Oslo Accords After 33 Years: Neither Alive Nor Dead — What Remains?

FILED - 08 September 2026, Palestinian Territories, Anata: Israeli forces raid the town of Anata in the West Bank. Photo: Jamal Awad/dpa
FILED - 08 September 2026, Palestinian Territories, Anata: Israeli forces raid the town of Anata in the West Bank. Photo: Jamal Awad/dpa
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Oslo Accords After 33 Years: Neither Alive Nor Dead — What Remains?

FILED - 08 September 2026, Palestinian Territories, Anata: Israeli forces raid the town of Anata in the West Bank. Photo: Jamal Awad/dpa
FILED - 08 September 2026, Palestinian Territories, Anata: Israeli forces raid the town of Anata in the West Bank. Photo: Jamal Awad/dpa

Perhaps all that remains of the Oslo Accords, signed 33 years ago between the Palestinians and Israelis, is an authority without real authority in the West Bank, widespread chaos, destruction and bloodshed in the Gaza Strip, and an East Jerusalem resembling West Jerusalem, both under full Israeli control.

All three — the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem — were supposed to constitute the Palestinian state just five years after the agreement was signed in 1993, or so Palestinians believed and hoped at the time.

Yet Oslo’s main problem cannot simply be considered its failure to deliver the hoped-for state. Since it was signed, the Palestinian Authority’s ability to govern has declined, while the territory under its control has shrunk day by day.

The PA’s role has changed considerably. Israeli governments have left it besieged, powerless and nearly bankrupt, facing numerous financial and security problems and countless internal problems affecting it and all Palestinians — in politics, security, public safety, salaries, health, the economy, electricity, water, fuel and the banking system.

Today, 33 years after the agreement, Palestinians find themselves in a central struggle to prevent the liquidation of the Palestinian cause and their displacement from their land. After Oslo, their struggle had been to establish a state.

All the blame can be placed on Oslo, its course and the decision to pursue it, as many Palestinians do. But its other party cannot be overlooked: Israel, which did not sign the agreement for it to succeed. This was precisely what then-Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir had promised: negotiations that would begin but never end, until nothing remained to negotiate over.

Nor can it be overlooked that a large segment of Palestinians themselves did not want the agreement either. Armed factions worked relentlessly to thwart it to the end, using all the power and weapons at their disposal.

Many on both sides regarded it as a dagger in their side and openly said they did not want it. In reality, it gave them neither peace nor security. Yet it has remained alive, refusing to die, even after Hamas launched the Al-Aqsa Flood attack in October 2023, sweeping away many things but not what remained of Oslo.

What is the Oslo agreement?

The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements was signed on Sept. 13, 1993. It provided for the phased withdrawal of Israeli forces from the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the establishment of a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority during a five-year transitional period, culminating in a permanent settlement based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

The agreement spoke of ending “decades of confrontation and conflict” and recognizing each side’s “mutual legitimate and political rights.”

The agreement clearly addressed the transitional period and permanent-status negotiations. The five-year transitional period was to begin with the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. Permanent-status negotiations between the Israeli government and representatives of the Palestinian people were to begin as soon as possible, but no later than the beginning of the third year of the transitional period.

It also stipulated that those negotiations would cover the remaining issues, including Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other matters of common interest.

The agreement also resulted in the establishment of a Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee to address issues requiring coordination, other matters of common interest and disputes.

The Oslo agreement divides the West Bank into Areas A, B and C. Area A includes the main Palestinian population centers and is under Palestinian security and administrative control, comprising 18% of the West Bank. Area B, comprising 21%, is under Palestinian administrative control and Israeli security control. Area C, comprising 61%, is under Israeli security and administrative control.

After October 2023, Israel no longer recognized these divisions.

What happened after Oslo?

A few years after the signing, Israel stopped completing the scheduled withdrawal of its forces. Instead, it repeatedly entered Area A, territory under full Palestinian security jurisdiction, and took measures that disrupted the transitional phase intended to achieve independence.

Israel carried out assassinations and killings, raided Area A, built more settlements and tightened political, security and economic pressure on the PA as though Oslo did not exist, while demanding greater security coordination from the PA under the agreement.

Israelis who opposed Oslo did not formally abolish it. They wanted it in intensive care — neither alive nor dead. Palestinians did not like Oslo either, but struggled to keep it alive even though they repeatedly declared it finished.

The Palestinians could not rid themselves of it because they simply could not maintain the PA without Oslo. That would mean a return to occupation — a thousand steps backward. For the Israelis, declaring themselves free of Oslo would mean dissolving the PA and returning to the occupation of the West Bank, the last outcome they wanted.

In short, everyone despised Oslo, but they wanted it. It continued to constrain them and produce further agreements.

Oslo’s extensions

It can be said that for many years, Palestinians and Israelis found themselves tied to Oslo. In an effort to keep it alive, the Palestinians concluded further agreements with Israel that could be described as extensions of Oslo.

Israel did not abide by any agreement it signed. Instead, it brought the PA to an unprecedented level of weakness after significantly changing its role. The PA entered one of the worst periods in its history, with the territory under its control shrinking, no political or economic horizon, a crippling financial crisis and another security crisis.

The Israeli left-wing group Peace Now has said that the Oslo agreement contributed significantly to increasing the number of settlements and settlers in the Palestinian territories.

Whether this amounted to marking time or moving backward, it was the reality Israel wanted, and it continued until the Al-Aqsa Flood war that began on Oct. 7, 2023.

After the war, everything changed. Israel began what resembled a war against the PA, the Palestinians and the dream of statehood. Israel appeared to want to reverse Oslo altogether and erase it, and no longer wanted the Palestinians or an agreement binding it to them.

Oslo, Netanyahu and Oct. 7

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has made no secret of his opposition to Oslo. Months into the Gaza war, Netanyahu called the Oslo agreement Israel’s great mistake, claiming that “the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza want to destroy Israel. One side says so openly, while the other does so through education and the International Criminal Court.”

Netanyahu’s attack on the PA was not new, but it was the clearest in revealing part of his plan to undermine the authority.

Since Oct. 7, 2023, Israel has begun treating the PA as though it did not exist. Israel escalated in the West Bank, with the army attacking cities, refugee camps and towns and permanently occupying some of them. It killed Palestinians in airstrikes, arrested them and destroyed infrastructure, while settlers were given free rein to kill, attack and seize vast areas by force.

At the same time, Israel advanced a plan to expand existing settlements and establish new ones, linking them through contiguous settlement belts. The plan served to expand settlement activity on the one hand, and to encircle and fragment the West Bank and create a barrier between the West Bank and Israel on the other.

PA remains committed to Oslo’s peaceful approach

After 33 years, what remains of Oslo is an Israel that continues to expand, with greater powers, and a Palestinian Authority with a president, security forces and ministries, but no state and fewer powers — along with more settlers, a devastated Gaza and a Jerusalem under Israeli control.

Yet the PA, now going through one of the worst periods in its history, remains fully committed to the Oslo agreement.

In May, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas said he remained committed to Oslo and subsequent agreements, the Palestine Liberation Organization and its program based on the unity of the Palestinian political system and a single legitimate weapon, as well as reforms and presidential and legislative elections, reaffirming his commitment to a peaceful approach amid a series of bloody wars in the region.

Contrary to what many believe or demand, Abbas told Fatah’s Eighth General Conference in Ramallah in May that inflicting a new Nakba on Gaza, killing and wounding more than 270,000 Palestinians there, making the territory uninhabitable, working to annex the West Bank through laws aimed at stealing land, unleashing settler terrorism in the West Bank, continuing to withhold Palestinian funds, besieging the economy, committing violations against Muslim and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem and attempting to divide Al-Aqsa Mosque required a return to implementing the signed agreements.

These included the Oslo Accords, the Paris Protocol on Economic Relations and the 2023 Aqaba and Sharm el-Sheikh understandings, as well as an end to unilateral measures that violate international law.

“We want the ‘treacherous’ Oslo agreement. We want to preserve it,” Abbas said sarcastically, mocking criticism of the agreement.

Abbas immediately attacked Hamas’s Oct. 7 assault.

“Whatever the assessment of what happened on Oct. 7 — the ‘glorious’ Oct. 7,” he said sarcastically, “things are judged by their outcomes.”

“We were slaughtered, displaced and our country was destroyed because of this act,” he added.

It was as though Abbas wanted to voice what many of his supporters and Fatah members say: “Oslo brought the Palestinians back to their homeland, laid the foundations of the state and brought an airport and a seaport to Gaza, while Oct. 7 destroyed everything and displaced Palestinians abroad.”

Opponents of Abbas and Fatah respond to that argument by asking: “Why is Israel ravaging the West Bank, which did not carry out Oct. 7? And why does Oslo not protect you?”

The confrontation between the two arguments does not appear close to being resolved. History remains the judge between the two experiences, while Israel continues to encroach on the dream of a Palestinian state.



Iraq Refers Oil Smuggling Case to Judiciary as Security Forces Deploy in Jurf al-Sakhar

20 November 2026, Iraq, Jurf Sakhar: Iraqi security forces take up positions in Jurf al-Sakhar, in Babil province, south of Baghdad, during the establishment of a new military command centre in the area, a strategic stronghold of the Iran-backed Kataib Hezbollah militia, as the government moves to strengthen its control over armed groups. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
20 November 2026, Iraq, Jurf Sakhar: Iraqi security forces take up positions in Jurf al-Sakhar, in Babil province, south of Baghdad, during the establishment of a new military command centre in the area, a strategic stronghold of the Iran-backed Kataib Hezbollah militia, as the government moves to strengthen its control over armed groups. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
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Iraq Refers Oil Smuggling Case to Judiciary as Security Forces Deploy in Jurf al-Sakhar

20 November 2026, Iraq, Jurf Sakhar: Iraqi security forces take up positions in Jurf al-Sakhar, in Babil province, south of Baghdad, during the establishment of a new military command centre in the area, a strategic stronghold of the Iran-backed Kataib Hezbollah militia, as the government moves to strengthen its control over armed groups. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
20 November 2026, Iraq, Jurf Sakhar: Iraqi security forces take up positions in Jurf al-Sakhar, in Babil province, south of Baghdad, during the establishment of a new military command centre in the area, a strategic stronghold of the Iran-backed Kataib Hezbollah militia, as the government moves to strengthen its control over armed groups. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa

The Iraqi government announced on Saturday that it had referred an oil smuggling case to the judiciary, with possible arrests of individuals suspected of involvement, as security forces redeployed in Jurf al-Sakhar in northern Babil province under an agreement providing for the gradual withdrawal of Kataib Hezbollah, which has dominated the area for more than a decade.

Government spokesperson Haider al-Aboudi said Saturday that protecting oil pipelines was the government's responsibility and a priority across the country. He noted that security agencies had submitted reports and intelligence to the prime minister concerning suspected smuggling operations and that the case had been referred to the judiciary.

In remarks carried by the Iraqi News Agency (INA), al-Aboudi said the investigations could lead to the arrest of individuals involved and that anyone named in the probe would face judicial accountability. He did not identify any suspects or groups, nor did he disclose details of the smuggling operations under investigation.

According to officials, the government's recent measures in Jurf al-Sakhar have gone beyond replacing the forces deployed in the area. They also include securing oil pipelines and facilities and reorganizing the administration of a territory that has remained largely outside effective government control for years.

Security forces began redeploying in Jurf al-Sakhar on Friday under an agreement calling for the phased withdrawal of Kataib Hezbollah's three brigades from the area.

Where Will Kataib Hezbollah's Forces Go?

Saad Maan, head of Iraq's Security Media Cell, said Saturday that the first battalion of the 45th Brigade had begun withdrawing and that the 72nd and 79th brigades of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) would take over their duties. The troop rotation is expected to be completed in less than a month.

Maan added that Kataib Hezbollah's three brigades would be assigned duties in other areas.

A senior official told Asharq Al-Awsat that the faction had begun redeploying its forces south of al-Qaim in Anbar province. Under the agreement, two battalions would withdraw each day in succession as government security forces moved in, with no obstacles reported so far.

However, the withdrawal was not yet complete. Videos circulating on Saturday showed Kataib Hezbollah members still stationed at the entrance to the area from the al-Fadhiliya side, even as the al-Fadhiliya overpass reopened to civilian traffic after nearly 12 years of closure.

Reporters on the ground also said armed members of the faction remained deployed along dirt roads in the area, obstructing the movement of official security units.

Avoiding a Confrontation

The ongoing arrangements reflect an effort by Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's government to bring the area under the control of official security institutions without triggering a direct confrontation with the armed faction.

Addressing security forces entering Jurf al-Sakhar, al-Zaidi said the approach was based on "containment, not exclusion," stressing that everyone would operate under one flag, one command and one law. He also reiterated his opposition to any weapons outside state control.

Security researcher Fadel Abu Ragheef said al-Zaidi's remarks indicated that the government was not pursuing a confrontation with any faction and that the current arrangements aimed to resolve the situation through troop rotations and adherence to the law.

He noted that Kataib Hezbollah had alternative positions in other areas, as well as positions within PMF brigades, adding that a limited contingent could remain in Jurf al-Sakhar under the agreement.

Rehabilitation and the Return of Displaced Residents

The return of residents to Jurf al-Sakhar remains one of the government's biggest challenges. Thousands of displaced people have been unable to return to their homes since military operations ended with the recapture of the area from ISIS in 2014.

Since then, Jurf al-Sakhar has become a heavily militarized area where Kataib Hezbollah wields considerable influence, amid persistent disputes over land administration and the return of residents.

Al-Aboudi said the command headquarters established in the area was intended to facilitate its full reopening and allow residents to return home.

He added that the government would take Jurf al-Sakhar's particular circumstances into account when preparing the 2027 budget, stressing that it did not want areas of the country to continue giving the impression of instability.

However, the return of residents requires measures beyond replacing military units.

A PMF commander stationed in the Jurf al-Sakhar sector said rehabilitating the area would take approximately one month, including completing the troop rotation and clearing landmines. He described mine clearance as a major undertaking that must be completed before arrangements for the return of displaced residents can begin.

Government plans also include addressing unauthorized housing built along oil pipeline routes.

Al-Zaidi instructed provincial governors to identify, document and address these violations, while ensuring that eligible residents of the affected properties are covered by the Watan housing initiative, which includes a project to provide one million residential plots.

The Interior Ministry has also secured more than five kilometers of oil pipelines.

Security affairs researcher Hussein Allawi said the government's actions were linked to intelligence reports concerning violations involving oil resources, not only in Jurf al-Sakhar but also in other oil-producing provinces.

He added that the government was seeking to bring the sector under federal institutional oversight while addressing the aftermath of the war against ISIS. These efforts include conducting security screenings of displaced residents, clearing remnants of war and reorganizing agricultural land.

Allawi suggested that the command headquarters could eventually evolve from a security body into a broader civilian and administrative structure, with an official appointed to coordinate with local authorities and relevant agencies in neighboring provinces.

A Test of State Authority

The developments come amid disputes between Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq, led by Qais al-Khazali.

Meanwhile, a video circulated on social media showing a group of masked men announcing the formation of a new faction called Asaib al-Jihad and its affiliation with the so-called Resistance Coordination Committee.

The group's identity and affiliations remain unclear, and no independently verified information has established a connection between its emergence and the dispute between the two factions.

However, a security source told Asharq Al-Awsat that the appearance of the new group came amid efforts to reorganize certain armed factions.

The source also spoke of Iranian efforts to establish new armed groups in Iraq, but provided no evidence that could be independently verified.


Taiz Faces Collapse in Essential Services as Houthi Siege Nears Third Month

Closure of the last remaining supply routes into Taiz (Local media)
Closure of the last remaining supply routes into Taiz (Local media)
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Taiz Faces Collapse in Essential Services as Houthi Siege Nears Third Month

Closure of the last remaining supply routes into Taiz (Local media)
Closure of the last remaining supply routes into Taiz (Local media)

Yemen's city of Taiz is approaching its third month under a Houthi-imposed siege, with essential supplies dwindling and food and fuel prices soaring. The crisis has spread beyond markets to hospitals and healthcare services, threatening residents' ability to meet their daily needs.

United Nations data show that deliveries of medicines and water to the city have fallen by as much as 90%, while fuel and cooking gas supplies have dropped by approximately 97%. The sharp declines have resulted from bottlenecks caused by road closures and blocked supply routes, which have severely disrupted the transport of goods and essential materials.

According to the UN Information Centre, these restrictions have driven food prices up by 60% and fuel and cooking gas prices by around 300%, while transportation costs have quadrupled. The increases have placed further strain on household budgets and reduced residents' ability to afford basic necessities.

The siege has affected not only the availability and prices of goods but also the healthcare sector, which faces severe shortages of fuel, surgical supplies and anesthetic medicines, according to Health Cluster data.

Healthcare workers warn that continued supply disruptions threaten emergency services and hinder surgical procedures, the operation of medical equipment and the production of oxygen needed in intensive care units.

Hospitals are facing growing difficulties maintaining their services as medical needs increase and supplies remain limited. The risk of being unable to treat critically ill and injured patients is also rising, particularly those requiring urgent surgery and specialized care.

Limited Supplies

In an effort to ease shortages, the World Health Organization (WHO) delivered 19.6 metric tons of medicines and medical supplies to three health facilities in Taiz, while humanitarian organizations are planning additional support for two hospitals.

However, the crisis extends beyond healthcare facilities inside the city. Reports indicate shortages of medical and surgical supplies at facilities along the front lines, including areas controlled by the de facto authorities.

These conditions are prompting humanitarian organizations to explore alternative aid delivery routes while intensifying negotiations to secure humanitarian access. The aim is to ensure supplies reach hospitals on both sides of the front lines and prevent disruptions to medical services.

The supply bottlenecks have also coincided with a deterioration in municipal services. The closure of roads leading to the waste incinerator has caused garbage to accumulate inside the city, further demonstrating that the impact of blocked access routes extends beyond the movement of goods, fuel and medicines.

Gaps in Trauma Care

Health Cluster data reveal major gaps in trauma treatment and referral services. Funding has been secured for only four of the 35 planned trauma stabilization points, with none funded in Aden or the areas of Lahj province toward which the front lines are advancing.

Medical referral services also lack the necessary funding as burn injuries increase. Many hospitals can provide only first aid, stabilize patients and dress wounds, without the capacity to deliver the specialized care required.

Mental health services, psychosocial support and rehabilitation remain among the weakest components of the healthcare response. This leaves many patients and injured people at risk of interrupted treatment and inadequate comprehensive care, particularly given the limited resources available.

On the epidemiological front, Health Cluster data showed a decline in cholera cases across the five most affected governorates, with suspected cases falling from 638 in epidemiological week 40 to 321 in week 45.

However, the city of Tarim in Wadi Hadramout has reported a concerning development, recording 172 cases of acute diarrhea since week 43.

Of those cases, 78 tested positive using rapid diagnostic tests, while 22 were confirmed through laboratory cultures, amid suspicions of contamination of food and water sources.

Preparations are underway to establish a diarrhea treatment center in the city to contain the outbreak and provide medical care to affected patients. The developments are placing additional pressure on healthcare services and epidemic control efforts.

Funding Shortages

Alongside the worsening humanitarian and health conditions, funding shortages have emerged as one of the main challenges to sustaining relief operations in Yemen, raising concerns about the impact of limited resources on services provided to civilians.

According to humanitarian data, funding for the 32 WHO-supported medical teams is available only through January 2027, raising uncertainty over the future of their services as health and humanitarian needs continue to grow.

The WHO is also finalizing its third request for $2.4 million in funding from the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF).

The request includes support for mobile medical sites and teams, along with supplies proposed by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).


France Coordinates with US on UN Resolution to Fill Post-UNIFIL Vacuum

Indian UN peacekeepers patrol in the village of Mary, in southern Lebanon's Hasbaya district, Monday, Nov. 16, 2026. (AP Photo/Bilal Hussein)
Indian UN peacekeepers patrol in the village of Mary, in southern Lebanon's Hasbaya district, Monday, Nov. 16, 2026. (AP Photo/Bilal Hussein)
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France Coordinates with US on UN Resolution to Fill Post-UNIFIL Vacuum

Indian UN peacekeepers patrol in the village of Mary, in southern Lebanon's Hasbaya district, Monday, Nov. 16, 2026. (AP Photo/Bilal Hussein)
Indian UN peacekeepers patrol in the village of Mary, in southern Lebanon's Hasbaya district, Monday, Nov. 16, 2026. (AP Photo/Bilal Hussein)

French diplomats have begun drafting a resolution for the period following the expiration of the current mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) on December 31, following a Security Council meeting at which members reaffirmed their steadfast commitment to Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Southern Lebanon is entering the final weeks of UNIFIL's mission with no clear indication of who will fill the vacuum left by the departure of the peacekeeping force, first deployed in 1978. Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts are underway in several capitals to develop an alternative acceptable to the United States, Israel and Lebanon.

The 15 Security Council members exchanged views Thursday on the situation in Lebanon, the implementation of Resolution 1701 (2006) and the next steps in light of Resolution 2790 (2025).

They reaffirmed their support for UNIFIL and called on all parties to take all necessary measures to respect the safety and security of UN personnel and premises, as well as the mission's freedom of movement, in accordance with international law. They also urged all sides to refrain from any actions that could endanger peacekeepers.

Council members reiterated that peacekeepers must never be the target of attacks under any circumstances and called on all parties to fully comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law.

They also demanded the full implementation of Resolution 1701, reaffirming their steadfast commitment to Lebanon's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity.

Incorporating the Trilateral Framework

Asharq Al-Awsat has learned that Council members agreed France, which serves as the penholder on Lebanon-related matters at the Security Council, should begin preparing a draft resolution in coordination with the United States.

Washington's position was conveyed by US Ambassador to the United Nations Mike Waltz during his November 15-17 visit to Lebanon, when he met senior Lebanese officials, including President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri.

During the visit, Waltz stressed the need to restore state sovereignty through the Lebanese Armed Forces and called on Hezbollah to disarm voluntarily, arguing that no country can have two armies.

He also discussed proposed updates to a new Security Council resolution that would revise elements of Resolution 1701 (2006), including the possibility of incorporating the Trilateral Framework reached by Lebanon and Israel under US mediation last June.

Waltz insisted that placing all weapons under state control was not optional and described Hezbollah as a cancer that must be eliminated.

French diplomacy is proceeding with considerable caution to avoid a public confrontation, particularly given Israel's opposition to Paris playing its traditional role in helping Lebanese authorities reestablish control over the country's entire territory.

France's approach begins with seeking agreement with Washington on Hezbollah's disarmament and securing a complete Israeli withdrawal from occupied Lebanese territory.

Given the limited time available, the simplest solution would be a short extension of UNIFIL's mandate, an option supported by most Council members.

However, Washington remains firmly opposed to any further extension, raising concerns among other members that a renewal proposal could face a US veto.

President Donald Trump's administration favors a direct security arrangement between Lebanon and Israel that would reduce outside involvement.

Following weeks of fighting that began when Hezbollah launched its offensive on March 2, Washington sponsored the first direct talks between Lebanon and Israel in more than four decades.

Those negotiations produced a framework agreement announced on June 26, establishing a sequence of pilot zones in which the Lebanese Army would deploy to oversee Hezbollah's disarmament and the dismantling of its infrastructure, in exchange for a gradual Israeli redeployment.

The agreement also established a Military Coordination Group comprising Israeli, Lebanese and American officers.

That arrangement differs from the mechanism established under the November 2024 ceasefire, which also included France and UNIFIL.

Stalled Process

The process has since stalled.

Israel accuses the Lebanese Army of failing to remove Hezbollah from the pilot zones, while Lebanon complains that Israeli military operations continue in both occupied and unoccupied areas. Hezbollah, meanwhile, rejects the agreement outright.

Among Washington's most notable proposals is one put forward by Secretary of State Marco Rubio on November 9, suggesting that the new mission could be civilian rather than military.

Observers acknowledge that civilian personnel could perform some of the mission's functions. However, essential responsibilities, including deconfliction and the protection of military observers, would require at least a limited armed presence.

Last June, UN Secretary-General António Guterres presented several options for an international mission to succeed UNIFIL.

The proposals varied in the size and cost of the force but shared several urgent priorities: deploying and protecting military observers, providing deconfliction services, clearing landmines and delivering engineering support.

That same month, France and Italy announced their willingness to participate in a new international coalition to support Lebanon after UNIFIL's withdrawal.

However, neither Paris nor Rome has yet presented a proposal acceptable to the United States, Israel and Lebanon alike, while Washington remains unwilling to deploy American troops to southern Lebanon.

According to an assessment by the International Crisis Group, the Security Council should put forward a credible proposal for a successor force in the form of a conventional UN peacekeeping mission, a model that has enjoyed broad acceptance in southern Lebanon for decades.

The group recommends establishing the mission under terms that make clear it would not simply replicate UNIFIL, but would instead constitute a new force designed to address American concerns.

Efforts to reassure Washington include proposals for a narrowly defined mandate, robust accountability measures, clear performance benchmarks and an approximate timetable for ending the mission.

Its priorities would be limited to military observation, mine clearance, escorting humanitarian aid convoys and facilitating access to isolated areas.

The cost of leaving a vacuum would extend beyond military considerations.

UNIFIL accompanies humanitarian convoys to predominantly Christian towns such as Ain Ebel, Rmeish and Debel, which are separated from the rest of Lebanon by Israeli-occupied territory.

It also helps farmers, residents and journalists gain access to sensitive areas.

Although the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), which has operated under a separate mandate since 1948, can continue deploying its observers, it relies in practice on UNIFIL for security and logistical support.

Humanitarian organizations likewise depend on the peacekeeping mission's real-time information to carry out their work in southern Lebanon.

Under the current timetable, UNIFIL will begin drawing down its positions and withdrawing equipment on January 1, 2027, with no designated successor to assume its responsibilities.