On October 24, Mike Watson wrote an article titled "Realignment and the Realities of the Middle East" in the Washington Free Beacon, opening with the line: "Most diplomats are judged by their ability to stay out of the news," yet, US Ambassador to Türkiye Tom Barrack made headlines recently. In a speech at the Global Security Forum in Doha, he said the US is no longer the guarantor of global security and Middle East. The US is shifting its approach in the Middle East. The old arrangement, under which Americans provided security for oil exports from the region, is being restructured. He added that what is happening is not an abandonment, but it is a message of realignment.
What was said is not new; many have spoken of significant changes in the Middle East taking on a "new" character. In truth, it was not new, yet it was aimed at establishing peace and integration in the Middle East, much as happened in the European region after World War II.
What occurred in our region followed the Kuwait liberation war and the convening of the Madrid Peace Conference, yet the closing years of the 20th century failed to achieve that goal. Instead, with the dawn of the 21st century came a new war against terrorism, of which Arabs and Muslims came to stand accused.
It began with the events of September 11, 2001, in the US, followed by the war in Afghanistan and then the US-led invasion of Iraq. Meanwhile, Middle Eastern fundamentalist veins swelled with the expansion of the "Iranian Revolution" into four Arab capitals - Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and Sanaa - followed by its convergence with all radical groups that conflate religion with the state, and terrorism with "resistance" and "defiance." There was no shortage of terrorists or their ideology, which infiltrated during the regional upheaval of the "Arab Spring," aiming to destabilize the Arab arena at a critical moment when change was imperative.
This shift made construction, development, and modernity a national and pan-Arab goal, alongside which regional stability became essential. This was embodied in the AlUla Declaration at the start of the current decade, when it pushed toward de-escalation, including engagement with Iran, leading to the resumption of diplomatic ties and the cultivation of many friendly relations. Not far removed from this was a current in the region that advocates "resistance and defiance", which had become a cover for subverting the nation-state.
Israel's continued occupation of Arab and Palestinian territories, coupled with a considerable degree of arrogance from the Israeli right that extinguished any remaining glimmer of hope from the Oslo Accords, heavily fueled Iran's ambitions and its networks in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Hamas's October 7, 2023, attack shattered existing balances, escalating matters to the Iranian war as we know it.
Iran has come to control more than one strategic strait—Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab—and paralyzing them brings international trade to a halt, taking the Suez Canal down with it. Combined with the oil factor, this is stripping the Arab region of its strategic advantages. Even more tellingly, it has become clear that the "Trump-style" security umbrella is unprepared to resolve the region's Palestinian question, and its promise of protection is contradicted by the realities of the ongoing war.
The Democrats' victory underscores this trend and reinforces what we noted earlier: "We have no one to rely on but ourselves." It underscores the need for realignment, as President Trump took office with a strategy to withdraw from strategic alliances in Europe and the Gulf unless partners assume full burden-sharing in funding and armaments.
There is no doubt that the beginnings of an Arab realignment are taking shape through the forging of regional alliances, starting with the Saudi-Pakistani agreement, followed by the naval and regional defense pact involving Pakistan and Türkiye, and then the signing of the "Makkah Agreement" between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Türkiye. Meanwhile, Egypt's parliament approved providing all possible support to defend Saudi Arabia.
What this realignment requires is a comprehensive strategy, and a strategy requires objectives. Objectives demand tools, and those tools are insufficient without training in their use and continuous evaluation.
The first objective is to affirm to citizens and the world the right of neighboring Arab states bordering the world's most vital maritime corridors to defend their national projects. Second is to formulate a position anchored in international law to safeguard maritime rights against states and proxies seeking to undermine them. Third, building a Middle East grounded in development and the defense of rights requires engaging neighboring adversaries, namely Israel and Iran, through the prism of shared interests. This was the essence of the AlUla Declaration with respect to Iran, as well as the peace treaties concluded between seven Arab nations and Israel.