Time and again, we feel obliged to return to Lebanon's sterile and closed debate. For decades, and above all since the "war of support," two opposing views have stood face to face, dividing the Lebanese: one holds that the country is saved by Hezbollah's resistance; the other, that it can be saved only by disarming the party and making peace with Israel.
If the first argument flies in the face of reason, logic, and experience, the second has fully saturated and can no longer take another step, to say nothing of the tedium it inflicts on an audience that receives it with a yawn. The debate thereby spins its wheels in the mud, and no higher thought ever grows from floundering in mud. Achieving a real resolution on the ground remains impossible and the state of neither war nor peace between the government and the party drags on. Meanwhile, it is becoming ever clearer that today's Americans, Israelis, and Iranians are not the Americans and Egyptians of 1958 who imposed a compromise on the Lebanese. Unity through reform is likewise an illusion that had been put to the test since the hopeless final days of the Chehabist experiment.
And the wheels continue to spin in the mud, as though they will remain with us until God intervenes. Meanwhile, the country withers, people grow poorer, youths emigrate, land remains occupied and open to further occupation, and hatred tightens its grip on our souls.
The two arguments’ proponents share only one thing: lampooning of the "state" represented by the president, prime minister, and army commander. To the advocates of resistance, these "sellouts" are "authorities of tutelage"; to the advocates of disarmament and peace, they are "cowardly" and "complicit."
This "state" does deserve criticism, and on more than one count, the criticism hits the mark. The deeper question, however, lies elsewhere: not in the temperament and psychological makeup of the politicians, nor even in their personal histories and their unspoken biases. It lies, before anything else, in the doctrine of the Lebanese state: a set of slogans under the themes of "national unity,coexistence," and "no victor, no vanquished." Efforts to give voice to this state and doctrine are condemned to paralysis so long as those slogans are dead, and dead is precisely what they have become.
The first sign of this paralysis, one that tends to go unnoticed, is that the government represents each and every one of the competing parties. This is part of a broader framework of sectarian quotas that runs from the top three leadership positions down to the security agencies, to say nothing of the “spoil-sharing," not only in its old and familiar forms but also in the new ones born of the present division. If it is true that the state's capacity to act in Lebanon rests on the ground where the sects intersect, it is equally true that where no such intersection exists, the very possibility of a state, and with it state efficiency, is extinguished.
This lack reveals itself in several forms. Most Christians have lost all attachment to Lebanese unity, in which they now see nothing but their being dragged into ruinously costly choices in which they had no part. On the other hand, the Shiites - with the exception of courageous individuals and of fleeting, sporadic statements that are not followed through on - have not broken with Hezbollah despite all it has brought down upon them. Within this context, voicing dissent behind closed doors can serve as a release valve preventing the eruption of larger and more organized rage.
These two major sects are reaping the consequences of their transformation into two ethnicities, or two nationalities. The process began with the Maronites, in their confrontation first with the Nasserism of the 1950s and then with the Palestinian resistance from the late 1960s onward. The comparable Sunni attempt, begun with Rafik al-Hariri, was cut short by his assassination, and orphanhood and the search for a father, in place of a decisive choice, remain the surest guide to that community's condition. Hezbollah, for its part, sustained by Iranian and Assadist backing, succeeded in turning the Shiite sect into an ethnicity and making a nation of it, and its success was dazzling.
What stands in the way of the "firm decision," then, is not a technical matter of fearing civil war or a split in the army, though that fear is not to be taken lightly. It is the collision of the "firm decision" with the very doctrine of the state, founded as it is on "no victor, no vanquished." For the triumph of either theory, "resistance" or "disarmament and peace," would leave behind a victor and a vanquished that this doctrine cannot bear, and that "coexistence" cannot bear either.
The passage to a state of the "firm decision" thus runs headlong into the state and its doctrine, which themselves become the root of the problem, just as any discussion of the present situation becomes automatically bound, whether we like it or not, to a discussion of the Lebanese national pact itself. That link may belong to the realm of the "unspoken," which many, each for reasons of their own, prefer to deny. But denial does not cancel the equation whose weight we now run up against, a weight that paralyzes. It is an equation that cuts across the countries of the Levant, though nowhere is it starker than in Lebanon. In Iraq, too, we find a paralysis not very different from Lebanon's.
It may rightly be said that challenging the established maps of our countries is an arduous undertaking, its results far from assured. But, once again, about what has not happened, we can only speculate, never be certain. About what has happened, certainty is possible: the experiment has failed, and so has the "unitary" way of life that divides time in two, one half for war and the other for waiting for it.