Lebanon: Political Reconstruction

The Lebanese are demanding the "reconstruction of what has been destroyed" today; much has been destroyed, and it must be rebuilt. They are raising this demand to friendly and capable countries, both in the Arab region and the world. However, as they rejoice at the collapse of the "old regime" with its axis and resistance, and at the election of a respectable president and prime minister, the Lebanese have not coupled their demand with a political discourse that has the decisiveness needed to serve reconstruction.
As we witness the start of the new president’s term- which, it is hoped, will turn into a new regime- insisting on a different discourse seems to be a necessary prerequisite for reinforcing the reconstruction we seek. Our recent experiences emphasize this need: after Lebanon’s long war (1975-1989), the country underwent a reconstruction process that could be both denounced or praised at length; however, the discourse that prevailed during this period was tainted by a heavy dose of amnesia mixed with self-glorification. This discourse presented Lebanon as a country where history meets cosmopolitanism and where we were building cities for the future that would inevitably be translated into skyscrapers and commercial centers that place Beirut on par with Dubai and Hong Kong, a status “befitting” of the Lebanese. With the oblivion that this discourse entailed, the reason for the destruction that had created the need for reconstruction was never addressed.
The few official references that were made to this reason were Rahbani-esque, presenting the conflict as a fluke, a fleeting exception, or a misunderstanding. This discourse was not isolated from the explosive political alliances that governed the country, at the forefront of which was the power-sharing arrangement between Rafik Hariri, who represented reconstruction (albeit through loans) and Hezbollah, who represented re-destruction through perpetual resistance. For its part, the Assad regime set the boundaries of this arrangement and governed its dynamics, leveraging Lebanon, its peace, and its economy, in its struggle for influence against Israel, leaving reconstruction constantly teetering on edge of the abyss.
Construction and the demolition of what had been built thus came to share a bed: the music that party-goers enjoyed at nightclubs late into the night would be played as gunshots were fired by men who were never asked why they had been shooting, either because they were part of a resistance movement that claimed it had been preparing itself to “liberate Palestine,” or because they were part of a community celebrating a boy of their own who had passed his Brevet exams. Every group, as we know, is part of a sect that can rely on a sectarian leader. Eventually, however, when all the conditions were in place, the gunshots gathered, intensified, and began to nibble away at everything else.
This is a bitter experience that we would do well to avoid repeating, so that we do not find ourselves faced with political and discursive cocktails that, at best, allow for nothing more than fleeting reconstruction. To be stable and durable, then, this reconstruction probably requires political and linguistic reconstruction. Three broad themes can be suggested:
On the one hand, avoiding propaganda that promotes causes like war with Israel and the liberation of Palestine etc... that become pretexts for forming armed groups who are given an exclusive mandate to do everything others are prohibited from doing. Caution and awareness of this costly discursive slide into the abyss are advised. The privileges and exemptions granted to the "cause" were the train that led us toward tolerance of Iran’s influence, Syrian tutelage, the withering of the state, social conflict, and ultimately, the explosion of everything. Mind you, a climate suitable for reconstruction prioritizes only the state and social cohesion, while looking into what Lebanese can do to support Palestinian rights, through the state and without undermining it, comes second.
On the other hand, not singing the praises of Lebanon’s “authenticity” and “message,” and not presenting recent developments as having paved the way toward the realization of this message and authenticity while the actual demand is for a normal state and society. Putting aside the rosy image that the poet Said Akl and others have painted of it, this “authenticity” contains a lot of killing, blood, and revenge. It is much more compatible with life in nature than in a state and society, which is necessarily “modern” but not “authentic.” Nothing could be more perilous than evading, once again, a re-examination of our responsibility for what happened through our “authenticity” “message.” Our “authentic” selves have fought and killed one another with our own hands as petty loyalties overwhelmed us and pushed us to do all the things that turn a country into rubble.
Third, avoiding lies about our history and contradiction in drawing the lessons we want this history to teach us. For example, the Lebanese gained their independence in 1943 without bloodshed, and this is a great achievement, but the glorification of blood and martyrdom does not align with this narrative. They gained their independence with support from the British, decades before their contemporary liberation from the Iranian axis, which was also the result of foreign powers’ actions, and that does not align with our claim to “strength.” Thus, we are weak and cannot solve our problems on our own, just as we cannot rebuild our country ourselves. All of that, in general, calls for adopting an honest and humble view of ourselves and the world that breaks with a culture of hubris and “slights of hand,” and wherein lurks, behind many twists and turns, immense violence.