The level of destruction in Sudan has reached its peak. The country now faces a cruel challenge that it must overcome sooner rather than later. It is a heavy burden carried by the weary shoulders of the Sudanese people. The time has come to cast it aside and rid themselves of its deadly philosophy. The Sudanese people alone are capable of breaking this infernal cycle.
Sudan has barely had a chance to catch its breath in the path 70 years. Civil wars have defined its history since 1955, the year before its independence, casting dark shadows over the emerging national state project, which from its very inception was plagued by struggles over spheres of influence and neglect of the distant regions in the south, west, and east.
As a result, rage seeped into the provinces, fermenting resentments that manifested themselves in destructive acts. It began with coups and repeated changes in power, eventually leading to the outbreak of the first civil war, which lasted seventeen years until the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972.
Soon afterward, an even more brutal conflict erupted: the second civil war, which began in 1983 and ended with the Naivasha Agreement in Kenya in 2005, ultimately leading to the secession of South Sudan and its division into two independent states.
A few years before this agreement, the Darfur crisis had already erupted due to overlapping factors: competition over resources between herders and farmers, as well as the ethnic and political dimension, and the cross-border agendas and organizations fueling the conflict. This conflict was another step toward the emergence of armed militias that would later contemplate swallowing the state.
In truth, what had seemed like a fleeting idea opened the gates of hell on April 15, 2023, and these gates remain wide open to this day. The time has come to close these gates. Normal states do not allow parallel entities to fester under any circumstances.
The Sudanese people are kind, educated, hospitable, and civilized, with roots stretching deep into history. They are diverse in ethnicity and culture, and this should be a source of wealth and strength. Is it logical, then, for such diversity to become a source of discord and alienation?
Here, it is worth taking a moment to discuss a philosophy embraced by some in the Arab world. This philosophy has been, and continues to be, like poison wrapped in honey: the philosophy of creating armed groups, parties, and militias. When these militias begin to feel like they could become obsolete, they quickly turn against those who created them.
Normal states should never have allowed the emergence of such parallel armed formations. Recent history clearly shows that these murky entities become the seeds of states’ downfall. These militias should not be conflated with national liberation movements whose mission ends once the pillars of the national state are established.
We can see this in the influence of the militias in Arab states that either permitted, ignored, or tolerated them. These militias came to dominate politics and became a substitute for the state, deciding matters of war and peace. Even in cases where people seek liberation and emancipation, as in Palestine, the multiplicity of factions hinders national unity.
If the events of 2011 left a mark on the Arab region, and if their echoes continue to resonate, the nations of the region have come to realize that certain regional and international powers are undermining stability, and deliberately fueling fragility and fragmentation.
The impact of the Sudanese war is felt by all. Sudan is at the heart of a highly sensitive geographical environment, sharing borders with seven countries and constituting a central pillar in the equations of both the Horn of Africa and the Arab region.
The continuation of the conflict exacerbates refugee and displacement crises across borders, burdens neighboring states with immense humanitarian, economic, and security pressures, and disrupts the flow of goods, services, trade, investment, and overland transportation between the Arab East and Africa. The vacuum created by the war also provides opportunities for foreign intervention and for regional and international powers to settle scores on Sudanese soil. This negatively affects efforts to combat terrorism, organized crime, and arms and human trafficking, while increasing the likelihood of inter-state conflicts in a region already suffering from political, security, and economic fragility.
Sudan’s stability is closely tied to issues of water security, the security of the Red Sea, maritime passages, and strategic overland routes. Sudan is therefore not merely a state suffering from a civil war; it is a bridge linking interconnected Arab and African systems. Perpetual instability could seep through to places far beyond its national borders.
I believe that Sudan, with its wise people, can emerge from its ordeal having learned a key lesson: 70 years of civil wars are enough. Sudan is like a small continent, rich in human and natural resources, capable of becoming the breadbasket and economic lung of the Arab world, as well as the vital bridge between the Arab and African regions. Arab, African, and even international security cannot be achieved while Sudan remains trapped in the orbit of internal wars.
I also believe that responsible and influential Arab states are now moving toward ending the war, reuniting the Sudanese people and fostering a long-awaited peace.
These states understand that peace in Sudan would extinguish other fires in the region, constrain foreign actors seeking to manipulate the Horn of Africa, and open the door to a new phase of stability, integration, and development. But that is another story.
