The remarks of the Lebanese army commander, and the defense minister's statement backing them, have gone beyond a debate over the military institution's performance. They raise the question of who holds the power of decision over defense and security in Lebanon, and who sets the limits of its implementation.
At stake are the rules of government, and the relationship between the authority that decides and bears political responsibility, and the institution that holds the instruments of force. Are we facing a disagreement over the division of powers, or signs that the system is setting out on a strange new path?
Precision requires distinguishing between the two positions. On November 6, army commander General Rodolphe Haykal affirmed the army's commitment to making the political authority's decisions succeed, but he linked criticism he described as an attempt to tarnish the army's image to a breach of national loyalties. The statement by Defense Minister Michel Menassa on November 10, went further. It held that the government's powers are confined to general defense and security policy, and that issuing orders and instructions is the exclusive right of the command.
While affirming commitment to the political decision, it gave the army's capabilities, its unity, and the protection of civil peace a leading place in setting the conditions of implementation. Here lies the problem: who weighs these considerations, and who decides when they conflict?
The constitution sets the reference point clearly. Article 65 vests executive power in the government and places the armed forces under its authority. It does not merely charge the government with setting general policy; it gives it the power to take the decisions needed to apply that policy, and to oversee the state's civil, military, and security agencies. To confine its role to drawing up directions, while stripping it of the power to follow through on implementation and bind institutions to it, is to reduce an explicit constitutional stipulation.
The president's status as supreme commander of the armed forces does not alter this rule. Article 49 couples that status with the forces' subordination to the government. The presidential title thus creates no military authority parallel to the government, and does not permit its powers to be bypassed in the name of the supreme commander's directives.
That is part of the structure of a parliamentary system that draws its legitimacy from constitutional institutions, not from the standing of individuals or the public's trust in them. But the army's subordination to the government does not turn the ministers into an operations room. The National Defense Law charges the army commander with preparing the institution for its assigned missions, drawing up plans and combat orders, and leading military and security operations when they are entrusted to him.
The distinction between the political decision and the operational order is therefore sound in principle. But the power to choose the means of implementation does not give the command the right to change the political objective or to cancel the mandate. The decisive question remains: is military expertise being used to carry out the decision on the best terms, or is it becoming an authority that decides how binding the decision is?
The command must be frank with the government about its shortfalls in capability, the risks of confrontation, and the possibility of division, and it should propose gradual approaches and alternatives. A responsible decision needs professional knowledge, and the government is obliged to provide the means and to bear the consequences of its choices. But a professional objection is submitted to the competent authority, so that it can review its decision or confirm it. It does not become a veto.
As for proving that actual obstruction has occurred, that requires comparing a specific government decision with what the army was asked to do and what it carried out. Statements are not enough to prove it. Here, the defense minister's responsibility comes into view. Article 66 makes ministers answerable to parliament for their departments and for the government's policy, while Article 15 of the National Defense Law places the ministry's institutions under the minister's authority and makes him responsible for carrying out their missions.
The minister should therefore be the link between political oversight and the military command: conveying the command's assessments to the government and ensuring the government's decisions are carried out. If he adopts a view that places the institution's judgment above its constitutional reference point, a gap opens between those whom parliament holds to account and those who hold the real power of decision.
The question of criticism matters no less than the question of implementation. The command has the right to answer false information and to defend the performance of its soldiers. But linking criticism of it to weak national belonging risks turning a public institution into an authority that hands out certificates of patriotism. Article 13 guarantees freedom of expression within the law, and the army's standing and its sacrifices must not become an immunity from debate and accountability. Nor does objecting to its commander's position amount to attacking the soldiers or belittling their martyrs.
Politically, entrenching this logic could produce a government that bears responsibility without fully commanding implementation, and a military institution drawn into judging the political appropriateness of its own decisions. Political forces might then compete to court the command instead of settling their choices within the institutions. The likely result is a weakened government and a politicized army together, exposing the one institution that unites the country to divisions that a clear chain of authority was supposed to protect it from.
Military interference in politics is nothing new in Lebanon. The Lebanese have known it since the 1960s, and it was followed by the dominance of militias of every kind, which persists. Is Lebanon entering a new phase, one that raises fears of more than one form of military tutelage over certain decisions, if the command is conceded the right to suspend their implementation according to an independent political judgment, and the right to narrow the legitimate space for criticizing it? That fear grows when the civilian authority provides cover for such a course.
What is needed, then, is to settle the question of authority within the government. Protecting the army requires giving it the means it needs, preserving its professionalism, and keeping it out of the contest for power.