It might be premature to determine the direction that the countries of the Levant are going in. This is particularly true of Syria, but it is also of Lebanon and Iraq. These countries have all been in perpetual freefall, though not in equally apparent measure, and their collapse has toppled the system of ideas and assumptions they were founded on. If it is true that countries need "national myths" that arouse the community’s imagination and speak to its experiences, drawing from a reading of history that prioritizes certain elements over others, then we in the Levent need alternatives that are more convincing, representative, and enduring after our old national myths fell apart.
The national myth of his father's Baathist ideology, which was centered on "unity, freedom, and socialism," “the liberation of Palestine," and "the fight against reactionary forces and imperialism" had collapsed years before Bashar al-Assad's regime fell. As a result, the son's reign was devoid of myths and essentially without purpose; triviality and crime covered up for these weaknesses, as they did all others.
This same Baathist myth was buried in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, and in its place emerged conflicting and obscure shreds that there has never been any serious effort to develop.
The "Two-Year War" left Lebanon’s national myths, both the archaic (our Phoenician past...) and the more recent ones built around trade and finance (Switzerland of the East...), in tatters. Once the war ended, the myth of "resistance" emerged. More divisive and ragged than any of its predecessors, the “resistance” myth is particularly distinguished by its immense capacity for destruction and self-destruction.
During this time, most of these myths were consistently peppered with notions derived from political Islam, imbuing them, and all the countries of the Levant, with overbearing authoritarianism and the sectarian and religious conflicts that come with it. On a much smaller scale, some patriotic groups in these countries have raised well-meaning but lazy slogans stressing that their country comes "first" (Lebanon first, Syria first...). However, these slogans remain just that, slogans. They do not lay the foundations for broad myths and conceptions, and they also risk leading us to the trap of arrogant nationalism and chauvinism that has no basis in the reality of our weak countries. Moreover, experience shows that these slogans often end up reflecting a particular sectarian community in each country.
The fact is that, above all else, the Levant share a history of being subjected to violence that dates back to the establishment of their modern states. In this sense, it could perhaps be wise to bet on the rejection of violence defining the ethos of the process through which national myths are developed. While the violence seen in Syria and Iraq has sprung from coups and military regimes, it sprung from civil war and its sequels in Lebanon. But in both cases, violence leads to outcomes that we have all experienced in the Levant that could be encapsulated by five characteristics:
- Mass suffering as a result of death, repression, displacement, and poverty.
- The proliferation of militias, whether directly (as in Lebanon) or circuitously (as in Syria and Iraq), that flourish at the expense of states, laws, and institutions.
- A county’s domestic politics being beholden to a particular regional axis and its conflicts.
- Living off, albeit by screams, several notions of power and dominance, particularly the "religion" of resisting Israel.
- Building poor relationships with neighbors and the Arab and Western worlds and a dependent relationship with Iran (and for Lebanon, until 2005, with Syria).
This experience (coups, civil wars, resistance, militias...) has corrupted concepts like independence and national unity. Ultimately, everyone, albeit to varying degrees, has suffered the catastrophic outcomes of this experience and been burnt by its flame, as no sect or community could be said to have benefited at this point.
This profound rejection of violence, be it that of military coups or civil wars, urges the adoption of educational systems that should be passed down from generation to generation. This is the point that my colleague Bashar Haydar tried to lay out in his column for the Lebanese newspaper "Nidaa Al Watan," urging post-Assad Syrians to establish "museums that tell the story of every person, family, village, town, and city that has suffered at the hands of the Assad regime. They should set up exhibitions that tell Syrians’ stories of detention, torture, killing, destruction, chemical weapons, and barrel bombs, and establish research centers and university departments that study Syria’s subjugation and collect everything linked to it. They should teach their children the story of this subjugation and how they defeated it in schools, turning visits to the prisons of Saydnaya, Tadmur, and other sites, to bear witness to Syria's pain, into a ritual that shapes their national and humanitarian consciousness."
The defense strategy we need does not entail strong armies, resistant nations, or any other sort of bankrupt nonsense that we have already tried. Rather, it entails reinforcing the notion that we must end the violence and rebuild our societies on a deep inclination toward peace that aspires to a future shaped by the lessons we have learned from the past.
More precise meanings of nationalism, particular to each of the national identities in the Levant, cannot crystalize around this myth alone. However, without it, no meanings or national identities will crystallize.
As for those who wish to continue going around the circles of the "million martyrs" in Algeria or martyrdom on the road to Jerusalem, good for them.
