The belated Lebanese awakening to demand an extension of the UNIFIL mandate in southern Lebanon seems largely unnecessary. Successive governments over the past two decades bear a significant share of the responsibility for undermining the international force.
An even greater responsibility lies with Hezbollah, which exploited its grip over decision-making institutions to establish its own “South within the South,” particularly south of the Litani River, in the very area of UNIFIL operations. Through collusion and obstruction, it helped portray the force as ineffective and dispensable.
The repeated insistence on adherence to UN Security Council Resolution 1701 is understandable, since the resolution stipulates a full Israeli withdrawal. It is also understandable because it has provided Lebanon with an international umbrella and legal framework against Israeli intransigence and recurring territorial ambitions.
Yet Resolution 1701, important as it is, resembles the international arrangements that preceded it, beginning with the Armistice Agreement and especially the Cairo Agreement of 1969. None of them established a genuine foundation for a sovereign state capable of protecting citizens, their rights, and their dignity. Instead, these arrangements allowed illegal weapons to remain, weakening the state, repeatedly inviting occupation, and ultimately being used against ordinary citizens through intimidation, displacement, and killing.
The realities today, after the twin disasters of the two support wars, cannot be ignored. In the first, Hezbollah proved incapable of responding to the “pager strike” and failed to retaliate after the killing of its leader Hassan Nasrallah, his successor Hashem Safieddine, members of the Jihad Council, and field commanders.
It hurried toward American mediation, authorizing Speaker Nabih Berri to negotiate on its behalf. This led to the November 27, 2024 agreement, which enshrined the scale of the defeat by explicitly calling for the disarmament of all non-state forces throughout Lebanon and limiting weapons to six official entities. In exchange for preserving the lives of those who escaped targeted assassinations, Hezbollah accepted the dismantling of its military, security, financial, and social-state structures.
In the second war, Hezbollah dragged Lebanon into devastating destruction.
The occupation expanded north of the Litani River with the fall of the Beaufort Castle and the Ali al-Taher ridge. More than 58 towns behind the Blue Line were effectively razed, while over one million citizens were forcibly displaced.
What happened in Lebanon reflects broader developments across the region. A new Syria has emerged. From Gaza to Iraq, the so-called “Axis of Resistance” has fractured, and Iran’s regional project has been contained. As journalist Abdulrahman Al-Rashed observed, “by losing Damascus, Tehran also lost Beirut,” leaving Tehran in its weakest position in the regional balance-of-power game with Tel Aviv and Ankara.
Against this backdrop, direct negotiations produced the Framework Agreement, based on the formula of “land for weapons”. In other words, it aims to achieve a dual liberation: liberating Lebanese land from Israeli occupation and liberating Lebanese decision-making from Iranian influence, while moving toward an end to the state of war.
It is worth noting that Lebanon has never formally declared war on Israel since the Armistice Agreement. Despite its shortcomings, born of military defeat, the accord provides for Israeli redeployment beyond the border in exchange for the disarmament of illegal armed groups, thereby eliminating the “security belt” that reflects Israel’s new strategy of forward defense.
Yet beyond proposals to merge the Framework Agreement with Resolution 1701 and discussions about a post-UNIFIL era, the agreement faces three major challenges.
The first comes from Israel, which insists on Hezbollah’s disarmament throughout Lebanon. The danger of its “forward defense” strategy should not be underestimated. This could mean maintaining an occupation zone extending between four and ten kilometers into Lebanese territory. The infrastructure Israel is currently constructing on the ground, linking southern Lebanon to northern Israel, could eventually become the most visible symbol of a lasting Israeli presence.
The second challenge stems from the obstinacy of Hezbollah and its patrons in Tehran, who continue to insist on retaining and rebuilding their weapons while claiming that the “resistance” is regaining strength.
This serves Israeli interests, since Israel recognizes that Hezbollah’s military option has collapsed. The failure of illegal weapons to protect their bearers or their community, their role in inviting occupation, and the historic calamity they have inflicted upon Lebanon’s Shiite community have all become evident.
The third challenge lies in the government’s gray-zone policies. The authorities understand that the continued existence of weapons outside state control threatens the legitimacy of the state itself. They also recognize that even a minimum level of stability cannot be achieved without a genuine transfer of security authority to state institutions and, above all, the restoration of full sovereignty through legitimate state forces alone.
Disarmament is not a matter open to compromise. Nor is the implementation of cabinet decisions that have placed Hezbollah’s military and security activities outside the law, decisions that enjoy the support of the majority of Lebanese as well as Lebanon’s international partners.
Arguments that limiting weapons should come through a broader approach encompassing security, political, social, economic, and developmental considerations effectively sidestep pressing dangers, including mass displacement, expanding poverty, and the ongoing erosion of the country as it increasingly becomes little more than a departure platform for young emigrants.
Such an approach also risks leaving the Framework Agreement only on paper. The formula of “land for weapons”, unavoidable as long as occupation persists, remains in force. Yet the consequences of inaction may be unbearable: displacement could become permanent, investment and reconstruction could remain stalled, and efforts to equip the Lebanese Army could remain suspended.
Under such circumstances, the initiative would effectively be left in Israel’s hands, allowing it to determine the scope and duration of its occupation, thereby threatening the very continuity of the Lebanese state.