The trilateral summit bringing together the leaders of the United States, China, and Russia, held in the Chinese city of Shenzhen on Thursday, November 19, 2026, acquired exceptional significance amid a series of regional and international issues in which the interests of these powers intersect. Chief among them are the war in Ukraine, commercial and technological competition, and the war against Iran and its implications for regional security.
Held on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings, the summit reflected hopes of opening new avenues for understanding among the three powers and testing their ability to leverage overlapping interests to reduce tensions and pave the way for broader political settlements.
Although Iran featured in (President) Trump's remarks, the joint communiqué did not include any explicit understandings regarding the war. The issue may have been discussed behind closed doors, but the publicly released statements neither reveal details nor confirm that any agreement was reached.
The interests and calculations of the three powers regarding the war and Iran’s future remain central to understanding the prospects for a settlement. As a direct party to the conflict, Washington seeks to translate its military and economic pressure into sustainable political and security gains.
Cooperation with Moscow and Beijing could provide an opportunity to increase pressure on Tehran or create conditions for a settlement aligned with US objectives and backed by the guarantees necessary for implementation.
Moscow's calculations differ. Russia may benefit from the continuation of the conflict through higher energy prices and the diversion of US attention toward another front away from Ukraine. At the same time, prolonged war could damage Russia's economic interests in Iran, particularly energy projects and the North-South Transport Corridor, which links Russia to India through Iran and provides access to new markets beyond trade routes affected by Western sanctions.
Russia is also keen to preserve its relations with Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, with whom it shares important interests in energy markets, trade, and investment. Continued escalation in the region is therefore a source of concern. By helping end the conflict, Moscow could protect these interests, strengthen its political role, and potentially use the Iranian file as leverage in negotiations with Washington over Ukraine and Western sanctions.
Beijing, meanwhile, has its own set of calculations. On one hand, it is negatively affected by the continuation of the war, rising energy prices, and disruptions to trade flows through the Gulf, particularly given its extensive economic ties with regional countries.
On the other hand, US preoccupation with the conflict and the expenditure of part of its military capabilities could provide China with greater room for maneuver in its strategic competition with Washington, especially in East Asia.
The redeployment of some US forces to the Middle East, the reduction of military exercises with South Korea, and the possibility of delays in weapons deliveries to Taiwan and Japan could all work to Beijing's advantage.
China also wishes to preserve Iran as an important economic and political partner while maintaining its broad relationships with Gulf countries. Consequently, Beijing may see participation in ending the conflict as an opportunity to expand its political influence in the region and to use its economic leverage over Tehran in negotiations with Washington on other issues, particularly trade and technology.
These overlapping interests among the three powers could therefore create an opening for understandings regarding Iran and potentially extend to other issues such as Ukraine, sanctions, trade, and technology.
If such understandings take shape, they could begin with measures to reduce military escalation with Iran and resume negotiations, eventually leading to a broader political settlement addressing the nuclear program, sanctions, and security guarantees.
Yet agreeing to end the war may prove easier than agreeing on the conditions for ending it and on what each side is prepared to offer to secure a settlement, especially given the differing interests and objectives of the parties involved.
The success of any settlement will remain closely tied to the participation of regional actors, foremost among them Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, in shaping future security arrangements.
This position was underscored in the GCC ministerial statement issued last October. For Gulf states, the priority is not merely ending the conflict but also addressing nuclear and missile threats, curbing regional interference, ensuring freedom of navigation, and upholding state sovereignty in ways that prevent a recurrence of conflict and promote long-term stability. The Makkah Agreement could also contribute to de-escalation efforts and help open the door to broader regional dialogue.
Accordingly, the impact of the Shenzhen summit on the war against Iran will become clearer through whatever understandings and follow-up measures emerge from it and whether they open the path toward a settlement that ends the conflict and contributes to regional stability.
Such stability, however, cannot rest solely on agreements among the major powers. It also requires the active participation of the region's countries in shaping their own security future, as essential partners in achieving peace rather than mere actors affected by its outcomes.