Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi rushed to Tehran under a cloak of complete secrecy. Yet in a country like Iraq - no different from most countries in the East - secrets are hard to keep, as it is well known that a secret ceases to be one once more than two people know it. Within hours, the visit that was meant to remain confidential became public knowledge, particularly after Tehran listened to him but sent him back without decisive answers.
Mr. al-Zaidi may have heard encouraging words from the Americans and offered to convey them to the Iranian side. The young prime minister's enthusiasm, along with his inclination, like that of other regional leaders, to reach a peaceful resolution to the conflict, drove him to carry what he had heard to the Iranians. Practiced in their customary art of patient listening - and prone to over-scrutinizing whatever negotiators put forward - they nonetheless gave the mediators and messengers, as usual, responses the other side had no wish to hear, sending them back with answers requiring yet more mediators to unpack and interpret.
The Iraqi mediation - or initiative, or window opening from Washington onto Tehran - may offer a fresh opportunity to avert confrontation. Yet the question never posed to the Iranian leadership is whether Tehran is willing to accept Iraqi mediation when it views Iraq itself as part of the arena of confrontation.
Thus, al-Zaidi may have returned without complete Iranian answers, neither on the external track involving the United States, despite talk of understandings on several points, nor on the internal track concerning the armed factions. It is as though Tehran is deliberately refraining from intervening, leaving al-Zaidi to shoulder responsibility for his own choices, or else is in no rush to reorganize one of its key factions, which serves as the spearhead in any potential confrontation.
First, the impasse between the Iranians and Washington is widening, and even the positive atmosphere occasionally fostered by mediators quickly gives way to disappointment, especially as the Iranians remain convinced that the cost of confrontation is lower than the cost of a settlement, meaning the prospect of war remains the top option ahead of all others.
The second impasse lies in the ongoing dispute between al-Zaidi and certain Iran-backed armed factions, specifically Kataib Hezbollah, the most loyal to and closely tied with Tehran. Yet Iran, it appears, was not concerned with resolving the dispute between components of the Coordination Framework and al-Zaidi, even though it threatens the stability of authority and the political system in Iraq, particularly as rifts within the Shiite framework can no longer be mended through traditional means.
It is clear that certain armed factions, by their very nature, refuse to comply with state demands, just as they refuse to heed the advice of their friends or partners. This obstinacy heightens the likelihood of a clash with the state and its institutions, particularly over the issue of restricting weapons to the state, which has become intensely sensitive for both its proponents and opponents. As the gap between the two sides widens, the capacity or desire for resolution and reconciliation fades, giving way to a growing inclination to seek an alternative solution - one that may prove no less costly than confrontation itself.
Between the visits of al-Zaidi and other Iraqi leaders to Tehran, and the intensive Iranian visits to Iraq, it is clear that since the killing of General Qasem Soleimani, there is no longer an Iranian figure capable of exerting decisive influence over Iraqi authorities or compelling the armed factions to accept compromises. This does not necessarily signify a decline in Iran's role and influence, so much as a loss of effective tactical instruments whose absence has begun to affect the strategic core.
