There is now a pressing need to understand what Hezbollah truly wants at this stage. Indeed, the military losses and political defeats it has suffered, as well as those of its allies and backers in the region, will be difficult to overturn in the foreseeable future.
What, then, does the party want as the recent ceasefire agreement falters and Israeli violations of it escalate, as we saw most recently with the resumption of targeted assassinations and the strikes on the southern suburbs? On top of that, the Americans and Israelis are explicitly upping the ante of their demands for the disarmament of the party.
Every observer knows that Hezbollah's policies and decisions cannot be separated from Iran’s policies and its regional objectives.
Since its founding, the party has been known for its military discipline and robust command and control. However, it found itself in a difficult position when it denied responsibility for the recent rocket attack on northern Israel - an episode that raises fundamental questions about how decisions are being made within the party. Is its denial merely a political maneuver to contain escalation, or does it signal serious intra-party divisions?
Hezbollah may now be facing unprecedented internal challenges, with different factions diverging on what to do next: some want to keep the fight and others realize that current circumstances dictate a strategic reassessment. Are we looking at fundamental changes that could reshape Hezbollah’s role in Lebanon and the region?
Some hypotheses about what is happening, including some that are internal, have recently become more prominent. Hezbollah is split between two broad wings with divergent assessments of the regional shifts and the role the party should play in the next phase. On one side, the traditional military and security wing remains attached to Hezbollah’s combative identity, and they see the party’s primary mission to be continuing the fight against Israel and building the party’s military power, regardless of political changes in the region.
The other wing recognizes the implications of the geopolitical shifts resulting from the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, the decline of Iranian influence, and the US strikes on the Houthis. Accordingly, it believes that the party must adapt to these developments.
Meanwhile, both hardliners and moderates are aware that the regional environment is no longer what it was a few years ago. They know unconditional Iranian support is no longer guaranteed amid the economic pressures on Tehran and the decline of its regional role. The party is also facing unprecedented challenges from its base. These problems are no longer hidden from view, as the recent war with Israel has had devastating consequences, while reconstruction and aid remain limited.
Regardless of how accurate or reliable we consider the reports about the party's internal dynamics, the majority, especially the moderates, recognize the unprecedented challenges that Iran itself is facing. Chief among them is its loss of a key foothold in Syria and the strikes suffered by its remaining ally in Yemen. Iran has probably been silenced, and its reach has been weakened, if not eliminated altogether.
On top of all that, Iran has no good options for dealing with this hardline US administration that is so strongly aligned with Israel, at least on the broad outlines of their expectations from Tehran. The available choices to Iran have now narrowed to either negotiations that would entail scaling back its nuclear project, or - if they fail - potential American or joint American-Israeli military operations that could destabilize the regime.
The surviving leaders of the party are clearly aware of this state of affairs and a set of potential outcomes. Despite their defiant posture, Hezbollah’s top brass recognizes that its options mirror those of Iran. The consequences for the party will be significant, whether Iran makes changes following negotiations with the Americans, or it has to deal with the aftermath of military action if those negotiations fail.
On the domestic front, the party is constrained by a ceasefire agreement it had reluctantly accepted. This agreement prohibits military operations from or beyond southern Lebanon, and it turns the party’s light and heavy weapons into a major burden that creates resentment. The internal political contentions around this issue will not work in Hezbollah’s favor, especially given the clear and explicit American, international, and regional emphasis on the need for disarmament.
The party now finds itself in a difficult position; it is caught between the demands of its external allies, who may have an interest in calculated escalation, and the pressures of the Lebanese interior. Indeed, the country is reeling from a crippling economic crisis and its people want to avoid another war, particularly in light of Israel’s threats and US insistence that reconstruction and aid will be blocked so long as the party remains armed.
Lebanese citizens have every right to ask what the party wants or does not want, as well as how it intends to confront these developments. The party knows that stalling, its habitual strategy, is no longer viable. Its only option is to choose between new paths, all perilous for its survival as an armed and organized resistance movement that is not under the control of the state.
Can the party adapt and change, abandoning its arms? Or will its internal divisions deepen, potentially making it a more dangerous non-state actor with less internal control, which would have grave consequences for Lebanon?
