Khan al-Ahmar: Last Tent in Battle for Greater Jerusalem

Khan al-Ahmar community in the heart of the West Bank (Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories - B’Tselem)
Khan al-Ahmar community in the heart of the West Bank (Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories - B’Tselem)
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Khan al-Ahmar: Last Tent in Battle for Greater Jerusalem

Khan al-Ahmar community in the heart of the West Bank (Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories - B’Tselem)
Khan al-Ahmar community in the heart of the West Bank (Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories - B’Tselem)

On the road to the impoverished Bedouin community of Khan al-Ahmar, in the heart of the West Bank, the upscale Israeli settlement of Maale Adumim occupies a large, elevated and commanding stretch of land.

But that is no longer enough for Israel’s far-right government, which now plans to annex everything, Maale Adumim, Khan al-Ahmar and the surrounding area, to Jerusalem under the controversial E1 project.

The plan aims, among other things, to realize the dream of Greater Jerusalem, the most important step in a project to change the face of the West Bank by cutting through it with a settlement belt.

That would strengthen the presence of settlers and settlements in what Palestinians describe as a new state of settlers, end the dream of a contiguous Palestinian state, and isolate Jerusalem, the hoped-for capital, from it.

No one in the West Bank has faced more demolition orders and threats than the residents of Khan al-Ahmar, which now finds itself in a battle larger than itself. Over many long years, they have fought several legal battles and ground confrontations, holding on to their land and tents and trusting in victory.

That confidence has been shaken only by Israel’s fierce and sweeping assault on everything Palestinian since Oct. 7.

“The situation is different”

Tension hung over Khan al-Ahmar days after a decision by Bezalel Smotrich. Eid al-Jahalin, also known as Abu Khamis, the head of the Bedouin council, had no clear answers for hundreds of calls, messages and questions from journalists and activists, some of whom came to the area to document what was happening inside and around the temporary tents and structures.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that he did not know exactly what would happen.

Abu Khamis, who speaks several languages, including English and Hebrew, was trying hard to deliver one message: that demolishing this simple and poor place would open the door to the most dangerous plan in the West Bank, “Greater Jerusalem.”

In his modest tent, among many others, there are maps, a coffee pot, journalists, visitors, solidarity activists and foreign delegations. He has grown used to such scenes with every Israeli threat to demolish Khan al-Ahmar. This time, however, he is more worried than ever.

“The situation this time is completely different and very dangerous,” Abu Khamis said. “In 2018, all Palestinians were with us. The government and civil society were sleeping here. I had 5,000 people with me. International pressure was strongly present, and our cause was at the top of the Middle East agenda. Today, the situation is different.”

Explaining his fears, he said: “After Oct. 7, Israel became more aggressive, and the West Bank has been turned into a state of settlers. This is a state war against us, not a problem caused by individuals. In the West Bank, we now have a thousand Khan al-Ahmars: killing, displacement and fire consuming every part of the West Bank, while the Palestinian effort is scattered.

“Internationally, too, there is the Gaza war, the war in Lebanon and the Hormuz war. The world is also busy and distracted. Governments have changed in America, Israel and elsewhere.”

He said the occupation believes this is the right time.

For Abu Khamis, Smotrich’s latest decision “was issued for actual implementation, and only real international pressure will stop it.”

Evacuation order and declared war

Smotrich, who is leading what Israelis describe as a revolution to change the status quo in the West Bank, signed an evacuation order for Khan al-Ahmar last month as part of the “beginning of a war” he declared against the Palestinian Authority.

He accused the PA of being behind a secret arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court, which had earlier rejected the matter.

Speaking at a news conference about 10 days ago, against the backdrop of reports that the ICC in The Hague had issued a secret request for an arrest warrant against him, Smotrich said: “The hands are the hands of The Hague, but the voice is the voice of the Palestinian Authority, the terrorist organization wrongly called the Palestinian Authority.”

Smotrich claimed that issuing arrest warrants against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and himself amounted to “a declaration of war.”

“In the face of a declaration of war, we will respond with an all-out war,” he said.

“I am not a submissive Jew, no. The Palestinian Authority has started a war, and it will get a war. From today, any economic or other target that falls within my powers as finance minister and as a minister in the Defense Ministry, and that I can harm, will be attacked. There will be no words and slogans, only actions.”

He added: “I announce here the first target. As soon as I finish speaking here, I will sign an order to evacuate Khan al-Ahmad under my powers as a minister in the Defense Ministry. I promise all our enemies: this is only the beginning.”

Smotrich immediately signed the decision to evacuate Khan al-Ahmar and ordered that “all necessary measures” be taken to demolish it.

The decision to demolish Khan al-Ahmar can only be seen as part of a campaign Smotrich has led for years against Palestinians in the West Bank.

It has included seizing large areas of land, changing laws related to control, ownership, land registration procedures and possession of property, as well as powers related to law enforcement.

It has also included his relentless work to weaken and dismantle the Palestinian Authority and turn the West Bank into a state of settlers by advancing major settlement plans and giving settlers a free hand in the area.

But Khan al-Ahmar’s significance is exceptional because it is a major obstacle to implementing the huge E1 settlement project, which involves a dangerous linking of a group of large surrounding Israeli settlements with Jerusalem, forming Greater Jerusalem.

The plan would connect Jerusalem to the large settlement of Maale Adumim in the central West Bank, in a way that Israeli rights group B’Tselem has said would severely threaten the possibility of a future Palestinian state and entrench a binational apartheid state.

The Palestinian National Information Center said that, in addition to the historically declared goal of linking Maale Adumim settlement with Jerusalem and excluding Palestinian neighborhoods from their natural development space, the plan serves the broader vision of “Greater Jerusalem,” covering about 600 square kilometers, or around 10% of the West Bank, through road belts, industrial zones and new neighborhoods.

Implementation depends on the settlement project known as the “fabric of life” road and alternative routes to separate Palestinian movement from the center of the West Bank, while connecting nearby Palestinian areas through controlled corridors in tunnels.

An old plan revived

Since 2009, Israel has sought to demolish the site. Each time it came close, however, it faced a storm of Palestinian, Arab and international reactions and criticism, until Khan al-Ahmar became a symbol of the conflict.

Israel therefore avoided demolishing it, even though an Israeli court gave the green light for the demolition.

Every time the court asked for an explanation as to why the site had not been demolished despite a judicial ruling, the Israeli government offered a different explanation for not evacuating the residential compound.

Yedioth Ahronoth said the evacuation of Khan al-Ahmar, which has become a global symbol, had turned into a diplomatic headache for the government because of international public opinion.

Even this time, 85 members of the US House of Representatives called on President Donald Trump’s administration to use all available diplomatic tools to halt the Israeli colonial construction project known as E1, warning that implementing it would impose a permanent reality on the ground and undermine the prospects of a two-state solution.

The appeal came in a letter from the lawmakers to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

The signatories said the E1 area, which extends over about 12 square kilometers east of Jerusalem, is one of the most sensitive areas in the West Bank because settlement construction there would separate the northern West Bank from its south and strengthen geographic contiguity between Jerusalem and the settlement of Maale Adumim, entrenching Israeli control over a strategic area in the heart of the West Bank.

They also pointed to other Israeli measures linked to the project, including plans to build what is known as the “Sovereignty Road,” as well as steps targeting the Bedouin community in Khan al-Ahmar. They said these measures were part of an accelerating process aimed at imposing new facts on the ground that would be difficult to reverse in the future.

In the view of the lawmakers, implementing the E1 settlement project would undermine the possibility of establishing a geographically contiguous Palestinian state. They called on the US State Department to clearly inform the Israeli government that moving ahead with the project contradicts declared US positions on the future of the West Bank.

Before them, more than 400 ministers, ambassadors and European officials called in an open letter to European Union leaders to “act now” against Israel’s “illegal annexation” of the occupied West Bank through the E1 project, under which it plans to build thousands of homes.

The 448 signatories, including former European Commission Vice President Josep Borrell and former Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, wrote: “The EU and its member states, in cooperation with their partners, must take immediate steps to deter Israel from continuing its illegal annexation of Palestinian land in the West Bank.”

The signatories said that “at a minimum, the EU must impose targeted sanctions, including visa bans and bans on conducting business activities in the EU, against all persons involved in illegal settlement operations, especially those promoting, participating in tenders for and implementing the plan related to the E1 area.”

These calls came after Israel took another practical step toward beginning the plan by issuing an official notice to demolish 50 structures and commercial premises in the town of al-Eizariya, southeast of occupied Jerusalem, that fall within the settlement plan.

These repeated international positions are what currently complicate the demolition of Khan al-Ahmar.

The decision to demolish may not be in Smotrich’s hands alone, according to Yedioth. It goes back to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in coordination with Defense Minister Israel Katz and the Israeli army, and would require explicit approval from the cabinet because of its consequences, which could complicate matters for Israel, embroil it politically and lead to very severe sanctions against it by the European Union.

But Meir Deutsch, director-general of Regavim, the movement founded by Smotrich that petitioned the High Court on the issue months ago, said: “The situation is different now and there is an opportunity.”

“Over the past two years, the Israeli government has taken unprecedented and historic decisions to ensure the future of the State of Israel,” he added. “Now, more than ever, the time has come to enforce the law against the aggressors in this field, and thus thwart the Palestinian Authority’s plan to seize this important site as part of establishing a terrorist state in the heart of the country.”

The Palestinian Authority understands this situation better than anyone. In previous years, when the situation was very different, the PA threatened to cancel agreements if Israel proceeded with the E1 project because it would kill the Palestinian state. It organized major campaigns to maintain a presence at the site, unlike what is happening now.

Geopolitical significance

Attorney Hassan Mlihat, the general supervisor of the Al-Baidar Organization for the Defense of Bedouin Rights, told Asharq Al-Awsat that “what must be understood is that Khan al-Ahmar is an area of enormous geopolitical importance. It is located northeast of occupied Jerusalem, specifically on the vital road linking Jerusalem and Jericho.”

“The extreme danger of this area lies in the fact that it falls within the E1 settlement plan, the most dangerous project targeting the Palestinian cause and the West Bank in the history of the conflict,” he added.

Mlihat said the danger of the project also lies in the fact that it would form Greater Jerusalem by taking control of 12,000 dunams in the heart of the West Bank and create continuous geographic contiguity between Jerusalem and Maale Adumim settlement all the way to the Dead Sea. This, he said, is the practical implementation of the Greater Jerusalem project.

For Mlihat, the project has other catastrophic consequences because it “re-engineers the demographic composition of these areas by expelling Palestinians and replacing them with settlers, and divides the West Bank into two separate parts, north and south. This means that the establishment of any geographically contiguous Palestinian entity or state would become impossible. The occupation’s success in this area would also become a starting point for isolating and targeting the rest of the West Bank.”

“This is a dangerous and huge project, and Khan al-Ahmar is the biggest obstacle,” he said.

Khan al-Ahmar at the heart of Greater Jerusalem

But it is not only Khan al-Ahmar. Mlihat believes the assault on Khan al-Ahmar is part of a wider attack on Palestinian Bedouins. While Israel has not demolished Khan al-Ahmar so far, it has already displaced more than 88 Bedouin communities in the West Bank.

Mlihat said that since 2019, specifically after the announcement of the “Deal of the Century,” the targeting of Bedouins had intensified, with the fierce assault on them escalating in an unprecedented manner after the events of October.

“This war targets the Bedouin presence in all areas and pockets of Area C, especially in the central West Bank east of Jerusalem because of the E1 plan, and in Jericho and the Jordan Valley because of their border and security dimensions,” he said.

Dozens of families have already been forced to leave their homes in the Palestinian Jordan Valley after several attacks by the army and settlers, in a recurring scene Mlihat described as an ongoing Nakba.

It was striking that the Bedouins were forced to face their fate alone in a battle larger than themselves, the same situation Jahalin pointed to in Khan al-Ahmar.

“Alone in the battle”

Abu Khamis looks after about 300 Bedouins in Khan al-Ahmar, who live in a place that includes a school, a mosque and a health clinic. These also serve many Bedouins from outside the community who come for education or treatment.

Abu Khamis looked toward the simple school as children played there, trying to steal a little space for joy, and asked many questions about whether the Israelis would really attack the place.

“We are alone in this battle,” Abu Khamis said.

“The war today is focused and directed specifically against the Bedouins,” he added. “It is the product of the consequences of the Oslo Accords and the division of the land into Areas A, B and C. Area C makes up about 62% of the West Bank. And who is in it? The Bedouins.”

“The problem of Khan al-Ahmar is that it lies at the heart of the Greater Jerusalem project, from al-Eizariya to the border of the Dead Sea. In this vast area, there is no Palestinian village or camp except Khan al-Ahmar,” he said.

Abu Khamis understands the matter well.

“If we are uprooted from here, the occupation will connect the settlements of Maale Adumim, Kfar Adumim, Mishor Adumim and Alon to form a settlement belt that clamps down on the eastern gate of Jerusalem and closes it completely,” he said.

“It will then cut up the West Bank and separate its north from its south. Jerusalem today is being surrounded by a massive settlement bloc, and Khan al-Ahmar lies at the heart of this most dangerous settlement project since the beginning of the occupation until today.”

This awareness is present among all residents of Khan al-Ahmar, even its children.

Ali had just finished his school day when he went to check on his family’s livestock. Ali told Asharq Al-Awsat: “They attack us from time to time, insult us and threaten us.”

The young Ali refused to accept moving where he lives, saying he loves the place and will not leave.

“We will not leave,” he said. “Even if they demolish the houses, we will not leave. It’s fine, let them demolish, but we will not leave. We want to stay here. This land is ours, and we will not leave it.”

Ali represents the fifth generation born in Khan al-Ahmar since its residents arrived there in the 1950s, displaced from Tel Arad in the Negev.

Sheikh Mohammed Abu Dahouk, 56, who was born in Khan al-Ahmar, told Asharq Al-Awsat: “My grandfather and my father were here. I was born here, and now my children and grandchildren were born here.”

Abu Dahouk does not intend to leave the place, although he expects them to demolish it at any moment.

“We expect anything from them,” he said. “Today, blood is flowing everywhere. But if they demolish, we will remain here in the sun. We will sit here. If they demolish, there is nowhere for us to go. Where would we go? There is nowhere for us to go. We will stay sitting in the sun.”

Like others, Abu Dahouk rejects the idea of moving to what Israel calls a “proper area.”

“Give us permits here,” he said. “We are the owners of the land. This is our land, and our land is dear to us. We are not leaving for any other place, whatever it may be.”

Alongside many previous legal battles, the residents of Khan al-Ahmar and the Arab al-Jahalin communities filed an objection to a plan to concentrate Bedouin communities in a “planned urban compound.”

The objection, filed through the Israeli group Bimkom, said the plan does not suit the communities’ way of life and could lead to their forced removal from the space where they have lived for decades.

Architect Alon Cohen-Lifshitz of Bimkom told Yedioth Ahronoth that this was “a plan of uprooting under the cover of planning,” stressing that it was part of a broader policy to shape the space in East Jerusalem and the West Bank.

Meanwhile, the saga of Khan al-Ahmar continued. Jahalin continues to receive European and local officials and activists, takes many calls, holds Zoom meetings with institutions and activists abroad, and has met, among others, Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa at his office. Mustafa, for his part, promised to support the residents’ steadfastness.

But none of this was new to Jahalin.

“Our struggle is not new,” he said. “It has continued since 1967, when Israel declared the area a closed military zone. They used to shoot to frighten them, before they were later surprised that those ‘military lands’ had turned into large settlements, including Maale Adumim and Kfar Adumim.”

Jahalin repeated what he had said several times: “It is a state of settlers, and this time is different from those before it.”

Yet despite everything that changed after Oct. 7, the Bedouin mentality has not changed.

Abu Khamis said it plainly: “I am a Bedouin, and I have spent 60% of my life in the sun. It will not hurt me if I spend 100% of it in the sun. I will be here or at the closest possible point to Khan al-Ahmar. Even if I remain suspended between the sky and the earth, I will not leave.”

 



In Taiwan, Jensen Huang’s ‘Flawless’ Image Damaged by Affairs

Photos of Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang during a previous visit are displayed at a local snack shop in Taipei on November 13, 2026. (AFP)
Photos of Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang during a previous visit are displayed at a local snack shop in Taipei on November 13, 2026. (AFP)
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In Taiwan, Jensen Huang’s ‘Flawless’ Image Damaged by Affairs

Photos of Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang during a previous visit are displayed at a local snack shop in Taipei on November 13, 2026. (AFP)
Photos of Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang during a previous visit are displayed at a local snack shop in Taipei on November 13, 2026. (AFP)

Taiwan-born Jensen Huang, the former boss of Nvidia, was feted like a rock star on visits to his birthplace, posing for selfies with fans and being mobbed by journalists.

His spectacular downfall might change that.

Huang's once "flawless" image in Taiwan has been shattered by revelations of two extramarital affairs -- including one with a woman accused of being a Chinese spy -- that forced him to resign from the company he founded.

"I thought he had the persona of a devoted husband, and it turns out he's kind of a scumbag," Ivan Liang, 28, told AFP during his lunch break on Friday.

Huang has been a source of pride and inspiration for many Taiwanese. While other tech titans kept a low profile, Huang was chatty and charming in public, readily signing autographs and posing for photos.

"I definitely think my perception of him has changed because, after all, he originally had that 'nation's dad' image," said Leo Fu, a 42-year-old import distributor.

"I feel like that image of him has probably taken a hit in the eyes of the general public in Taiwan."

Dessert shop owner Jane Hsieh, 70, still has fond memories of Huang visiting her store on multiple occasions for one of her traditional tofu puddings.

"Before this, he felt like such a flawless person," Hsieh told AFP in her shop where photos of her and her husband posing with the leather-jacketed Huang, his wife Lori, and son Spencer, are proudly displayed.

"It's just a shame because he gave everyone the impression that he was a really great guy, and he was always very polite when he came here," she said.

While her feelings about Huang have changed as a result of the affairs, Hsieh said she would not remove the photos from her shop.

"Why kick someone when they're down?" she said.

- 'Pretty outrageous' -

At the Chinese restaurant where one of Huang's lovers -- identified as suspected Chinese spy Alice Huang -- was filmed kissing him on the cheek in May 2025, a plate signed by Huang on the same night is still on display.

Staff were reluctant to talk about the infamous evening to AFP on Friday, only saying they were always focused on serving their customers.

"I think it's pretty outrageous," 38-year-old Chen Yu-ting, who works in finance, said of Huang's affair with someone believed to have spied for Beijing.

"If the other person really was trying to use him, it seems like he was just way too easily deceived," she said.

"Given his status, he really should be paying much closer attention to the people around him and who he associates with."

While Huang's affairs have tarnished his reputation, some Taiwanese are more concerned about the impact the scandal could have on Taiwan's economy and stock market.

Huang has generated huge amounts of wealth for the island at the centre of the global artificial intelligence (AI) technology boom.

Nvidia's advanced chips critical to the AI buildout are made by Taiwanese tech titan TSMC and have helped drive Taiwans' stocks to record highs and push its economy into double-digit growth.

Ivan Liang, who works in imports and exports, said he was "very worried".

"The market crashed... a few days ago, and then Nvidia's stock price just kept dropping and dropping and dropping," Liang said.

"I don't trade US stocks myself, but the US and Taiwan stock markets definitely move in tandem and affect each other," he said.

"Whatever he does is none of my business -- I only care about my money."


Can One Security Force Implement Resolution 1701 and the Framework Agreement in Southern Lebanon?

A UNIFIL military vehicle patrols the southern Lebanese town of Ibl al-Saqi (AFP)
A UNIFIL military vehicle patrols the southern Lebanese town of Ibl al-Saqi (AFP)
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Can One Security Force Implement Resolution 1701 and the Framework Agreement in Southern Lebanon?

A UNIFIL military vehicle patrols the southern Lebanese town of Ibl al-Saqi (AFP)
A UNIFIL military vehicle patrols the southern Lebanese town of Ibl al-Saqi (AFP)

Countries involved in Lebanon are considering a security force to replace the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) when its mandate expires at year-end.

The force would support the Lebanese army in implementing agreements and international resolutions in southern Lebanon. But can a new force enforce both UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and the US-brokered framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel?

Talks have produced broad agreement on the need for such a force, but its composition, mandate, operating procedures and participating countries remain undecided.

The uncertainty was reflected in a statement by Group of Seven foreign ministers after their Nov. 9-10 meeting in Paris. They called for a robust, credible, and long-lasting security architecture in Lebanon to support the Lebanese Armed Forces, in line with Resolution 1701 and to advance implementation of the Trilateral Framework.

No further agreements were announced.

US envoy to visit Beirut

Attention now turns to a visit to Beirut on Monday by US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz, who is due to meet with President Joseph Aoun.

Recent media reports suggest Washington is moving to replace UNIFIL in southern Lebanon with a verification committee and substitute the framework agreement for Resolution 1701.

The resolution ended a 33-day war between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006. Its main provisions included an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and the deployment of additional UN troops to monitor the cessation of hostilities alongside the Lebanese army.

Lebanon, Israel and the United States signed the Trilateral Framework Agreement in Washington on June 26, setting out a phased process to end the conflict and restore Lebanese sovereignty over the country's entire territory.

Under the agreement, the Lebanese army would gradually assume security control of designated "pilot zones" as non-state armed groups are disarmed and their military infrastructure dismantled, paving the way for a phased Israeli withdrawal.

The agreement also calls for a US-backed military coordination group to oversee and verify implementation.

It remains unclear whether separate international forces would replace UNIFIL and oversee the framework agreement, whether the two mandates could be merged, or whether Resolution 1701 would be dropped in favor of the agreement, with a single force assigned to implement it.

'Complicated' transition

A diplomatic source described the situation as "complicated," saying the current transition differs from the circumstances surrounding Resolution 1701.

At the time, a new military and political reality had emerged that the parties sought to preserve, the source told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Today, the source said, the mandate, powers, composition and operating procedures of any force replacing UNIFIL remain unclear.

The framework agreement also presents a legal obstacle.

"It is an understanding between three parties and cannot be imposed on the international community or assumed to have its automatic endorsement," the source said.

Turning it into a Security Council resolution would be difficult, the source added, because some member states could object.

Israel's position

Israel appears reluctant to accept a new international force to replace UNIFIL, which it accuses of having allowed Hezbollah to expand toward its border.

According to details emerging from recent negotiations over the framework agreement's implementation, Israel wants direct oversight of efforts to verify that the pilot zones are free of Hezbollah weapons and military infrastructure.

It favors a mechanism giving it a continuing monitoring and operational role rather than relying on reports from an independent international body.

Fundamental differences

Military and strategic expert Brigadier General Khalil Helou said UNIFIL's departure would render Resolution 1701 meaningless, effectively allowing the framework agreement to take its place.

"Resolution 1701 contains clear provisions and has a legal dimension, unlike the US-sponsored framework agreement, which requires negotiations to implement each of its provisions," Helou told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Merging the two would therefore be difficult, he said.

The framework agreement also makes no provision for foreign forces to implement it. Instead, it outlines understandings between Lebanon and Israel, with a military annex setting out reciprocal steps, he added.

Legal obstacles

Legally, a single force could implement both Resolution 1701 and the framework agreement. But constitutional and legal expert Adel Yamin said the nature of its mandate would pose further obstacles.

"Verifying disarmament is more intrusive than providing conventional support to the army," Yamin told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Such a mission could require clearer rules of engagement, raising questions about the host state's consent, he said.

Yamin also cited reports that Israel opposed an international force including French troops and that Washington considered Resolution 1701 obsolete, favoring the framework agreement as a basis for direct communication between the Lebanese and Israeli militaries.

One option, he said, would be a UN force or mission to implement Resolution 1701 alongside a multinational mechanism to oversee the framework agreement.

But that would risk overlapping powers and conflicting reports.

UN umbrella for framework agreement

International efforts are also being discussed to bring the framework agreement under UN auspices, potentially superseding Resolution 1701.

Yamin outlined several legal routes.

One would be to register the agreement with the UN Secretariat under Article 102 of the UN Charter, provided it qualifies as a treaty.

Registration would not give the agreement effective UN backing but would allow it to be invoked before UN bodies, he said.

Another option would be for the parties to send identical letters seeking Security Council endorsement, followed by a presidential statement or resolution welcoming the agreement.

The council could also endorse the agreement and annex it to a resolution, or establish a new force or expand an existing mandate to implement it, following the model of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).

But Yamin warned that UN backing would be a double-edged sword.

It would internationalize Israel's withdrawal obligations rather than leave them dependent solely on US guarantees. At the same time, it would place Lebanon's commitments to bring weapons under exclusive state control under tighter international scrutiny.

Yamin also cautioned against incorporating into a UN resolution any provisions that could cast doubt on Israel's obligation to withdraw immediately from Lebanon.

Such provisions should not gain international legal cover, he said, arguing that any clause undermining Lebanon's sovereignty or territorial integrity would violate both the UN Charter and the Lebanese Constitution and would be automatically void.


Saudi Arabia in Times of Crisis: Three Centuries of Sovereignty and Independent Decision-Making

Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman bin Abdulaziz and Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman (SPA)
Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman bin Abdulaziz and Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman (SPA)
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Saudi Arabia in Times of Crisis: Three Centuries of Sovereignty and Independent Decision-Making

Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman bin Abdulaziz and Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman (SPA)
Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman bin Abdulaziz and Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman (SPA)

Anyone who traces the history of the modern Saudi state will recognize that the threats and challenges it faces today are not fundamentally new, even if their methods and circumstances have changed. For three centuries, Saudi Arabia has upheld its sovereignty and independence in decision-making.

From the earliest stages of unification, King Abdulaziz bin Abdulrahman faced internal and external challenges as he built the state. Among the most dangerous were those that arose between 1927 and 1934, when domestic rebellions became intertwined with foreign threats, nearly plunging the country into crises on several fronts.

These included the rebellion of certain Ikhwan leaders who had previously been among the most prominent participants in the country's unification. Their disagreements with King Abdulaziz, rooted in their misguided interpretations of religious matters, the authority of the state, control over military raids and relations with neighboring countries, eventually escalated into armed confrontation. The conflict culminated in the Battle of Sabilla in 1929, before the rebellion was finally suppressed in 1930.

In the northern Hejaz, Hamid bin Rafadah led a rebellion in 1932 that was linked to opposition activities and backed by outside parties.

The south witnessed an Idrisi rebellion that same year, aimed at restoring the family's former influence. The rebels exploited border disputes with Yemen and received support from Imam Yahya, developments that later contributed to the Saudi-Yemeni War of 1934.

King Abdulaziz bin Abdulrahman (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Early Threats

The danger posed by these crises lay not only in their succession and occasional overlap, but also in their geographical reach, extending from the country's central and eastern regions to its northern and southern borders.

Tribal, political and religious motivations became entangled with the calculations of neighboring powers.

These events unfolded as Italy competed with Britain for influence in the Red Sea. Rome supported Imam Yahya's activities, opposed Saudi sovereignty over territories formerly controlled by the Idrisis and backed their rebellion, despite the signing of the Saudi-Italian Treaty of Friendship in February 1932.

King Abdulaziz, however, did not consider these developments sufficient grounds for severing relations.

While responding decisively with military force to the rebellion and Imam Yahya's actions once peaceful options had been exhausted, he also pursued diplomacy to neutralize external parties and subsequently settled disputes through treaties designed to preserve the state's stability.

He thus succeeded in overcoming one of the most complex periods in the Kingdom's formative history.

At the time, the emerging state faced the simultaneous challenges of consolidating its authority at home and securing recognition of its borders, sovereignty and independent decision-making abroad, while colonial powers competed for influence across the region.

King Abdulaziz confronted other challenges and crises in an exceptionally complicated regional and international environment.

What distinguished his political approach, however, was his ability to understand the balance of power and benefit from international relations without allowing those relationships to compromise his freedom of decision or undermine the state's fundamental interests.

These events illustrate a policy that distinguishes between managing disagreements and protecting national interests.

Differences with an international power need not result in severing relations, just as maintaining relations with that power does not require surrendering rights or sovereignty.

That approach continued under successive kings as state institutions developed and foreign relations expanded.

Over time, successive experiences helped build a body of expertise in crisis management that extended beyond wars and security threats to encompass economic disruptions, political transformations, waves of terrorism and other crises.

Each brought challenges that required the development of national institutions, systems and capabilities.

It is therefore nothing new for Saudi Arabia to face political and security threats involving overlapping regional and international interests, or challenges whose objectives and consequences extend beyond the immediate incidents through which they emerge.

Throughout the nearly three-century history of the Saudi state, it has experienced various forms of conflict and attempts to influence its decisions and positions.

The sources and methods of these threats have changed, but protecting national security and preserving independent decision-making have remained fundamental principles of Saudi policy.

The Current Attacks

The developments unfolding in the region today, including attacks against Saudi Arabia by the terrorist Houthi militia and other groups, together with the accompanying international positions and media commentary, require a broader understanding of the situation.

These incidents cannot be assessed solely through their immediate military consequences.

An attack on a civilian facility or critical infrastructure, however serious, may be one manifestation of a wider crisis involving several parties whose interests and objectives differ, even if their positions sometimes produce similar outcomes.

The attacks targeting Saudi cities in recent weeks offer an example of the nature of these challenges.

Threats have extended to airports and civilian and economic facilities, with consequences reaching beyond physical damage and defense costs.

They have also involved attempts to disrupt transportation, economic activity and the public's sense of security and stability.

Understanding these attacks therefore requires examining more than the weapons used. It also calls for assessing their political objectives and the potential pressure they seek to exert beyond the battlefield.

The broader political environment surrounding such incidents deserves close scrutiny, particularly when security threats form part of a wider situation involving economic interests, international alliances and political choices.

Historically, the challenges facing Saudi Arabia have not been exclusively military or political.

At various times, some parties have sought to exploit the Kingdom's religious standing and its responsibilities toward the Two Holy Mosques for political purposes, despite the principle that religious rituals and sacred sites should remain outside political conflicts.

Certain actors have attempted to undermine Saudi Arabia's standing and its service to the Two Holy Mosques by turning these responsibilities into instruments of political pressure.

Terrorist attacks against Saudi security can also be understood from this perspective, particularly when they involve areas or facilities connected to services for Hajj and Umrah pilgrims and other visitors.

Examples include missile attacks targeting the Makkah and Madinah regions and attacks on King Khalid International Airport.

Allies' Calculations

Setting aside the religious and moral dimensions, and recognizing these attacks as forms of military and security threats, the political and international developments surrounding them reveal another layer of complexity in the crises states confront.

Strategic relationships, however strong and deeply rooted, do not guarantee permanent alignment of interests and positions.

Partners may differ in their assessments of the nature of a threat, the appropriate means of confronting it or the extent of the support they are prepared to provide.

This does not diminish the importance of the alliances Saudi Arabia has built over many decades.

Those relationships have contributed to political, economic and defense cooperation and remain an important component of the Kingdom's foreign policy.

But partnership, in political terms, does not mean surrendering freedom of decision. Nor do differing calculations during a particular crisis eliminate the shared interests on which relations between states are founded.

Here lies one of the most complicated challenges.

A country may face a security threat that requires cooperation with its partners while simultaneously confronting political choices or arrangements whose consequences and duration extend far beyond addressing that immediate threat.

This dilemma may emerge in two directions.

An adversary may seek, by attacking civilian facilities, to push Riyadh toward settlements that do not serve its interests or to use Saudi Arabia as a means of relieving pressure on other parties.

Conversely, others may seek to draw the Kingdom into a broader regional conflict whose scope and conclusion it cannot determine on its own.

Independent decision-making means rejecting both possibilities.

Under such circumstances, preserving the freedom to make sovereign decisions becomes an essential part of crisis management.

The need to confront an immediate danger must not become a reason to accept strategic commitments that are not justified by national interests.

The point is that managing crises in a world of intertwined interests involves more than confronting adversaries.

It also requires managing differences with partners, maintaining a range of options and avoiding dependence on the calculations of any single party, regardless of the importance of that relationship.

Media Pressure

Alongside these developments, various analyses and arguments have emerged concerning the attacks and threats facing Saudi Arabia.

Some link them to the future of the Kingdom's economic and development projects, its ability to maintain stability and attract investment and tourism, or the implications for its international relationships and political choices.

It is natural for these issues to attract attention from the media and research centers.

Saudi Arabia's religious, political and economic significance, its extensive economic and development transformation, and the secure and stable environment required by its major projects make attacks on airports and critical infrastructure particularly newsworthy.

Yet some interpretations, especially in the media, tend to focus on the immediate scale of the threats before drawing conclusions about the Saudi government's ability to preserve its political and strategic choices.

Such assessments often fail to give sufficient weight to the historical experience of the Saudi state and its institutions, or to the resources, capabilities and international relationships at its disposal.

This tendency is evident in analyses that treat security attacks as a direct indication that the state's options are narrowing.

Others assume that escalating threats will inevitably compel Saudi Arabia to adjust its political positions according to what other parties consider appropriate responses to the crisis.

The problem is not in examining these possibilities, which is a legitimate part of analysis, but in treating them as inevitable outcomes.

It is equally problematic to measure a state's capacity to manage a crisis solely by the damage it sustains during a particular period.

Political history offers no basis for assuming that states necessarily change their strategic choices whenever they encounter military or economic challenges.

Likewise, maintaining a particular political position does not mean ignoring changing circumstances or refusing to reconsider the methods used to achieve national objectives.

King Faisal bin Abdulaziz (Asharq Al-Awsat)

The Limits of Coercion

An important distinction must be drawn between the ability to inflict damage and the ability to dictate decisions.

An armed terrorist group may succeed in threatening critical infrastructure or disrupting certain activities, but that does not mean it has acquired the power to determine the political choices of the state it targets.

Nor does producing an economic or media impact necessarily amount to achieving strategic objectives.

One of the defining features of Saudi Arabia's experience is that crisis management is no longer confined to a limited set of options or temporary responses.

As state institutions have developed, crisis management has become a coordinated effort involving multiple agencies, each with its own responsibilities and areas of expertise.

This enables the state to address crises across their security, economic, social and political dimensions.

Elements of this accumulated expertise have been demonstrated throughout Saudi history.

The relevant question is not how many crises the Kingdom has faced, but how it has overcome them and continued its course while political systems elsewhere changed, balances of power shifted and the calculations of major powers proved mistaken.

Consider, for example, the 1960s, when Saudi Arabia confronted one of the most dangerous and perhaps most complicated crises in its modern history.

An internal struggle over the monarchy, which ended with King Faisal assuming power in 1964, coincided with the rise of Nasserism and the ideological conflict sweeping the Arab world.

The confrontation extended beyond media campaigns and political incitement.

The Kingdom experienced attacks along its borders, as well as a wave of bombings and sabotage targeting security, military and oil installations.

These included the Trans-Arabian Pipeline, known as Tapline, and sites in Riyadh, Dammam and Khamis Mushait.

There were also attempts to infiltrate the military establishment and plot coups.

Saudi leaders confronted these dangers while reorganizing the institutions of government and the state, building military and security capabilities, and continuing development projects.

They did so within international alliances that offered no absolute guarantees, and amid repeated political efforts to contain the war in Yemen that did not always succeed.

Throughout these challenges, independent Saudi decision-making remained a consistent policy.

An example of this approach to external pressure and security threats can be found in a US diplomatic document dated August 11, 1965.

According to the document, Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz, then Minister of Defense and Aviation, summoned Talcott W. Seelye, the US chargé d'affaires in Jeddah, to a meeting attended by Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammed Ibrahim Masoud.

Acting on King Faisal's instructions, Prince Sultan outlined the threats facing Saudi territory.

When the American side made the deployment of fighter aircraft to help deter attacks conditional on specific requirements, Prince Sultan responded decisively that Riyadh did not want American assistance if it came with such conditions.

This did not represent a rejection of cooperation with Washington.

Rather, it was a refusal to allow a request for military support to become a constraint on Saudi political decision-making, even in the face of direct threats to national security.

Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz (Asharq Al-Awsat)

The Arab defeat in June 1967 subsequently transformed the regional balance of power.

Yet King Faisal did not treat the weakened position of his former adversaries as an opportunity to settle scores.

Instead, he moved beyond the dispute with Egypt and contributed to supporting it in the aftermath of the war.

This is what makes that period significant.

Saudi Arabia confronted threats to its security, borders, political stability and economic interests, but managed those challenges without allowing them to undermine the state's unity or stability.

Indeed, it emerged with greater strength and standing.

The crises of the 1970s followed, including the Iranian Revolution, the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Makkah and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

These developments confronted the Kingdom with security and ideological challenges, as well as strategic transformations whose consequences would endure for decades.

They were followed by the Iran-Iraq War and the pressures of the 1980s, which tested the Saudi economy's ability to sustain development spending amid economic and security challenges.

Alliances Put to the Test

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 posed an equally serious crisis.

Saudi Arabia faced a direct military threat to its borders and oil installations, ballistic missile attacks against cities and critical infrastructure, and an Iraqi incursion into the city of Khafji.

The Kingdom also encountered political pressure arising from divisions within the Arab world and the repercussions of bringing in international forces to liberate Kuwait.

Economically, the Saudi treasury bore the costs of the war, hosting military forces and supporting affected countries, with expenditures estimated at approximately $55 billion.

The budget deficit rose to 17% of gross domestic product in 1991.

The threats became severe enough to force the closure of several airports, including those in Riyadh and Dhahran, the suspension of civilian flights and the imposition of military restrictions on Saudi airspace.

These measures were not evidence that the state was incapable of protecting its skies.

They were responses to exceptional wartime circumstances, a distinction that must be remembered when assessing current threats.

This applies particularly to the suspension of operations at King Khalid International Airport, without confusing the existence of a threat with the ability to confront it.

The challenges did not end with Kuwait's liberation.

Security and financial commitments continued, while the consequences of the war placed pressure on government spending and development for years afterward.

Liberating Kuwait ended the occupation, but it did not eliminate the financial burdens borne by Riyadh or the political and security repercussions of the conflict.

The Kingdom was therefore confronting more than a war on its borders.

It faced a test of its ability to protect national security, manage alliances and shoulder the burdens of regional stability without losing its internal cohesion.

Confronting Terrorism

The September 11, 2001, attacks placed Riyadh in the midst of one of its most complicated political and media crises.

Its relationship with Washington faced an unprecedented test, accompanied by campaigns casting doubt on Saudi Arabia and pressure for reform and change.

These developments coincided with an international war on terrorism that soon reached Saudi territory through terrorist attacks targeting the state's security, facilities, citizens and residents.

The consequences of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 were no less serious.

The regional balance of power was disrupted, creating greater opportunities for Iranian influence.

Amid these developments, concepts such as "creative chaos" and the "New Middle East" gained prominence, while maps emerged proposing the redrawing of regional borders, including the partition of Saudi Arabia itself.

Yet the state that confronted terrorism at home and political and media pressure abroad did not allow these crises to dictate its choices.

It preserved its stability and territorial integrity while the wider region continued for years to bear the costs of wars and attempts to reshape its political landscape.

Arab Transformations

The events of the so-called Arab Spring in 2011 brought a different set of challenges.

These were not merely protests that toppled Arab governments, but transformations that threatened regional balances, opened the door to internal conflicts and foreign interventions, and facilitated the rise of extremist organizations.

Saudi leaders faced unrest in Bahrain, a gradual political and security collapse in Yemen, political transformations in Egypt, and wars in Syria and Libya.

There were also attempts to exploit those events to foment unrest inside Saudi Arabia.

The Kingdom had to confront the consequences of these transformations, preserve its own security and stability, and support stability in other Arab countries while regional alliances and balances of power were being reshaped.

The striking aspect was not merely that Saudi Arabia weathered this wave of upheaval.

It also came to shoulder part of the political, security and economic burdens left by crises across its Arab neighborhood.

If Saudi Arabia, with fewer resources at its disposal, managed to overcome those challenges while preserving its stability and independent political decision-making, it is today better equipped to confront new threats under the leadership of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman bin Abdulaziz and Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman.

The Kingdom now possesses greater capabilities, stronger institutions and extensive international alliances.

What some analyses overlook is that the existence of a threat does not necessarily indicate weakness on the part of the state.

Nor does the reluctance of some partners to become directly involved undermine this argument. On the contrary, it reinforces it.

Such reluctance offers practical evidence that a country's security cannot be left to the calculations of others, and that even the strongest partnerships remain subject to each partner's priorities and domestic considerations.

A state confident in its capabilities does not base its decisions on waiting for support that may arrive or be delayed.

It relies instead on its own resources and uses international relationships to expand its options, not as substitutes for them.

Recalling these historical experiences is not intended to equate different crises.

Each has its own characteristics and requires its own methods of response.

The point is to demonstrate that accumulated expertise in crisis management depends on understanding the various consequences of a crisis rather than addressing only one of its manifestations, while preserving the ability of the state and its institutions to fulfill their responsibilities.

This explains why current attacks must be addressed within a comprehensive strategy that is not confined to military retaliation.

Military action should instead form part of a coordinated set of political, diplomatic, economic and security measures serving national interests.

The Saudi state understands that it is not immune to challenges and that past achievements do not eliminate the need to prepare for the future.

It also bears responsibility for protecting its security, citizens and residents, and for assessing the consequences of its decisions.

This is particularly important when the region faces the possibility of a widening conflict involving multiple parties, with repercussions that could extend well beyond the immediate confrontation.

Perhaps the most important lesson of the Saudi experience is that independent decision-making cannot be secured merely by declaring it.

It requires the ability to choose, a range of alternatives, coordination among state institutions and balanced foreign relations, so that confronting one crisis does not create other, more complicated crises.

Here I emphasize once again that, amid the transformations taking place in the world today, the pressures facing states are no longer limited to direct military threats.

Economic, political and media considerations may become intertwined with those threats.

Managing relations with partners, maintaining confidence in the economy and protecting critical infrastructure have therefore become integral elements of national security.

Enduring Principles, Multiple Options

With its long history of navigating regional and international transformations, and the religious, political and economic responsibilities it carries, Riyadh understands that confronting challenges does not mean simply reacting to the accelerating pace of events.

It means retaining the ability to assess interests and risks and to choose the means of achieving national objectives without compromising the state's fundamental principles.

Over the decades, the sources of threats and methods of pressure have changed.

The interests of countries and alliances have shifted, and challenges unknown to previous generations have emerged.

Yet one principle has remained constant throughout the Saudi state's experience: its security, stability and independence in decision-making are responsibilities that cannot be left to the judgment of others, however important its relationships and shared interests with them may be.

Circumstances may change, methods of pressure may multiply, and the positions of adversaries and partners may diverge.

But sovereignty, at its core, remains a state's ability to preserve its freedom of decision and choose what it considers consistent with its interests and responsibilities, rather than what others seek to impose on it under the pressure of crises.