Yalta II is the sobriquet chosen by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for the recent meeting of US, Chinese and Russian leaders in the Chinese city of Shenzhen. Zelensky’s reference was to a meeting held by US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin in the Russian resort of Yalta during World War II.
Surprisingly, many commentators on both sides of the Atlantic have taken up Zelensky’s quip as a proper description of the Shenzhen rendezvous. Some pundits claim that just as the Big Three of Yalta divided the world into zones of influence, the new Big Three will decide a new carve-up of the globe.
The subscript of that assumption is that Donald Trump, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are looking for ways to end the current wars and disorder and throw the weight of the Big Three behind a new World Order.
Among those who propagate that analysis are some European pundits who think the Old Continent is definitely scripted out of international relevance and must learn a thing or two from a new model of rule set by “strongmen” like Trump, Xi and Putin. Some even talk of “authoritarian democracy”, an oxymoron if ever there was one.
Advocates of “authoritarian democracy” remind one of the 19th century European Physiocrats who admired the Chinese and Tsarist Russian models of governance, both of which emphasized the absolute authority of the state even beyond limits imagined by Hobbes in his seminal treatise “The Leviathan”.
In that fantasyland China, those who ran the state were not chosen by clueless and fickle voters of a democracy, but according to merit established through rigorous examinations that decided who could become Mandarin. Voltaire, and other admirers of Tsarina Catherine II of Russia, admired a model in which state power was exercised by a robust and resourceful aristocracy with the talent for rule woven into its genetics.
Today, however, the picture is somewhat different.
China is ruled by a Communist Party that over the past three decades has morphed into the centerpiece of a giant holding with economic, business and military wings with entry tickets obtained fundamentally through loyalty rather than merit alone. Putin’s Russia is more of a trompe-l’oeil because it allows some strictly controlled electoral process as a façade for what is basically a politico-business oligarchy.
The third angle of the Shenzhen triangle or triumvirate, the United States was always admired, albeit at time grudgingly, for its partly real partly imaginary dependence on what baron de Tocqueville described as “the will of the people”.
Today, however, the so-called “will of the people” is exercised through countless lobby groups, sectarian alliances and special interests engaged in disabling the Leviathan through a thousand cuts. To see Trump as a model of “strongman” is to miss the tremendous process of change underway in the American politico-cultural system.
In short, the Shenzhen troika doesn’t resemble the Yalta one. At that time, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin had real, if not absolute power. They had millions of troops occupying over 20 countries on three continents at a time that, leaving aside Latin America, there were few independent nations in the world. The Yalta trio represented almost 53 percent of the global gross domestic product (GDP) and was on the eve of the greatest military victory in history.
Today, the Shenzhen trio accounts for 44 percent global GDP, the bulk of it provided by the United States. But there are other big players including the European Union that represents the world’s largest economy, as well as Japan, India, Brazil and a dozen other fast moving upward nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
In Yalta, the Big Three knew that once the Axis had been destroyed, they faced no serious challenge in deciding the fate of Europe, indeed as we later saw, the whole world. The Shenzhen three, however, are already bogged down in crises they seem unable to manage let alone to resolve.
Trump is caught in the Iranian quagmire, plus tension-ridden relations with European Union, Canada, China and even Australia and South Korea. Putin is bearing the Ukrainian cross he carved for himself, unable either to end the war or win it. Xi has put himself in a Cold War style cage with his obsession with one day marching in triumph in Taipei.
More importantly, perhaps, the Shenzhen three are mired in a cesspool of differences on almost all key issues from limiting nuclear arsenals to reforming the United Nations and harmonizing their tariff and trading policies.
In the past decades, both Russia and China have tried their hand in classical style imperialism and emerged with burned fingers. Russia threw a vast net into black Africa and harvested nothing but shark bones and was forced to flee after sustaining heavy financial and human losses.
In any case, the Shenzhen shindig was for all Asia-Pacific area nations none of whom, not even South or North Korea, are ready to play poodle to any of the Big 3. The post-World War II order guaranteed by a few big powers is over. We have entered an era of nation-states, each trying to act according to its national interests.
Today, economic, diplomatic, cultural and military power is more widely distributed than ever in history. The fact that no nation is too small to be included in efforts to shape the world order highlights the importance of bilateral relations among the 193 members of the United Nations. In many cases, there may be small leaders, never small nations.
More importantly, almost everywhere people are learning that no one can scratch their back except their own fingers. Any insurance policy marketed by big power salesmen needs to be closely examined.
To be sure, small states could also make big mistakes, often under the influence of flatterers and carpet-baggers from the big nations. But even then, the good news is that almost everywhere we see people claiming a bigger say in decision-making. In major economies, hundreds of multinational concerns are in a position to deprive the state from the kind of power it exercised in the post-Yalta world.
In the now emerging world, still chaotic as every birth is at first, the politics of persuasion could become more effective than the choice of coercion.
History seldom repeats itself, and on rare occasions that it does, we get a caricature of the original. Thus, Shenzhen is a caricature of Yalta. Remember you first read it here: there will never be another Yalta.