The approaching end of the mission of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, UNIFIL, marks a fundamental turning point in the history of southern Lebanon, not only at the security level but at the political, diplomatic, economic, and social levels as well. After decades of an international presence on the Lebanese-Israeli border, Lebanon finds itself before a new phase in which responsibility for security and stability is supposed to pass more fully to the institutions of the Lebanese state.
In Resolution 2790 of 2025, the Security Council decided to extend UNIFIL's mandate for the last time until January 31, 2026, after which a drawdown of its numbers would begin, with an orderly and safe withdrawal over the course of a year. The declared aim is for the Lebanese government to become the sole party responsible for providing security in southern Lebanon. But the basic question concerns not only the date of UNIFIL's departure, but whether the political and security conditions preceding that departure in fact allow for a smooth transfer of responsibilities.
Since its establishment in 1978, UNIFIL's presence has been bound up with attempts to stabilize southern Lebanon and monitor the situation on the border. After the 2006 war, its mission expanded under Resolution 1701 to include monitoring the cessation of hostilities, supporting the deployment of the Lebanese army, and assisting in securing humanitarian access and protecting civilians, in addition to roles connected to the border and the Blue Line.
UNIFIL's departure does not simply mean a foreign force leaving the region. It means the end of an international system that played a part in monitoring conditions on the ground, in communication between the parties, and in preventing misunderstanding and escalation. Hence the importance of the Lebanese army being ready to assume greater responsibilities, not only militarily but also in terms of deployment, logistics, the capacity to monitor the border, and rapid response to incidents.
Southern Lebanon remains an open theater for Israeli military operations, without the complex but intermittent political and technical negotiations between Lebanon and Israel providing any incentive to halt those operations, which amount to a flagrant violation of Lebanese sovereignty. They are a clear message from Israel that it is in no hurry whatever to withdraw from Lebanon or to reach any arrangements putting an end to the current escalation.
Talk of a post-UNIFIL era must not turn into a mere discussion of international forces, but into a wider discussion of building the Lebanese state and its capacity to bear its sovereign responsibilities. Resolution 2790 tied stability in the south to a fundamental principle: that there be one authority and one set of weapons under the authority of the Lebanese state.
But the transition to that equation cannot come about through an international resolution or the withdrawal of a UN force alone. It requires a broad Lebanese political settlement, agreement on the future of the weapons and the necessity of confining them to the hands of the state, agreement on the army's role, and regional conditions that allow these arrangements to be implemented without recourse to force. Yet the success of the coming phase does not depend on Lebanon alone. If Israeli occupying forces, buffer zones, or military operations remain inside Lebanese territory, the Lebanese army's task will become more complicated, and the south will remain exposed to escalation even if UNIFIL's withdrawal is completed.
Any sustainable formula for the post-UNIFIL period must therefore include a clear mechanism for controlling the border, monitoring the ceasefire, addressing violations, and maintaining channels of communication that prevent incidents on the ground from turning into a new war. The post-UNIFIL phase is not merely the day after the departure of international forces. It is a real test of the concept of the Lebanese state and its sovereignty, and of the extent of Israel's commitment to international resolutions, or of its offering conduct that reflects, somewhere, a desire to close the chapter of an open war on Lebanon.
If Lebanon succeeds in strengthening the army's deployment, securing international support for it, and reaching an internal understanding on the exclusivity of weapons and of security decision-making, alongside an actual halt to attacks and violations and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, then the end of UNIFIL's mission may turn into the beginning of a new phase of stability. Otherwise, the opposite is equally possible.
