In fact, Egypt had been expected to join the Gulf front in confronting Iran and its proxies in Iraq and Yemen. This is, after all, a necessity for Egypt’s own regional balance of power.
Now that Cairo has declared its readiness to participate, we can expect this official Egyptian position to be met with skepticism and criticism from various hostile and doubtful parties: Why did Cairo not take part ten months ago? Is its position linked to the Saudi financial deposit? Or is it merely a verbal pledge?
But Cairo, whether it likes it or not, has become a party to the war. Egypt has been directly targeted by projectiles, and before that had been explicitly threatened by Iran-aligned groups in Yemen and Iraq.
For three years, Egypt has been paying the price for Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea through lost foreign-currency revenues. The cost has exceeded the combined repercussions of the wars in Libya, Sudan and Gaza. According to international estimates, Cairo is losing around $6 billion annually in Suez Canal revenues.
The Egyptian economy also faces its most serious threat from the war’s repercussions for Egyptians working in the Gulf. More than five million Egyptians work in five Gulf states, and their jobs and incomes could be disrupted if the war continues and those countries’ oil and gas exports decline.
Under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Cairo has never been enthusiastic about going to war. But these Gulf wars have placed Egypt on the front line against its will. The challenge goes beyond economic risks and threats to the livelihoods of millions of Egyptians. The emergence of Iran as a dominant power in the Gulf would diminish Egypt’s influence and threaten its national security.
Cairo had previously been an undeclared arena for confrontation between Gulf governments and the Iranian regime following the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power. At the time, Tehran sought, through a series of moves, to support the Brotherhood and strengthen its control over the state.
President Sisi’s declaration of readiness to enter the war sends a clear message to Tehran, which has benefited from divisions among Gulf states and the absence of broader Arab support, leaving the Gulf fragmented and isolated.
As for why Egypt is acting now rather than months ago, there may be understandable considerations behind the timing, including allowing an opportunity for negotiations and reconciliation and avoiding the appearance of joining Washington in a united front against Iran.
Some seek to reduce Cairo’s motives to financial considerations. But the equation goes far beyond that. Iran’s rise would come at Egypt’s expense, and Cairo is acting in defense of its interests, influence and economy. Tehran could once again interfere in Egypt’s internal affairs and seek to destabilize the country, as it has done before.
Egypt is also defending its economic security: losses in Suez Canal revenues resulting from Houthi and Iranian actions amount to around $6 billion annually, or $18 billion over three years of attacks on shipping and vessels avoiding the canal. Beyond the canal’s losses, the war also threatens the livelihoods of millions of Egyptians working in the Gulf.
The final question remains: Will Egyptian participation alter the military balance on the ground? That will depend on the nature and scale of its involvement, which remains to be seen.
Politically, Cairo is sending a message to Iran and the Arab world: it is no longer possible to remain silent in the face of Iran’s war against the Gulf.
