Tehran shows intense concern for the geography of its influence — the near geography that abuts it in Iraq, and the far, which abuts Israel from Lebanon, in the south. Inside the national borders of the two countries, Iraq and Lebanon, Tehran sets its own frontier: one that overrides the idea of the near or distant neighborhood, of shared interests and social and spiritual commonalities, and even overrides those countries' own internal national interests — all in the service of its regional system of interests.
In Baghdad, once again, the speaker of the Iranian parliament and its chief negotiator, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, reminded the ruling Iraqi political elite of the constants of the relationship between Iraq and Iran — of the nature of what Iran requires of a Baghdad it entered through the gate of weapons, under the loose banner of "resistance." At the outset of a visit that is his most important to Iraq in both its domestic and its external timing, he said that the resistance in Iraq had become an essential component of global power, holding that the Iraqi experience had exceeded the bounds of the two countries to become an influential force at the regional and global levels.
This announcement — of the birth of a new regional order, which Qalibaf proclaimed to the world from Baghdad — had been preceded days earlier by a statement matching his Iraqi remarks in geographic and strategic sensitivity, when he declared, roughly a week ago, that he was in direct contact with Hezbollah fighters on the front lines. And the front lines are, in practice, the operational boundary between Tehran and Tel Aviv, where the two engage directly inside Lebanese territory, far from the will of Lebanon as a state and a people — the people of the south in particular — since October 8, 2023.
From Baghdad to Beirut; from the weapons of the Iraqi armed factions that raise the banner of "resistance" to the weapons of a party that raises the same banner, Tehran persists — through Qalibaf, or Esmail Qaani, or other commanders versed in the geography of Iranian interests — in confining the decision of the two states to the hands of the weapons, rather than the reverse. What it is trying to impose on the Iraqi government is what the Lebanese government already confronts and what Lebanon has been unable to carry out, Iraq will find it impossible to carry out.
For by the substance of Qalibaf's regional order — new and old at once — the priority in Iraq and Lebanon is not the state, nor helping Iraq's political system past its crises, nor easing the catastrophe borne by the people of southern Lebanon, but the continuation of confrontation by invoking the idea of a permanent "resistance."
Iraq is entering the challenge of the coming September 30: the date for the complete withdrawal of American forces and for the factions to surrender their weapons, amid a sharp split within the ruling Iraqi Shiite political house over the utility of those weapons, their slogans, and their role once the last American soldier has left. At that point, a real test begins between the state and what lies beneath it — between weapons that protect the state and weapons that protect the nature of the system.
The scene repeats itself in Lebanon, though its heading now is the anticipated confrontation at the Ali al-Taher position in the Nabatieh governorate, and the Israeli plan to occupy it, which would mean occupying the city of Nabatieh and its surroundings, or destroying them outright. The Lebanese state stands powerless to spare the south and Nabatieh the catastrophe. The Israeli enemy is determined to seize the position, and the Iranians are determined on confrontation, which has led to the failure, or the deliberate frustration, of attempts to hand it over to the Lebanese army.
For the Israeli enemy, this approach failed before, in clearing the areas south of the Litani river of weapons; on the other side there is total Iranian rejection of any withdrawal from Ali al-Taher, and impossible conditions attached to surrendering Hezbollah's weapons.
Meanwhile the authorities in Lebanon try to impose their sovereignty over their own territory while avoiding an internal confrontation — the more so since Israel is not prepared to honor its commitments and withdraw in stages, and Iran is not disposed to accept the party's retreat or any partial relinquishing of its weapons. All of which, once again, confines the decision on the security and stability of the south to the hands of the Iranian negotiator.
Between Qalibaf and the two governments in Baghdad and Beirut lie commitments, deadlines, and borders abutting confrontation, from the Strait of Hormuz to the hill of Ali al-Taher — confrontations in which it is hard to give up weapons, whatever the consequences of holding on to them. In Iraq, where the divisions run through a single house of power and the government carries external commitments, matters may lead to crises of extreme gravity, ones that threaten the edifice of the 2003 system and end in strife and chaos. Lebanon, meanwhile, lies between two risks: the confrontation at Ali al-Taher and what follows it, and an internal confrontation with its own aftermath.
Accordingly, the two governments are convinced of the need to avoid a confrontation that could lead to internal fighting and chaos. And since those holding on to the weapons, and their backer, are not disposed even to maneuver — since Tehran prefers a confrontation at Ali al-Taher to handing the position to the Lebanese army, while the Iraqi factions prefer to conceal their weapons rather than fold them into the state — it is clear that confining weapons to the hands of the state is difficult, while the truth is that the weapons are besieging the decision of the two states.
