In light of the immense human and material costs borne by the Palestinians, the ceasefire in Gaza has brought pressing questions back to the fore: Is resolving the problems of "the Palestinian cause" the only necessary gateway to peace and stability in the region?
One objective of the October 7, 2023, operation was to disrupt the dynamics of peace that had been emerging in the region. These dynamics were reflected in Arab states’ political positions in favor of comprehensive peace, as well as discussions of economic and infrastructure projects that go beyond diplomatic and political normalization, such as the economic corridor linking India, the Middle East, and Europe. These shifts unfolded after the "Abraham Accords" were signed between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan in 2020, a historic turning point on the path to a new Middle East.
With the Gaza war, a war against this peace in particular, we saw many parties claim that Arab states’ normalization with Israel had "stripped" Palestinians of their leverage. Accordingly, there is a need to look into whether Palestinians had effectively leveraged Arabs’ boycott of Israel to advance their cause. Let us remember that, for over seven decades, Arab states tied any improvement in relations with Israel to a solution for the Palestinian cause without much effect. Indeed, this boycott did little to halt settlement expansion or make progress toward the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.
As for the argument that normalization and the newly emerging dynamics that could potentially engender similar agreements have marginalized Palestinians and undermined their cause, it overlooks a deeper truth: the Palestinian leadership is largely responsible for the declining prominence of the Palestinian cause. Palestinian factions are responsible for intra-Palestinian divisions, rampant corruption, the absence of a unified vision for a national project, and the lack of workable strategies- whether for peace or war.
The Palestinian leadership has not merely squandered decades of unconditional Arab support. It has also used this support to fuel internal divisions, denying its people the opportunity to capitalize on initiatives that served their interests. Their poor leadership also compelled Arab countries to rethink their priorities and put addressing other regional challenges higher on the agenda: pushing back against the Iranian threat, fostering economic development, and ensuring stability in fragile states.
The great tragedy, today, is the promotion of the idea that the "October 7 attack" proves that sidelining Palestinians destabilizes the region, as though this war actually served the Palestinian people's interests or lessened their supposed marginalization. In reality, putting the blame for this war on the "Abraham Accords" overlooks the fact that Hamas, with Iranian backing, has consistently sought to thwart any peace initiative, regardless of the terms.
Moreover, this claim ignores the fact that the Middle East is unstable for a whole host of reasons, including sectarian conflicts, failed states, and geopolitical rivalries (Saudi-Iranian dynamics, the state of affairs in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, and Libya...). These broader issues would likely perpetuate instability even if the Palestinian issue were resolved; in fact, tying solutions to these problems to the fate of the Palestinian cause would only aggravate them.
There are many indications that the region cannot accept the idea that the Palestinian question must be resolved before other countries’ challenges (economic, security, climate, technology, governance, and the need to build political systems) can be addressed. The "Abraham Accords" have endured, new proposals for a comprehensive peace have been made with US President Donald Trump's return to the White House, Syria’s rhetoric regarding the conflict with Israel has changed following the fall of Assad's regime, and a new equation that subtly entertains the idea of peace has emerged in Lebanon.
These developments expose a failure to understand shifts in public opinion in countries like Lebanon and Syria, which are closely linked to the Palestinian cause. They show that it is simplistic to assume, as many have, that the Arab public is inherently opposed to their governments’ normalization with Israel without a decisive solution for the Palestinian question.
An equally simplistic common assumption is that anything that does fully benefit the Palestinians is absolutely detrimental to their and the Arabs’ interests.
Normalizing with Israel, as we saw in the cases of the UAE and Morocco, has allowed states to further their national interests without forcing them to abandon their support for Palestinian rights. For instance, Morocco secured US recognition of its sovereignty over the Sahara in exchange for its normalization with Israel, a strategic gain for Rabat. The UAE, on the other hand, has leveraged its peace with Israel to reinforce its economic and commercial interests in the Middle East, its technological investments, and its ability to address regional security challenges through its partnerships with Israel.
Abu Dhabi also used its trust-based relationship with Israel to play a leading role in providing humanitarian aid and supporting the resilience of the Palestinian people during the war. Its support includes building field hospitals, establishing water desalination plants, and offering food, medical, and logistical aid in Gaza. Its normalization thus reflects a balance between its national interests and defending the Palestinian cause in practical and effective ways.
To judge peace agreements through the binary of “total peace or the aggravation of instability” is to oversimplify the question. Building peace in a complicated region like ours is a process that entails accumulating achievements that ensure some stability and could eventually lead to comprehensive stability. Furthermore, the assumption that normalization is a static process overlooks these relationships’ long-term potential. These ties could allow Arab states to attain greater influence over Israel, and they could be leveraged in favor of Palestinian rights- if a capable Palestinian leadership can seize the opportunities they are offered.
