The resignation of Fares al-Nur, a senior figure in the Sudan Founding Alliance (Tasis), from all his posts in the Rapid Support Forces and the political bloc backing it has revived questions about a wave of defections from the force in recent months and what they may mean for its military and political cohesion.
The move comes as Sudan’s war enters its fourth year with no clear sign that either side is close to a decisive military victory.
Al-Nur told Asharq Al-Awsat on Wednesday that he had left all positions of responsibility within the RSF and Tasis. He said he acted because of what he described as a deepening political deadlock, the continuation of the war and the vast humanitarian suffering it has caused.
He said his resignation was intended to open space for a broad Sudanese dialogue that brings together different parties, away from political and military polarization, and helps reach a settlement to end the crisis.
The importance of the step lies not only in al-Nur’s position inside the alliance, but also in its nature. He is not a battlefield commander with troops on the ground.
He is instead viewed as one of the most prominent political figures associated with the project that the RSF sought to build alongside its military campaign. That gives his resignation political weight beyond any immediate military effect.
Al-Nur was a member of the Tasis presidential council and had been appointed “governor of Khartoum Region” in the parallel government announced by the alliance. He had previously served for years as an adviser to RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, and was one of the most prominent members of the RSF negotiating delegation at the 2023 Jeddah talks.
What makes this different?
This type of departure differs from earlier splits within the RSF over the past two years. Most of those involved were field commanders with military influence or fighters on the ground.
In May, Bashara al-Huweira, who was responsible for military operations on the Bara axis in North Kordofan State, announced his defection from the RSF. Before him, field commander Al-Nour Adam, known as Al-Nour al-Qubba, said he had withdrawn from the RSF and joined the Sudanese army after his forces left their positions in North Darfur.
Before them all, Abu Aqla Keikal, one of the RSF’s most prominent commanders and the governor of Gezira State while it was under RSF control, announced his cooperation with the Sudanese army.
That was seen as one of the most consequential defections because of his influence in central Sudan. Most recently, field commander Ali Rizq Allah, known as Al-Savannah, announced his defection and joined the Sudanese Armed Forces.
The political and military weight of these figures varies. But the pace of defections over a short period has raised a sharper question: do they point to growing pressure inside the RSF camp, or are they still individual moves that do not affect the force’s core structure?
The RSF has tried to project a different picture. In recent days, it broadcast video clips that it said, according to its Telegram platform, showed groups from the Joint Force of armed movements allied with the army joining its ranks.
The message was clear: movement between the camps is not going in one direction only.
Such messages are part of a propaganda and media war running alongside the fighting, with each side trying to prove its cohesion and its ability to attract leaders and fighters.
Shartai Samir, a prominent RSF supporter on social media, played down the importance of Fares al-Nur’s departure. He said the political and military project represented by Tasis had moved beyond individuals, and that the departure of leaders or groups would not affect its continuity.
He also said the developments were part of attempts to attract political and military figures from the RSF camp after its opponents, as he put it, failed to achieve their goals militarily.
But the key question is not how many people leave. It is what effect they have.
Political researcher Mohamed Latif says it is important to distinguish between political and military defections.
He told Asharq Al-Awsat that Sudanese politics has seen repeated splits inside parties and alliances over many decades, but that they have rarely produced a radical shift in the balance of power.
Latif said most political splits are driven by personal disputes or ambitions rather than ideological or programmatic differences. For that reason, their impact often remains limited.
He said the impact of “military defections” is measured by how far they affect a party’s fighting strength or geographical deployment. In his view, most of the defections from the RSF in the recent period have not had a tangible effect on its basic military structure or its main areas of influence.
That is why he said he did not expect the departure of Fares al-Nur, as a political and civilian figure, to have a major impact on the cohesion of the Tasis alliance.
But not everyone agrees with that assessment.
Retired Brigadier General Dr. Jamal al-Shaheed, a strategic expert specializing in security and military affairs, says defections should not be judged by the announcement alone, but by their practical effects on the ground.
Al-Shaheed told Asharq Al-Awsat that defections become significant when they reach middle-ranking and field commanders, or political figures with organizational and social influence. Such figures, he said, are the link between the top leadership and the base.
“The indicators that should be monitored are not limited to the number of defectors, but include whether the phenomenon continues and expands, and its impact on internal discipline, the ability to recruit and mobilize, and the maintenance of field deployments,” he said.
According to al-Shaheed, the decisive test is ultimately military performance.
If defections are accompanied by battlefield retreats, the loss of areas of influence, or a weaker ability to carry out coordinated operations, then they move from being a political or media event to a factor affecting the balance of the conflict.
The retired military expert points to earlier experiences of Sudanese armed movements during the civil war in southern Sudan and the Darfur conflict. Some defections yielded no meaningful strategic results, while others weakened entire factions by stripping them of influential leaders and undermining their organizational cohesion.
All of this raises a broader question about the future of the war itself.
RSF supporters say the latest defections are no more than individual moves that will not affect their political and military project. Others argue that their repetition warrants close attention as a sign of internal pressures and challenges that may extend beyond individuals to the organizational structure itself.
So far, there is no evidence that defections between the parties to the war can, on their own, change the course of the conflict or force a political settlement.
But their persistence and spread among military and political figures make them a phenomenon worth watching in a long, open-ended war. Its final outcome still depends on what the battlefield reveals in the coming months, and on whether the warring parties can preserve both military and political cohesion.
