Ignoring the noise and claims surrounding the negotiations, their continuation is a good indicator that both parties are desperate to reach an agreement. The cost of the current lingering crisis is high, and war, if resumed, would be devastating. The Trump administration cannot wage a major war without support, and the Iranians are bleeding daily due to being prevented from selling their oil, despite their propaganda claiming otherwise. The continued blockade will force Tehran into one of two paths: war or further concessions.
What if it turns out that Trump's deal resembles the 2015 Obama deal, which was limited solely to the nuclear file, and sanctions were lifted in exchange?
In my opinion, it is most likely that it will end with a similar agreement, but the situation today is different.
Let's go back and understand what happened during the Obama administration and what drove Tehran to negotiate at that time. Bashar al-Assad's regime was besieged and faltering due to the revolution against it. The Obama administration had announced its intention to punish Assad by imposing a no-fly zone to deter him, following repeated chemical massacres that shocked global public opinion. Closing the skies over the rebellious areas, which were being pounded by barrel bombs, would have led to the downfall of Tehran's ally.
To salvage the situation, and like a bullfighter, Iran waved the red flag: its nuclear program, placing it on the table for negotiation. Obama assessed that the nuclear issue was more important than toppling Assad and engaged in negotiations on a single item: the nuclear issue, concluding his presidency with what became known as the comprehensive agreement.
Historians and politicians differed on the evaluation of that experience. On the one hand, the agreement succeeded in reducing enrichment to a low percentage for ten years, and the enriched uranium was transferred to Russia, thus stripping Tehran of the opportunity to build a nuclear weapon at that time. On the other hand, Iran's gains were not insignificant. Assad survived, almost all sanctions on Iran were lifted, billions in debts were returned to it, its regional proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen were overlooked, and it continued to build its ballistic arsenal.
Obama succeeded in postponing the military nuclear project for a short period, just one decade. The President's team at the time defended the agreement, in response to criticism from Gulf countries, Israel, and the American Republican Party, stating that the deal would build trust with the Iranian regime, foster reformers' inclinations towards transformation and peaceful regional and international engagement, and that the regime's aggressive policies were a result of its besiegement and fear for its existence. The truth is that all countries in the region know their neighbor very well, and Obama's perceptions about changing Tehran's behavior bore no relation to reality.
For years, Trump has criticized Obama's deal and still ridicules it today, vowing not to sign a similar one. However, because a decisive military blow has not been achieved, his options remain limited.
With the absence of victory, both sides are forced to negotiate. The Trump administration and the Tehran regime are both cornered and in need of some agreement. The American president has repeatedly denied that he is compelled to accept a single-issue agreement; the nuclear one, but he may ultimately accept it.
Trump, at least, differs from Obama in that he has tried using military force, is imposing a suffocating blockade, and has achieved some results. Obama was in a different situation; he enjoyed full support from his Democratic party and the backing of the European Union, and he stated that he chose to confront Iran on a chessboard.
Trump refuses to sign a similar version of Obama's deal, fearing it would weaken him politically and electorally, and harm his image and historical legacy.
Therefore, we must examine his options and understand what the minimum acceptable terms for “Trump's camp” are. The first and nuclear-related concession required from Iran is to refrain from or limit the level of enrichment, and to transfer the enriched material - buried underground -abroad. This is essential for any agreement.
Second: Iran to back off from controlling the Strait in any form is a necessity for Washington's allies in the Gulf.
Third: Exempting Israel from any commitment that prevents it from using force against Iran's regional proxies would be a necessity for Tel Aviv. These three projections represent the minimum for any agreement to be considered acceptable, and this outcome is close to the 2015 Obama deal. At that time, the Strait was open, and Israel's hand was free. If the agreement does not include these concessions from Iran, Obama's deal will be considered a better version.
As a result of each side's desire not to appear as the loser, a new reality might be created, based solely on a “disengagement” understanding at this stage. Recent leaks say that Washington is prepared to gradually lift the blockade on Iran's ports, in exchange for Iran removing its presence and mines from the Strait of Hormuz. Iran has confirmed the same narrative, although it stipulated the recovery of $24 billion frozen in foreign banks, which are funds resulting from oil sales. Disengagement would ease tensions, but it might prolong negotiations, taking Iran out from the pressure of the blockade. And the Trump administration cannot end the state of war without a nuclear agreement, which is the bare minimum.
