It would be reckless, very reckless... to speculate that developments in the Arab region between now and the Arab League summit scheduled for May 17 will follow a logical trajectory!
Anything could happen, as there are no guardrails or constraints between us and the abyss. The most prominent of the many factors behind this state of affairs is Washington’s ambiguous strategy for dealing with Tehran and the Israeli right-wing government’s escalating penetration into the heart of the Levant, where it is "managing" fragmentation, division, and historical distortion. Meanwhile, the broader landscape seems foggy as far as the eye can see, from Lebanon and Jordan to Syria and Iraq.
The timing of the recent developments in Jordan should be read carefully. It would be extremely naive to explain these events in isolation of Benjamin Netanyahu’s plans to reshape Gaza and the West Bank and to force neighboring states to deal with the repercussions for Palestinians. Of course, it would also be naive not to recognize that the Israeli right’s approach to “political Islam,” both Sunni and Shiite, is built on provocation, domination, and exploitation.
It would thus be reasonable to assume that some Islamist movements in Jordan, whose presence cannot be denied, have several reasons to worry:
Chief among their concerns is that the "alternative homeland" project has become a permanent fixture of the Israeli political establishment’s strategy. Indeed, the extreme right is imposing its agenda on Israel’s domestic politics, its American ally, and its Arab neighbors...
Secondly, Hamas’s gamble on October 7, 2023, changed things on the ground, whatever we hear about global sympathy for the innocent martyrs of Gaza. It has strengthened the momentum behind Netanyahu’s effort to swallow the West Bank, starting with Jenin, Tulkarm, and the suburbs of Jerusalem.
Thirdly, the hopes that some Islamists had for the political shift in Syria seem to have been misguided. It has become clear that the "interim leadership" in Damascus is more concerned with practical interests than sentiment, as became clear with Syria’s recent negative stance on Palestinian factions aligned with Iran, which had been a long time coming in truth. It never made sense for Palestinian factions that had grown out of the Muslim Brotherhood to support a regime that demonizes "political Sunnism," equates it with extremism, and uses foreign militias to repress Sunni movements.
Fourthly, Türkiye (the largest regional power presenting itself as a patron of Sunni political Islam across the Levant) has to make complex calculations vis-a-vis the United States, Europe, Russia, and Central Asia. These calculations regarding its Middle East strategy are far from centered on supporting Hamas and similar movements.
That covers Jordan, but what about Syria and Lebanon?
All signs point to a decline in Iran’s influence over developments in Syria and Lebanon. This is both beneficial and troubling.
In theory, Tehran's waning ability to shape affairs in the "arenas" of Syria and Lebanon has given many citizens of both countries a renewed sense of hope; with goodwill from their leaders and the international community, they believe, “reconstruction” might finally begin.
“Reconstruction,” here, encompasses both countries’ infrastructure and societies. It entails a vast effort coupled with broad and profound national compromises between different communities that heal wounds and strengthen the belief in a shared destiny.
Unfortunately, none of this has materialized yet, as the vacuum left by Iran’s setbacks is being rapidly exploited by "Likudist" Israel, which can rely on unwavering US support and take comfort in the accelerating pace of Arab normalization with Israel.
As for Lebanon, some of Israel’s old allies now feel that the defeat of the Resistance Axis opens the door to "another Lebanon" and reshapes the country on their terms and Israel’s.
This has given rise to sharp polarization over key questions: how to disarm Hezbollah, how to rebuild the Lebanese state and its sectarian power-sharing framework, the electoral law, Lebanon’s security and economic architecture, and the country’s "relationship" with Israel, with whom Lebanon shares both land and maritime borders in a region rich in promising natural resources.
As for the transnational communities present in Israel and both Lebanon and Syria, Israel is developing an array of sectarian, religious, and ethnic schemes that could destabilize and destroy its two northern neighbors.
In fact, the Israeli government, which sensible observers believe will probably not abandon its "Nationality Bill" it has passed or the "Greater Israel" project advocated by some of its ministers, is moving forward with its effort to exploit the sensibilities of various communities in Syria and Lebanon, particularly minorities.
For some time now, it has been seeking "de facto partition" by undermining the national cultures of its neighbors, though it continues to hide behind softer terms like "federalism" and "decentralization."
Its engagement with the Kurdish issue, specifically, is by no means new. Now, however, it is using firepower as it awaits clarity from Türkiye’s.
As for the Druze, their situation is becoming increasingly perilous. Israel has waged a war explicitly aimed at erasing their Arab and Islamic identities. Compounding the threat, it is offering financial incentives and arms deals, as well as playing on sectarian sensibilities and fueling incitement online, to shape Druze politics in Syria and Lebanon.
... And then there is Iraq, where the next Arab summit will be held.
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani is a pragmatic figure. He is well aware of the circumstances that brought him to power, as well as the irreconcilability of the "state-building project" and "sectarian militias."
More than that, Al-Sudani is cognizant of Iraq's geographic location, sectarian composition, natural wealth, and, last but not least, the interests of the major global powers in the country.
At this confusing moment regionally and internationally, he is aware that a great deal is expected of Iraq. Like any rational actor, however, he also knows that he does not have much room to maneuver.
Thus, the bitter truth has not changed. Under the umbrella of Washington’s interests, Iraq, and indeed the entire Levant, has become a secondary player in the grand "power struggle" between Israel, Iran, and Türkiye.
