With the partial formation of Ali Faleh al-Zaidi’s government, the greatest dilemma facing both the man himself and Iraq as a whole is beginning to crystallize. His background as one of Iraq’s leading businessmen, combined with the support of the Coordination Framework, the coalition of Shiite parties, theoretically provides him with a strong opportunity to launch a phase of political restructuring in Iraq and transform the country into a normal state that enjoys full sovereignty and independent decision-making. Such a state would be one in which civilian authority and the rule of law prevail over the conditions that lie at the heart of what is commonly described as a failed state. The objective is legitimate domestically, desirable internationally, and enjoys support among younger generations who have grown weary of the unchecked power of armed groups, regardless of their name.
The opportunities exist in theory, but they are not without constraints and obstacles. This is only natural in a political system shaped over a quarter of a century by foreign occupation, whose consequences and legacies remain deeply embedded in the functioning of institutions, relations among political parties, and generational dynamics even after its formal legal end. Iraq has also experienced extensive Iranian influence, most visibly through the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), which were formed following the 2014 fatwa of “collective jihad.” The PMF played a role in containing the threat posed by ISIS, but they also established security structures parallel to constitutional institutions and official state agencies. Even after being granted legal status under Law No. 40 of 2016, they remain parallel organizations that do not regard themselves as fully subordinate to state authority. Added to this is their ideological character, which links them organically to Iranian influence.
The paradox is that the Coordination Framework parties that nominated Ali Faleh al-Zaidi for prime minister, after both Nouri al-Maliki and Mohammed Shia al-Sudani refused to withdraw their own candidacies, are themselves the key stakeholders in supporting Zaidi’s plan to restructure the Iraqi economy. Such restructuring is viewed as an unavoidable step toward closing avenues of corruption, preparing Iraq to attract investment and, most importantly, ensuring that the state holds a monopoly on the use of force.
Here the central dilemma comes fully into view. Restricting arms to the state requires integrating all forces operating outside government authority into a framework governed by law and the constitution. This would mean revisiting the law governing the PMF and launching a difficult two-track process. The first would involve transferring the weapons held by these organizations to legitimate state security institutions. The second would involve reintegrating members of these ideological organizations into conventional security structures such as the army, police and intelligence services. Some of these proposals have been linked to ideas attributed to David Petraeus, the former US military commander who led American forces in Iraq in 2007 and who now serves as a senior informal adviser at a political consulting institution. Petraeus is also said to have proposed removing the PMF’s ideological leaders and replacing them with professional military commanders known for competence and professionalism.
In practice, both tracks face enormous obstacles. Foremost among them is the belief among PMF leaders that their weapons are weapons of “resistance,” not unlawful arms that spread instability in the country. Surrendering them is not among their priorities. On the contrary, they believe that keeping these weapons outside government control is essential to safeguarding Iraq’s security and supporting their principal ally during this critical period.
This outlook directly conflicts with Zaidi’s broader vision of placing all weapons under state control. It is reinforced by the considerable benefits and influence these groups enjoy throughout Iraq’s state institutions, as well as their political representation in parliament. They possess the capacity to bring down a government or undermine its performance. PMF-aligned factions hold 59 of the 169 parliamentary seats controlled by the Coordination Framework, in addition to commanding nearly 200,000 armed personnel who receive reasonable salaries instead of facing poverty and deprivation. Combined with ideological considerations, these factors make any security confrontation appear tantamount to political suicide and a recipe for a Shiite-on-Shiite civil war, a responsibility that no one can afford to bear.
How should Zaidi proceed? What foundations could give him a chance of succeeding in restructuring Iraq economically, politically and in terms of security?
Restructuring the PMF is the indispensable core of restructuring Iraq’s political system as a whole and transforming it into a normal civilian order governed by the principles of law, transparency, constitutionalism, equality and citizenship. Many Shiite Iraqi politicians recognize that the time has come for the Iraqi state to reclaim its standing, free itself from manifestations of foreign influence and place Iraqi national interests above all other considerations. This recognition constitutes an important asset for Zaidi’s vision.
For that vision to succeed, however, two additional elements are essential. First, US policy must abandon the language of threats and the use of force to dismantle the PMF. If Washington pursues such an approach, the threat itself would become a source of political, moral and popular legitimacy for the PMF rather than weakening its support among Iraqis. The alternative would be a US policy based on incentives and on facilitating the work of Iraqi institutions, particularly by lifting restrictions on Iraq’s banking system and helping implement transparency and financial governance measures. Such policies would in turn help close avenues used to circumvent state laws and relevant international agreements.
The second element concerns the creation of a regional support framework for Zaidi’s government. This would involve moving beyond a model based on grants and aid toward the gradual introduction of major investments in sectors such as oil, electricity, water and agriculture. Such investments could provide opportunities that attract young Iraqis, enabling them to secure their livelihoods and the future of their families without becoming involved in armed organizations. In turn, this would support Zaidi’s vision of restructuring Iraq’s economy and building a normal society.
