The more days pass without a final declaration that the US-Israeli-Iranian war has come to an end, the greater the doubts remain about the possibility of renewed rounds of conflict. The current state of “neither war nor peace” places pressure on all parties, while security incidents in the Strait of Hormuz and limited military operations against Iranian targets could accumulate and suddenly erupt, returning the region to square one. This time, the conflict could be even more violent and far-reaching.
Against this backdrop, efforts to find a political solution have gained momentum. One of the most significant was the “Six-Party Meeting” held in Paris on November 10, bringing together the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
The joint statement affirmed support for mediation efforts, the restoration of safe navigation through the Strait of Hormuz in accordance with international law, and the prevention of Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
The importance of this meeting lies in the participating countries’ recognition that Gulf security is a fundamental pillar of any future agreement between the United States and Iran. Equally significant was Saudi Arabia’s support for Qatari mediation and the presence of four European countries, signaling a strong Western diplomatic push to prevent a return to war.
The Six-Party Meeting followed discussions between Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, US President Donald Trump, and Vice President JD Vance, which came after intensive Qatari contacts with Tehran.
Through these communications, Doha announced progress in narrowing differences between the concerned parties, though without revealing any final, comprehensive agreement. This is particularly important given the widening gap between Iranian and American demands, with each side insisting that the other take the initiative, reflecting the deep mistrust and mutual skepticism between them.
Looking again at Saudi Arabia’s participation in the Six-Party Meeting, it is clear that Riyadh maintains channels of communication with all sides and understands that continued disruption of maritime traffic and cross-border attacks threatens both energy security and economic stability in the Gulf and beyond. This places the Kingdom in a position to engage with various parties and exert at least some influence over their positions, helping to bridge differences and bring viewpoints closer together.
Accordingly, Saudi Arabia, in coordination with regional partners, could help formulate arrangements that prioritize Gulf interests and prevent any potential agreement from becoming a limited bilateral understanding whose consequences would be left for Iran’s neighbors to bear.
However, the success of the Saudi role requires clear Iranian commitments to respect the sovereignty of neighboring Arab states, prevent attacks on civilian facilities and maritime routes, and halt support for cells involved in destabilization or espionage on behalf of the Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Parallel to these efforts, in Washington, President Trump has, so far, decided to postpone new military strikes against Iran, giving diplomacy additional time while maintaining the naval blockade on Iranian ports and shipping. This stance affords the US administration greater room for maneuver and reduces pressure for a hasty or poorly conceived settlement that might portray Trump as the “loser,” an image he has consistently sought to avoid. Nor is he likely to grant the Iranian leadership even a symbolic victory. Moreover, Republican losses in midterm elections do not necessarily diminish Trump’s ability to maintain pressure, a reality that Tehran must assess pragmatically rather than through unrealistic hopes or expectations.
On the other hand, Mohsen Rezaei, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, continues to insist that Washington fulfill seven conditions before negotiations resume and before the Strait of Hormuz is reopened. Tehran’s demands include lifting the blockade, easing sanctions, and obtaining guarantees against a renewed outbreak of war.
Washington’s reluctance to accept these conditions stems from concerns that offering economic concessions before resolving the issue of Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile and the future security arrangements in the Strait of Hormuz would amount to rewarding Tehran and encourage even greater intransigence.
This impasse may be resolved through an interim understanding based on simultaneous commitments by Tehran and Washington. Such an arrangement could begin with specific measures to reduce maritime tensions and halt attacks on civilian infrastructure, matched by US steps such as easing certain humanitarian and economic restrictions and conditionally releasing financial resources for the purchase of food, medicine, and other essential goods.
These steps could pave the way for renewed operational cooperation between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), ultimately leading to nuclear negotiations concerning the fate of highly enriched uranium and the future of Iran’s nuclear program as a whole.
Once the negotiating process is moving along the right track, broader issues could be addressed through two parallel channels: A US-Iranian track and a Gulf-Iranian track. The latter is particularly important because of urgent regional concerns, including bilateral relations, militias, and attacks directed against Gulf states.
The Paris Meeting has provided a political framework for supporting a potential settlement between Tehran and Washington. In effect, it represents European and Saudi backing for Qatar’s mediation efforts. However, it is not a magic wand capable of quickly producing a breakthrough.
The success of Qatari mediation ultimately depends on genuine Iranian flexibility and practical intentions for peace, as well as sustained American commitment capable of moving the Gulf out of a period of stagnation that has harmed regional economies and affected the wider world.
