In recent days, images showing the falling water level of the Nile in Sudan have been causing concern and raising the alarm. Beyond the appearance of sandbars caused by the river's retreat. In some areas, the Nile has come to resemble a shallow seasonal stream that people can cross on foot. The decline has also led to a drinking-water crisis in parts of Khartoum North and Omdurman after major water stations stopped operating. Agricultural projects have likewise been affected as irrigation pumps went out of service, while signs of the river receding have emerged in several states, extending as far as northern Sudan.
This decline comes at a time when people would normally expect water levels to rise with the rainy season, renewing debate over the effects of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). A number of water-resource experts argue that, although natural factors such as delayed rainfall have played a role, it was primarily the operation of the dam, which has altered the natural pattern of water flow. Some experts have described the recession as a warning to Sudan and Egypt, particularly as Ethiopia insists on managing it unilaterally and controlling water releases without sharing data on storage and discharge. This leaves the transit country, Sudan, and the downstream country, Egypt, hostage to decisions made in Addis Ababa.
Concerns are growing as Ethiopia speaks of plans to build additional dams, as Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed said in a televised interview from the dam site in September 2025. He described the dam's inauguration as the beginning of a new phase that would "strengthen Ethiopia's geopolitical standing." The issue returned to the forefront after Israeli websites reported that Addis Ababa had prepared designs for three more dams upstream on the Blue Nile. Such projects would inevitably require the withdrawal of large quantities of water for storage and would give Ethiopia unprecedented control over the flow of the river.
This unilateral approach poses a challenge to Sudan and Egypt. It also contradicts Ethiopia's claim that it wants to turn water projects into instruments of cooperation and mutual benefit rather than sources of conflict. Since the GERD project began 15 years ago, repeated rounds of negotiations have failed to produce binding agreements. Even the Declaration of Principles signed in Khartoum in 2015 by Sudan, Egypt, and Ethiopia, with the aim of promoting consultation and cooperation, has remained merely words on paper and achieved nothing.
Under these circumstances, talk of potential benefits, or assurances that Ethiopian water projects will not harm neighboring countries, is meaningless without an agreement on operating rules and data sharing. There is broad agreement among water-resource experts that the lack of a binding legal framework among the countries concerned lies at the heart of the problem. The solution, they argue, is institutionalized regional cooperation: transparency, data exchange, and coordinated management of shared water resources.
Water is the lifeblood of societies. With growing populations, development needs, rising demand for resources, and accelerating climate change, cooperation among states is becoming more urgent than ever. The alternative is to deepen disputes and open the door to conflicts whose cost would be exorbitant for all.
There are successful examples of managing shared rivers. The Organization for the Development of the Senegal River, established in 1972 by Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal, is one of the most prominent models of sharing the benefits of water resources. Its member states agreed to distribute the economic benefits of water regardless of the geographical location of dams and created a system for the joint management of major projects, including collective ownership of some dams.
The Mekong River Commission, established in 1995 by Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, offers another model. It is based on prior consultation over water-development and hydropower projects, as well as the protection of fisheries, with the aim of reducing disputes and promoting cooperation in resource management. It provides a platform for continuous dialogue, the exchange of hydrological data, and joint planning for projects in areas that affect all the signatory states. While the Mekong model is based on the institutionalization of regional consultation, the Senegal River model goes further by sharing project management, financing, and benefits.
History, however, also offers many examples of water becoming an instrument of conflict. Different eras have witnessed disputes and wars linked to control over water resources or to their use for military purposes. Water has been used to flood areas and create defensive barriers, as the Dutch did in the 17th century to prevent the advance of French forces, and water supplies have been cut off, as Serb forces did during the Bosnian War.
The future of the Nile Basin should therefore not be built on the balance of power or unilateral actions, but on clear rules for cooperation, transparency, and benefit sharing. Managing international rivers is no longer merely an engineering or technical issue. It has become a test of states' ability to build sustainable partnerships that prevent water, the foundation of life, from becoming a new cause of conflict and war.
