The impasse of the conflict in Lebanon it will not end with a ceasefire, guarantees that Israeli aggression will not be repeated, and the implementation of the decision to confine arms to the state. It will also require, perhaps primarily, addressing the issues of Hezbollah’s constituency, which has been shaken by its repeated displacement and has at times criticized the party, holding it partly responsible for its suffering. Even so, the greatest challenge after the war ends will essentially concern fundamental remedies within Lebanese institutions.
The truth is that the real bet is not that Hezbollah's base could “turn” on the party because of the hardship of its wars, or because of the victims and destruction inflicted on its areas. Elements of the base will continue to see the party’s arsenal as an asset in structure, even if it accepts an end to hegemony.
The question that must be raised after the war ends does not only cover security. It will be, above all, a social, political, and anthropological effort to reconsider the history of Lebanon’s sects, their role, and the nature of the Lebanese system since the country’s independence, to “decode” the unique phenomenon that is Hezbollah. Its experience is distinct from those of the other sects, and its investment in militarization and armed organization, which broke the consensus and mutual deterrence, that had been in place among Lebanon’s components, in favor of an armed model that dominated political and military decision-making for decades.
Hence, the question becomes: where will Hezbollah’s domestic energy go? What will the 90 percent of party members who do not fight Israel do? Who will they turn to after the war ends? Concern for civil peace is legitimate, as implementing the unavoidable decision to place arms exclusively in the hands of the state will not be easy. However, the more difficult task will be making Hezbollah’s base more similar to the rest of Lebanon’s communities: communities that know diversity and political disagreement, and in which no party or “duo” represents an entire sect to a single political project alone.
It is simply astonishing the extent to which Hezbollah’s project has penetrated segments of Lebanese society over more than a quarter of a century, and how the party’s weapons were transformed from a force of liberation against the Israeli occupation in 2000 into a force of domination and control, dragging the country and its people into wars on behalf of others.
The truth is that fanatic religious and ideological projects have appeared among all sects and religions, inside and outside Lebanon. They have always represented only part of this or that community, and Lebanon has known Sunni extremism and Christian extremism. However, the difference is that these groups did not succeed in taking their communities hostage to their political or sectarian projects.
There is no doubt that the challenge to implementing the decision to confine weapons to the state is daunting. However, the challenge of turning Hezbollah’s base into a community resembling the rest of the Lebanese is even more daunting, though not impossible. This does not mean that they should speak like the rest of the Lebanese, nor that they should hold the same political positions. Rather, it means that they should manage the healthy diversity found in all sects, they should be convinced that weapons will bring neither status nor superiority, and they should support state institutions so these institutions can protect everyone.
We must remember that a small country like Lebanon and all its sects has produced great politicians, artists, and writers, as well as fighters who resisted occupation when necessary. It also has a cross-sectarian culture based on trade, services, and tourism, and it has produced creative figures in every field who have competed with long-established countries in the region whose populations are more than ten times that of Lebanon. It seems strange that this country could be dominated by a fanatic religious project tied to Wilayat al-Faqih and the interests of a regional state until it became “the sole voice of the sect.”
The challenge Lebanon will face after the war ends will be Hezbollah’s project and the values it imposed on a segment of the Lebanese and its success in persuading them that its arms are their only shield and the pillar of the Shiite community’s status within Lebanon.
In truth, all of this can be resolved. To confront it, the country will need a comprehensive economic, political, and cultural vision for dealing with this situation to rehabilitate and integrate the party’s non-combatant members into state institutions, find alternative sources of income to replace the money that used to flow from Iran to the party and its civilian institutions, and define the future of these ideological fighters, who have a value system different from that found within the Lebanese army.
We believe that Lebanon is capable of overcoming these issues if there is a shared will and if the Lebanese choose to turn toward building their country, which wars have eroded.
