Regardless of what we think of "Hayat Tahrir al-Sham" leader Ahmad al-Sharaa, it is difficult not to be taken aback by his remarks about war and peace. He has openly stated that he does not want Syria to fight Israel or become embroiled in conflicts because the task of rebuilding his devastated, exhausted, and bankrupt country takes precedence over all else, adding that mandatory military service will be scrapped in the new Syria. Going against the drivel promoted by "national liberation" movements that present “resistance” and “revolution” as a way of life, or something to be worshiped, we heard him announce that the revolution had ended when the tyrant was overthrown and that it would not become the foundation of governance in the country. Revolution is merely an action that societies are forced into by the need to set their country straight, after which life returns to normal.
These would be perfectly ordinary statements if they had been about another country. However, in Syria- a society militarized to the teeth- they could signal a significant shift. Since 1949, Syria's rulers have all been military men, with the exception of the few years when politicians like Shukri al-Quwatli and Nazim al-Qudsi were in power (and even then, the military kept very close tabs on them), making the army the creator of modern Syria, and its destroyer. According to the official narrative that eventually became a popular narrative, soldiers like Yusuf al-Azma, Ibrahim Hananu, Sultan al-Atrash, and Saleh al-Ali, who resisted the French mandate, are the country’s only founding fathers. However, Syrian society cannot be reduced to those figures, nor can its history be reduced to resistance. Moreover, the diverse sectarian and ethnic backgrounds of these figures have been used to support the narrative of an Arab national struggle that unites all- a struggle by which we assess pluralism, not vice versa. Indeed, this singular focus on the military compelled "the doctor" Bashar al-Assad to wrap himself in military uniform when it was decided that he would inherit power, as no man should rule Syria without it.
Of course, Palestine was the ultimate pretext for justifying the need for a military ruler who presides over a militarized society and state. We know that Husni al-Zaim's coup, the first in modern Syrian history, came just one year after the Palestinian Nakba of 1948. Since then, and especially after the Baathist coup of 1963, the country has been far more a combat function- it "stands steadfast,confronts," and "thwarts conspiracies;" “betrayal crumbles under its rocks”- than it has been home to human endeavors, production, exchange, education, and health... Thus, it could be said that Syria's military history has swallowed its civic history just as its emphasis on war has consumed its other dimensions and everything it stands for.
Even more astonishing than Sharaa's statements is the fact that they have not been repudiated. The people of Syria are no longer drawn to the notion of their country being the "beating heart of Arabism" that threatens to liberate Palestine and unify the Arabs. Even more surprising is that these statements were made as Israel occupied additional territory in Syria and continued its assault. It is as though Sharaa has tasked politics and diplomacy with resolving a problem that, as we have just seen for the millionth time, force cannot solve.
It might be fair to speculate that, among other potential outcomes, this militarized Syria could become a thing of the past after having killed scores of Palestinians, Lebanese, Jordanians, and Iraqis, in addition to Syrians, in the name of Palestine and Arabism, riddled the region with arms and militias and carried out assassinations and car bombings in the streets of various cities. Another possibility is that we are about to witness the birth of a new, peaceful Syria that is focused on building itself up and repairing the deep cracks left by the previous regime.
If this hypothesis is correct- a big "if"- we could see Syria adopt the traditional Lebanese approach in which the military answers to civilian authorities, symbolism eclipses the material in the fabric of the military establishment, the use of force is avoided rather than worshiped, and foreign conflicts are resolved through politics and diplomacy. This is an approach that the former Syrian regime and armed militias prevented Lebanon from adopting time after time.
The irony of the insistence we have seen in some quarters on not disarming Hezbollah is that we are importing the Syrian theory as Syria imports the Lebanese theory. Our import of Syria’s theory grew as Hezbollah emerged and became increasingly powerful at the expense of Lebanon’s state and society. 2013, the year Hezbollah began its military intervention in Syria (which became an occupation and an ethnic cleansing campaign soon after) was a critical turning point along this disastrous path. The roles were reversed, with Hezbollah's Lebanese members tasked with militarily torturing Syrian society after the militarized Syrian state had taken on the task of torturing Lebanese society.
However, if the new Syrian experiment succeeds, this import is likely to end because the exporter will have stopped operating. Moreover, the entire region has demonstrated, and continues to demonstrate, reticence to wage a war that few still believe in. Otherwise, something like the "Al-Aqsa Flood" would have paved the way for waves of violence in the Arab world that no "treacherous" regime could have withstood.
The intention is to ensure that Lebanon remains a "jungle of rifles" as Syria announces that it will be destroying its jungle of rifles, from which the others sprang. This will probably be extremely difficult if not impossible.
