Although the US president has repeatedly vowed to destroy Iran, it was the recent remarks by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent that triggered a sharper, more furious reaction from the Iranian leadership. Speaker of Parliament Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, a veteran negotiator and general, expressed outrage and announced that Tehran would draft new strategies to counter these threats. In a strikingly candid and significant address seemingly directed at the Supreme Leader and war-hawk military commanders, Qalibaf warned: "Regardless of our military strength, if our people are hungry and we suffer from financial scarcity and a lack of economic growth, we will not endure."
Following the failure to impose a military solution on Iran, the Treasury Secretary may prove to be Trump's most successful cabinet member and weapon. Bessent holds the keys to financial movement, and his comments have not yet been exhausted by the media. His statements appear to have been drafted in the White House; he did not merely threaten sanctions, but also vowed to topple the Iranian regime. Trump himself has stopped threatening the regime's existence.
The Treasury Secretary's remarks are likely part of a coordinated pressure campaign. While the impact of punitive steps will take a long time to emerge, this does not diminish their significance. Economic pressures were what triggered the first widespread protests in 2009, followed by a wave of demonstrations, ultimately leading to negotiations with the Obama administration.
Furthermore, intensified sanctions have a significant impact on psychological warfare. Although few objections have emerged from within Iran against the leadership's insistence on war, most domestic complaints and criticisms now focus on the livelihood and economic consequences for Iranian society. The first of these was President Masoud Pezeshkian's warning regarding the war's impact on living conditions. Most recently, former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami appeared, criticizing the negotiation policy itself and attacking its rigidity, despite risking accusations regarding his loyalty.
The Treasury Secretary has vowed that the Trump administration will subject Iran to "the greatest coordinated economic isolation in history." The nature of these measures, the timeframe required for them to achieve their objectives, and the participating nations remain unclear. In the absence of specific details, these moves will be viewed as part of a psychological warfare campaign aimed at pressuring the Iranian negotiator into accepting American terms.
On the other hand, the new threat confounds Iranian strategists who had based their negotiations on backing Trump into a corner ahead of the midterm election, hoping for more concessions. In order to preempt the November polls, Iran launched a military campaign against producing Gulf states and shipping lanes, hoping to raise oil prices, and consequently increase energy and living costs in the US, to threaten Trump’s electoral standing.
This leaves us facing two wars: Iran's oil weapon, and now the US economic sanctions weapon. The question is not about the efficacy of the sanctions, as they are undoubtedly capable of harming Tehran; rather, what hangs in the balance is time. How serious is the Trump administration, and how ready is it to adopt this as an actual strategy rather than mere rhetorical threats? Furthermore, does this mean the Trump administration has abandoned its plan to preempt the November elections with a political solution?
The Iranians view the time as their winning leverage, striking every moving target in hopes of driving up American fuel prices and threatening Trump with defeat. When the Treasury Secretary announced the plan to isolate Iran and crush its economy, he may have been signaling that the administration is now prepared to challenge Iran's game of time.
Ten weeks separate us from the elections, and current readings do not suggest that Trump will lose. Oil prices remain below one hundred dollars, yet the remaining time feels like an eternity. Theoretically, time plays in Iran's favor until election day, but after that, the equation will flip against it.
For Trump to continue walking this long tightrope for all this time, he needs to sustain efforts to export large volumes through the straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, which could renew violent military confrontations. Recent military activity has enabled the opening of the Omani corridor for oil tankers, and Saudi Arabia's insistence on taking risks and exporting through the Red Sea is achieving the required political equation.
Why is this required from a Gulf perspective? The reason is clear: the weakness of Trump's negotiators before the Iranians, due to considerations that the oil market could ultimately lead to handing over the Strait of Hormuz to the Iranians and granting their militias a license to operate against regional states. Here, the primary loser of the Iranian game is the Gulf countries.
