I have no doubt that the Houthi militia is a creation of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and operates under its management, making the strategies of both sides inseparable.
Iran and its supporters deny this connection because they want the group to be perceived as a domestic Yemeni faction fighting within a local conflict. Politically and militarily, the Houthi movement was engineered by the IRGC in the same way as Iraq's Hezbollah and Lebanon's Hezbollah - a reality that remains unchanged by its status as a Yemeni front.
Historically, this tribal faction possessed neither a political project nor military capabilities beyond its native Saada governorate. It lacked any experience in running security apparatuses, government facilities, or even media outlets. Al-Masirah, the Houthis' primary television network, is operated from the southern suburb of Beirut.
The origin dates back to the 1990s, when Iran selected the Houthi movement due to its location on the southern Saudi border. Adopting the exact methodology used with Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran singled out this Yemeni group. Since 1994, Iran began receiving delegations of Houthi students in Qom, forging theological and personal ties with them. By the late 1990s, the Houthis adopted a rhetoric that replicated the Iranian narrative, centered on fighting Jews and America.
The concept of the "Leader of the Revolution", then Hussein al-Houthi, was similarly replicated, elevating his status above official institutions. Following the death of his father, Abdul-Malik was selected as the group's leader, having previously maintained a special relationship with and frequent visits to Iran.
Iran appears to have developed the Houthi movement from a border militant group on the Saudi frontier into a project aimed at governing all of Yemen, capitalizing on the 2011 Arab Spring unrest in the country. A jihad council modeled after that of Hezbollah was established, incorporating a deputy and an assistant from the Lebanese Hezbollah. Through these advisors, military training and logistics were coordinated, according to a study published by the West Point institute.
In 2012, Iran established the Al-Masirah television station in Beirut. It placed the capabilities of Hezbollah at the service of the Houthi movement to come up with legal narratives for international and human rights organizations, as well as to engage with the international media.
The most compelling evidence of Houthi subordination emerged in 2013, when the US Treasury announced that Khalil Yusif Harb had overseen Hezbollah's operations in Yemen and coordinated financial transfers to the group. That same year, the vessel “Jihan” was intercepted carrying Iranian weapons and explosives. While UN investigators noted a lack of definitive proof that the Houthis were the final destination, no other Yemeni faction maintained ties with Iran. The alignment was subsequently confirmed by Iranian lawmaker Alireza Zakani, who declared Sana'a the fourth Arab capital, joining Baghdad, Damascus, and Beirut, to fall under the mantle of the Iranian revolution.
Evidence linking the Houthi movement to Iran has steadily accumulated, culminating in a 2016 Conflict Armament Research report that matched "Qasef-1" drones to Iranian design, manufacturing, and serial numbers. Subsequent military studies, including ones from West Point, proved that the missiles, drone boats, and explosives in the Houthis' possession are Iranian. This indicates a transfer of specialized capabilities that enable them to strike distant targets and threaten shipping beyond Yemen's borders, confirming that the group, much like Lebanon's Hezbollah, is an arm of Iran's Quds Force.
Iran's fingerprints are clearly evident in the current war in Yemen through the utilization of tunnels, fortifications, and mines, demonstrating that it is the true mastermind while the Houthi militia acts merely as its proxy. Politically, the Iranians state that they are responsible for the Houthis, and they have repeatedly told the Saudis that they must negotiate with them in Tehran if they wish to arrange a solution in Yemen.
In August 2018, Revolutionary Guard commander Nasser Shabani declared: “We asked the Yemenis to strike two Saudi oil tankers, and they did.” That same year, the US State Department designated Lebanese Hezbollah military commander Haytham Ali Tabatabai as a wanted individual for overseeing the formation of Hezbollah special forces in Syria and Yemen, while also naming Abdul Reza Shahlai as a Sanaa-based Quds Force commander. Furthermore, the Treasury revealed that tens of millions of dollars are funneled to the Houthis via Iranian intermediaries and exchange networks, establishing the existence of a structured, cross-border financial apparatus.
Following the targeting of navigation in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, Tehran confirmed that closing the strait is part of its strategy. Reuters, citing regional and Iranian sources, reported that commanders from the Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah are present in Yemen to assist in directing maritime attacks, providing targeting data, and identifying vessels. Iran no longer conceals that it arms, directs, and fights alongside the Houthis as part of its strategy in the ongoing conflict.
