detainees and order them to lie on their backs. Then one of the members would come and step forcefully on the detainee’s neck, killing him within minutes, while those still alive were forced to collect the bodies at the door of the detachment,” he said.

He pointed to the forensic doctor’s indifference. “He would not enter the detachment or examine the patients. He would simply ask the assistant from the doorway, with disgust, about the number of bodies so he could record them,” Ammar said. He added that during four visits to Tishreen Hospital, he witnessed “the liquidation of about 45 detainees by breaking their necks.”

Among the survivors was also Ibrahim Ali al-Hamdan, who held the rank of conscripted first lieutenant in the former regime’s army in Daraa. He defected in mid-2012 and was arrested in Damascus in August 2012.

Hamdan spoke bitterly to Asharq Al-Awsat about the severe torture he endured for a month and a half at Harasta Hospital.

“My body was exhausted from torture for three weeks. An assistant named Abu al-Layth told me, ‘There is a recommendation from the head of the branch to slaughter you because you are an informant for the Free Syrian Army.’”

He added: “A medical committee came to the section. When the doctor examined me, he found that my feet were infected because of the severe beatings. He cut open the swelling with a scalpel, without any anesthesia or disinfectant, and began pressing on it.”

According to Hamdan, Abu al-Layth once brought in a detainee, accompanied by a doctor and two members of the security forces. They tortured him severely for hours. After resting briefly, they resumed torturing him until midnight, and he died at dawn.

In July 2013, Hamdan was transferred to Sednaya prison. During his detention, he was referred 47 times to Tishreen Hospital, where on one occasion he stayed for about four months while suffering from several illnesses.

“They gave me an IV drip, and I developed a severe fever. I felt I was dying, and I vomited blood, while the doctors were saying that I might die,” Hamdan said.

Because of his condition, a doctor requested that Hamdan be transferred to the intensive care unit. But the director of the medical section replied: “He will remain in the holding cell until he dies. Intensive care is for war wounded, not traitors.”

Hamdan, who was released from Sednaya in late 2020 after serving his sentence, said “the hospital was a place to finish off detainees, not treat them. During four months, I recited the shahada for 40 people before they died.”

Diab Serrih, executive director of the Association of Detainees and the Missing in Sednaya Prison, said: “It is not possible, given the current data and circumstances, to verify any figures for the number of victims at Tishreen Military Hospital. But we estimate that about 39,000 detainees entered Sednaya prison between 2011 and 2021, of whom about 6,000 remained alive.”

Serrih said in a report published in 2023 that a significant number of those who lost their lives were transferred alive to Tishreen Military Hospital, then died there. He added: “We were able to document only 80 cases of people who returned alive from the hospital to Sednaya prison, out of 1,160 documented cases inside the prison.”

The fate of the perpetrators

In this context, Rahban said the old Military Medical Services Directorate had been “completely dissolved, and most of those involved in those crimes are believed to have fled the country.”

He said Major General Dr. Ammar Suleiman, the former director of the Military Medical Services Directorate, who had close ties with Bashar al-Assad, was chiefly responsible for the liquidation operations carried out in those hospitals.

Rahban said Suleiman was believed to have “fled the country, while Brigadier General Dr. Nizar Ismail was arrested two or three months after liberation.” Ismail had held the posts of deputy director of the directorate, head of the supply branch and head of its therapeutic branch.

“Information indicates that the head of the officers’ department in the directorate, Colonel Lubna Ali, fled on the night of liberation from her office to her hometown, then abroad. As for the directorate’s security officer, Brigadier General Mazen Iskandar, there is no information about him,” Rahban said.

According to Rahban, Major General Dr. Mufid Darwish, who served as hospital director until the fall of the regime, knew all the details of what was happening in the hospital, whether in the main building or in the isolated building for sick detainees.

But his treatment was extremely harsh even toward the medical staff working in the main civilian building.

Darwish remained in the country for a short period after liberation, then left for the United Arab Emirates. Some doctors were detained and later released, including the security officer at Tishreen Hospital, Brigadier General Dr. Hani Salloum.

As for the heads of medical departments and divisions in the main building, Rahban said they “had no connection to what was happening in the isolated building.”

He said most of them had regularized their status and were granted settlement documents after it was confirmed that they were not involved in bloodshed and that no personal claims had been filed against them.

Travel ban notices were placed on their names at land, air, and sea crossings. Anyone wishing to travel must submit a request to the Ministry of Defense and may be allowed to do so once for a period of three months after a security review.

Distribution of roles and tasks

The role of the forensic medicine division in the hospital was to document the deaths of detainees and issue death certificates.

But its head would state in the death certificate that the death resulted from “cardiac and respiratory arrest” or “cardiovascular collapse,” even though detainees had in fact died under torture.

From 2011 until liberation in December 2024, Brigadier General Dr. Akram Fares al-Shaar, from the Hama countryside, headed the forensic medicine division at Tishreen Hospital.

The division also included his deputy, Brigadier General Ismail Kiwan from the city of Sweida; Lieutenant Colonel Ayman Khalo; Lieutenant Munqith Shammut; and seven noncommissioned officers who served as nurses and administrators.

Rahban said Shaar had been detained, and noted that Ayman Khalo had been detained for some time over a criminal case unrelated to Tishreen Hospital. Ismail Kiwan fled to areas controlled by Druze cleric Hikmat al-Hijri in Sweida province in southern Syria.

With the dissolution of the old Military Medical Services Directorate, Asharq Al-Awsat’s information indicates that the number of former medical staff members who returned, including doctors and nurses, “can be counted on one hand.”

A number of doctors who were not involved in crimes are practicing in private clinics, while others have left for Western, regional, and Arab countries.

An accelerated process is currently underway to evacuate and hand over the ready housing units affiliated with Tishreen Hospital. The move implements a decision issued by the Ministry of Defense at the beginning of this May, which set a one-month deadline from the date of issuance.

An organized network of killing and torture

The Syrian Network for Human Rights does not yet have a fully documented figure for the number of doctors and medical personnel involved in liquidation operations specifically inside Tishreen Hospital.

What can be confirmed, according to the network’s documentation methodology, is that the hospital included an organized network of doctors, nurses, and security officers who cooperated in killings and torture, and that the violations were not committed by isolated individuals.

Its director, Fadel Abdul Ghany, told Asharq Al-Awsat that “the data collected by the network indicate the existence of networks of doctors, nurses, and security personnel involved in these crimes, including organ removal in addition to direct killings.”

The available data point to three categories. The first includes detainees whom the new security authorities managed to arrest. The second includes those who fled Syria. The third includes those who remained inside the country with unresolved legal status.

Abdul Ghany said some medical staff members were still in the hospital housing units or in different parts of Syria, as revealed by the recent security operation conducted in the nurses’ housing units affiliated with the hospital.

Abdul Ghany said the escape of some of those individuals posed a serious challenge to accountability efforts, requiring immediate international coordination to issue Interpol notices and international arrest warrants against suspects.

Abdul Ghany noted that some suspects had been arrested, but said their number remained limited compared with the scale of documented crimes.

Among the most prominent cases documented by official Syrian sources was the Interior Ministry’s announcement in late 2025 that five former members of the medical, judicial, military, and security cadres had been arrested in the nurses’ housing units in early May 2026, while a number of former workers were detained.

A German court issued its ruling on June 16, 2025, sentencing Syrian doctor Alaa Mousa to life in prison on charges of committing crimes against humanity, including torturing detainees in military hospitals in Syria.



Olive Trees in S. Lebanon Under Israeli Fire: Deprivation of Harvest Seasons Erodes Village Memory

Lebanese farmers pick olives in the southern Lebanese village of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah, near the neighboring village of Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, where Israeli forces are stationed, in southern Lebanon, 10 October 2026. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH
Lebanese farmers pick olives in the southern Lebanese village of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah, near the neighboring village of Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, where Israeli forces are stationed, in southern Lebanon, 10 October 2026. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH
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Olive Trees in S. Lebanon Under Israeli Fire: Deprivation of Harvest Seasons Erodes Village Memory

Lebanese farmers pick olives in the southern Lebanese village of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah, near the neighboring village of Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, where Israeli forces are stationed, in southern Lebanon, 10 October 2026. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH
Lebanese farmers pick olives in the southern Lebanese village of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah, near the neighboring village of Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, where Israeli forces are stationed, in southern Lebanon, 10 October 2026. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH

The killing of a retired Lebanese Army chief warrant officer by Israeli tank fire in Yater has underscored the perilous reality for southern farmers. Targeted while inspecting his home and olive grove, his death has turned this year's harvest season into a stark symbol of the dangers facing those attempting to reach their land.

The incident comes as residents of border villages continue to be deprived of their harvests for nearly three years. It also coincides with a lawsuit filed in France accusing the Israeli military of uprooting around 600 ancient olive trees in Zawtar al-Sharqiyah. Local officials warn of economic and social repercussions that extend far beyond the loss of crops.

Volunteers from Lebanon's northernmost province of Akkar and the city of Sidon take part in an olive-picking initiative in the southern Lebanese village of Jibshit near Nabatieh on October 11, 2026, in a show of solidarity with Southern Lebanon and its farmers. (Photo by MAHMOUD ZAYYAT / AFP)

Targeted While Inspecting His Land

The Lebanese Army announced on Sunday the death of retired Chief Warrant Officer Ali Abdel Hassan Sweidan after being directly targeted by Israeli tank fire while inspecting his property in Yater in the Bint Jbeil district.

The army said a military unit supervised the recovery of his body after contact with him was lost. The municipality of Yater stated that he had been checking on his home and olive grove on the outskirts of the town when he came under fire from the direction of Sarbine, warning residents against approaching unsafe areas.

The incident once again highlights the obstacles facing farmers during a season when families traditionally head to their groves to gather their harvests, as access to parts of agricultural land has become fraught with ongoing security risks.

600 Trees at the Center of a Lawsuit

In Paris, a 37-year-old French businessman of Lebanese origin filed a complaint against unknown persons on September 22, accusing the Israeli military of uprooting roughly 600 olive trees from his family's land in Zawtar al-Sharqiyah.

According to his lawyers, cited by Agence France Presse (AFP), some of the trees are approximately 500 years old, while the family has cultivated the land for about 250 years.

The complaint includes allegations of theft, destruction, and damage to property as potential war crimes. The complainant suspects that the trees were transported to Israel, though this has not been established judicially. He stated that his family home was destroyed in an Israeli strike in April, before the trees were uprooted following Israeli control of the area.

Volunteers from Lebanon's northernmost province of Akkar and the city of Sidon sort olives during an olive-picking initiative in the southern Lebanese village of Jibshit near Nabatieh on October 11, 2026, in a show of solidarity with Southern Lebanon and its farmers. (Photo by MAHMOUD ZAYYAT / AFP)

Half the Fields Out of Reach

Hanna Al-Amil, head of the municipality of Rmeish, told Asharq Al-Awsat that since the beginning of the war nearly three years ago, residents have been deprived of access to a large part of their olive fields “because most of them lie along the border, where security conditions do not permit locals to reach them and harvest their crops.”

“Even today, we do not know whether we will be able to harvest olives this year, especially since the season has not yet started and security risks continue to prevent access to the land."

He explained that roughly three-quarters of Rmeish's territory lies along the border and that more than 50 percent of its olive groves have remained unharvested for the past three years.
This deprives families of a basic source of income, he added.

Al-Amil stressed that agricultural losses are not limited to olives but also affect tobacco cultivation, the town's primary agricultural activity. "This year's tobacco production reached only about 60 percent of pre-war levels, meaning families have lost a significant portion of the income on which they relied."

A Memory Shared by Families and Generations

Mohammad Ismail, head of the municipality of Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the town's olive groves are “more than just trees or a source of income. They are heritage, history, and the memories of generations. They embrace the hills and fields, shade the alleys of Zawtar, and provide cool breezes that ease the summer heat."

He noted that olive trees also provide heating wood for many residents.

According to Ismail, the olive harvest is an annual occasion that brings entire families together. "Not merely to gather the crop, but to renew their connection to the land and to the ancestors who planted and cared for these trees, keeping a shared memory alive across generations."

"Today, the occupier seeks to strip us of our spirit and sever our connection to history, our ancestors, and life itself. It seeks to erase the traces of life from our hearts and minds and wipe away its fragrance from our memory,” he said.

"What is happening is not merely the uprooting of trees. It is the uprooting of hearts from chests and an attempt to erase the people's memory and their bond with the land,” he added.

Olive Trees as Part of Southern Identity

Ibrahim Sweidan, deputy head of the municipality of Yater, told Asharq Al-Awsat that "olive groves have become part of the identity of southern Lebanon. For southerners, the olive tree is not merely a tree but part of who they are and their attachment to the land."

A Lebanese farmer shows harvested olives in the southern Lebanese village of Zawtar al-Gharbiyah, near the neighboring village of Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, where Israeli forces are stationed, in southern Lebanon, 10 October 2026. EPA/WAEL HAMZEH

He said the strongest evidence of that attachment is the return of residents to their villages and homes despite difficult security conditions and their determination to remain on their land.

According to Sweidan, attacks on agricultural land, public facilities, and homes all form part of the same pattern: "A strategy aimed at undermining the foundations that allow people to remain in their villages and weakening everything that connects southerners to their land and identity."


Al-Haddad Predicted an 80-Day Israeli War... Saad Called for It to End

Qassam Brigades fighters infiltrated Israeli territory in an unprecedented attack on Israel, dubbed “Al-Aqsa Flood.” (File photo: Qassam Brigades website)
Qassam Brigades fighters infiltrated Israeli territory in an unprecedented attack on Israel, dubbed “Al-Aqsa Flood.” (File photo: Qassam Brigades website)
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Al-Haddad Predicted an 80-Day Israeli War... Saad Called for It to End

Qassam Brigades fighters infiltrated Israeli territory in an unprecedented attack on Israel, dubbed “Al-Aqsa Flood.” (File photo: Qassam Brigades website)
Qassam Brigades fighters infiltrated Israeli territory in an unprecedented attack on Israel, dubbed “Al-Aqsa Flood.” (File photo: Qassam Brigades website)

Details and behind-the-scenes accounts of the October 7, 2023, attack continue to emerge day by day, although many secrets were buried with those who planned the attack and whom Israel pursued and ultimately killed. They include Yahya Sinwar, the former head of Hamas’s political bureau; his brother Mohammed, one of the most prominent commanders of the Qassam Brigades; the brigades’ commander-in-chief, Mohammed Deif; and other figures.

Last July, Israeli intelligence agencies disclosed the contents of a letter they claimed belonged to Sinwar, reportedly seized from Hamas premises in Gaza. In it, he allegedly anticipated a major Israeli response to the attack, including the possibility of using nuclear weapons to strike Gaza. New Palestinian information is now emerging about the planning behind the attack and expectations of Israel’s response.

Yahya Sinwar in an archive photo taken in Gaza on October 21, 2011. (AP)

Ezzedine Al-Haddad

Two Hamas sources in Gaza told Asharq Al-Awsat that Ezzedine al-Haddad, the commander of the Qassam Brigades who assumed responsibility for the brigades after the assassinations of Mohammed Deif and Yahya Sinwar, had predicted in a message sent on the first day of the war that it would last only 80 days, after which an agreement would be reached to exchange prisoners and secure Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

According to one source, al-Haddad, who was among the planners and overseers of the attack, had assigned defensive tasks to certain field commanders, instructing them not to exceed specific limits during their participation in the assault on the morning of October 7. However, the sudden collapse of the Gaza Division prompted Qassam fighters to expand their incursion and reach areas that the brigade leadership had not expected them to reach inside the Israeli communities surrounding Gaza. The leadership had overseen the operation from several command centers.

The source said some units had been tasked with advancing deep into Israeli territory and disrupting Israeli forces, while others had been assigned limited objectives before withdrawing to take up defensive positions later. However, the plan did not unfold as intended in several respects because of the collapse of Israeli defenses.

Another source noted that the deaths of numerous field commanders during clashes or in the intense Israeli bombardment in the attack’s opening hours undermined the defensive plan prepared for parts of Gaza Governorate, where al-Haddad was then responsible for a brigade.

The source said al-Haddad was one of the figures who had the greatest influence on the execution of the October 7 attack. He had overseen efforts to increase production of the Yasin 105 launcher for defensive as well as offensive operations. He also authorized field commanders to launch the operation just hours before it began. They had not been briefed on the plan or informed about the attack in advance. During the operation, he had urged them to capture as many Israelis as possible to secure the release of Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails.

A Hamas banner bearing the slogan “We Are the Flood... We Are the Day After” during the handover of a group of Israeli hostages. (File photo: AFP)

​​​​​​​The Defensive Plan

The source explained that al-Haddad was responsible for defending Gaza City and the northern Gaza Strip. He led the defensive plan alongside field commanders and did not leave the northern part of the territory after Israel separated it from central and southern Gaza. He continued moving among his fighters at the most advanced positions where clashes with Israeli forces were taking place, while also focusing on protecting Israeli hostages.

Assessments within the Hamas and Qassam Brigades leadership that the war could last several months reflected a more optimistic expectation of Israel’s response, given that the group held hostages. However, observers believe these assessments failed to account for the scale of the events, particularly after Israel felt that its security and national pride had been wounded and that it had been humiliated. This prompted Israel to seek revenge by every means available and to continue the war to this day.

A third source said the collapse of the defensive plan forced al-Haddad to find replacements quickly among the leadership. However, the limited experience of some of them led the Qassam commander to adopt a strategy of launching surprise attacks while allowing Israeli forces to advance deep into areas where fighters had set up ambushes. The aim was to inflict unexpected casualties on the Israeli military and focus on capturing soldiers to undermine their morale.

One aspect al-Haddad appears to have failed to anticipate in his defensive plan for northern Gaza was Israel’s ability to reach certain military positions and weapons, missile, and drone storage facilities quickly.

At the same time, the sources believe that al-Haddad and prominent field commanders succeeded in thwarting what became known as the “Generals’ Plan.” The plan aimed to carry out a very large-scale military operation in northern Gaza after separating it from the center and south of the Strip. It involved coordinated attacks by air, land, and sea; taking control of hospitals, shelters, and other facilities; killing, wounding, and arresting hundreds of people and transferring them into Israel; and displacing residents to the southern part of the Strip.

However, after more than 107 days, the plan had failed, and Israel withdrew from those areas amid fierce surprise attacks that killed dozens of Israeli troops.

Raed Saad

Another revelation from behind the scenes of the war concerns divisions within Hamas and the Qassam Brigades leadership over ceasefire proposals. According to one source, prominent Qassam Brigades commander and military council member Raed Saad called in the early months of the war for efforts to end the fighting at any cost.

According to several sources, Saad was among the leaders taken by surprise by the October 7 attack and did not know when it would be carried out, despite being one of the commanders who had helped develop the plan. Israel calls the plan “Jericho Wall,” based on intelligence it had obtained years earlier. Saad was then responsible for operations and had drawn up the plan in 2016. Its implementation was postponed several times over the following years.

According to the first source, Saad sent a written message to the military council leadership during the first four months of the war, urging it to reach an agreement and accept a ceasefire. He stressed that continuing the war did not serve Hamas or the Qassam Brigades, particularly given the high number of fatalities and the possibility that the toll would rise over time.

However, Israel’s repeated rejection of proposals and insistence on continuing the war sidelined those voices, and the fighting continued, the source told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The source added that Saad oversaw numerous areas of responsibility and tasks during the war that strengthened the Qassam Brigades’ ability to withstand the fighting. He continued supporting field commanders in combat and remained in close and regular contact with al-Haddad and other leaders to determine military operations, confront Israeli forces, and keep Israeli hostages in a way that could help secure a prisoner-exchange deal.


Arabs in Israel: A Dangerous Security Secret, Especially During Elections

Benjamin Netanyahu with his wife and Israeli President Isaac Herzog (AFP)
Benjamin Netanyahu with his wife and Israeli President Isaac Herzog (AFP)
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Arabs in Israel: A Dangerous Security Secret, Especially During Elections

Benjamin Netanyahu with his wife and Israeli President Isaac Herzog (AFP)
Benjamin Netanyahu with his wife and Israeli President Isaac Herzog (AFP)

“We on the right and center-right represent about 65% of the electorate, so we will remain able to form governments in the future. I know I will lose support and may even alarm many of my good friends. But I believe we must tie our fate to that of the Arabs in Israel.”

Natan Eshel, known as Benjamin Netanyahu’s closest adviser, published those words on June 16, 2019.

His opinion piece appeared that day in two newspapers at opposite ends of Israel’s political spectrum: Haaretz, which the right sees as radically left-wing, and Makor Rishon, the newspaper of the pro-settlement right, which the left regards as a platform for the fascist right.

Anyone who knows the inner workings of Israeli politics understands that the article expressed Netanyahu’s own views. The governing right was addressing the entire Israeli public, from the far right to the far left, through the liberal center.

Its message: the right had the courage to change official policy toward Arab citizens, marked throughout Israel’s history by racial discrimination and the suppression of freedoms.

The article sent shock waves through Israel. The country was in a historic constitutional crisis, going through five elections in two and a half years. “The Arabs are not the problem, but the solution,” Eshel wrote in the same article.

What happened over seven years to make Netanyahu abandon that path and embrace its opposite, hostility and hatred?

And why is Israel’s Central Elections Committee, supposedly a model of integrity, now voting overwhelmingly to disqualify all Arab candidate lists, seeking to deny Arab citizens their basic right to run for the Knesset?

A closer look reveals that most Israeli parties are mired in racism. They treat the Arab minority with arrogance and condescension, just as Aryans in Europe treated Jews: excluding them, trampling on their rights and doing everything they can to diminish their standing.

The question remains: What drove Netanyahu to seek fair treatment for Arabs, then retreat so far that he now sees them as an “eighth front” in Israel’s wars, alongside Iran, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Iraq’s Hezbollah, Hamas in Gaza, the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the Houthis in Yemen?

Mansour Abbas. AFP

The turn begins

Some trace the shift to 2016, when Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit decided to file indictments in three serious corruption cases.

These analysts see Netanyahu’s outreach to Arab citizens as a normal democratic step: an attempt to redress decades of racial discrimination and show that the right, in particular, could put them on a path toward equality.

He had approved Plan 922, allocating $5 billion to narrow some of the disparities caused by discrimination. The plan was developed with the Joint List, led by lawmaker Ayman Odeh, and the National Committee of Heads of Arab Local Authorities, led by Mazen Ghnaim.

But Netanyahu’s aides had a different calculation. They were building an alliance of right-wing parties to shield him against the judiciary, which was trying him on three corruption indictments.

The right was fragmented. Its far-right parties distrusted Netanyahu’s governments, which always included one or more centrist parties. He offered them a deal: a permanent alliance, in good times and bad, that would hold under any circumstances and support him in court.

When far-right leaders began throwing their weight around and imposing conditions, he turned to another tactic: an alliance with one of the Arab lists.

All the Arab parties had by then united under the Joint List. Netanyahu knew that bringing one into his coalition could break that unity. He would achieve three goals at once: divide his opponents, as he routinely did; secure a governing majority; and win respect in the West for ending the exclusion of Arabs and discrimination against them.

But the hard-line far right insisted he must not ally with Arabs. The opportunity collapsed.

His center-right rivals, Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, seized it instead. In 2021, they formed a coalition with the United Arab List, led by lawmaker Mansour Abbas. That alliance gave them the numbers to form a government.

The government lasted a year and a half; too little time to fundamentally change Israeli policy. But it gave Arab parties political legitimacy and secured several gains for Arab citizens, foremost among them Plan 555, providing an estimated $10 billion in funding.

It began with Rabin

Abbas’ alliance with the Bennett-Lapid government was not the first to include Arabs.

In 1993, Shas, the party of ultra-Orthodox Jews of Middle Eastern origin, left Yitzhak Rabin’s government, reducing it to a minority. Rabin turned to the Arabs.

They were represented by two parties: the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, led by lawmaker Tawfiq Zayyad, with three seats, and the Arab Democratic Party, led by lawmaker Abdulwahab Darawshe, with two. Together, they formed the “blocking bloc,” preventing the right from toppling the government.

Rabin showed a sincere commitment to the alliance. He accepted two conditions: begin a process to achieve full equality for Israel’s Arab citizens and recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The alliance delivered on both fronts. The Oslo Accords were one of its fruits. But, as is well known, the Israeli right assassinated Rabin. Netanyahu then took power for his first term, from 1996 to 1999.

The process was derailed. Arabs were again excluded and pushed toward the political margins. Their parties resumed their struggle from the back benches of the Knesset opposition, in street demonstrations and through international pressure from United Nations bodies, the European Union and other institutions.

Netanyahu once again turned them into a bogeyman to frighten Jews.

Incitement long before Oct. 7

The impression that Netanyahu is exploiting the Hamas attack of Oct. 7, 2023, to fuel hatred of Arabs in Israel misses the longer history. Incitement against them began long before the attack. Netanyahu himself played a decisive role.

An Israel Democracy Institute poll showed how successful that incitement had been.

Conducted a week before his June 2019 call to bring Arabs into the coalition, it found that 81% of Jewish respondents opposed Arab parties’ participation. Just 13% supported it.

The Hamas attack, however, became a defining benchmark for Israeli policy and a fixation for an entire society. At its core lies hatred of Palestinians — all Palestinians, including Gaza’s children — and support for killing them alongside their mothers, daughters and elderly people. Even Palestinian citizens of Israel were cast as enemies.

Why? Did they join the Hamas attack? Did they approve of it?

Every Israeli politician and military official knows that Arab citizens stand in direct opposition to Hamas and wholly opposed its attack. Many were themselves killed or wounded.

Arabs opposed the attack

Arabs in the Negev were among the first hit by Hamas rockets during the attack. Six were killed.

The attackers also killed a Palestinian woman wearing a headscarf who tried to stop them from killing civilians. She told them their actions violated Islamic values. They shot her.

They also shot an Arab paramedic from Iksal, near Nazareth, who worked for Magen David Adom, as he treated a wounded Jew.

Even the Islamic Movement led by lawmaker Mansour Abbas condemned the Oct. 7 attack as “a massacre and an inhuman, unjustified act that does not reflect the values of the Palestinian people.” Almost every Arab politician in Israel did much the same.

To say that “after Oct. 7, no government may be formed that relies on Arab parties” is therefore a slur built on lies and ingratitude. Behind it lies blind racism.

The threat this policy poses to Israel’s future has ignited a struggle among Jews themselves over how to respond.

The majority, including liberal centrist forces led by Gadi Eisenkot, Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, embrace this racist position without shame or hesitation.

Despite their positive experience of an alliance with Mansour Abbas, they bowed to Netanyahu’s campaign, disavowed that alliance and pledged to reject any government dependent on an Arab party.

Eisenkot tried to soften his opposition. At a meeting with voters in Jerusalem last Friday, he said: “Since this morning, my team has been dealing with the promise supposedly made to them that Mansour Abbas would be in the government. Anyone who knows me knows that I do not make promises.”

His answer still left him an opening. Every partner, he said, must accept three basic principles: that Israel is a Jewish, democratic and liberal state; the values of the Declaration of Independence; and the obligation to perform military or national service.

Last Tuesday, he told Radio 103FM he had added a fourth condition: anyone joining his government must support eliminating Hamas.

A liberal and left-wing current rejects this racist approach. It argues that the Jewish people, who once suffered racial discrimination in its most abhorrent forms, now practice it openly, explicitly and as official policy.

“Bringing Arab parties and Arab society into any future governing coalition is a strategic necessity to save Israel and defeat the right, which is destroying Israel,” said Yair Golan, leader of the Democrats party.

Yet Golan joined the racist right-wing parties in backing the disqualification of Sami Abu Shehadeh, leader of Balad.

Yair Lapid. AFP

A cautious Arab campaign

Arab parties are fighting cautiously, seeking to give the right no ammunition against them on any front.

The right has made the fight against these parties a central campaign goal, particularly as it watches its opponents fall into its trap. It is pursuing a legal battle to disqualify every Arab party and bar them from elections, arguing that they support terrorism and do not recognize Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.

Arab party leaders grasped what the election battle meant for their community’s future. They chose the safest paths to greater political weight.

First, they sought to prevent any Arab votes from being wasted.

Three parties formed an alliance: the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, led by Professor Yousef Jabareen; the Arab Movement for Change, led by lawmaker Ahmad Tibi; and the National Democratic Assembly, led by Sami Abu Shehadeh. They also signed a surplus-vote agreement with the United Arab List, led by lawmaker Mansour Abbas.

Second, the two Arab lists signed a code of honor pledging a fair and clean election campaign. Their leaders agreed to cooperate in the Knesset afterward to secure the strongest possible parliamentary leadership positions.

Third, Abbas added a Jewish lawmaker, former police major general Yoav Segalovitz, to his list, giving him second place.

Segalovitz has an extensive record of fighting organized crime, now the gravest scourge facing Arabs in Israel. His presence on an Arab list undercuts those who would deem it illegitimate.

Abu Shehadeh’s disqualification

Fourth, they widened the battle with the right, involving international actors from the United Nations, the European Union and some groups in the United States to prevent the racist campaign against them.

The Elections Committee disqualified Sami Abu Shehadeh over an article he wrote on Oct. 8, 2023, the day after the Hamas attack on Israel.

The article glorified the attack as a successful act of resistance and an outcome to be expected under the physical principle that “for every action, there is a reaction.”

Abu Shehadeh repudiated its substance. Speaking before the committee on Wednesday, he said he had written it before learning of the atrocities committed during the Hamas attack.

Writing the article was a mistake, he said. If he wrote it today, he would write it differently.

He stressed that he rejected violence against any party, whether a state or individuals, and that his political record was full of support for a just peace. The proposal to disqualify him was therefore unfair.

The retraction did not save him. A decision was also made to disqualify even Abbas’ list, which had expressed willingness to join the government.

The Supreme Court adopted the same position. It told him it would disqualify him if he continued with the court proceedings, but advised him to withdraw and cancel his candidacy himself.

He did so. His action joined the earlier measures seen as part of a measured effort to pull the rug out from under the right.

First the parties, then citizenship

Arabs now see their struggle as fundamental and existential. Those seeking to disqualify their parties are, in practice, paving the way to stripping them of their status as citizens.

They see clearly how brutal views such as those of Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich influence a range of Jewish actors: from armed militias threatening their existence to the terrorist professor at Bar-Ilan University who devised a plan for a Jewish terrorist organization to kill hundreds of Arabs and force them from their homeland.