Israel Struck an Iranian Steel Facility. Was it a Valid Military Target?

This video grab taken on April 3, 2026, from undated UGC images shared on social media on April 1, 2026, shows thick plumes of smoke rising following airstrikes in Baharestan, in Iran's central Isfahan province. (Photo by various sources / AFP)
This video grab taken on April 3, 2026, from undated UGC images shared on social media on April 1, 2026, shows thick plumes of smoke rising following airstrikes in Baharestan, in Iran's central Isfahan province. (Photo by various sources / AFP)
TT

Israel Struck an Iranian Steel Facility. Was it a Valid Military Target?

This video grab taken on April 3, 2026, from undated UGC images shared on social media on April 1, 2026, shows thick plumes of smoke rising following airstrikes in Baharestan, in Iran's central Isfahan province. (Photo by various sources / AFP)
This video grab taken on April 3, 2026, from undated UGC images shared on social media on April 1, 2026, shows thick plumes of smoke rising following airstrikes in Baharestan, in Iran's central Isfahan province. (Photo by various sources / AFP)

Washington: Yeganeh Torbati

Over the course of the Iran war, US and Israeli warplanes hit missile depots and launchers, security forces’ headquarters and air defense systems.

Yet not all of the targets during the six-week campaign were traditional military sites.

On March 27, and again a few days later, Israeli airstrikes pounded a vast steel complex just outside Isfahan called Mobarakeh Steel, and another one in the southwest of the country.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu asserted that his country’s strikes had slashed Iran’s steel production capacity and eliminated revenue for the powerful Revolutionary Guards, whose repression underpins the Iranian government.

Companies like Mobarakeh illustrate the complexities inherent to Iran’s economy. While Iran’s clerical leadership and security forces are deeply enmeshed in the country’s most profitable and important businesses, those same companies are vital to the livelihoods of millions of ordinary Iranians, regardless of whether they have deep ideological allegiance to the government.

The attacks shut down major parts of the Isfahan plant for weeks, idling over 20,000 workers and choking off the supply of steel to domestic manufacturers. “I felt like my own home had been destroyed,” said Mostafa, a former employee, who asked to speak on condition of anonymity to avoid retribution by the government.

The United States and Iran have lurched between peace talks and exchanges of fire in recent weeks. Their negotiations were expected to cover the economic benefits Iran might receive in return for long-term limits on its nuclear program.

The interim ceasefire agreement, signed last month, could result in as much as $300 billion for Iran’s reconstruction and economic development. But that now seems a distant prospect, after Trump said this week that he believed the temporary truce was “over.”

If any investment does flow to Iran, companies like Mobarakeh will undoubtedly come into focus because of their importance to Iran’s economy, as well as their affiliation with Iran’s most powerful security forces.

Trump has frequently threatened to attack Iranian infrastructure, and if war restarts, there will be scrutiny over any such strikes.

On Thursday, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps accused the United States of striking a railway bridge that connected the country with Turkmenistan.

A spokesman for US Central Command confirmed that the United States struck the railway bridge, describing it as military logistics infrastructure that enabled a flow of weapons and other military supplies to key areas.

Mobarakeh has provided revenue to an investment fund belonging to a state-run militia, the Basij, which answers to the Guards, according to the US Treasury.

A 2021 report by Iran’s Parliament identified the investment fund as a major shareholder of Mobarakeh.

Recent financial statements from Mobarakeh show that its shareholders include an investment fund ultimately controlled by Iran’s supreme leader.

Although the statements do not show a link to the Guards, they often obscure their ownership through proxy investors.

In justifying the strikes on steel facilities, Netanyahu said they would deprive the regime “of both financial resources and the ability to produce many weapons.”

Mobarakeh executives did not respond to a request for comment, and it is unclear if the steel produced at Mobarakeh was used in making Iran’s weapon systems.

“Mobarakeh Steel products might not be directly used in missile production, but the company is most probably engaged in research and development of modern high-strength steel alloys for future large-scale production,” said Farzin Nadimi, a senior fellow with the Washington Institute and an expert on Iranian military affairs.

He added, “Mobarakeh Steel products, though, are more likely used in producing missile transporter-launcher vehicles.”

International law prohibits strikes on industrial sites that serve civilians, unless the facility makes an effective contribution to military action and striking it confers a definite military advantage, international law experts said.

The dominant international view rejects the idea that generating revenue for military operations is enough to qualify a civilian site as a military target, said Susana SaCouto, director of the War Crimes Research Office at American University’s Washington College of Law.

Miad Maleki, a former US Treasury official, said that while he believed the complex was a legitimate target for sanctions, he doubted that it should have been hit in military strikes.

“These are the Iranian people’s assets, and it’s going to hurt the economy even way beyond the Islamic republic,” he said.

“It does employ many people and pay salaries for many people,” Maleki added. “But at the same time, it’s really just a major source of revenue for a lot of corrupt actors.”

Opaque ownership

Built by an Italian business group, Mobarakeh became operational in 1992 and was a symbol of Iran’s industrial development and rebuilding after the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s.

People with ties to the Revolutionary Guards moved into leadership positions at the plant starting in the late 1990s, two former employees said, declining to be named to avoid repercussions from Iran’s government.

For instance, Mehdi Taj, a former senior Guards commander, served on the complex’s board of directors and held an executive position there in the early 2000s.

Taj is now the director of Iran’s soccer federation, which did not respond to a request for comment.

And a privatization drive carried out in the mid-2000s transferred portions of state-owned companies, like Mobarakeh, to powerful and opaque players such as the Guards and conglomerates that answer to Iran’s clerical leadership.

In 2008, a consortium led by Mehr Eghtesad Iranian Investment Company, an outfit belonging to the Basij, purchased 45% of Mobarakeh’s shares.

As of 2021, Mehr Eghtesad was one of Mobarakeh’s largest shareholders, with a nearly 14% stake, according to a parliamentary report written that year.

The Basij is one of the primary forces that the regime deploys to suppress protests, including the recent nationwide demonstrations in December and January. Those protests arose over discontent with Iran’s currency crisis and perceived economic mismanagement by the government.

Mehr Eghtesad’s owner, a bank, in 2020 merged with another Iranian bank, Bank Sepah, which did not respond to a request for comment.

Mobarakeh earned roughly $1.6 billion in net profit in 2024-2025. The US Treasury said in 2018 that the company “has provided millions of dollars” annually to Mehr Eghtesad.

“Some part of the economy is run through the government, but some larger part of the economy is run through the shadow government or Revolutionary Guards,” said Mahdi Ghodsi, an economist at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies.

One relatively new shareholder of Mobarakeh, according to documents filed with the Tehran Stock Exchange, is a company belonging to Astan-e Quds-e Razavi, an Iranian foundation that the United States put sanctions on in 2021 for being controlled by Iran’s former supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. The company owned 1.79% of Mobarakeh as of last year.

Other major owners include several state-owned pension funds. Iran’s pension funds have been struggling for years to make payments to retirees, and the destruction of key sectors of the economy is likely to worsen that problem.

Iranian legislators investigated possible corruption by managers at Mobarakeh in 2021 and blamed many of its issues on the flawed process of privatization, saying it was “now governed by completely opaque ownership alongside entirely state-controlled management.”

A ‘beloved’ company

Interviews with some of the people who used to work at Mobarakeh present another image of the company.

For aspiring engineers growing up in Isfahan, working at Mobarakeh was a “dream job,” said Maryam, who now lives outside Iran. She and some other former employees whom The New York Times spoke to requested that they not be fully identified, for fear of repercussions for speaking publicly.

Some said they felt they were at a prestigious, state-of-the-art company that was contributing to the country and cared about their well-being.

“Even before I was born, my father was working in steel,” said Maziyar Shokrani, who, like his father, worked at Mobarakeh.

Shokrani began working there as a lawyer in the mid-2000s, taking a bus each day to the sprawling plant 40 miles outside Isfahan. “I know my entire life and existence to be from steel,” he said.

Mobarakeh also donated funds to build stadiums and educational institutions and supported poor families in the area surrounding the complex, said Mostafa, the former employee, who now lives outside Iran.

“It was beloved in that region,” Mostafa said. “Any industry that hit a snag, or any group that had a problem, they had some hope that Mobarakeh Steel would arrange for some kind of support.”

The Iranian news outlet Rouydad24 reported in early May that of 27,000 workers, just 2,000 were still working at the plant. Iranian officials have said that Mobarakeh is being rebuilt more quickly than expected, and in early June the company relaunched a furnace that had been damaged in the strikes.

In interviews, former employees had differing views about who was to blame for the strikes on Mobarakeh.

“More of the blame should be cast with the Guards, because it deliberately and consciously took the country’s economy down this path,” said Shokrani, who now lives outside Iran.

In the minds of Iranians, the United States and Israel were closely linked in their conduct of the war, said Abbas Kamranian-Marnani, a mechanical engineer who worked at Mobarakeh or its contractors for a decade and now lives in Europe. “They worked mostly toward the destruction of infrastructure and the destruction of Iran,” he said.

Kamranian-Marnani said strikes like the one on the steel plant had caused Iranians to lose hope in the idea of better relations with the United States.

A senior US military official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss operational matters, said they did not know of any US role in the steel strikes.

The New York Times



Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa: The Emir Who Transformed Qatar

Former Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Former Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (Asharq Al-Awsat)
TT

Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa: The Emir Who Transformed Qatar

Former Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Former Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (Asharq Al-Awsat)

With the passing of the Father Emir, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, Qatar closes the chapter on one of the Gulf region's most significant political and development success stories of recent decades. His name became synonymous with the most profound transformation in the country's modern history, as Qatar evolved during his reign from a state with a limited international profile into an influential player in regional and global politics, economics, and media.

Sheikh Hamad is widely regarded as one of Qatar's defining leaders and the architect of its modern renaissance. Under his leadership, the country underwent sweeping economic, social, and cultural transformation. During his reign, Qatar's gross domestic product expanded more than twenty-fourfold, while GDP per capita increased nearly sixfold.

Born in Doha in 1952, Sheikh Hamad graduated from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 1971. He then joined the armed forces, rising through the military ranks before being appointed Crown Prince and Minister of Defense in 1977. On June 27, 1995, he assumed power, and in June 2013 handed authority to his son, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, in a smooth transfer of power widely regarded as one of the region's rare peaceful successions.

A Strong Economy

Sheikh Hamad's economic strategy centered on harnessing Qatar's vast natural gas wealth to build a strong and diversified economy. During his years in power, the country's GDP grew dramatically, average incomes rose sharply, and exports of liquefied natural gas ushered in a new era in Qatar's history. Following the first LNG shipment in 1996, Qatar became the world's largest exporter of liquefied natural gas by 2006, generating enormous revenues that financed major investments in infrastructure, education, healthcare, and public services.

Expanding Qatar's International Role

On the international stage, Qatar adopted a far more active foreign policy, positioning itself as a mediator in a number of regional and international conflicts. Among its most prominent diplomatic efforts were its role in Lebanon during the 2006 war and the country's political crisis in 2008.

Qatar also took a leading role in supporting the Palestinian cause, particularly through economic assistance to the Gaza Strip and by providing a platform for negotiations aimed at ending the conflict there. In 2012, Sheikh Hamad became the first Arab leader to visit Gaza after Hamas took control of the territory.

He also forged close strategic ties with the United States. During his reign, Al Udeid Air Base was established in 1996. Qatar financed almost the entire construction of the base, at a cost exceeding $1 billion, as part of a strategy to strengthen its defense capabilities and deepen military cooperation with the United States following the Gulf War. By 2002, it had become one of the most important US. military bases outside the United States.

Qatar also participated in the international conference supporting post-Gaddafi Libya in Paris. During Sheikh Hamad's rule, Doha became a major supporter of the Syrian cause, providing extensive political and humanitarian backing to the Syrian opposition, an approach that continued in subsequent years.

Beginning in the mid-1990s, Qatar pursued a foreign policy built on relative neutrality and open channels with opposing parties, allowing it to serve as a mediator in regional and international disputes. Over time, this approach became one of the country's most effective instruments of soft power, transforming Doha into a permanent venue for negotiations and political dialogue.

Today, the Qatari capital is widely recognized as one of the world's leading hubs for mediation and conflict resolution, a role first established under Sheikh Hamad and later expanded during the reign of Sheikh Tamim.

Soft Power

Just one year after assuming power, Sheikh Hamad launched the Al Jazeera Media Network in 1996. The network quickly became one of the Arab world's most influential media platforms, giving Qatar an outsized voice in regional political discourse. As the Arab world underwent profound political change, Al Jazeera emerged as one of Qatar's most powerful instruments of influence, elevating the country's international profile far beyond its geographic size.

The World Cup

Qatar's hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup was far more than a sporting event. It was a strategic national project and a defining milestone that reshaped the country's standing on the global stage.

By hosting football's biggest tournament, Qatar became both the first Arab nation and the first Middle Eastern country to stage the World Cup, earning unprecedented global visibility across the media, political, and economic spheres while reinforcing its image as a nation capable of organizing events of the highest international caliber.

The tournament also became one of Qatar's most effective soft power tools. Rather than relying solely on traditional forms of influence, Doha used sport to strengthen its international image, showcase its organizational capabilities, and capture the world's attention.

Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani leaves behind a lasting legacy in Qatar's modern history. His name is inseparable from the country's transformation from an economy largely dependent on natural resources into a state wielding influence through a diverse set of instruments, including economic strength, global investment, media, diplomacy, and sport.

Many of the defining features of Qatar's current policies remain rooted in the foundations he laid during his years in power, making his legacy one of the Gulf region's most significant political and developmental transformations in recent decades.


‘Our Land, Our Sky:’ West Bank Palestinians Fly Kites in Defiance of Israeli Settlers

 A youth releases a kite in the colors of the Palestinian flag as he takes part in a kite festival under the theme "The Land Is Our Land and the Sky Is Our Sky," in the village of Burin near the West Bank city of Nablus, Friday, July 10, 2026. (AP)
A youth releases a kite in the colors of the Palestinian flag as he takes part in a kite festival under the theme "The Land Is Our Land and the Sky Is Our Sky," in the village of Burin near the West Bank city of Nablus, Friday, July 10, 2026. (AP)
TT

‘Our Land, Our Sky:’ West Bank Palestinians Fly Kites in Defiance of Israeli Settlers

 A youth releases a kite in the colors of the Palestinian flag as he takes part in a kite festival under the theme "The Land Is Our Land and the Sky Is Our Sky," in the village of Burin near the West Bank city of Nablus, Friday, July 10, 2026. (AP)
A youth releases a kite in the colors of the Palestinian flag as he takes part in a kite festival under the theme "The Land Is Our Land and the Sky Is Our Sky," in the village of Burin near the West Bank city of Nablus, Friday, July 10, 2026. (AP)

As brightly colored kites climb above Burin, a Palestinian village in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, children race across a sun-baked hillside, watching their creations soar into the sky.

Behind them, the red-roofed houses of Har Bracha, an Israeli settlement, overlook the village below.

Established in 1983, the settlement, illegal under international law, is one of several that encircle Burin, a village of a few thousand people.

Every summer since 2009, residents have gathered on this hill for a kite festival, held on land they say has been partly lost after being confiscated by settlers.

"We want to tell the settlers that this is our land, this is our sky. If we can't reach those lands anymore, our kites can," Ghassan Najjar, one of the festival's organizers, told AFP.

While the festival is primarily for children, it also carries a "political message," he says.

In Burin, conversations rarely drift far from settler attacks or the steady spread of Israeli settlements across the Palestinian territory.

As early as 2008, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) had warned of settler attacks in the area, citing shootings targeting Burin residents and the uprooting of their olive trees.

Since the start of the war in Gaza in October 2023, the United Nations has reported a sharp increase in violence attributed to Israeli settlers in the West Bank, while several Israeli ministers have continued to call for the annexation of all or part of the territory.

Palestinians and solidarity activists fly kites towards the Israeli settlement of Har Bracha from the village of Burin, south of Nablus in the occupied West Bank on July 10, 2026. (AFP)

- 'Our roots' -

For a few hours, however, the hillside takes on the air of a village fair.

A clown paints children's faces, music fills the air, as families spread picnic carpets across the grass.

Kites in the black, white, green and red of the Palestinian flag soar overhead, joined by another in the colors of Egypt, flown in tribute to the Egyptian national football team.

"Our children have the right to play and to have a real and good life," says Najjar.

Yet even this celebration unfolds under the shadow of the conflict.

Before gathering, residents say they first checked that no groups of Israeli settlers were nearby.

"Sometimes we are scared... Last year we didn't come because settlers had attacked the village," says 15-year-old Sanaa Bashar Najjar.

"We stay only half an hour or an hour, just to get a bit of fresh air. With the war and the economic hardship, we're simply trying to breathe."

Another resident, Dalia Zaban, says her parents' home was attacked, its windows smashed and cars vandalized.

"Today, we just hope they don't come down here," she said.

As the afternoon wears on, the wind begins to fade and the kites slowly drift back to earth.

The villagers, however, say they will return next summer, determined to reclaim at least a patch of sky.

Wearing sunglasses and dressed with care, Burin resident Qusai Walid Eid summarizes the feeling, saying he attends the festival every year to strengthen "our roots in this land".


What Does Removing Syria from the US List of State Sponsors of Terrorism Mean for Its Economy?

US President Donald Trump holds a bilateral meeting with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa alongside the NATO leaders summit at the Bestepe Presidential Compound in Ankara, Türkiye, July 8, 2026. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst
US President Donald Trump holds a bilateral meeting with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa alongside the NATO leaders summit at the Bestepe Presidential Compound in Ankara, Türkiye, July 8, 2026. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst
TT

What Does Removing Syria from the US List of State Sponsors of Terrorism Mean for Its Economy?

US President Donald Trump holds a bilateral meeting with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa alongside the NATO leaders summit at the Bestepe Presidential Compound in Ankara, Türkiye, July 8, 2026. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst
US President Donald Trump holds a bilateral meeting with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa alongside the NATO leaders summit at the Bestepe Presidential Compound in Ankara, Türkiye, July 8, 2026. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst

The US administration’s decision to begin the process of removing Syria from its list of State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) - where it has remained since 1979 - marks the country’s most significant political and economic shift in decades.

The designation was more than a political label; it served as the legal cornerstone of the extensive US sanctions architecture imposed on Syria. Its removal could reopen the door to trade, investment, and large-scale reconstruction.

The announcement followed what Washington described as “positive changes” by the Syrian government and formal assurances from Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa that Syria would not support acts of international terrorism in the future.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio subsequently notified Congress of President Donald Trump’s intention to rescind the designation after the required 45-day congressional notification period, describing the move as “historic” and saying it offers Syria a genuine opportunity to rebuild and open a new chapter for its people.

Syrian officials welcomed the decision. Finance Minister Mohammad Yosr Barnieh called it “a historic moment” heralding a new era of prosperity, investment, and economic recovery. He said the move would open a new chapter for the Syrian economy, accelerate recovery, encourage investment, and facilitate Syria’s reintegration into the global economy.

Central Bank Governor Safwat Raslan likewise described the decision as “a positive turning point” that would strengthen confidence, attract investment, and help reintegrate Syria into the global financial system. He reaffirmed the central bank’s commitment to reforms, monetary stability, and long-term economic recovery.

Reconnecting to the Global Financial System

In practical terms, the decision paves the way for Syrian banks to gradually reconnect with the global financial system, correspondent banking networks, and the SWIFT international payments system. The terrorism designation had effectively prevented foreign correspondent banks from dealing with Syrian financial institutions for fear of US legal penalties.

Reintegration could improve access to trade finance and sharply reduce the cost of remittances from Syrians abroad. For years, expatriates have relied on costly informal channels to circumvent sanctions. Easier remittance flows would provide a direct boost to household incomes and financial stability.

Removing Barriers to Investment

For years, US secondary sanctions linked to the terrorism designation discouraged foreign companies from participating in reconstruction projects, fearing hefty fines or exclusion from the US market.

Highlighting the policy shift, the US administration quoted Trump as telling Al-Sharaa: “I promised to remove all the barriers preventing you from rebuilding your country, and very soon you will finally be able to do so.” Trump also said US companies are already interested in investing in Syria.

Removing the designation significantly reduces reputational risk and gives multinational companies greater legal and procedural certainty to invest in infrastructure, real estate, telecommunications, and other sectors.

Reviving Trade and the Energy Sector

Foreign trade is also expected to benefit. Previous restrictions limited imports of advanced industrial equipment and technology classified as “dual-use” goods with potential civilian and military applications. Easing those restrictions would allow Syrian manufacturers to import production lines, agricultural equipment, and medical supplies with far fewer regulatory hurdles.

The energy sector, which has suffered years of severe deterioration, could also benefit. International companies would be able to provide spare parts, technical expertise, and technology needed to rehabilitate damaged oil and gas fields and repair aging power plants, helping ease chronic electricity shortages and support industrial production.

Restoring Access to International Financing

Syria’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism also triggered an effective US veto on loans, grants, technical assistance, and other support from international financial institutions, particularly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

With the designation removed, Damascus could theoretically begin negotiations with these institutions to secure development financing, support economic restructuring, and implement monetary and fiscal reforms.

From Blanket Prohibition to Risk-Based Assessment

Legal experts say the decision fundamentally changes how international companies and financial institutions assess Syria.

Previously, US law effectively imposed a blanket prohibition on doing business with Syria, leaving banks and corporations with virtually no room for discretion. Now, the automatic legal barrier is removed. Banks and companies can independently assess the remaining legal and commercial risks and proceed with transactions that comply with other applicable sanctions. This represents a fundamental shift, giving investors and financial institutions flexibility that has not existed since Syria was added to the terrorism list in 1979.

Why the Economic Crisis Will Not End Overnight

Despite the significance of Rubio’s announcement and the June 30, 2025 executive order easing certain restrictions, the economic impact is unlikely to be immediate.

The biggest constraint is that removing Syria from the terrorism list does not dismantle the broader sanctions regime. Numerous US laws and executive orders targeting key economic sectors, entities, and individuals remain in force.

In addition, Syria is likely to face prolonged caution from international banks — a phenomenon known as “over-compliance.” Many financial institutions are expected to spend months, if not years, conducting extensive legal reviews before reopening accounts or facilitating trade with Syria, seeking to avoid penalties under the sanctions that remain in place.

Ultimately, Syria’s economic recovery will depend not only on the easing of US restrictions but also on its ability to implement deep structural and institutional reforms, improve the business environment, and maintain monetary stability.

Removing Syria from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list is a major step toward reducing reputational risk and reopening international markets. But a full recovery remains a long-term process that will require the gradual dismantling of the remaining sanctions, which continue to pose the greatest obstacle to Syria’s reintegration into the global economy.