An informed reader may well scoff at the term “world order,” because it appears that there is no longer a global system that everyone recognizes and follows. The situation is somewhat different when we speak of the international order. There is still an organization with a central headquarters, encompassing all the world’s states, and supposedly responsible for safeguarding their independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty.
That organization, the United Nations, held its annual General Assembly in New York. Heads of state and senior officials traditionally make a point of attending and addressing the gathering as a demonstration of legitimacy, international recognition, and standing within the community of nations.
Why, then, raise the question now of the international order and the world order, or perhaps the absence of one?
This year, among the world’s major leaders, only President Trump attended the New York meetings. The Chinese, Russians, and Indians were absent. Among the middle powers, only the Iranian president and the Israeli prime minister showed up.
The US president attended because he has demands of the United Nations, many of whose structures and principles were originally established during the United States’ liberal era. He then moved on to meet the Chinese president in Washington.
The Iranian president attended because his country remains under pressure and isolation, making dialogue with those present at the UN, whether large or small states, a necessity.
The Israeli prime minister, meanwhile, needed a visit to the US before the elections. Since his requests were not accommodated, the New York gathering provided an opportunity, after which it would be difficult for American officials not to receive him.
It is not necessary to claim that the UN is no longer important. Even if the Security Council has lost much of its ability to preserve peace, the UN’s agencies and commissions remain vitally important in delivering various forms of assistance to poor countries and to those suffering from wars, internal conflicts, or disputes instigated by neighboring or distant states.
The truth is that during recent years, as wars have multiplied and expanded geographically, the Security Council, despite its many votes and resolutions, has failed to stop any of them. This has been true not only in cases of disagreement among major powers, but even when there has been apparent consensus, because the party conducting or supporting the war often ignores calls to end the conflict despite formally endorsing them.
Another revealing phenomenon can be seen in the nature of alliances. During the Cold War, there were two poles: The United States and the Soviet Union. Countries around the world generally aligned themselves with one camp or the other. When conflict erupted within a state, it was often the responsibility of its major patron to bring it to an end.
The Soviet Union managed to suppress conflicts within its sphere that were encouraged by the US, often through direct force. The Afghan conflict, however, in which the Soviets intervened while the US backed the Mujahideen against both the Soviet forces and Afghanistan’s communist government, did not subside even after Moscow and Washington agreed to a Soviet withdrawal. Once the Soviets left, the Mujahideen factions turned their weapons against one another in a struggle for power until the Taliban eventually seized control.
One indication of the weakening international order is that states no longer limit themselves to a single ally or alliance. Middle powers such as India, Brazil, and Germany once focused on reforming the United Nations system, particularly the Security Council, whose permanent membership remains confined to the five major powers that emerged victorious from World War II.
Today, however, neither middle nor smaller powers are satisfied with UN membership alone. Instead, they diversify their alliances according to immediate interests. Naturally, partnerships with major powers remain desirable and valuable. Yet even while maintaining such ties, states increasingly seek one or two specific benefits or protection from conflict by partnering with a nearby powerful state or a wealthy country capable of providing assistance.
As a result, today’s alliances are increasingly varied, reflecting diverse alignments. They are more pragmatic and less ideological than in the past. Strategic autonomy may now be achieved precisely through the diversification of alliance objectives. Alliances have become comprehensive packages of interests, resembling networks because of their fluidity and flexibility. The old notions of a clearly defined “West” and “East” have largely fractured.
Certain realities remain, however: technology lies at the heart of modern alliances, and alliances themselves have become tools for managing risk rather than expressions of permanent identity. Part of managing both risk and opportunity is the tendency of middle powers to cultivate multiple partnerships moving in different directions.
Many once viewed the Cold War as an unmitigated evil. Yet despite today’s endless array of alliances, neither global nor regional security has improved. New forms of conflict, intervention, and militia activity have emerged that were largely absent from the previous era. At the same time, reaching agreement among the major powers on a new, alternative global order appears nearly impossible.
And God works in mysterious ways.
