Have Hezbollah’s Drones Changed the Rules of Engagement with Israel?

Smoke rises following Israeli bombardment on the village of Jibchit in southern Lebanon on May 23, 2026. (AFP)
Smoke rises following Israeli bombardment on the village of Jibchit in southern Lebanon on May 23, 2026. (AFP)
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Have Hezbollah’s Drones Changed the Rules of Engagement with Israel?

Smoke rises following Israeli bombardment on the village of Jibchit in southern Lebanon on May 23, 2026. (AFP)
Smoke rises following Israeli bombardment on the village of Jibchit in southern Lebanon on May 23, 2026. (AFP)

The “support war” waged by Lebanon’s Hezbollah in backing Hamas in late 2023 shattered the doctrine of “deterrence” that the Iranian-backed group had embraced and promoted for nearly two decades in its confrontation with its traditional adversary, Israel. Israel, for its part, also helped reinforce this assumption, which proved entirely mistaken the following year. The new round of fighting in 2026 then offered both sides an opportunity to establish a new set of rules governing the conflict.

Israeli patience and cunning

Israel did not rush into a direct war with Hezbollah after the group launched a wave of largely “performative” attacks, beginning with rockets fired at the outskirts of Israeli military positions in the Shebaa Farms. Instead, it quietly steered the confrontation in a different direction, displaying notable restraint and considerable strategic calculation.

This approach was reflected in diplomatic efforts undertaken by Tel Aviv through Washington to persuade Hezbollah to separate the Lebanese front from the Palestinian one. In July 2024, then US envoy Amos Hochstein reportedly told Lebanese officials that he was prepared to deliver what would amount to a political victory for Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah if the group halted its operations.

Nasrallah immediately rejected the proposal. According to those who relayed the message to him, he replied that the war in Gaza would first have to end. After that, other matters could be discussed.

This was not Hezbollah’s first strategic misjudgment. The shape of the new conflict unfolding in Lebanon’s border villages quickly revealed a clear Israeli technological and military advantage. A senior Hezbollah official later disclosed that in previous confrontations, fighters could launch a rocket, calmly gather their equipment after informing command that the launch had been successful, and leave the site before Israeli aircraft arrived.

People react while attending the funeral of an Israeli soldier Captain Doctor Ori Yosef Silvester, a 30-year-old army doctor for the Givati Brigade's Shaked Battalion, who was killed in southern Lebanon, at the Segula Cemetery in Petah Tikva on June 2, 2026. (AFP)

In the new conflict, however, the window between launch and retaliation had narrowed to between five and twenty seconds. As a result, the official said, fighters often dug into the ground and sought immediate cover after firing in the hope of surviving. Every launch effectively became a near-suicidal operation.

Subsequent developments underscored Israel’s superiority even more clearly. Israeli forces carried out a series of precise assassinations targeting Hezbollah military commanders, culminating in a strike that eliminated most of the leadership of the Radwan Force, the group’s elite unit.

Israel then killed Hezbollah’s military commander and launched the “pager operation,” which put thousands of Hezbollah operatives out of action at the push of a button. This was followed by the assassination of Nasrallah in a massive airstrike on Beirut’s southern suburbs and, later, the killing of his successor, Hashem Safieddine.

Instruments of war

According to field sources, the weapons and tactics employed by both sides suggest that they prepared for a prolonged war of attrition rather than a decisive battle.

Beginning in the first week after the latest ceasefire agreement, Hezbollah reduced its reliance on rockets, scaled back the use of suicide drones, and curtailed the deployment of guided anti-tank missiles, whose operators were often vulnerable to detection. Instead, it introduced first-person-view (FPV) drones.

These drones are typically operated within a range of 10 to 15 kilometers in southern Lebanon and are guided through fiber-optic cables linking the aircraft directly to its operator. A thin wire connects the control station to the drone carrying the explosive payload, allowing it to evade electronic jamming.

An Israeli self-propelled howitzer artillery gun fires rounds towards southern Lebanon from a position in the upper Galilee in northern Israel near the border on March 15, 2026. (AFP)

Hezbollah in 2026: A war of drones

Hezbollah sought to regain the initiative in the latest conflict, which erupted in March and coincided with the war with Iran. Israel conveyed a message that it was not interested in opening a front with Lebanon so long as Hezbollah remained on the sidelines.

The group reassured officials in Beirut that it would not initiate hostilities. It nevertheless surprised observers by launching rockets toward northern Israel, prompting a fierce Israeli response.

Unlike the image it initially projected through the launch of six rudimentary rockets, Hezbollah appeared far more organized and capable in the fighting that followed, revealing capabilities that had remained concealed during 15 months of relative calm. The group claimed to be carrying out as many as 100 operations a day against Israeli forces and introduced new weapons systems to the battlefield.

Its ground strategy also evolved. Rather than relying on static defenses or attempting to halt Israeli advances outright, Hezbollah focused on inflicting the greatest possible damage on advancing forces.

Rise of drones

Rockets no longer dominate the battlefield between Israel and Hezbollah. After weeks of fighting that erupted in the spring of 2026, a notable shift emerged in the military operations, with attack and suicide drones moving to the forefront and becoming one of the most influential factors shaping combat on both sides of the border.

For years, Hezbollah’s military identity was closely associated with its vast rocket arsenal, which represented Israel’s primary security concern. The current conflict, however, has shown that the group no longer relies exclusively on rockets. Instead, it has expanded its use of drones on a large scale.

According to Israeli assessments, a substantial share of Hezbollah’s recent attacks has involved attack and suicide drones, while conventional rockets have assumed a less prominent role than before.

Israeli researchers argue that this shift reflects lessons drawn from recent conflicts, particularly the war in Ukraine, where inexpensive drones demonstrated their ability to inflict significant losses on technologically superior forces.

According to Israeli reports and military studies published since the outbreak of the war in March, Hezbollah’s principal weapon is no longer its rocket arsenal alone but the attack and suicide drones that have become the primary threat facing Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.

Israeli soldiers operate a drone. (Israeli army)

Foremost among these are FPV suicide drones guided by thin fiber-optic cables, making them effectively immune to electronic jamming. Their small size, low-altitude flight profiles, and erratic maneuverability pose additional challenges for Israeli radar and air-defense systems.

These drones carry relatively small explosive payloads, typically weighing no more than five kilograms. A Lebanese security source told Asharq Al-Awsat that Hezbollah employs three different types of warheads depending on the intended target—whether a tank, a conventional vehicle, or personnel.

Former Israeli officers say the threat posed by these drones extends beyond fixed military targets. They are also capable of tracking moving forces and striking tanks, vehicles, and field command centers, placing continuous pressure on Israeli ground units in southern Lebanon.

No definitive figures are available regarding the number of suicide drones Hezbollah has used since the beginning of the war. Unofficial Israeli estimates, however, suggest that the number may range from several hundred launches to more than a thousand.

Israel recently stated that Hezbollah had launched more than 120 drones of this type. The group, meanwhile, has released dozens of videos purporting to show drones striking vehicles, armored platforms, electronic systems, and personnel in the field.

Israel says Hezbollah’s operations have killed 20 soldiers and wounded dozens more since March.

In addition, Hezbollah has claimed responsibility for detonating explosive devices against Israeli vehicles deep inside operational areas and for repelling Israeli incursions using light and medium machine guns, as well as rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).

A screengrab image taken from a handout video released by the Israeli army and created on April 27, 2026, shows Israeli army footage of what it says is the destruction of Hezbollah infrastructure in Lebanon, where a ceasefire has been in place since mid-April. (Israel Army / AFP)

Anti-armor missiles

Anti-armor missiles remain the backbone of Hezbollah’s ground warfare capability and have been used against Israeli tanks, vehicles, and fortifications.

Israeli sources point in particular to the Almas missile family, derived from Israel’s Spike missile system. According to those sources, Iran reverse-engineered the weapon after Hezbollah fighters captured an Israeli missile during the 2006 war. Russian-made Kornet systems and other anti-tank platforms also remain in service.

A third category of weapons consists of short- and medium-range rockets and artillery projectiles used extensively against military positions, troop concentrations, and bases in the Galilee and northern Israel. Their use, however, declined relative to drones during many phases of the 2026 conflict.

Reconnaissance and attack drones

Reconnaissance and attack drones rank fourth among Hezbollah’s principal battlefield systems.

Not all of them are suicide drones. Some are used for surveillance, fire correction, and target acquisition, while others carry small munitions and return to base after completing their missions.

Israeli sources have also reported limited use of anti-aircraft missiles and air-defense fire directed at Israeli aircraft.

Nevertheless, these systems have not proven as decisive as drones and anti-armor missiles in the current conflict.

A photograph taken from the southern area of Marjeyoun shows flares fired by the Israeli military descending over the village of Arnoun late on May 13, 2026. (AFP)

Evolving tactics

Israel, too, has adapted its methods of warfare.

Rather than relying primarily on armored formations advancing under air cover, it has sought to reduce casualties and increase mobility.

Lebanese security sources said the Israeli military has adopted tactics centered on small special forces teams moving along unpaved routes to avoid mines and ambushes. At the first sign of resistance, these units withdraw while combat aircraft strike hostile firing positions.

Alongside heavy air raids conducted by fighter jets and precision strikes carried out by drones against individuals traveling in cars and motorcycles, Israel has introduced two additional systems to the battlefield.

The first consists of loitering munitions, which have appeared in footage targeting motorcycles and personnel in the field.

The second is the extensive use of guided artillery rounds in 155 mm and 240 mm calibers, according to field sources in southern Lebanon. These systems have been employed against villages located well beyond the border zone.

The sources described the rounds as laser-guided, providing greater accuracy and enabling strikes at distances reaching up to 30 kilometers inside Lebanese territory.

According to Israeli statements and observations by military research centers during the 2026 war, unmanned aerial systems have been among the most heavily utilized assets in Lebanon. Israel maintains an extensive drone network covering both front-line and rear areas, including the Hermes 900 and Hermes 450 platforms, as well as smaller Skylark reconnaissance drones.

These systems have been used for surveillance, target acquisition, fire direction, and precision strikes against both mobile and fixed targets.

A beachgoer stands in the water against the backdrop of smoke rising from the site of an Israeli strike that targeted the southern Lebanese village of al-Mansouri on May 22, 2026. (AFP)

Precision munitions and guided missiles

Israel has also employed long-range missiles from the Spike NLOS family, as well as precision-guided aerial munitions launched from aircraft and drones against command centers and launch sites.

Tanks and armored units remain central to Israeli ground operations in southern Lebanon, although many have come under attack from drones and anti-armor missiles.

Israel has also employed artillery, surface-to-surface missiles, long-range rocket launchers, and self-propelled guns to strike targets deep inside Lebanon, along with precision ground-to-ground missiles against preselected objectives.

Air-defense systems

Israel possesses several major air-defense systems, most notably Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow.

Yet Israeli reports themselves acknowledge that these systems have faced difficulties countering the small suicide drones used by Hezbollah, particularly those guided through fiber-optic cables.

Israeli media previously reported that the military had introduced the Ro’em artillery system into service in southern Lebanon. The Israeli-made 155 mm system is wheel-mounted for enhanced mobility, features automatic loading, requires a crew of only three rather than seven personnel, offers a firing range of up to 40 kilometers, and incorporates advanced command-and-control capabilities.

Heavy machinery clears the rubble at the site of an overnight Israeli strike in the southern city of Tyre, Lebanon, May 23, 2026. (Reuters)

Rules of engagement

Since the ceasefire took effect, Hezbollah has sought to establish rules of engagement that would confine the fighting to occupied territory by refraining from targeting Israeli towns and settlements in the north. The Israeli military, however, gradually expanded the battlefield through sustained airstrikes and bombardment reaching the outskirts of Sidon.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, retired Brig. Gen. Said Kozah said Hezbollah has been attempting since the ceasefire to establish a new operational equation with Israel based on the principle that every Israeli strike should trigger a response. However, he argued, Israel continues to work against this.

Kozah noted that describing the situation as “rules of engagement” is not entirely accurate because the term is generally used between regular armies or within a clearly defined military framework.

“In practice,” he said, “Hezbollah is attempting to entrench a new set of rules under which any Israeli attack would be met with retaliation—whether through strikes against Israeli positions in occupied Lebanese territory or through rocket fire directed into Israel.”

He added that Hezbollah had recently carried out operations against Israeli positions in the border area, some involving drones and others consisting of infiltration attempts or direct attacks.

He also remarked that rocket launches into Israel had declined in recent days and that many had been intercepted because of the relatively limited numbers employed.

According to Kozah, Hezbollah seeks through these operations to reinforce the legitimacy of retaining its weapons under the banner of resisting occupation within Lebanese territory. At the same time, the group avoids addressing the factors that led to the current level of escalation and occupation.

As for whether Hezbollah has succeeded in imposing this new equation, Kozah said the situation suggests Israel remains the one setting the rules.

“The Israeli military is not limiting its operations to the buffer zone or the so-called ‘Yellow Line,’” he said. “It continues to conduct operations, clearing activities, and strikes against villages north of that line, effectively rejecting the balance Hezbollah is trying to establish.”



'Currently Impossible': North Korea Defections in Freefall

Visitors look towards North Korea, which has worked to seal off links to the outside world. Lillian SUWANRUMPHA / AFP
Visitors look towards North Korea, which has worked to seal off links to the outside world. Lillian SUWANRUMPHA / AFP
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'Currently Impossible': North Korea Defections in Freefall

Visitors look towards North Korea, which has worked to seal off links to the outside world. Lillian SUWANRUMPHA / AFP
Visitors look towards North Korea, which has worked to seal off links to the outside world. Lillian SUWANRUMPHA / AFP

A building-sized North Korean flag waves from a tower on the de facto border with South Korea, marking territory that experts say has become nearly impossible to escape.

The combined total of North Koreans to reach South Korea in the past six years is less than the number that typically defected each year for decades -- and appears to be declining further in 2026, said AFP.

The main cause is leader Kim Jong Un's aim to preserve his family dynasty by sealing the country off from the outside, keeping people in and information out, experts say.

"As I understand it, bringing family members directly from North Korea is currently impossible," 29-year-old Chae Yoon-seo, who fled in 2019, told AFP.

She swam across a river into China at night with a smuggler's help, and travelled through Laos, Vietnam and Thailand before finally flying to South Korea.

Defections to the South hit a peak of more than 2,900 in 2009 and stayed well above 1,000 per year for the next decade.

But there were just 63 in the first half of this year -- down by over a third from the same period in 2025, said Seoul's Unification Ministry.

- 'Soviet-style border' -

Arrivals have fluctuated over the decades, but plunged sharply during the Covid pandemic when many nations shut their borders.

A key change in North Korea, however, started years before.

After taking power in 2011, Kim began restricting the informal trade and migration links along the roughly 1,415-kilometer (880-mile) northern border with China.

In addition to being an economic lifeline, the Chinese border region has also been the first step in most defectors' escapes.

The long frontier was relatively porous, unlike the heavily mined, fenced and surveilled Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that serves as the Koreas' de facto border.

Along the boundary with China, Kim's government has erected fences and installed cameras as well as strips of sand that preserve the footprints of anyone who crosses.

"North Koreans built a real Soviet-style border security system," said Andrei Lankov, an expert on the North at Kookmin University in Seoul.

Beijing has helped too, said Lankov, noting China's preference to keep the status quo of the Kim dynasty by opposing potential instability from defectors or their supporters.

As part of its efforts, China reportedly has put in place hundreds of facial recognition cameras, noted Rachel Minyoung Lee, senior fellow with the Stimson Center's 38 North.

She added that Beijing also added more patrol boats and new or planned deportation facilities along its northeastern border.

- Ousted, killed or exiled -

The roughly 34,500 defectors to reach the South since 1998 are a fraction of North Korea's 26.6 million people, UN figures show, but the plunging number of escapes has consequences.

"Defectors are the main source of information about the North," said Fyodor Tertitsky, lecturer at Seoul's Korea University, noting both South Korean intelligence and researchers interrogate them.

Though some people still do get out.

Defector Gyuri Kang's 2023 escape by boat with her mother and aunt -- across the maritime border with the South, an extremely rare feat -- was a "miracle", she told a UN hearing.

She is also a case in point for why North Korea has made great efforts to seal itself off.

Kang noted the influence of South Korean dramas smuggled in on USB drives, finding them "so refreshing and more credible than North Korea state propaganda".

"North Korean authorities are keenly aware of the impact of outside media," she said.

In 2020, North Korea made possessing foreign media a crime punishable by years-long forced labor terms -- and potential death sentences for large-scale distribution, according to Amnesty International.

Lankov, from Kookmin University, said external information is the greatest threat to the long-term survival of North Korea's leadership.

"If they let their people interact with the outside world, they are highly likely to be overthrown, and maybe killed or driven into exile," he added.

Chae, the defector, said her hope was that the North's isolated people are not one day simply forgotten by the outside world.

"These days, there are a lot of cynical reactions on helping other countries, so I am a bit worried that one day, interest in North Korean human rights might fade away as well," she added.


How Israel’s Regional Neighbors See Its Upcoming Elections

 Israeli right-wing activists supporting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gather for the Jewish holiday of Sukkot, the Feast of the Tabernacles, in a field outside Kibbutz Nir-Am by the Israel-Gaza border on September 27, 2026. (AFP)
Israeli right-wing activists supporting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gather for the Jewish holiday of Sukkot, the Feast of the Tabernacles, in a field outside Kibbutz Nir-Am by the Israel-Gaza border on September 27, 2026. (AFP)
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How Israel’s Regional Neighbors See Its Upcoming Elections

 Israeli right-wing activists supporting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gather for the Jewish holiday of Sukkot, the Feast of the Tabernacles, in a field outside Kibbutz Nir-Am by the Israel-Gaza border on September 27, 2026. (AFP)
Israeli right-wing activists supporting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gather for the Jewish holiday of Sukkot, the Feast of the Tabernacles, in a field outside Kibbutz Nir-Am by the Israel-Gaza border on September 27, 2026. (AFP)

Israel's upcoming elections are being followed closely by its regional neighbors, who are aware that any outcome will have ramifications far beyond the country's borders.

In his Likud party's campaign launch this month, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu repeated his refrain that he "has changed the face of the Middle East" and vowed to continue doing so.

He has been unapologetic about keeping Israeli troops in neighboring Lebanon and Syria, while his ministers tout plans to displace Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, creating a refugee crisis for Jordan and Egypt and making a future Palestinian state impossible.

Opinion polls show the October 27 elections are likely to be close. The bloc led by Netanyahu and his far-right and ultra-Orthodox allies are squaring off against that of his main opponent, centrist Gadi Eisenkot.

AFP correspondents around the region take a look at how different countries are following the contest:

- Jordan -

While Netanyahu has stopped short of formally annexing the West Bank, observers say unofficial annexation is creeping in, as his government -- the most right-wing in Israel's history -- approves an unprecedented number of settlements.

Government officials repeatedly call for the expulsion of over three million Palestinians across the Jordan River, posing "an existential threat" to the Hashemite kingdom, according to Oraib Rantawi, founder of Amman's Al-Quds Center for Political Studies.

At the UN on Tuesday, King Abdullah II said "the Israeli government's expansionist appetite is now a regional threat".

"In the medium and long term, Jordan and Israel are on a collision course," Rantawi said, as right-wing politicians try to push responsibility for "dealing with the Palestinian population" onto Amman.

Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994, and "is maintaining a minimum level of political engagement" Rantawi said is unlikely to change, no matter the outcome.

- Egypt -

Israel's other neighbor, most often threatened by what Israeli ministers describe as "voluntary emigration", has kept a "cold peace" since it first recognized Israel in 1978.

Cairo maintains extensive security collaboration, but ties have been increasingly strained as Egypt says it has had to resist repeated efforts to force more than two million Palestinians into its territory.

The best-case scenario is "a government that is less ideologically driven and more focused on security, which could help lower the temperature around Gaza, even without changing the fundamental Israeli position," said former ambassador El-Sayed Shalaby.

Asked by AFP, Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty said Egypt "will deal with any government that is coming," before blaming Netanyahu for obstructing the Trump ceasefire plan, which Egypt brokered.

- Lebanon -

Israel's attacks on and invasion of southern Lebanon have killed more than 4,300 people and left 329,000 displaced since March, while Beirut pursues gradual talks with Israel centered on the disarmament of Hezbollah.

Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri said this month that Israel "is turning southern Lebanon, its people and their properties into a ballot box soaked in blood" ahead of the vote.

"We are not optimistic," a former Lebanese minister and diplomat told AFP on condition of anonymity.

"The style may change... perhaps Eisenkot has a less radical discourse, but on the ground, the policy will remain unchanged. It is the far right that remains in power."

In an interview with AFP, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun said the elections were an internal matter.

"But the question we want to ask the Israeli people, the State of Israel and all future governments is the following: do they want stability, security and no wars on their border, or not?" he said.

- Syria -

Since the December 2024 ousting of longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad, Israel has launched hundreds of strikes into Syria, sent troops into a UN-patrolled buffer zone on the Israeli-annexed Golan Heights and carried out regular incursions.

"For Damascus, the stakes are not whether the Israeli elections will completely change the rules of the game, but whether they will produce a government that is less inclined toward escalation and more willing to listen to Washington," a Syrian diplomatic source told AFP.

"A more centrist government, or a right-wing government that does not revolve around Netanyahu... could be less inclined to make political capital out of escalation," and work towards gradual security understandings.


From Jeddah to New York: Why Do Sudan's Truces Fail?

Members of the Quintet and Quad after their first joint meeting on Sudan. (African Union)
Members of the Quintet and Quad after their first joint meeting on Sudan. (African Union)
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From Jeddah to New York: Why Do Sudan's Truces Fail?

Members of the Quintet and Quad after their first joint meeting on Sudan. (African Union)
Members of the Quintet and Quad after their first joint meeting on Sudan. (African Union)

Sudanese doctor "S" needed a truce to get out of a health center where she and her colleagues were trapped in the first days of the war. She took a long route from Nile Street, crossing the Fiteihab and Halfaya bridges, until she reached her family in Kober.

She said she found bullet holes in the walls of her bedroom. Her siblings were waiting for her so they could leave together. The family fled and remains displaced today.

A brief halt in fighting in May 2023 allowed S to escape, but it did not last long enough for her family to remain in their home. Since that brief truce, initiatives and agreements have followed, while the hardest question has remained: How can mediators bring the two sides to agree to a cessation of fighting that is implemented and sustained?

The question returned to the fore on Sept. 23, when the Quad and Quintet met together for the first time in New York, under the co-chairmanship of the African Union and the United States. Participants called for a humanitarian truce and an end to hostilities.

They agreed to coordinate efforts to protect civilians and prepare to monitor and verify the implementation of any agreement. But the meeting's statement announced no agreement with the army or the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and set no date for talks between them.

A worker repairs a damaged building in Khartoum on September 20, 2026 (Photo by Ebrahim HAMID / AFP)

The sticking point lies in the terms of the truce itself. According to Reuters, the army-led government accepted most of a US proposal for a 90-day truce but rejected a provision that would limit the RSF's withdrawal to specified areas.

It demanded that the RSF withdraw from all cities it had seized. Sudan's Foreign Ministry said this week that it rejected any negotiating process it believed would legitimize a reality imposed by the RSF through force. The RSF, meanwhile, welcomed the truce proposal, but the fighting continued.

Even when the two sides signed an agreement, it did not guarantee its implementation. In Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, the army and the RSF signed a declaration committing them to protecting civilians on May 11, 2023. On May 20, they signed an agreement on a short ceasefire and humanitarian arrangements.

But the ceasefire did not hold. In June, the army suspended its participation in the talks, accusing the RSF of violating the agreement.

Other efforts faced different obstacles. In December 2023, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional organization involved in peace efforts in the Horn of Africa, announced that army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, had agreed to meet face to face under its auspices. IGAD renewed the invitation in January, but the meeting never took place.

In Manama, Bahrain, a document titled "Principles and Foundations for a Comprehensive Solution to the Sudanese Crisis" was initialed on Jan. 20, 2024, in the names of Shams al-Din Kabbashi for the army and Abdel Rahim Dagalo for the RSF, according to the published text. But the initialing was not followed by a final agreement or a sustained negotiating process. Dagalo accused Kabbashi of backing away from the document, while Kabbashi did not comment on the reasons for the process coming to a halt.

In August 2024, the absence of one of the warring sides prevented direct ceasefire talks in Switzerland, shifting the focus to facilitating the delivery of aid and protecting civilians.

Rosalind Marsden, a researcher at Chatham House, wrote in an analysis published by the institute on Sept. 18, 2024, that the main reason the August 2024 ceasefire talks in Switzerland failed was that both the army and the RSF continued to seek a military victory. Their continued hopes of making military gains were a major reason for the negotiations' failure to make progress, despite limited progress in delivering aid to Darfur.

In September 2025, the Quad proposed a roadmap beginning with a three-month humanitarian truce, during which aid would reach areas across Sudan, followed by a permanent ceasefire and a political transition.

But the Quad's roadmap remained a proposal by the mediators and did not become an agreement between the warring parties. The dispute over withdrawal in the latest US proposal shows that the two sides have yet to agree on the terms under which a new truce could be tested.

Researcher Ahmed Soliman says the multiplicity of mediation groups and weak coordination among them make it necessary to link ceasefire efforts to a Sudanese political process led by civilian forces.

Hubert Kinkoh, a researcher at Chatham House, argued in an analysis published by the institute on Feb. 13, 2026, that the multiplicity of mediation tracks on Sudan, along with the absence of clear leadership and effective coordination among them, had allowed the army and the RSF to resist making serious concessions.

The New York meeting may help address the fragmentation of mediation efforts. Its real value, however, will become clear if it can bring the warring parties to a clear agreement and establish a mechanism to monitor compliance and address violations.

A brief truce allowed S to reach her family, but the family was then forced to leave their home. The truce that displaced people and refugees are waiting for today would allow aid to reach them and mark the beginning of a lasting end to the fighting, making a safe return to their homes and communities possible.