In a conversation with a smooth-talking Iranian writer, after reciting the familiar refrain of cursing the Americans, the West, and the Zionists, he told me: "And you in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, what do you want with these Americans? We are brothers to you, and it is better for everyone to drive them out of the region."
I was not surprised by this remark. This narrative expresses the essence of Iranian strategy, and you hear it voiced by military officials, politicians, academics, and commentators. They view the US presence as the obstacle standing in the way of Iran's project to dominate the Gulf and the region.
The Iranians used terrorist operations to drive out the Americans, and they achieved some success. The 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, which killed 241 US servicemen, prompted President Reagan to withdraw US forces, leaving Lebanon an open arena for them, which later paved the way for the rise of their proxy, Hezbollah.
The same thing happened in Iraq. The Americans withdrew following chaos, terrorist operations, and systematic destruction, after which the Iranians extended their control over the Iraqi state.
The exact same pattern applies to Al-Qaeda. Saif al-Adel, the head of the organization, currently resides in Iran.
They tried the same thing with Saudi Arabia, but they failed following the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, which killed 19 Americans and wounded hundreds. The objective was to intimidate the Americans, force them to leave, and therefore sabotage the relationship between Riyadh and Washington. The same scenario repeats itself: the Americans will leave once they suffer harm and the cost of their stay rises. It is a violent strategy, yet an effective one.
All of this is understandable. The Iranians harbor ancient imperial ambitions dressed in religious garb. They deploy propaganda about fighting the Zionists and defending the oppressed, Islam, and the Palestinian cause, while their true goal remains extending their hegemony, which is precisely what happened over the past two decades before their ambitions suffered a setback.
What is striking is that some Gulf voices are going even further than the Iranians themselves following the attacks their countries have faced, calling for actions that would harm the relationship between Washington and the Gulf states. They speak openly about the US having become a burden on the Gulf countries and argue that it must leave!
There are Gulf figures courting the Iranians with such rhetoric, and others among pro-Tehran leftist and Islamist groups who know that undermining the Gulf-US relationship would weaken the Gulf states and leave them exposed to Iranian extortion. And there is a third category influenced by media propaganda echoed even in left-leaning Western outlets, or by the recently emerging right-wing isolationism.
They view the relationship between Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, and US as an old sin that must be corrected. These voices echo that propaganda and are celebrated by pro-Tehran circles because it aligns with Iran's grand strategy.
This does not mean that Washington does not make mistakes for which the Gulf pays the price. Saudi Arabia, for instance, opposed the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and was proven right. It likewise pushed back against President Obama’s rapid withdrawal, and it was right. Similarly, it opposed the recent strike on Iran, favoring diplomacy with it instead, and it was also right. Yet, differences in position are no reason to dismantle a strategic partnership, no matter how eagerly Iran, its proxies, and its sympathizers wish for that outcome.
Europeans strongly disagree with the Trump administration over its stances on Ukraine, Russia, and NATO, yet they recognize the scale of the military might and economic standing of the US as a superpower, which is why their leaders travel to Washington in an effort to influence President Trump. This is also evident among America's allies in Asia. They disagree with the US administration's choices and Trump's reckless statements, yet this does not affect the core of the strategic relationship.
America is like a bull in a china shop; any wrong move can cause serious damage, yet forcing it out of the shop altogether risks even worse harm. Those in the Gulf who push to wreck this relationship are tightening Iran’s noose around their own necks without even realizing it.