As we know, Yemen has long been, and continues to be, a prime target of Iran's strategic ambitions. Today, it is particularly enticing to Tehran as it seeks to transform the country into a forward operating base for aggression across the Arabian Peninsula, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden.
The government of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps now seeks to hold the Bab al-Mandab Strait in its left hand while already gripping the Strait of Hormuz in its right. In doing so, it would tighten its chokehold over both waterways, with the Houthis serving as an indispensable instrument in this dangerous design.
The Western world, along with the Arab world and even the Gulf states, has yet to fully make up its mind about uprooting the threat posed by the Iranian regime once and for all. As we argued yesterday, freeing Hormuz from Iranian domination could become common ground for all those harmed by Tehran's conduct.
Until that day comes, is it not possible to act on the Yemeni front to expel, weaken, or fragment Iranian influence there?
The Houthis are no longer enjoying their strongest days, especially as living conditions continue to deteriorate. Long-suppressed public anger is now beginning to boil over, particularly among Yemen's tribes, the country's foremost social force. Among the principal tribal strongholds are Al Jawf and Marib.
In recent days, tribal sheikh Hamad bin Fadgham, one of the prominent leaders of the fierce Dahm tribes, declared an uprising against the Houthi movement and called upon all Yemeni tribes to respond under the tribal custom known as "al-Nakaf." Tribes have since begun converging on Matrah Al Rayyan in Al Jawf Governorate in answer to that call.
Knowledgeable sources in the Houthi-controlled capital, Sanaa, told Asharq Al Awsat that Houthi commanders and supervisors have, over the past several days, begun mobilizing residents to confront the "tribal Nakaf," or tribal mobilization, in Al Jawf Governorate. Under the pretext of combating treason and collaboration, they have held large meetings across neighborhoods, urging residents to prove their loyalty by joining security operations and military preparations.
The sources also told this newspaper that tribal leaders and local notables who declined to participate in the Houthi mobilization campaign have been placed under measures resembling house arrest.
Yes, Sheikh Hamad bin Fadgham is a controversial figure, as the report notes, whose positions have shifted repeatedly over the years. After backing the internationally recognized government and leading thousands of fighters against the Houthis, he reversed course, pledged allegiance to them, and handed over his weapons and military equipment. Yet such conduct is hardly unusual in Yemen's culture of war and tribal politics. There is even a saying, offered half in jest and half in earnest: you may find one branch of a tribe fighting alongside the Houthis while their cousins fight for the legitimate government. They might sit together beneath the shade of their pickup trucks, chewing qat, before each side returns to its own battlefield. Such scenes were witnessed during the war between the Republicans and the Royalists following the fall of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom.
That is true. But it does not preclude saying that this tribal uprising against the Houthis is different. Nor does it preclude recognizing that cracks have appeared through which Houthi domination can be challenged, whether on the tribal front or elsewhere. At the end of the day, ordinary Yemenis are not content living beneath the Houthi dagger. Their livelihoods, their security, and their means of survival are all being squeezed.
The bottom line is this: why not seize the opportunity to build genuine momentum against Iran's presence, contain it, and push it to the margins?
