Whenever the United States and Iran draw closer to the negotiating table, the same question resurfaces: Can a lasting agreement be reached with the Islamic Republic of Iran, or do negotiations simply turn into a new pitstop in a long, never-ending conflict? Indeed, the experience spanning since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 indicates that the relationship between the two parties has never known true stability; rather, it has moved from one crisis to another, and from one round of negotiations to a new, more complex one.
Today, escalation is returning, and contacts between Washington and Tehran are resuming through the mediation of several countries - most notably the Sultanate of Oman, Qatar, Türkiye, Pakistan, and Egypt - in an attempt to contain the tension and prevent the region from sliding into a wider confrontation. However, the path does not seem easy, as each party enters negotiations with entirely different goals from the other.
Many experts believe that negotiating with Iran differs from conventional diplomacy, not only because of the issues on the table, but also due to the very nature of the regime itself, which blends religious, political, military, and security considerations, alongside distinct cultural temperaments. Therefore, any agreement is not confined to a single issue but extends to a broad network of regional and international interests.
The late Israeli diplomat Uri Lubrani, Israel’s last ambassador to Iran before the Islamic Revolution, was among those who warned most strongly against underestimating the Iranians' negotiating skills. He famously described Iranians as "a nation of carpet weavers and chess players," referring to their immense patience and their ability to think several moves ahead.
He believed that Tehran does not treat negotiations as a fast track to an agreement, but rather as a tool to improve its political posture and buy time, even calling their style of managing negotiations "a masterpiece in misleading the world."
Whether one agrees or disagrees with this assessment, it reflects the prevailing impression among many diplomats who have dealt with Iran over the past decades.
Perhaps the most defining feature of Iranian policy is its ability to pursue multiple tracks simultaneously. It negotiates, but at the same time, it maintains various leverage points - whether through its regional influence, military and security files, or its ability to impact maritime navigation and energy flows in the Gulf. Consequently, observers note that Tehran always makes sure never to enter any negotiations stripped of its pressure cards.
The role of mediating countries is particularly prominent at this stage. These countries do not merely pass messages between the two sides; they play a larger role in aligning positions, opening backchannels, and defusing tension when negotiations hit a dead end.
In recent years, Türkiye has gained extensive experience in this field, leveraging the role of its security and diplomatic apparatuses in managing complex regional crises. Pakistan has also bolstered its presence by hosting meetings and helping the parties keep the dialogue alive despite major disagreements.
These countries do not view mediation solely as a diplomatic chore, but also as an opportunity to enhance their regional and international standing. Every success in bridging viewpoints grants them greater political weight and increases their influence over other dossiers within the region.
As for Iran, it realizes that time may be one of its most critical elements of strength. The longer negotiations drag on, the more pressure builds on the other parties - whether due to security concerns, volatility in energy markets, or domestic political calculations. For this reason, several analysts believe that the Iranian leadership does not view the time factor as a burden, but rather as a card that can be capitalized on to secure better terms.
In contrast, the US administration faces different pressures. It is expected to demonstrate its ability to prevent military escalation while simultaneously avoiding concessions that might appear too significant to the American public.
Furthermore, any developments on the ground in the Middle East could directly impact domestic US politics, especially with upcoming elections, a factor that narrows Washington's margin of maneuver.
The difficulty of the negotiations is not limited to nuclear issues alone; it also encompasses the future of economic sanctions, Iran's regional role, maritime security in the Gulf, and relations with US allies in the region. Consequently, reaching a comprehensive agreement requires addressing deeply intertwined files, each with its own calculations.
At the same time, Iran faces internal challenges that cannot be ignored. The economy has been suffering for years under sanctions, foreign investments remain limited, and inflation and rising prices are squeezing citizens. Meanwhile, the state requires substantial resources for reconstruction and to offset the losses left by the recent war. Therefore, while Tehran needs to ease economic pressures, it seeks to do so without appearing to make concessions that compromise its standing or influence.
Conversely, policymakers in Washington realize that any agreement lacking clear guarantees could turn into a temporary truce rather than a permanent solution. Hence, negotiations continue with a high degree of caution, as each side tests the other's intentions before moving toward more significant steps.
The fundamental question remains: Can diplomacy end this long conflict? So far, there is no definitive answer. History shows that relations between the United States and Iran have gone through several phases of rapprochement and tension, and that previous agreements did not prevent the return of new crises.
Thus, the current phase looks like a new test of diplomacy's capacity to achieve a genuine breakthrough. Success will depend not only on what is said inside the negotiation rooms, but also on the political, security, and economic developments taking place outside them.
In the end, the biggest challenge may not be signing a new agreement, but rather the ability to sustain it and turn it into lasting stability in a region accustomed to seeing temporary settlements morph into new crises shortly thereafter.
